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1 Governance, equity 
and sustainability in 
sub-Saharan Africa
 An introduction to the discourse
Merle Sowman and Rachel Wynberg
Worldwide, natural resources are faced with increasing pressures from globaliza-
tion, growing consumption levels, stark disparities between the rich and the poor 
and contestation for use by different stakeholders (Agardy et al 2005; Turner and 
Fisher 2008; German et al 2010). The consequences of this approach are well-
known: runaway climate change, accelerated biodiversity loss and deforestation, a 
decline in well-being for billions of people and a planet that many describe as being 
at a tipping point of irreversible change (World Health Organization [WHO] 
2005; Rockström et al 2009; Biermann et al 2012; Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2012). These threats have had a severe 
impact on local communities and indigenous people, many of whom are exposed 
to abject poverty and rely on natural resources for food security, income and liveli-
hoods (Fabricius et al 2004; Béné 2008; Nelson 2010; Barrett et al 2011). This is 
especially the case in Africa, where biologically rich forests, drylands, savannahs, 
rivers, lakes and seas underpin the livelihoods of millions of people.
Histories of colonialism, independence and ‘modernization’ have fundamen-
tally changed the way in which natural resources are accessed and used in Africa, 
and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. A growing consensus among scholars and 
development practitioners points to governance as the most significant obstacle 
to enabling sustainable use of these resources and, more widely, securing a devel-
opment path for developing countries that is sustainable and equitable (Ribot 
2004; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2005; Cronkleton et al 
2008; Adger and Jordan 2009; Ratner and Allison 2012). Indeed, governance has 
taken central stage in unfolding debates about the nature and role of the state in 
managing natural resources, the way in which the state interacts with other social 
actors, the evolving systems of rules that shape these actions and the plurality of 
social and legal systems – more especially in rural areas where customary rules 
often still hold strong (Kooiman et al 2005; Treib et al 2007). Governance, at its 
most general level, is about steering and guiding society and the economy through 
collective action to address problems and achieve common goals (Kooiman et al 
2005; Torfing et al 2012). It is a slippery concept with a diversity of definitions and 
understandings. In the natural resource arena, it is thus increasingly interpreted 
in its widest sense as comprising ‘political, institutional, and cultural frameworks 
through which diverse interests in natural and cultural resources are coordinated 
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and controlled’ (Cronkleton et al 2008: 1) with interactions between and across a 
wide diversity of governing actors (Kooiman et al 2005).
What, then, does governance mean in the context of natural resource man-
agement in sub-Saharan Africa, and how can it be configured to best meet the 
needs of the poor, in a way that is both socially just and ecologically sustainable? 
This question underpins the rationale for this book, which seeks to understand the 
nature of governance across a range of natural resource sectors and governance 
approaches. The book builds on a spate of recent books on governance and natu-
ral resources in Africa (e.g. Keeley and Scoones 2003; Fabricius et al 2004; Nelson 
2010; German et al 2010; Ojha et al 2013), but seeks to provide a more holistic, 
interdisciplinary and multisectoral perspective on governance by including case 
studies from a host of natural resource sectors across sub-Saharan Africa, which 
focus on different dimensions and modes of governance.
The intention is to enhance the understanding of governance across diverse nat-
ural resource sectors, in order to learn lessons about the complex interactions and 
institutional arrangements that constitute governance. It is also to provide guid-
ance on the principles, approaches, processes and mechanisms that lead to or miti-
gate against equitable, socially just and environmentally sustainable outcomes.
A key assumption underlying this book is that both social justice and environ-
mental sustainability are desirable societal objectives. Yet, they may not always be 
compatible. Our central thesis is that it is the nature and mode of governance that 
will ultimately determine the extent to which these objectives can be fulfilled and 
where trade-offs need to be negotiated.
Of particular interest are governance modes involving interactions and proc-
esses which work towards outcomes that do not exacerbate the situation of the 
most vulnerable members of society. The chapters of this book thus seek to explore 
the extent to which considerations of justice and sustainability inform governance 
interactions and interventions, as well as the institutional arrangements and deci-
sion processes that determine who gets what, when and how.
Natural resource use in sub-Saharan Africa: Ecology, 
economy and context
The geographies of sub-Saharan Africa – the region’s physical attributes, ecologi-
cal composition, social and economic profile, political economy and history – are 
integrally tied to the governance and use of natural resources in the region. Key 
physical characteristics include an erratic and variable climate, highly erodible 
and often nutrient-poor soil and severely constrained water resources. In southern 
Africa, which is the focus of many of the chapters in this book, most of the region 
receives less than 600 millimetres of rainfall per year, and aridity and drought 
are central features of the landscape (Southern African Development Community 
[SADC] 2008). At the same time, the region is extremely rich in biodiversity, with 
floral species forming the foundation of more than 70 of the major vegetation 
units that are nested within the subcontinent’s six floristically distinct biomes 
(Cowling and Hilton-Taylor 1997). The diversity of terrestrial, freshwater and 
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marine ecosystems includes an array of wildlife, ranging from little-known insects, 
reptiles, birds and amphibians through to the spectacular and somewhat iconic 
group of large mammals that typify the region and which have often been at the 
centre of community-based conservation initiatives.
The importance of these natural resources, especially for the world’s poor, is 
unequivocal. Despite Africa’s rapid urbanization (United Nations Human Settle-
ments Programme 2008; Turok and Parnell 2009), with almost 50 per cent of the 
population now living in cities (Dietz 2011), the use of water, land, crops, forests 
(including non-timber forest products), fisheries and wildlife has been and contin-
ues to be an integral part of the day-to-day lives of millions of African people, gen-
erating substantial food and livelihood benefits (Fabricius et al 2004; German et al 
2010; Nelson 2010). Furthermore, natural resources provide a vital supplement to 
other livelihood activities and are an important safety net in times of environmen-
tal stress or economic crisis, thereby reducing vulnerability and risk (Béné 2003; 
Jul-Larsen 2003; Shackleton and Shackleton 2004).
Natural resources also underpin many African economies, providing the eco-
nomic basis for the region’s expanding agriculture, mining, tourism, forestry and 
fisheries industries. Although less than 25 per cent of southern Africa is consid-
ered arable, at least 70 per cent of the population relies on agriculture for their 
food, income and employment, with crop production contributing 34 per cent of 
southern Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) (SADC 2008). Similarly, inland 
and marine fisheries contribute to the food security of an estimated 200 million 
Africans and the income of over ten million people who engage in production, 
processing and trade (New Partnership for Africa’s Development [NEPAD] 2004; 
Béné and Heck 2005). Forests, although comprising only 3 per cent of GDP in 
southern Africa, which is largely from exotic plantations and commercial indig-
enous timber, also contribute significantly to rural incomes. Over two-thirds of 
the continent’s inhabitants rely on forest products, either for direct subsistence use 
or as a form of cash income (Timko et al 2010). Some studies suggest that contri-
butions from forest products is as high as 40 per cent of the total income for the 
poorest households (Shackleton et al 2011), with the use of natural products for 
medicinal purposes common amongst some 80 per cent of the African population 
(Roe 2008; Payyappallimana 2010).
Natural resources, moreover, frequently go way beyond their utilitarian value, 
remaining deeply embedded in the ways of life and cultural identity of many indig-
enous and local communities (Jentoft 2003; Bernard and Kumalo 2004; Turner 
2004; Sunde et al 2013). Indeed, in some cases, peoples’ need to access resources 
and live off the land are intrinsic not only to the welfare of such communities, but 
also to their cultural survival (Stevens 1997).
This wealth in natural resources is not, however, mirrored by the economic 
profile of the region’s inhabitants. Seventy per cent of the population in south-
ern Africa, for example, live below the internationally recognized poverty line of 
US$2 a day (SADC 2008), while in sub-Saharan Africa some 51 per cent of the 
population live on less than US$1 a day (Chen and Ravallion 2008). While the 
past decade has seen a reduction in poverty levels on the subcontinent and signifi-
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cant economic growth in many African countries, this has been accompanied by 
growing levels of economic inequality. In its 2012 annual report, the prestigious 
African Progress Panel (2012) notes: ‘The deep, persistent and enduring inequali-
ties in evidence across Africa have consequences. They weaken the bonds of trust 
and solidarity that hold societies together. Over the long run, they will undermine 
economic growth, productivity and the development of markets.’
Understanding inequality in Africa, including its historical roots, is an integral 
part of comprehending governance. Colonial interventions in particular had a 
profound influence on economic justice and environmental sustainability, shaping 
rights and access to natural resources and in many cases altering or eradicating 
local systems of governance, including the appropriation of resources from indig-
enous populations (Beinart and McGregor 2003; Hara et al 2009). Colonialism 
also imposed new forms of centralized political authority over access to land and 
natural resources, often undermining local institutions or, in some cases, support-
ing and relying on customary institutions to promote the interests of the colonial 
state and the European settlers (Mamdani 1996; Lemos and Agrawal 2006). As 
Hara et al (2009) remark, this led to a fragmentation of integrated resource sys-
tems, in contrast to customary resource governance approaches and norms that 
coordinated resource use and overlapping claims. Increased centralization also led 
to situations of dual governance, or legal pluralism, with customary and statutory 
systems existing side by side, often in conflict, which is a situation that prevails 
today (Okoth-Ogendo 2008).
The political independence of many African states in the second half of the 
twentieth century reinforced the strategy of state centralization, as states sought 
to consolidate their political authority and drive modernization plans (Nelson 
2010). Declining economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, however, combined 
with the shock of rising petroleum prices and an increase in inflation and pub-
lic debt throughout the world, led to new approaches of global integration and 
trade liberalization and the increased dominance of market forces (Independent 
Commission on Population and Quality of Life 1996). Increased debt in African 
countries formed the setting for the introduction of structural adjustment pro-
grammes, often requiring deep cuts in social spending and a diminished role for 
the state. This was matched by a realization that the state had limited capacity. 
Increasingly, therefore, states began to adopt decentralization strategies to devolve 
natural resource management to the local level.
These decentralization reforms evolved alongside increasing concerns that cen-
tral state agencies had mismanaged natural resources. Despite state claims of own-
ership, a lack of capacity to enforce restrictions on use led to open access situations, 
or the misappropriation of public assets for private benefit (Nelson 2010). Increas-
ing calls were made by environmental and civil society organizations for more 
participatory resource governance systems, which were buoyed by the democ-
ratization of several African states. The 1990s thus witnessed the emergence of 
a range of community-orientated initiatives. Community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM), for example, arose out of a desire ‘to rectify the human 
costs associated with coercive conservation’ and sought ‘to return the stewardship 
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of biodiversity and natural resources to local communities through participation, 
empowerment and decentralization’ (Dressler et al 2010, p. 5). Many of the under-
lying principles of CBNRM were also applied in cooperative or co-management 
arrangements which emerged as a result of concerns about resource management 
and the need for greater involvement of resource users in decision-making. The 
emphasis was on sharing rights and responsibilities between government, resource 
users and other stakeholders in order to achieve sustainable and equitable resource 
governance (Peluso 1992; Borrini-Feyerabend et al 2000; Roe et al 2000).
Despite initial optimism, however, many of these initiatives have seen limited 
benefits for local resource users, with decisions regarding who gains access to land 
and resources, especially high-value resources such as land, wildlife and forests, 
remaining vested in the state (Murombedzi 2001; Murphree 2005; Jones 2010; 
Nelson 2010). A key obstacle to implementing these decentralization and devolu-
tion programmes has been the reluctance of central governments to relinquish 
power over valuable natural resources (Keeley and Scoones 2003; German et 
al 2010; Nelson 2010). Furthermore, the role of customary laws and institutions 
remains unclear and is largely subservient to formal state policies and legislation, 
despite being the de facto governance regime for the majority of Africa’s rural 
poor in local resource allocation and decision-making (Claassens 2011; Wicomb 
and Smith 2011).
New forces are now emerging with completely different sets of dynamics. Since 
the 1990s, increased pressures have been brought to bear on natural resources 
in sub-Saharan Africa from continued trade liberalization, broader global eco-
nomic forces such as globalization and increasing demands for commodities. This 
in turn is exacerbating declines in natural resources and promoting contestation 
over access to and use of resources. In particular, increasing levels of foreign 
direct investment in the region to gain access to agricultural land, forest prod-
ucts and other raw materials, especially from China, India and other emerging 
economies (Cotula et al 2009; Karsenty 2010; Nelson 2010), are undermining the 
environmental resource base upon which many of these economies depend. The 
tendency of countries such as China to offer financial assistance to resource-rich 
African countries, in exchange for guaranteed access to specific strategic resources, 
is threatening governance reforms and commitments to bilateral agreements 
and other voluntary instruments aimed at sustainable use and development of 
resources (Capistrano 2010; Karsenty 2010). Land-grabbing for the purposes of 
growing food crops and agrofuels, among other activities, has emerged as a signifi-
cant threat, with foreign investors targeting smallholders’ land in particular. This 
is especially prevalent in Africa. Of the 46,000,000 hectares that have changed 
hands in 756 verified land deals to date, about half took place in Africa, especially 
in Ethiopia and Mozambique (Land Matrix 2013).
These geo-political and economic processes, as well as the ongoing drive to 
address poverty through short-term economic growth initiatives, have resulted 
in natural resources being threatened by overexploitation, degradation and pol-
lution. This in turn undermines natural resource requirements for current and 
future generations, and has a severe direct impact on the livelihoods of local 
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communities and indigenous peoples, many of whom suffer abject poverty (Fab-
ricius et al 2004; Béné 2008; Brown et al 2008). Communities that are depend-
ent on natural resources are thus bearing the brunt of neoliberal economic forces 
and processes that drive decisions, investments, development approvals and trade 
agreements.
The governance of natural resource use in sub-Saharan 
Africa
Many of these trends have been influenced by the way in which governance has 
been configured. The central question remains: just how can we ensure that new, 
unfolding systems uphold the rights of the poor and entrench ecological sustain-
ability? Chapter 2 of this book presents some theoretical perspectives on govern-
ance, but we now turn to a brief review of the concept of governance, how it has 
evolved over time and how it relates to justice and sustainability.
The notion of governance, despite having wide interpretation, is now a central 
theme in the fields of international relations, development policy, public adminis-
tration and finance, political studies and, more recently, natural resource manage-
ment (Hyden and Court 2002; Kooiman et al 2005; Treib et al 2007; Cronkel-
ton et al 2008; Adger and Jordan 2009; Nelson 2010; Torfing et al 2012). While 
approaches differ, there is a growing consensus among scholars and development 
practitioners that inadequate governance is the most significant obstacle to achiev-
ing sustainable development and the sustainable use of natural resources (Ribot 
2004; UNDP 2005; Cronkleton et al 2008; Adger and Jordan 2009; Ratner and 
Allison 2012).
Young (2005) argues that there is no grand theory of governance, but rather 
various discourses, normative prescriptions and interpretations that enable us 
to better understand governance in all its complexity. Notwithstanding the vari-
ety of narratives on governance theory, the overriding common element among 
them, which distinguishes governance from government and management, is that 
governance is concerned with interactions and processes which occur between a 
diverse group of actors, including non-state actors often with diverging interests, in 
the process of addressing societal issues and creating solutions (Bavinck et al 2005; 
Kooiman et al 2005; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Jentoft 2007; Torfing et al 2012). 
Governance is basically concerned with embracing a wider range of governance 
actors, beyond the state, working in ‘networked configurations’ (Walters 2004) 
with and through a host of private sector, parastatal, customary, voluntary and 
other civil society groupings. Such ‘new governance spaces’ (Taylor 2007) offer 
opportunities for dialogue, deliberation and empowerment among different actors 
(Swyngedouw 2005).
These interactions may or may not be characterized by shared values and visions, 
deliberative processes of policy formulation and implementation, collaborative 
rule-making and enforcement, joint planning and decision-making, mechanisms 
for conflict resolution and the design and operation of institutional arrangements 
to support these governing activities. The intended focus of these interactions is to 
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collectively address societal problems and create solutions (Kooiman et al 2005). 
This interpretation of governance recognizes the enormous value and potential of 
involving a range of different actors in addressing societal issues by bringing new 
knowledge, fresh insights, expertise and a range of perspectives to the deliberations 
and decision-making process.
Governance scholars have also been debating and seeking conceptual clar-
ity on the various ‘modes of governance’ that occur in different contexts and 
across a range of scales (Hyden and Court 2002; Kooiman et al 2005; Swyn-
gedouw 2005; Treib et al 2007). There are many different conceptions and cat-
egorizations of modes of governance in the literature. Most recognize a range of 
governance modes, including hierarchies (state-centric governance), networks or 
co-governance (a constellation of actors in varying partnership arrangements), 
markets (market-based instruments and incentives), voluntarism (non-binding 
agreements and instruments) and self-governance (including customary govern-
ance). Treib et al (2007), although providing a much more nuanced categorization 
than given above, emphasize that these categories should be seen as ideal and not 
actual, as elements of one form of governance may be found in another.
Kooiman et al (2005) propose that these modes of governance operate at differ-
ent levels, or what they refer to as ‘orders of governance’. First-order governance 
is concerned with the day-to-day management that governing actors are engaged 
in to address problems and find solutions. Second-order governance concerns the 
design of the institutions, including rules, required to address problems and serve 
public needs. Third-order governance or meta-governance (Kooiman et al 2005) 
is concerned with the values and principles that guide first- and second-order 
governance. Regardless of the mode of governance, all orders of governance are 
required for effective and legitimate governance (Bavinck et al 2005).
‘Governance’ has also been used by various agencies in a prescriptive way to 
characterize a particular mode of governance that, if adhered to, will lead to a set of 
socially desirable outcomes (UNDP 2002; World Bank 2002; International Union 
for Conservation of Nature [IUCN] 2011). Consequently, several scholars and 
international development agencies have sought to identify a set of universal prin-
ciples which should underpin governance, while others have characterized what 
they consider constitutes ‘good governance’ (Hyden and Court 2002; Weiss 2000; 
World Bank 2002; Graham et al 2003; Greiber et al 2009; Lockwood et al 2010).
However, there are concerns about the appropriateness and value of defining 
such a set of universal principles, given that these are not value-free and are largely 
fashioned according to neoliberal political and economic systems of Western soci-
eties that do not reflect an appreciation of the plurality of socio-legal and cultural 
systems (Parthasarathy 2005; Eberhard 2008; Davis and Ruddle 2012). For exam-
ple, many international agencies promote ‘market efficiencies’ and ‘adherence to 
the rule of law’ as desirable outcomes, yet these may have a negative impact on 
local livelihoods and customary practices. Davis and Ruddle (2012) in particu-
lar present a harsh critique of the rhetoric surrounding new resource governance 
alternatives, or in Swyngedouw’s (2005, p. 251) terms ‘governance-beyond-the-
state’, arguing that in reality, it simply advances neoliberal prescriptions about 
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private ownership and rarely reflects an understanding of conditions on the 
ground.
In a similar vein, various scholars (Bourdieu 2005; Brand 2005; Swyngedouw 
2005; Ratner and Allison 2012; Torfing et al 2012) note that the governance dis-
course fails to address the complex histories of domination and power relations 
which exist among actors, as well as the broader international drivers and political 
frameworks within which deliberations and interventions take place. Opening up 
new governance spaces may promote greater engagement from non-state actors, 
but it also provides opportunities for powerful political and economic actors to 
impose their agendas and influence. Swyngedouw (2005) argues that these new 
governing processes are questionable in terms of ‘democratic content’, as there 
are no generally agreed upon principles for, and rules of, engagement. While gov-
ernance theorists recognize the inevitability of conflict in these new governance 
spaces (Kooiman et al 2005; Swyngedouw 2005; Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007), 
the dominant narratives emerging in the literature support a normative view of 
governance as a space of interaction, collaboration, deliberation and problem 
solving.
In reality, however, and as the chapters in this book attest, governance in 
sub-Saharan Africa does not fall neatly into any of these categories, but instead 
embraces properties of several of these idealized modes. Our intention, therefore, 
is not to try to define or categorize governance, but rather to explore govern-
ance in all its diversity and complexity, with a view to better understanding which 
modes of governance, or aspects of a particular mode of governance, offer promise 
for promoting justice and environmental sustainability.
Inequality and justice
Much like governance, the concept of justice is a vigorous and ongoing debate, 
and there is no universally accepted definition. However, there seems to be broad 
agreement that justice focuses on fairness and equity. In essence, justice, fairness 
and equity are concerned with fair treatment or due reward and the equitable dis-
tribution of ‘things’ (Dobson 1998; Maiese, 2003; Schroeder and Pisupati 2010). 
In general terms, philosophers have identified five categories of justice. As Table 
1.1 elucidates, these include justice in exchange, distributive justice, procedural 
justice, restorative or corrective justice and retributive justice.
The notion of an environmental justice that encompasses elements of the above 
‘justices’ is growing in importance in the environmental management and sus-
tainable development literature, as scholars examine how environmental impacts 
– ‘goods’ and ‘bads’– are distributed among citizen groups and the processes 
informing such decisions. In the context of natural resource governance in sub-
Saharan Africa, all these categories of justice are relevant.
Despite broad agreement on the basic meaning of justice, conceptions and defi-
nitions of justice are not fixed by some natural law, but are always contested and in 
flux. Cook and Hegtvedt (1983), for example, argue that justice should be viewed 
as both strategic and normative, emerging from ‘the process of people interacting 
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. . . and attempting to negotiate some agreement or compromise over what will be 
accepted as just and fair’ (Sampson 1981, p. 11). In reality, different perspectives, 
frames of reference and socio-cultural contexts will influence whether people see 
processes and decisions as fair or unfair.
As Sen (2009) argues, given the impossibility of achieving consensus on what 
justice is, and the difficulties of ascertaining whether justice has been achieved or 
not, it may well be more prudent to focus effort on reducing injustice – a condition 
which is much easier to discern and agree upon.
Evolving from these various debates and interpretations, justice is now a key 
principle in the natural resource governance lexicon, and is incorporated into 
many multilateral and bilateral agreements dealing with environmental issues 
broadly, and natural resource management in particular. The Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD), for example, commits its 193 signatories to the fair and equi-
table sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge, a commitment now articulated in its Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization. Several other provisions of the CBD include strong recognition 
of indigenous peoples and traditional knowledge holders. Justice is thus central 
to the CBD, both between generations and between the providers and users of 
biological resources. Schroeder and Pisupati (2010) consider the incorporation of 
justice principles in the CBD to be a ‘breakthrough in international politics, which 
Table 1.1 Categories of justice
Categories of justice Definition 
Justice in exchange Establishes the fairness and equity of a transaction between parties 
and concerns the mutually beneficial exchange of things – giving 
one thing and receiving what is due in return. Such exchanges must 
be voluntary and all parties must consent to the exchange, and be 
competent to do so.
Distributive justice Regulates the fair allocation of existing, scarce resources 
among qualifying recipients, as well as the allocation of rights, 





Is concerned with righting the wrongs that were brought on 
another. This could be determined through court decisions on 
just remedies or by administrative actions and receipt of just 
compensation.
Retributive justice Establishes the nature of punishment that would be appropriate for 
a given crime or whether the punishment allocated is fair in terms 
of the crime committed.
Procedural justice Is concerned with fair procedures and fair practices, as well as 
perceived fairness in reaching an agreement or making a decision, 
as well as the more informal need for honesty, transparency and 
respect in decision-making processes.
Sources: Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Dobson 1998; Floyd and Johnson 2002; Whiteman and Mamen 
2002; Greiber et al 2009; Schroeder and Pisupati 2010
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puts common concerns for humankind and their ethical resolution at the forefront 
of international negotiations’.
Despite the adoption of the CBD and a range of other binding and guideline 
agreements, such as the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, in the natural resource policy rhetoric of most countries, mechanisms for 
making them operational in a manner that achieves both justice and sustainabil-
ity are proving difficult to achieve in practice (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Nelson 
2010; Ojha et al 2013). For example, balancing the pressures for economic growth 
against calls for the expansion of conservation areas presents an enormous chal-
lenge for those concerned with governance for justice, especially when this involves 
a loss of access to customary land and resources. Yet, as the next section explains, it 
is vital that steps be taken to redress the environmental crisis that faces Africa.
Environmental sustainability
It is now widely acknowledged that humans are transforming the planet in ways 
which could undermine development goals and poverty alleviation (Griggs et al 
2013). As Rockström et al (2009) remark, the earth has entered a new epoch, 
the Anthropocene, in which humans constitute the dominant driver of change 
to Earth systems – the atmosphere, oceans, forests, waterways, biodiversity and 
biogeochemical cycles – with deleterious or even catastrophic impacts on human 
well-being. Natural resources are fundamental to food security, poverty alleviation 
and socio-economic development, but the levels of resource exploitation and the 
scale of infrastructural development, as well as the quality of economic growth, are 
resulting in overexploitation, habitat destruction and the loss of ecosystem services 
(Agardy et al 2005; Ojha et al 2013).
The findings of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005) provide a 
sobering view of the state of the earth’s resources and ecosystem health. Despite 
gains in human well-being in some areas, the findings indicate that these gains 
have resulted in a significant and rapid transformation of ecosystems, a substantial 
degradation of ecosystem services and an exacerbation of poverty for some groups 
(MEA 2005). Predictions are that the degradation of ecosystems could grow sig-
nificantly worse in the first half of the twenty-first century unless these trends are 
reversed (MEA 2005). Similarly, widespread evidence demonstrates the decline 
in biodiversity the world over: a quarter of the world’s plants are threatened with 
extinction; the abundance of vertebrate species has fallen by a third over the past 
30 years; forests, rivers and other ecosystems continue to fragment and degrade 
and there is sustained erosion of crop and livestock genetic diversity in agricultural 
systems (CBD 2010).
Many of these trends are mirrored in sub-Saharan Africa, with the most sig-
nificant threats emerging from habitat loss as a result of land transformation for 
uses such as agriculture, mining and the expansion of human settlements. Indeed, 
in many instances there is even greater cause for concern in the region. Rates of 
deforestation, for example, are twice the global average, resulting in the loss of 
more than 4,000,000 hectares of forest per annum and associated fauna and flora 
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(United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] 2009). Wildlife populations 
are similarly affected by habitat transformation, with cattle grazing, management 
and enforcement problems, poaching and conflict between humans and animals 
playing a significant role in species declines.
Notwithstanding the widespread recognition of these environmental problems, 
and decades of work at different levels to resolve them, only limited successes have 
been reported (CBD 2010). In a similar vein, notwithstanding extensive endorse-
ment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which include eradicat-
ing extreme poverty and hunger, promoting gender equality and empowering 
women, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partner-
ship for development – there is still a considerable way to go to attain the MDG 
targets (Africa Progress Panel 2012). These multiple failures are due in part to 
the intricate governance challenges of managing natural resources. According to 
Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009), these are ‘wicked problems’, in that they cannot 
be remedied or resolved through positivistic science-based methods or by conven-
tional resource management approaches. A range of dimensions needs to be taken 
into account in their redress – social, cultural, economic, ecological, physical, insti-
tutional and political – across a range of scales, from local to global.
With these complexities in mind, an increasing and rapidly evolving body of 
literature is pointing towards the importance of developing governance systems 
which bring together approaches in ways that recognize the diverse, complex, 
dynamic, adaptive and unpredictable nature of these so-called social-ecological 
systems (e.g. Holling 2001; Berkes et al 2003; Folke et al 2005; Kooiman et al 
2005; Folke 2006; Jentoft 2007). Folke (2006, p. 260) observes incisively that eco-
systems are typically treated as a ‘black box’ in the social science literature, with 
‘the assumption that if the social system performs adaptatively or is well organized 
institutionally it will also manage the environmental resource base in a sustainable 
fashion’. Similarly, an undue focus on ecological principles as a basis for decision-
making on sustainability has led to ‘narrow and wrong conclusions’ (Folke 2006, 
p. 260). Adopting conventional resource management approaches to deal with 
complex social-ecological systems presents problems due to their diverse biological 
or physical characteristics, political histories and socio-economic contexts, as well 
as the plurality of legal systems used to regulate use and management (Berkes et al 
2001, 2003; Garcia et al 2008; McConney and Charles 2009; Ribot 2010). Adap-
tive goverance is thus increasingly considered to provide a more nuanced and 
holistic approach to understanding and managing these complex natural resource 
systems (Berkes et al 2003; Symes 2006; Armitage et al 2008).
An important gap in the literature concerns the integration of justice into this 
thinking. Quite clearly, environmental sustainability and justice are integrally 
woven together, but this is not necessarily a happy marriage. Concerns have been 
raised in particular about the uncritical application of the normative concepts of 
sustainability and justice at the local level (Claassens and Cousins 2008; Greiber 
et al 2009; Fraser 2010). In the context of Africa, a continent struggling with 
food insecurity, poverty, habitat degradation and natural resource decline, a key 
conundrum in determining what constitutes justice is how to reconcile local food 
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and livelihood priorities with global and national environmental priorities. How, 
it is asked, can local development needs be balanced with the need to conserve 
‘public goods’ which serve the broader interests of the public at large, the nation 
as a whole and/or the international community?
It is of increasing concern that global and national normative discourses on 
either conservation or economic growth may take precedence over values and 
needs at the local level. While there has long been talk of finding win-win solutions 
to environment-development conflicts, Brown (2009) argues that tackling trade-
offs across competing interests, scales and sectors, as well as long- and short-term 
timescales, is where our attention should now be focused. ‘Lack of attention to los-
ers has undermined human welfare, and ultimately the losers have been the poor, 
the vulnerable and the powerless’ (O’Brien and Leichenko 2003, p. 47). It is at 
this interface – between balancing the demands of equity and social justice against 
concerns for environmental sustainability – that choices and decisions need to be 
made.
Overview of chapters
The intention of this book is to begin to shed light on these issues, by exploring 
the interplay between governance, justice and sustainability in a range of natural 
resource sectors. The book comprises 16 chapters, 12 of them case studies recount-
ing experiences in the forest, wildlife, fisheries, conservation, mining and water 
sectors of diverse countries: Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa, Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Cameroon.
Following this introduction, the book begins with an overview of selected theo-
retical deliberations on natural resource governance in Chapter 2. Here, Kabiri 
Ngeta notes the absence of a common understanding of governance and pro-
vides an overview of some of the conceptual underpinnings on which such an 
understanding could be based. He offers a series of building blocks to help analyse 
governance and its constituent elements. With a focus on Africa, Ngeta identifies 
possible modes of governance and argues that these should be conceptualized as 
interactive rather than oppositional. He further advises a focus on the effective-
ness of governance, based on the stated objectives and outcomes of governance, 
such as equity and environmental sustainability, rather than on good governance, 
which may be evaluated quite differently by different actors, depending on their 
world views.
As Chapter 3 demonstrates, however, the effectiveness of governance is as much 
about scale as it is about values, including the uncritical application of interna-
tional sustainability and conservation discourses and norms at the local level. 
Using the example of a World Heritage Site – the iSimangaliso Wetland Park 
in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa – Melissa Hansen, Vasna Ramasar and Kent 
Buchanan describe how the internationally driven narratives of biodiversity con-
servation, growth-led economic development and public participation have influ-
enced policy rhetoric at national level and management actions at local level. The 
case study illustrates how iSimangaliso’s status as a site of ecological world heritage 
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raises it above the level of the global conservation discourse – or, as the authors 
describe, ‘above the level of the local territory and often beyond the decision-
making authority of local people’ – raising questions about who should bear the 
costs of the park’s designation.
External influences of the global conservation agenda have also had negative 
impacts in Madagsacar, combined with pressures from foreign investors and 
international agencies such as the World Bank. In Chapter 4, Barry Ferguson, 
Charlie Gardner, Mijasoa Andriamarovololona, Tim Healy, Frank Muttenzer, 
Shirley Smith, Neal Hockley and Mathilde Gingembre explore the impacts of 
policy reforms across the agriculture, mining, forest and conservation sectors on 
justice in that country. Despite the diversity of these sectors, all share flaws in the 
conception, design and implementation of policy, largely due to the asymmetries 
between powerful economic and political actors, and local communities that often 
lack the capacity to make meaningful contributions to these processes. Decades of 
well-intentioned environmental governance reforms have thus failed to protect the 
rights of Malagasy communities effectively.
Power relations are also a central theme of Chapter 5, which explores two case 
studies in West Africa: the mining sector in Sierra Leone and the forestry sector in 
Cameroon. Marlène Buchy and Roy Maconachie draw upon the concept of the 
three-dimensional ‘power cube’ – visible, hidden and invisible – to emphasize the 
importance of taking unequal power relations into account in decentralized natu-
ral resource management. Community participation, they argue, must consider 
the web of powers that exists, as well as prevalent social structures and norms, 
ethnicity, gender, histories and the relevant laws and management institutions.
The complexities of CBNRM are elaborated in the next three chapters. Clare 
Gupta, in Chapter 6, provides a critical analysis of CBNRM in the Chobe Enclave, 
Botswana, and argues that the CBNRM model in that country is flawed, has failed 
to generate the collective action required for such models to work, is not down-
wardly accountable and is in need of revision to make it more appropriate to local 
realities. Assumptions about resource tenure, market access, cultural plasticity and 
social organization, she contends, are seldom met, and despite 16 years of project 
efforts, villagers still associate wildlife with the decline of agricultural livelihoods. 
Residents are not dependent on wildlife-related incomes and instead rely strongly 
on social security and remittances from the highly centralized welfare state. State-
led mechanisms thus play a major role in ameliorating human-wildlife conflicts in 
this study.
In Chapter 7, Art Hoole explains the dichotomies of state- and community-led 
conservation for a very different situation in Namibia, long held up as one of the 
leaders in CBNRM in the region. He considers linkages between CBNRM in the 
Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy and the neighbouring state-centric Etosha National 
Park. In the colonial period the Herero people were displaced from the area now 
designated as Etosha, and this led to a ‘decoupling’ of the social-ecological systems. 
Although the conservancy has yielded some concrete benefits for local people, in 
the form of meat and through income from wildlife and projects, people still feel 
excluded from the benefits of the park. Hoole argues for ‘recoupling’ to restore 
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social and ecological systems, allowing improved integration in wider regional 
landscapes along with greater linkages between community-based and state-led 
conservation.
In Chapter 8, Brian Child, Patricia Mupeta, Shylock Muyengwa and Rodgers 
Lubilo take us to the heart of CBNRM: the distribution of benefits at a local level. 
Drawing on case studies from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Botswana, they 
examine what they refer to as ‘micro-governance’ by comparing participatory and 
representational governance and ways in which revenues are allocated in each. 
The authors find profound differences between the two approaches, with only 
participatory governance resulting in better financial flows, equitable benefit shar-
ing and high levels of participation. They conclude that for CBNRM to succeed, 
it must be rooted in well-designed, face-to-face processes of decision-making and 
accountability that are ‘constructed from the bottom up and to serve the bottom’.
Moving to freshwater systems in Chapter 9, Belda Mosepele, Ketlhatlogile 
Mosepele, Shadrack Mogotsi, and Douglas Thamage examine the formation of 
a fisheries co-management committee in the Okavango floodplains in Botswana. 
Developing a co-management strategy brought together actors who had previ-
ously been in disagreement and helped resolve conflicts and enhance local partici-
pation in fisheries governance. While this suggests a more promising approach to 
floodplain management than a centralized regime, the authors highlight a number 
of challenges at implementation and operational levels, in particular maintaining 
its momentum.
The bringing together of different actors to effect policy changes is also the topic 
of Chapter 10, which reviews a new governance framework for small-scale fisheries 
in South Africa. Merle Sowman, Serge Raemaekers and Jackie Sunde provide an 
overview of the five-year policy formulation process largely driven by civil society, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and researchers, but including ongoing 
engagement with the fisheries management authority. Underpinned by human 
rights, sustainability and good governance principles, the policy is a radical depar-
ture from the technocratic, resource-centred and highly regulatory approach of 
the past. The authors argue that despite structural and implementation challenges, 
the policy offers much greater potential for redress, and for the promotion of social 
justice and ecological sustainability.
A theme that recurs in many of the chapters is the multiplicity of governance 
systems that are found within and across different sectors. The next two chapters 
look explicitly at situations in which customary governance systems exist along-
side statutory regulatory systems – a condition often referred to as legal plural-
ism. In Chapter 11, Sharon Pollard and Tessa Cousins identify tensions and com-
plementarities between statutory and customary systems of water governance in 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa. They conclude that local 
level customary governance systems are an apposite choice, given their adapt-
able and resilient nature, their holistic and systems-based perspective, and their 
grounding in the notion of community membership and responsibility. The lack 
of capacity within southern African states to manage and regulate water resources 
gives this conclusion further credence.
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Witness Kozanayi, Rachel Wynberg and Frank Matose describe in Chapter 12 
how the co-existence of customary and statutory systems governing the use and 
protection of the baobab tree offer a glimpse into the conundrum of multilayered 
governance systems that exist in communal areas of Africa. In the Chimanimani 
district of eastern Zimbabwe, customary systems govern the use and management 
of the baobab through such measures as taboos and the belief in autochthonous 
spirits. Concerns about the overharvesting of the tree for fibre and fruits, how-
ever, have increased the state’s role in regulation. This has been accompanied by 
political and economic upheavals, alongside an erosion of traditional authorities, 
which, as the authors explain, have now become ‘functionaries of the state’. Yet 
degradation of the baobab resource continues, exacerbated, no doubt, by multiple 
governance systems and the lack of clarity regarding which norms and rules apply 
and which institutions hold decision-making authority.
The next three chapters begin to explore the role of the market in determining 
the different actors involved and the temporal and geographical scale of natural 
resource governance. In Chapter 13, Ralph Hamann explores the unravelling of 
a partnership between an international conservation NGO and a mining com-
pany. The case, located in Namaqualand in the far north-west of South Africa, 
was once hailed as a constructive example of how such collaboration could fulfil 
both conservation objectives and local community interests. The sale of the mine, 
however, led to the abandoning of community projects and financial responsibili-
ties for rehabilitation, as well as unresolved land claims. The case demonstrates 
why collaborative governance arrangements require a clear regulatory framework 
within which to operate.
In Chapter 14, Rachel Wynberg and Jaci van Niekerk examine two plant spe-
cies endemic to southern Africa and used commercially: Hoodia gordonii, succu-
lent plants developed as appetite suppressants based on traditional knowledge of 
the indigenous San peoples, and Pelargonium sidoides, incorporated into a widely 
used global phytomedicine and harvested by rural communities in the region. 
Interventions initiated by the state, transformations in the private sector and 
mediations offered by NGOs offer great promises of benefit distribution, sustain-
able resource use and poverty alleviation based on these species. However, as 
the authors relate, local realities are quite different from global promises, and 
these initiatives may well get caught up in a policy snare that is self-serving in 
nature and ultimately detrimental to rural producers and traditional knowledge 
holders.
In the final thematic chapter, Chapter 15, Penny Urquhart takes a step back 
to examine linkages between climate, justice and adaptation, and in particular 
the distributional issues of sharing the costs and benefits of climate change. As the 
author notes, the adaptive capacity of communities relies on their ability to act 
collectively, through flexible and robust institutions that govern social relations 
and build in requirements for equity. This is especially relevant given the vulner-
abilities of marginalized communities in Africa and the fragile ecosystems in which 
people reside. Adaptive governance is absolutely critical as the continent heads 
towards periods of climatic unpredictability and significant change.
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Chapter 16, the final chapter, brings the threads together and highlights key 
findings and governance trends emanating from the various cases. It concludes 
with a summary of the main enabling and constraining factors that limit govern-
ance for justice and sustainability and points towards future areas of action.
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2 Theoretical deliberations 




This chapter outlines a conceptual framework for enhancing understanding about 
governance in the natural resource sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. It includes sev-
eral building blocks that outline a definition of governance, delineate its concep-
tual schema, and specify the key governance elements that constitute a govern-
ance structure. It also situates the governance process within the level, or levels, at 
which actor interactions are taking place.
The framework contributes to a toolkit for understanding natural resource gov-
ernance systems in Africa. This chapter thus adds to debates on how to specify a 
governance system, as opposed to the dominant trend, which focuses on how to 
evaluate a governance system by tabulating indicators of good governance.
Elements of a governance system pertain to the empirical realm, while the notion 
of good governance and its associated operationalization, in terms of indicators, 
belongs to the normative realm. While the concept of elements of a governance 
structure is applicable across natural resources and actors, that of good govern-
ance, by virtue of being normative, cannot be generalized and must be sensitive to 
the context of both sectors and actors.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the background to the popularization of 
the concept of governance and goes on to examine the elements central to under-
standing governance. Key indices that constitute a governance system are then 
suggested, and the conclusion follows.
Governance: Lack of consensus on a shared meaning
Literature on governance suggests that, while the term is used liberally in day-to-
day discussion, there is little consensus, if any, among either academics or prac-
titioners regarding its meaning. The popular opinion appears to be that while, at 
some point, it has been used as synonymous with ‘government’, the term actually 
implies more (Bratton and Rothchild 1992; Hyden 1992; Rosenau 1992; Rhodes 
1996; Stoker 1998).
Some scholars, however, argue that the difference between the two (govern-
ance and government) is one of means, not ends. This is because both seek the 
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same end: ordered affairs and collective action in society (Stoker 1998). A govern-
ment achieves these outcomes through formal and institutional processes (Stoker 
1998). Governance, on the other hand, is presented as operating both through 
governmental and non-governmental or extra-governmental means, and specifi-
cally through the participation of non-state actors (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; 
Bressers and Kuks 2003). Some scholars have criticized the use of intervention 
by non-state actors to distinguish governance from government (Walters 2004);1 
nevertheless, this approach to governance, based on the participation of non-state 
actors, dominates the contemporary notion of governance, and the statement that 
governance is not just about government is now a common refrain. As the next 
section explains, the roots of this dominance lie in the neo-liberal phenomenon of 
the 1990s.
Genesis of the popularity of the notion of governance
‘Governance’ as a discursive term gained currency in the post-communist era con-
sequent to the Bretton Woods agenda of economic liberalization in developing 
countries. While development agencies had long partnered with African govern-
ments, the dictates of Cold War politics obliged them to tolerate governmental 
ineffectiveness. With the end of the Cold War, Western-based development agen-
cies raised the alarm about the inability of developing country governments to 
design policies and discharge functions (Bratton and Rothchild 1992; Hoon and 
Hyden 2004).
Consequently, a crisis of governance in Africa was pronounced. Western devel-
opment agencies and universities founded governance programmes to address 
this crisis (Bratton and Rothchild 1992; Hyden 1992). Proponents of development 
diagnosed this crisis as emanating from the way political elites were undermin-
ing the state through rent-seeking (Bratton and Rothchild 1992). Consequently, 
governments were losing legitimacy among their citizens, and this undermined 
government effectiveness (Bratton and Rothchild 1992).
A remedy was sought in the involvement of non-state actors, both in the direct 
activities of government and in offloading from the state certain roles and dispers-
ing them to private and voluntary actors in new regimes characterized by such 
elements as a free press, citizen involvement and the rule of law (Bratton and Roth-
child 1992). The conduct of state affairs was seen to depart from the traditional, 
centralized model dominated by a legislature and bureaucracy, to one engaging 
autonomous private and voluntary actors. The functions hitherto discharged by 
governments were now presented as being discharged by a shared coalition of 
public and private actors.
It is this interdependence of partners and the way they are coordinated that has 
been popularized as ‘governance’ (Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; Pierre 2000; Treib 
et al 2007). Some scholars find this conceptualization so all-encompassing that it 
is devoid of any analytic value (Hyden 2002; Walters 2004). The question of what 
‘governance’ means as a concept therefore remains salient if it is to be deployed 
for analytic usage.
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Conceptualizing governance
The deployment of the concept of governance as discussed above led Bratton and 
Rothchild (1992) to observe that
the concept of governance is asked to bear the heavy weight of numerous 
intellectual agendas . . . no single concept can be all things to all people. The 
attempt to stretch the concept of governance to perform multiple, perhaps 
contradictory, purposes helps to explain why its definition in the academic 
literature has so far been slippery.
They further observed that ‘definitional questions remain to be solved’ (Bratton 
and Rothchild 1992, p. 280) (see Box 2.1). In the light of such disparities among 
analysts in the way they think about governance, there is a need for inquiries 
on governance projects to clarify the way the term is used. Such clarification is 
important because it would eliminate a situation in which the conversation on the 
governance of natural resources in Africa is pursued in terms of different concepts 
and premises, while the disputants assume they are discussing one and the same 
thing, thereby obscuring more than they illuminate.
From the list of conceptions of governance in Box 2.1, for example, can the 
outcomes (successful delivery of goods and services as expected by citizens) envis-
aged in Delapalme (2011) be secured without any of the routes specified in the 
other conceptualizations? This can certainly happen, but the question then would 
be whether those subscribing to the view of networks advanced by Hysing (2009) 
would consider that process to be part of the governance phenomenon. Moreover, 
there is the question of whether analyses of the governance of the natural resource 
sector based on the two perspectives would yield compatible conclusions.
What all this implies is the need to structure the conceptualization of the term 
‘governance’ in such a way that the variances in understanding are narrowed and 
the various inquiries speak to the same phenomenon.
Box 2.1 Conceptions of governance
Mayntz (2003, pp. 27–8) argues that ‘governance’ is used in two ways that 
are distinct from political guidance or steering. There is, she says, ‘a new 
mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model, a 
more cooperative mode where state and non-state actors participate in 
mixed public/private networks’. In the other, ‘new’, usage, ‘governance 
means different modes of coordinating individual actions, or basic forms of 
social order’.
Hyden et al (2004, p. 16): ‘Governance refers to the formation and stew-
ardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the 
arena in which state as well as economic and social actors interact to make 
decisions’.
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Drawing from the myriad usages of the term, it is possible to outline, as below, a 
description capturing the broad meaning of the concept of governance and speci-
fying certain features which can be used to identify the phenomenon of govern-
ance. It appears that a definition of governance has to be structured around a 
system of rules that allow decision-making and implementation by social actors 
in a coordinated way, with specific objectives as the end, within the context of 
the public realm (Hyden 1992; Mayntz 2003; Hoon and Hyden 2004; Treib et al 
2007; Kooiman et al 2008). This conceptualization of governance is elaborated 
upon by describing what its elements could be.
Broadly, governance has two aspects: content and activity. ‘Content’ refers to 
rules and goals. The process of generating these rules must itself be seen as part of 
governance, while the other part is implementing them. ‘Activity’ refers to both 
the production of content and its implementation (Hyden 2002; Hyden et al 2004). 
Rules are meant to guide public affairs, a process referred to in the literature as the 
‘steering’ or ‘coordination’ of social systems (Hyden and Court 2002; Hyden et al 
2004). If rules are produced but not implemented, then there is no steering, and 
hence no governance is achieved. To this extent, then, governance is not the same 
as law or policy-making. Rather, rule-making must be seen as part of a broader 
governance continuum.2 
The interplay between rules and coordination implies an existence of goals to be 
achieved. The rules spell out these goals. Consequently, governance has to be con-
cerned with outcomes (Rosenau 1992; Rhodes 1996; Pierre 2000; Jreisat 2002). In 
terms of the public realm, this outcome is the social order that entails the manage-
ment of relations between state and citizens in various sectors within the social, 
political and economic life of society (Stoker 1998; Hyden et al 2004; Kooiman 
and Bavinck 2005; Kooiman 2008). While it is not clear to what extent this man-
agement of relations includes those among citizens, it can be assumed that matters 
which are deemed contractual among citizens fall under this management.
Kooiman and Bavinck (2005, p. 17): ‘Governance is the whole of public 
as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create 
societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of prin-
ciples guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them’. 
(See also Kooiman et al 2008, pp. 1–3.)
Hysing (2009, p. 647), citing Sørensen (2006, p. 99): ‘The story line tells 
us that we are witnessing a transformation from hierarchical governing by 
nationally organized political institutions (i.e. government) to modes of govern-
ing in which a multitude of public and private actors from different policy 
levels govern society through networks and soft policy instruments – in other 
words, governance’.
Delapalme (2011, p. 2), citing the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s definition of 
good governance: ‘the successful delivery of those public goods and services 
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The management of relations implies that there is a terrain between rules and 
goals. This is the implementation sphere (Stoker 1998; Mayntz, 2003; Béné and 
Neiland 2006). Implementation is about the activities that translate intentions into 
outcomes. This is largely what is considered the dominant meeting place of the 
actors involved in the governing system. If, however, it were taken to be what gov-
ernance was all about, that would be limiting the conceptualization of governance. 
As discussed above, the coordination of social systems, or steering, is only part of 
the governance story.
A steering process has to be backed by either formal or informal authority to 
ensure the desired outcomes. Thus a governance system must be denoted by a 
sanctioning mechanism.3 If, as Rhodes (1996, p. 652) concedes, governance, even 
when non-hierarchical (‘hierarchical’ is a subtext for state domination), involves 
the ‘authoritative’ allocation of resources and exercising control, it becomes 
difficult to comprehend a controlling authority that is devoid of a sanctioning 
mechanism.4 This is especially so when we consider the arena in which the act of 
governing takes place: the public realm.
The activities that constitute governance take place in the public realm (Hyden 
2000; Hyden 2002; Hyden et al 2004). The ‘public realm’ is defined by Hyden et 
al (2004, p. 16) as the ‘arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors 
interact to make decisions’. The public realm is to be conceptualized in contradis-
tinction to the private or family arena, unless matters supposedly falling within this 
latter domain are brought out for adjudication in the public arena.
From the above conceptual schema, a governance structure can then be 
described. The way the resultant structure plays out in practice determines the 
form of governance (hierarchical, market, local, self-governance or networks/
intermediaries5) which ensues.
Governance structures for natural resources
Certain structures or elements of what can constitute a governance edifice may be 
delineated in broad categories. The dynamics of these structures, either singly or in 
combination, have direct ramifications for the governance of natural resources.
Actors, world views and preference diversity
Actors in natural resource sectors come in various forms. They include individual as 
well as corporate, formal, informal, state and non-state actors. Broadly, the tendency 
is to categorize some actors as government, while others are grouped under both mar-
ket and civil society. In a case such as that of a river catchment area, the actors can 
span all three of these broad categories. In the Ruaha River in Tanzania, for exam-
ple, the Great Ruaha River Catchment stakeholders include the Ruaha National 
Park, communities downstream (and those in the areas where streams feeding the 
Ruaha River come from), a hydro-generating agency, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) (e.g. the World Wide Fund for Nature), local government authorities, 
the Rufiji Basin Water Board and Tanzania’s national Ministry of Water.
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The complexity of the actor constellation tends to increase as one moves up 
the governance ladder from the local to the global. This is in part because, at 
higher levels, even when lower-level actors may not be physically present or even 
formally represented, they shadow the actors because most natural resources exist 
at the level where these lower-level actors are to be found. Their response is thus 
a factor in the activities at these higher levels, and they can therefore be portrayed 
as a shadow presence at those levels. The reverse need not be the case, where the 
issue at the local level is not so momentous as to have national or international 
ramifications.
Actors hold a view or image of the world with respect to a specific issue area: 
that of what is to be governed (Bressers and Kuks 2003; Kooiman and Bavinck 
2005; Jentoft 2007). The issue area in the case of the natural resource sector in 
Africa could include forests, wildlife, land and specifically rangelands – whose gov-
ernance involves both wildlife and livestock – and aquatic ecosystems: watersheds, 
fisheries, coral reefs, mangrove swamps and wetlands. Some sectors are single-
resource sectors, while others are multiple-resource sectors, such as wetlands and 
rivers. The African wetlands are utilized for such purposes as fisheries, pasture, 
wildlife, veld products, water and land for irrigation (see, for example, Kgathi et 
al 2011 and Haller 2010 on wetlands and Homewood et al 2009 on rangelands). 
Natural resource sectors may be valued differently by different actors, with high 
value resources attracting more complexity and intense forms of governance.
The image of the world that the actors bring to either of these issue areas defines 
what they perceive as the importance of the sector and how it should be governed 
to achieve its objectives. Both of these considerations are informed by the actors’ 
assumptions about the world and the information that they have about that area 
(whether factual or misperceived).
Actors intervening in the natural resource sectors in Africa have been driven 
by several considerations. These considerations include economic interests, social 
differentiation, cultural practices, spiritual values, nationalist sentiments and social 
justice.
The view that natural resources should serve economic purposes has been dom-
inant since pre-colonial times. It intensified and was formalized with the rise of 
modern economies organized around the nation-state, when sectoral policies and 
strategies were formulated. According to the policy and strategy of the fisheries 
sector in Tanzania, for example, the main goal of the sector is to promote the 
conservation, development and sustainable management of fisheries resources for 
the benefit of present and future generations. The benefit referred to here is largely 
economic development. This is clear from the list of objectives of the policy, which 
include: ‘To put into efficient use available resources in order to increase fish pro-
duction so as to improve fish availability as well as contribute to the growth of 
the economy’ (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism [MNRT] 1997). The 
economic consideration also permeates other images, such as the expression of 
cultural-spiritual and nationalist sentiments.
This view of certain natural resource sectors in terms of the national heritage 
took root with the rise of the new states after independence. Foremost among those 
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to give expression to this was Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere. In one of the 
earliest conferences on the future of African wildlife, Nyerere and others asserted:
[T]he survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa. 
These wild creatures amid the wild places they inhabit are not only important 
as a source of wonder and inspiration but are an integral part of our natural 
resources and of our future livelihood and well-being . . . we solemnly declare 
that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our children’s 
grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance.
(International Union for Conservation of Nature [IUCN] 1963, p. 13)
But even as these views on national heritage were being asserted, other actors 
held that such considerations in the natural resource sector would have to dovetail 
with the economic imperatives. During the very symposium at which President 
Nyerere made the above observations, his Minister of Land and Surveys, T.S. 
Tewa, associated the conservation motive with economic considerations:
[I]f the mass of my countrymen are to be enlisted in the ranks of conservation-
ists, they will expect to see that what they are told is ‘their heritage,’ however 
valuable it may be as a cultural asset, can still be made to earn its keep. I 
believe it can – through tourism.
(IUCN 1963, p. 21)
Another view that has dominated the natural resource sector is one that conceives 
it as a theatre of social differentiation. Again, this has been evident since the pre-
colonial era, but whereas state power was used to drive this imperative during the 
pre-colonial and colonial eras, the objectives of social differentiation have been 
achieved in the post-colonial era by the market, which has been used to price 
certain classes of society out of these sectors. In the pre-colonial era, centralized 
societies that had royalty could establish royal hunting grounds, and in the colonial 
period national parks were established as colonists’ recreation havens, from which 
native populations were largely excluded (Brooks 2005).
The basis for pursuing such exclusionary agendas was, as Anderson and Grove 
(1987, p. 4) observed, the tendency among ‘Europeans to impose their image of 
Africa upon the reality of the African landscape’, as there existed ‘a wish to protect 
the natural environment as a special kind of “Eden”’. In modern times, such think-
ing has persisted, albeit in more subtle ways. Recently the Tanzanian Minister for 
Natural Resources and Tourism, Ezekiel Maige, told communities in one of the 
protected areas that was also a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization World Heritage Site that they would not be allowed to farm in 
that area because it had been accorded heritage status partly because it was ‘natu-
ral and free from human activities such as farming’ (Philemon 2011).
Of relevance to this topic is that societal conceptions of what should constitute 
the goals or objectives of natural resource governance (e.g. environmental sustain-
ability, economic development, cultural heritage and social justice) will inform how 
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the actors define the outcomes they seek to achieve through the governance proc-
ess. Given that the societal conception discussed above is not necessarily homoge-
neous, the process of defining the outcomes is therefore driven by the diversity of 
actor preferences. Preferences diversity is bound to be reflected not only in what is 
done with certain natural resources, but also in how it is done. With the advent of 
the formal conservation movement during the colonial era, for example, although 
Europeans and Africans agreed on the need to conserve natural resources, there 
seemed to be sharp differences about the way forward. While Europeans favoured 
a route that separated humans and nature, Africans thought that conservation 
could be achieved by keeping human beings in harmony with nature.
These differences have been reproduced in the contemporary period in the 
cleavages between preservation and conservation (see, for example, Hutton et al 
2005; Goldman 2011). With respect to the question of national heritage referred to 
above, for example, we see the minister introducing the rider that the national her-
itage has to pay for itself, which raises the question: what if it is not able to, should 
resources be shifted from other sectors to sustain the wildlife heritage? Moreover, 
there are now some who question the nature of the balance between conservation 
and economic development where such natural resources are not perceived to 
contribute to the formal economy. These critics question whether large tracts of 
land should be set aside exclusively for natural resources instead of being opened 
up to active economic activities in light of the demographic pressures on food sup-
ply and shelter (Jones 2006).
The implication here is that it is critical, in delineating the actors, to determine 
the diversity of their preferences. Actors without a diversity of preference – in 
whatever dimension: what, how, who and when – would not face a social dilemma 
and would therefore have no need for a mechanism to aggregate preferences for 
which institutions become relevant.
Institutional frameworks
Institutional frameworks have to do with both the rules of engagement and the 
organizations charged with overseeing those rules, or providing the terrain through 
which the opportunity offered by the rules is accessed. To achieve their objectives, 
actors need to operate either individually or in collectives, and must have rules 
which structure and adjudicate their interactions. In a context of preference diver-
sity, as discussed above, rules serve to constrain behaviour so that actors pursue 
their preferences within limits that recognize the interests of other actors. Rules 
secure the interests of the various actors similarly or differentially. Of special inter-
est here should be the way rules are formulated (Hyden 1992; Hoon and Hyden 
2004), because that will have direct implications for the content of these rules.
In terms of formal institutions, the rules that structure interactions in the various 
natural resource sectors can be categorized broadly as national constitutions, sec-
toral policies, sectoral Acts of Parliament and subsidiary legislation. In certain con-
texts, subnational legislation in the form of local government by-laws that regulate 
natural resources in those jurisdictions may exist. In other cases, there are customary 
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rules as part of customary governance systems that comprise a coherent set of rules 
and customary institutions that govern activities and the social activities of the com-
munity (Bennett 2008). There may also be sectoral compacts entered into by actors 
in private or communal conservancies, either among themselves or between them-
selves and the national or local government authorities. Beyond the nation-state, 
some sectors are embedded in regional and international instruments.
The constitution is the supreme law from which specific Acts of parliament are 
derived, sometimes under the umbrella of a policy that outlines the national vision 
for a specific sector. Such an Act may confer power on the minister in charge of a 
resource sector to implement subsidiary legislation to further the broad objectives 
of the Act. Subnational jurisdictions can, within the context of the laws under which 
they are established, also make by-laws that could be part of the sector’s govern-
ance. Communal and private conservancies may also have their own rules, some 
of which are recognized by national legislation and thus have the force of law (for 
example, communal conservancies in Namibia and Wildlife Management Areas 
[WMA], in Tanzania), while others are local arrangements without official recogni-
tion (see, for example, Rihoy et al 2010, regarding the Communal Areas Manage-
ment Programme for Indigenous Resources [CAMPFIRE] in Zimbabwe, and the 
Mahenye community, because the legal unit was the rural district council [RDC]). 
Customary governance systems have and continue to play a central role in the lives 
of millions of people worldwide (Jentoft et al. 2003). Although customary legal sys-
tems were generally subordinate to the introduced colonial legal systems, in many 
countries these customary laws continued to be the de facto legal system followed at 
the local community level and included institutions for rule-making, decision-taking 
and conflict resolution (Techera 2008; Wicomb and Smith 2011). These customary 
institutions continued to exist despite being disregarded by formal, largely Euro-
centric, legal systems of the colonial governments. Over the past three decades, 
there has been an increasing trend in the constitutions of many countries in Africa 
to recognise the existence of customary law as an independent and equal source of 
law (Wicomb and Smith 2011). This has been largely influenced by various court 
rulings in favour of the rights of indigenous peoples as well as the emergence of 
various international instruments that call for the recognition and respect of the 
rights of customary communities to own, use, develop and manage their own land 
and resources.
National legislation operates in concert with international instruments ratified 
by the state. Some of the key instruments are the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention 
on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention), the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal 
Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora, and the various protocols of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) on fisheries, forestry and transfrontier conser-
vation areas in southern Africa.
In the international context, there are also initiatives that are not binding, but 
nevertheless influence natural resource governance. These include the voluntary 
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guidelines of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on fisheries and land 
transactions. The formal rules discussed above are shadowed by informal rules 
and informal networks, in the case of the organizations discussed below, which 
influence governance in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). These formal 
regulations are executed within an organizational web that spans international 
and local levels. As mentioned above, these organizations ought to be understood 
alongside informal governance systems and networks that form part of the govern-
ance of natural resources.
In terms of formal organizations, the national ministry in charge of a sector is 
the apex of that sector’s governance. Within the ministry there is a department 
that manages the sector. That department may have representation through the 
structures of government down to the local level. In some countries, there is a 
donor development group that brings together donors to all natural resources in 
general.
For those sectors with formalized international rules, the international organi-
zational dimension is most evident in the conference of parties of the convention 
concerned. Some international organizations, such as the FAO, exert their influ-
ence through non-binding guidelines such as the ones on responsible fisheries, 
planted forests and the responsible governance of land tenure.
At the regional level, organizations may have various origins, but most of those 
in Africa currently are rooted in two regional economic blocks, SADC and the 
East African Community (EAC), as well as, to a certain extent, the Common Mar-
ket for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Such organizations deal prima-
rily, though not exclusively, with transboundary natural resources. Examples are 
the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, which was formed by five countries in the 
Lake Victoria catchment area to coordinate fisheries activities in that area. The 
Lusaka Agreement Task Force, which is in charge of enforcing the Lusaka Agree-
ment, was sponsored by COMESA, while the SADC secretariat normally oversees 
the protocols that it sponsors.
At the subnational level, local authorities constitute organizations in that they 
enact by-laws on land, forests, wildlife, wetlands and other natural resources. Zim-
babwe’s rural district councils (RDC), Tanzania’s district councils and Kenya’s 
local and county authorities are examples.
At the community level, communal areas may have local associations that may, 
in turn, form umbrella bodies at the national level. Such institutions could be a 
mix of both customary institutions (such as chiefs or councils) as well as modern 
associations triggered by state law. Examples of such structures are CAMPFIRE in 
Zimbabwe, community resource boards in Zambia, and the Namibian Association 
of Community-Based Natural Resource Management Support Organisations. In 
Tanzania, the WMAs are governed through local-level authorized associations of 
all the villages forming a single WMA.
As a variation on the communal associations, big landowners form private con-
servancies but retain individual title to their own land and hence are not ‘commu-
nal’ within the meaning of ‘communal landownership’. In Namibia, private white 
landowners in the 1990s formed freehold wildlife conservancies (Barnes and Jones 
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2008). Conservation NGOs, as well as local, national and international private 
firms, also form part of the institutional framework.
All these organizations provide the theatre in which the governance of natural 
resources in Africa is played out, with actors pursuing their preferred outcomes 
through the action they take, based on their resources and strategies.
Resources, strategies and action
The interaction of actors is a function of their resources and strategies. Resources 
are both human and non-human and are deployed to deliver the desired outcome. 
Human resources include expert personnel who bring technical know-how in the 
issue area. This is particularly determinative if the matter of concern requires sci-
entific exposition – as, for example, in the case of fisheries. Actors who do not have 
an adequate command of the relevant information on the natural resources as 
well as technical competencies are likely to lose out in the contestations over the 
modalities of utilization and conservation in the sector.
Social and political capital is also a significant resource, especially in matters of 
governance, where the balance of power in society is critical in tilting the outcome 
one way or another. This was notably the case in Africa’s earlier political dispensa-
tions, in which neo-patrimonial tendencies implicitly allowed those with proximity 
to state apparatus to secure their preferences, as opposed to those without such 
state connections (see, for example, the case of wildlife politics in Zambia under 
Kenneth Kaunda [Gibson 1999]). As the democratic space opens, the balance 
of power may tilt towards those who can marshal the rank and file, because elec-
toral politics tends to drive public policy. This human resource dimension will be 
strongly felt in sectors such as forestry, fisheries, wildlife and land use, where access 
to resources is not necessarily capital-intensive, and thus attracts ordinary actors, 
who constitute the bulk of the electorate.
In terms of non-human resources, the biggest asset has been funding: those able 
to mobilize funding can command substantial influence in their sectors of interest. 
Nevertheless, to deploy these resources, actors require a strategy that would translate 
their visions into action (Bressers and Kuks 2003; Kooiman and Bavinck 2005).
One of the strategies carried over from the colonial era is that of giving one way 
of knowing about nature a higher status than other ways. Modern formal science 
is favoured and local and indigenous knowledge underplayed, with the result that 
certain actors are effectively sidelined (Goldman 2011). In addition, there is a ten-
dency to denigrate certain utilization practices in an effort to depict certain actors 
as agents of resource degradation, who should therefore be objects of governance, 
not governance agents. This has particularly been the case among pastoralist, as 
opposed to sedentary communities. The former are portrayed as degrading the 
range (Little 1996; Beinart and McGregor 2003; Pollini 2010), even though they 
are known to contribute to the sustainability of biodiversity in the rangelands (Lit-
tle 1996).
There have also been direct political economy strategies, such as the state laying 
claim to all natural resource sectors and thus making other actors subsidiary to it. 
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Both the colonial and postcolonial states utilized this strategy. Germany’s colonial 
forestry policies in Tanzania, for example, which declared the forests to be owner-
less, uninhabited and not for peasant use, were intended to exclude the indigenous 
peoples from the forest sector so that concessionaire companies could dominate 
the sector, with the indigenous peoples becoming a pool of cheap labour or taking 
up cash-crop production, on which they could be taxed (Sunseri 2003).
Modes of governance
Courses of action can be framed between two extremes: coercion and voluntar-
ism (Treib et al 2007). The course taken is largely a function of the existing mode 
of governance. The central claim defining contemporary conceptualization about 
governance, as stated earlier, is that governance is not just about government; it also 
includes other actors. The force of this conceptualization notwithstanding, if either 
governance or government has to be thought of in terms of a process of enabling 
interactions among actors who seek to produce a certain outcome through collective 
action (Rhodes 1996), then that process can take place in various modes.
These modes can be either hierarchical or horizontal. The former is the domi-
nant characteristic in the presumed old way of thinking about government. Some 
commentaries on governance present it as a top-down style of interaction between 
a state and its citizens in which the notion of control by one actor is a key con-
cept (Kooiman and Bavinck 2005). In the case of natural resource governance in 
Africa, this style is best represented by the protectionist approach, whose institu-
tional embodiment is the protected areas model (see, for example, Wilshusen et al 
2002; Hutton et al 2005).
The horizontal approach, on the other hand, is associated with supposedly new 
patterns of interaction. This approach has two major variants: interactive/net-
work modes and the market (Dixon and Dogan 2002). The interactive/network 
modes have been described in many ways, for instance self-regulation and/or co-
regulation, public-private partnerships, cooperative management and joint entre-
preneurial ventures. A general characteristic of all variants in this mode is that 
the societal actors come together for a common purpose under circumstances in 
which actor autonomy is observed and the actors interact in a horizontal way. The 
actors define their own rules, act interdependently and are self-organizing. There 
is an underlying assumption in this narrative of interactive/network modes of gov-
ernance that such interactions take place outside the purview of the state (Rhodes 
1996; Ostrom 1999; Dixon and Dogan 2002; Kooiman and Bavinck 2005; Koo-
iman et al 2008).
Some of these claims can present difficulties, especially in relation to natural 
resource governance. This is because the natural resource sector is largely embed-
ded in state policies and laws, so that whatever actors outside the state do is to some 
degree conditioned by the statutory imperatives that loom in the background, even 
as the actors’ operations adopt a veneer of autonomy. An elaborate argument to 
this effect has been advanced with respect to the market as the other variant of 
horizontal modes of governance.
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The market has been presented as one of the institutions of governance, along 
with the state and civil society (Coase 1960; Sbragia 2000; Dixon and Dogan 
2002; Kooiman 2008; Hysing 2009). In the context of natural resources, the mar-
ket certainly does play a coordinating role among actors in such sectors as forestry, 
as exemplified by the Forest Stewardship Council, a forest certification scheme 
that seeks to use the market to leverage the proper management of forests and 
the responsible production of wood products. In the wildlife sector, the market is 
increasingly playing a direct role in governance, particularly in the emerging pri-
vately managed public protected areas in certain parts of Africa (Fearnhead 2008). 
In addition, the endeavours by such institutions as the World Bank and Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to intervene in the land market and issue volun-
tary guidelines on private sector transactions in land matters arguably constitute 
an attempt to shore up the role of the market in the governance of land, including 
that under customary tenure (FAO 2012).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the market itself also has such vari-
ants as command economy and free market. (In the case of natural resources, 
the liberal approach is best represented by free-market environmentalism.) While 
the former is directly under the state, this is, as both Walters (2004) and Sbragia 
(2000) contend, not to say that the latter is wholly independent of the state. Sbra-
gia (2000) argues that the market does not displace public authority; rather, the 
state looms large in these supposedly non-state manifestations. This is because the 
market requires the state for it to function.
[T]he ‘rule of law’ is critical for a market economy, and the absence of well-
defined legal and judicial mechanisms for resolving conflicts among parties is 
an almost insuperable barrier to the construction of a functioning economy. 
. . . Markets, just like the welfare state, are absolutely dependent on public 
authority.
(Sbragia 2000, p. 245)
Thus, interactive/network governance, rather than being seen in terms of the 
absence of government, should rather be presented as involving interactions among 
civil, public and private actors (Kooiman et al 2008). The dynamics of these inter-
actions are likely to be amplified by the prevailing resource tenure regime,6 as well 
as the level at which they take place.
Levels of interaction
Levels of interaction can be horizontal, vertical or both. The focus on the vertical 
level needs to be flexible enough to allow for the possibility of an interaction either 
at or through the local, national, regional and global levels. Governance takes 
place at all these levels. They are not, however, independent of one another; some 
or all of them do interact, and what happens at one level often has ramifications at 
other levels. This is particularly so with respect to the national and international 
levels, which impact on the subnational and local levels.
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At the local level, governance may be organized around individual villages or 
even households and this could either be customary governance systems or one 
based on modern statutory provisions. In certain cases, the national legal regime 
may sanction institutional arrangements for the governance of national resources 
at the local level. This can be fixed, or may be flexible to allow for local particulari-
ties. In other cases, such institutions could be endogenous and reflect a situation 
in which large families and big landlords drive the governance process (Bandiaky 
2008; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
[UNESCAP] n.d.).
Natural resource governance at the subnational level brings together several 
local jurisdictions that may share a common ecosystem or problem, which there-
fore has to be governed by a broad range of actors in the region. As stated earlier 
with respect to river catchment areas, the scale includes not just the immediate 
vicinity of the river, but also the areas where streams which feed the river origi-
nate. The same case applies to rangelands where migratory species roam over a 
wide territory. This makes it necessary to govern the range as one unit rather than 
as a simple locale, because wildlife may be at one locale at a certain time of year 
and elsewhere at other times.
Governance at the national level is concerned with policy-making and the enact-
ment of legislation on natural resources. The policy sets out the main objectives of 
the sector in terms of how the sector should be managed and for what ends, and it 
supposedly informs the legislation in the sector, but that does not always happen. 
The terrain of translating policy into legislation is often a site of actor contestation. 
This is mostly because, in terms of securing actor preferences, it is the legislation 
that holds sway, not the policy.
The national level provides the contact point between the state and regional 
and international initiatives in natural resource governance. There are various 
regional initiatives involved in the governing of natural resource sectors. In south-
ern Africa, for example, SADC has formulated protocols on the governance of 
such sectors as fisheries, forestry and wildlife. In eastern Africa, the EAC created 
the Lake Victoria Basin Commission and the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organiza-
tion for the governance of the shared lake basin. In addition, there are other initia-
tives targeting transboundary shared natural resources, and the development of a 
regional climate-change regulatory framework has been undertaken. In addition 
to these initiatives by formalized regional bodies, individual states may undertake 
joint efforts for the governance of shared resources. Such efforts include the Lake 
Tanganyika Authority, which was formed by the countries sharing the lake to 
coordinate fishery activities.
At the global level, the situation is rather fluid:
[T]here is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single 
structure or set of structures. It is a broad, dynamic, complex process of inter-
active decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing 
circumstances.
(Commission on Global Governance 1996)
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The global governance of natural resources is largely associated with the intergov-
ernmental structures that are constituted as the UN General Assembly and the 
UN’s agencies. The most visible global role is seen in the environmental agree-
ments that deal with the global governance of various natural resource sectors. A 
multitude of other, non-state actors that participate in the process through their 
attendance at UN-organized meetings, principally as accredited observers, are 
able, depending on their organizational abilities, to influence the decision-making 
process. There are also multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization, that are associated with the UN system but enjoy a 
measure of autonomy from the UN General Assembly.
Outside the UN framework, global natural resource governance is also driven 
by multinational corporations, international NGOs and community-based organ-
izations (CBOs), global media and private interests. Thus, as the Commission on 
Global Governance observed, global governance is multifaceted and involves a 
network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms that is still develop-
ing (Abbott and Snidal 2010). In the realm of natural resource governance, global 
governance is mostly approached sector by sector.
Outcome of the governance process: Effectiveness or good 
governance?
Given that every governance system is put in place to generate particular out-
comes, it follows that once the steering process has taken place, the resultant out-
come should be evaluated for its congruence or otherwise with the intentions of 
that process. This should in turn disclose the extent of the effectiveness of the 
governance system. Effectiveness is empirical, unlike good governance, which is 
normative. Effectiveness is about the extent to which a process generates the out-
come it was intended to secure. The securing of that outcome may be achieved 
even when both the means and the ends cannot be characterized as good govern-
ance. In a rent-seeking society, for example, the dominant actors may structure 
the governance system to be a failure in order to cover up their activities. In such 
a case, the governance system would be delivering the outcome intended by its 
designers, even though, from a broader societal perspective, it fails the test of good 
governance.
A similar case can be made of a governance regime beset by competing visions. 
Until such competing visions are harmonized, it can be expected that different 
actors will return a different verdict on what they adjudge to be good govern-
ance in the sector being governed. Thus the concept of good governance is better 
conceived as contextual to both the sector and actors’ preferences, such that, in a 
given sector, competing notions of good governance can be expected, depending 
on the convergence or divergence of actor preferences.
Perhaps the best example here is to be seen in global financial institutions such 
as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which are proponents of 
good governance (in the economic sphere), yet have critics who condemn the 
outcomes that result from the path these institutions consider good governance 
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(Global Exchange 2000; see also Imrie and Racot 1999, where openness and 
accountability are presented as liabilities to the pursuit of efficiency, yet their 
worth is taken as axiomatic by proponents of good governance).
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined some of the conceptual underpinnings for understand-
ing the governance of natural resource sectors in Africa. It has described the pop-
ularity of the contemporary notion of governance, especially with reference to 
Africa, and the need to clarify the concept with regard to natural resources, given 
the absence of a consensus on the meaning of governance. The chapter has offered 
a series of building blocks to enhance understanding of governance of natural 
resource sectors, including analysis of the various concepts of governance and the 
elements that constitute a governance structure or system.
The chapter has also identified possible resultant modes of governance, and has 
argued that these need not be conceptualized in terms of mutual opposition; an 
interaction among them could rather be envisaged, contrary to the popular notion 
that tends to see governance as not being about government.
Also highlighted in this chapter has been the need to situate the level or levels 
at which actor interactions take place during the governance process, as well as 
the need to focus on the effectiveness of the governance process in contradistinc-
tion to the popular concern with good governance. The latter, it is advanced, 
should be contextualized with respect to actors and sectors. The key thrust of 
this proposition is based on the fact that governance involves actors who may 
espouse divergent preferences, which implies that they are guided by different 
world views, a fact that affects either the ends they pursue or the ways they pur-
sue these ends, or both.
Arguments about good governance, and especially the indices often used to 
mark good governance, are mostly located within this space (that of ends and 
means to those ends), and different actors can obviously be expected to have dif-
ferent evaluations of either the processes or outcomes of governance. The question 
of effectiveness, however, can be evaluated on the basis of the stated objectives of 
the governance process (such as equity and sustainability) and the discernible out-
comes, irrespective of whether the actors consider these outcomes as good or not.
Notes
1 Walters (2004) contends that governments have never monopolized control over territo-
ries, and that the intervention of non-state actors in governmental processes has always 
been a feature of society.
2 The dichotomy between rules and steering that Hyden and Court (2002) allude to does 
not, therefore, arise. They contend that in terms of the substantive content of govern-
ance, there are differences between those who believe it is concerned with rules of how 
to conduct public affairs, and others who see it as steering or controlling public affairs. 
The two are essentially inseparable, since rules are made to guide the steering in order to 
make it predictable.
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3 There is a notion in the literature suggesting that there is a form of governance not 
backed by formal authority. This proposition is problematic if it is meant to suggest that 
the actors involved are engaged in a laissez-faire interaction.
4 A sanctioning mechanism may be weak or fragile, and therefore may not realize its man-
date, but this does not mean that the governance regime is designed to be without a 
sanctioning mechanism. The use of the notion of a sanctioning mechanism as opposed 
to police powers is more robust because the notion of police powers can give the impres-
sion that the absence of a police phenomenon implies the absence of a government, and 
hence the commonly held notion that governance takes place without a formal authority, 
and hence no government.
5 This could also involve governance under the shadow of hierarchy or in areas of limited 
statehood (Borzel and Risse 2010).
6 Such tenure regimes include state, community, customary, private, state-communal and 
state-private ownership. Some resources, even when owned by the state, are de facto 
open-access, though some actors may decide to govern them if they find them useful for 
their purposes.
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 Implications for justice
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Introduction
With the increasing scale and complexity of environmental and social problems, 
there has been a trend of elevating responses to the global level. The call to ‘think 
global and act local’ means that a global perspective on what is required for sus-
tainability strongly influences actions at national and subnational levels (United 
Nations [UN] 1992). Global environmental governance is underpinned by a set 
of normative discourses which hold assumptions on the causes of unsustainability 
and the corresponding solutions to these challenges (Kates et al 2001; Clark and 
Dickson 2003; Ostrom 2010). Such normative discourses are important in provid-
ing a coherent frame for international strategies in response to large-scale prob-
lems such as biodiversity loss, climate change and desertification.
Normative discourses on sustainability, as well as social goals and values are 
deeply embedded in the minds of agents, the structures of institutions and rules 
of policy. When global sustainability goals are introduced at the national and 
local levels, they meet and are influenced by traditional normative objectives that 
nations aspire to, such as democracy, human rights and economic growth. This 
chapter explores the intersection of global normative sustainability discourses with 
others of social and economic development. This is done in order to understand 
how, at a local level, these normative discourses may correspond or clash, and 
what the outcomes are for social justice of resulting management decisions. The 
analysis is based on a case study of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP) under-
taken in 2011 and 2012 in South Africa.
A theoretical discussion on the role of normative discourses in governance fol-
lows immediately below, after which the case study is introduced and contextual-
ized. The third section presents the actors involved in the IWP’s governance, trac-
ing their primary legislative mandates and the underlying normative discourses 
that direct their management decisions. The tensions that arise through the appli-
cation of differing normative discourses at all levels are then described – tensions 
most often related to a conflict between the divergent goals of the conservation 
of World Heritage sites and national goals of social and economic development. 
Evidence from the case study is used to explicate these conflicts in South Africa. 
This is followed by a discussion of the overall findings and some final conclusions.
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Theoretical background
Norms and normative discourses in governance
In our definition, ‘governance’ refers to ordered rules and collective action in soci-
ety, where a system of rules around decision-making is implemented by social 
actors in a coordinated way (Hydén 2001). A system of rules has a distinctive 
normative foundation, and this is true at all levels. Norms have an influence on 
the governance regime of the IWP through various initiatives at the global and 
regional levels, as well as through national legislation and policy frameworks. The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is based on a cooperative govern-
ment approach – and this is integral to the governance framework of the IWP1 
(Republic of South Africa 1996: 1267–9). Here it is important to recognize that 
different agents involved in governance have their own particular mandates and 
normative approaches.
The Oxford Dictionary describes a ‘norm’ as ‘a standard or pattern, especially 
of social behavior, that is typical or expected’ (Oxford Dictionary 2012). Norms are 
embedded in our thinking and often not explicit. They are, however, extremely 
powerful, in that they represent a prevailing view on a topic and therefore often 
assume consensus. To better understand what we mean by a ‘norm’ here, we follow 
Hydén and Svensson’s (2008) ontological analysis, founded on the Aristotelian ideas 
of ‘essence’ and ‘accident’. A distinction is thus made between the ‘essential’ and 
‘accidental’ attributes of norms. Three essential attributes of norms are that they 
are behavioural imperatives, they are socially reproduced and they are the indi-
vidual’s understanding of surrounding expectations regarding their own behaviour 
(Hydén and Svensson 2008). Accidental attributes of norms include the presence of 
sanctions, the origin of the norm, the context or arena in which the norm is socially 
reproduced, whether the norm is system-oriented or value-oriented, the internal 
function of the norm and the purpose of the norm (Hydén and Svensson 2008).
A legal norm is a compulsory rule of conduct established by the state. For exam-
ple, South Africa’s National Environmental Management Act (Act 107 of 1998) 
directs the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social, economic and 
environmental rights of everyone and strive to meet the basic needs of previously 
disadvantaged communities’ (RSA 1998a: 2). Legal normative discourses here are 
those around human rights and restorative justice. A social norm is a habitual rule 
that governs behaviour in groups and societies. A social normative discourse in the 
post-apartheid South African context may favour the embracing of a vibrant mul-
ticulturalism (Sonnichsen 2009). A technical norm may relate to rules of conserva-
tion, for example the necessity of a fence to protect ‘sensitive’ ecological areas from 
human impact (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
[UNESCO] World Heritage Centre 2011, pp. 1, 11). An economic normative 
discourse may presume, for example, that job creation is integral to economic 
growth, or that gross domestic product is an indicator for economic growth (RSA 
2010). A bureaucratic normative discourse may be that of transparency or of dem-
ocratic participation (RSA 2000).
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Normative discourses prescribe what ought to be done. They are the rules that 
are implicitly followed in management decisions. This chapter delineates the nor-
mative discourses underlying legislative and policy documents at different levels 
(global and regional, national and local). This has important implications, in that 
conflicting normative discourses may lead to the precedence of global, regional or 
national priorities and values over those at the local level, or vice versa, leading to 
important outcomes for social justice. This chapter will look specifically at contra-
dictions arising through normative discourses directing the divergent goals of the 
conservation of World Heritage, and social and economic development, influenc-
ing the management decisions of actors at different levels.
Normative discourses of sustainable development and the 
iSimangaliso Wetland Park
The IWP is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Our analysis is based upon the 
argument that, as a site of ecological world heritage, the governance framework of 
the IWP is partly founded upon normative discourses of global conservation and 
the public interest. Through the World Heritage Convention Act (Act 49 of 1999), 
which incorporates the World Heritage Convention into South African legisla-
tion, a global commitment to the conservation of areas of ‘outstanding universal 
value’ has received national legislative support and, in this case, been given effect 
through the establishment of the IWP. Thus global norms of conservation become 
entrenched in national and local levels of government.
At the national level, although normative discourses around economic develop-
ment are present, intersectional justice, human rights and social development also 
come strongly into play, in light of South Africa’s post-apartheid priorities. The 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa states: ‘Everyone has the right to 
an environment that is not harmful to his or her health or well-being’ (RSA 1996). 
Even the World Heritage Convention Act includes a strong emphasis on intersec-
tional justice. Among the fundamental principles of the Act are that ‘participation 
by vulnerable and historically disadvantaged persons must be ensured’ and that 
‘decisions must take into account the interests, needs and values of all interested 
and affected parties’ (RSA 1999).
At a southern African regional level, the IWP comprises a major node of the 
Lubombo Spatial Development Initiative (LSDI) and of the Lubombo Transfron-
tier Conservation and Resource Area (LTFCA),2 two collaborative development 
projects of the governments of Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland. Jourdan 
(1998) has argued that spatial development initiatives are guided by growth-based 
definitions of development. Among the priorities for the LSDI are to generate 
economic growth by making maximum use of the inherent, but underutilized, 
potential of the area; to maximize private-sector involvement and create an attrac-
tive and stable climate for investors to operate in; and to maximize job creation by 
ensuring that the new industries being stimulated are competitive and have a long-
term future in the region (National Department of Environmental Affairs [NDEA] 
n.d.). At the signing of the Trilateral Protocol for the LTFCA on 22 June 2000, 
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Mohammed Valli Moosa, South Africa’s Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism at the time, stated that the LTFCA ‘aims to consolidate conditions for 
the development of Lubombo’s considerable tourism potential that underpins the 
promise of a revitalized regional economy’ (Moosa 2000). The role of the iSiman-
galiso Wetland Park Authority (IWPA) (then the St Lucia Wetland Park Authority) 
would be to ‘accelerate development, generate sustainable jobs and create condi-
tions for the establishment of an internationally competitive tourism destination’ 
(Moosa 2000). This shows that there is a strong emphasis on economic develop-
ment goals at the southern African regional level. Here the policy view is that the 
IWP will facilitate socio-economic development through tourism.
Introduction to the case study
The study area
The IWP in northern KwaZulu-Natal was listed as South Africa’s first UNESCO 
World Heritage Site in December 1999, in recognition of its superlative natural 
beauty and unique global values (UNESCO World Heritage Centre [WHC] 2000). 
Specifically, three of the ten criteria of UNESCO were met (UNESCO WHC 2000). 
First, the IWP is an example representing ongoing ecological and biological proc-
esses in the evolution and development of ecosystems and communities of plants and 
animals. Second, it contains superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional 
natural beauty and aesthetic importance. Lastly, it contains the most important and 
significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including 
those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point 
of view of science or conservation. The IWP also contains four wetlands of interna-
tional importance under the Ramsar Convention (Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism [DEAT] 2009).
The IWP was elevated to the status of an icon in the history of the environ-
mental struggle in South Africa (DEAT 2009). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
a proposal by a multinational company to mine the dunes on the eastern shores 
of Lake St Lucia for titanium and other heavy metals was met with vehement 
and polarized public debate (Bainbridge 1993/1994). An extensive environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) process was characterized by a clash between two con-
trasting views: economic benefits versus aesthetic value and sense of place (Drogin 
1994; Kruger et al 1997; Lyman 1993).
An independent review panel, chaired by Justice Ramon Leon, was appointed 
to review the EIA process and the final reports, to assess public opinion and to 
submit a recommendation to the cabinet as to which land use for the area was 
considered to be the most appropriate (Bainbridge 1993/1994). The panel put for-
ward a proposal that future development be based on ecotourism as the primary 
land use option (Dominy 1993/1994). This proposal was influenced by an over-
whelming national and international outcry about the loss of a global biodiversity 
hotspot, representing an explicit connection of the IWP to global conservation 
goals. Significant normative discourses here were those around global biodiversity 
conservation and the public interest.
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Informed by the recommendations of the Leon Commission, South Africa’s new 
democratic government ruled that dune mining on the eastern shores of Lake St 
Lucia be prohibited and the area’s fragile beauty and sense of place protected for 
future generations (DEAT 2009). This was a landmark decision for the South African 
environmental movement, contributing to a change in the way conservation areas 
were thought of in South Africa, and creating the opportunity to view ecotourism 
as a viable alternative to primary-sector natural-resource extraction as an economic 
growth strategy (Dominy, 1993/1994; Chellan and Khan 2008; Walker 2008).
Saved from dune mining, the IWP (then known as the Greater St Lucia Wetland 
Park) was proclaimed in 2000, in terms of regulations published under the World 
Heritage Convention Act. At the same time the IWPA was set up to manage the 
park on behalf of the state. The IWP effectively consolidated 16 parcels of previ-
ously fragmented land – a patchwork of former proclamations (the earliest going 
back to 1895), state-owned land, commercial forests and former military sites3 – to 
create an integrated park for the first time (DEAT 2009; IWPA 2009).
The IWP covers more than 330,000 hectares, stretching 220 kilometres from 
Kosi Bay, just below the Mozambican border in the north, to Maphelane, south of 
the St Lucia estuary (DEAT 2009) (Figure 3.1). Its eastern boundary is the Indian 
Figure 3.1 Geographical location of the iSimangaliso Wetland Park.
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Ocean and its western boundary is irregular, incorporating the entire Kosi, Sibaya 
and St Lucia lake systems, as well as the uMkhuze Game Reserve. It encompasses 
one-third of the KwaZulu-Natal coastline and 9 per cent of the entire coastline of 
South Africa (DEAT 2009).
Socio-economic context
The IWP falls almost entirely within the boundaries of the uMkhanyakude Dis-
trict Municipality (IWPA 2008). Some of the most impoverished communities in 
South Africa are found in the uMkhanyakude region, and areas neighbouring the 
IWP in particular (IWPA 2008). As of 2007, 614,046 people live in the uMkha-
nyakude council area, translating into 114,973 households (Community Survey 
2007, cited in uMkhanyakude District Municipality 2011/2012). Within the 
Coastal Forest Reserve section of the park, there are six small townships4 whose 
combined population in 1998 comprised approximately 200 families (KwaZulu-
Natal Nature Conservation Services [NCS] 1998). The area is characterized 
by high levels of underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty, along with 
some of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in the country (uMkhanyakude District 
Municipality 2011/2012). Significantly, many people rely on natural resources 
for their livelihoods. For example, our fieldwork identified the common use of 
ncema reeds (Juncus krausii) for mat-making and the building of traditional Zulu 
structures, ilala palm (Hyphaene coriacea) for the production of ilala wine, fish from 
the coastal area and grazing land for cattle. The integrated management plan for 
the IWP raises a concern about increasing pressure on such resources inside the 
park, through the depletion and degradation of natural resources in communal 
areas (IWPA 2008).
Data collection
Field research was carried out in 2011 and 2012, with numerous visits to com-
munities residing both in and adjacent to the IWP, as well as interviews with local 
tribal authorities, municipal officials from the Big Five False Bay Local Munici-
pality (a subdivision of the uMkhanyakude District Municipality) and several non-
profit organizations working in the Big Five False Bay local municipal area. Data 
collection consisted primarily of semi-structured interviews and direct observa-
tions (Kvale 1996; Brockington and Sullivan 2003), as well as focus groups (Bry-
man 2008) in KwaDapha, a small community residing within the boundaries of 
the IWP. In addition, household surveys were conducted with around half of the 
49 households belonging to this community, in order to gain information about 
the socio-economic context of the area and perceptual data on the impacts of 
the IWP on everyday life and the nature of community relations with the IWPA. 
Relevant legislative and policy documents were also collected and analysed and 
newspaper articles relating to the management of the IWP were also reviewed. 
To improve the credibility of results, most of the findings were verified through 
triangulation.
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Five interviews of approximately one hour each were undertaken with officials 
from the IWPA in February and March 2011 and August 2012.
The governance framework of the iSimangaliso 
Wetland Park
This section discusses the actors constituting the governance framework of the 
IWP, their enabling legal framework and the normative discourses that guide their 
management decisions.
The iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority
The IWPA is the management authority for the IWP. Its major objective is to 
ensure the implementation of the proposal put forward by the Leon Commission 
– that the development of the park be based on ecotourism as the primary land use 
option, integrating both the conservation of World Heritage and local economic 
development. The authority reports directly to the national Department of Envi-
ronmental Affairs, from which it receives its core funding5 (DEAT 2009). It has a 
board of nine members, including the CEO, who represent business, traditional 
councils, land claimants, the provincial government (specifically Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife), the national government (specifically the Department of Environmental 
Affairs) and local government (DEAT 2009).
The goal of the IWPA is ‘develop to conserve’ (IWPA 2008, p. 2). The authority 
specifically strives to balance conservation and sustainable development, taking 
into account the ‘pressing social development priorities of the region’ and aiming 
to end the ‘paradox of poverty amongst natural plenty’ (IWPA 2008, p. 2). Con-
servation objectives however, are foremost, in order to ensure that World Heritage 
values are not compromised (IWPA 2008). Although the goal of intersectional 
justice is of fundamental importance in the IWP’s policy framework, it is overshad-
owed by that of global conservation.
In addition to conservation as its primary aim, the mandate of the IWP includes 
the facilitation of optimal tourism-based development in the park (IWPA 2008). 
The integrated management plan for the IWP aims to achieve this through cre-
ating an enabling environment for tourism development. It clearly recognizes 
the role of the private sector as the primary actor in the development of tour-
ism (IWPA 2008). The plan explicitly strives to balance conservation, tourism 
development and the local economic development of historically disadvantaged 
communities in and adjacent to the IWP (IWPA 2008). The latter is expected to 
be achieved through equity partnerships between the private sector and manda-
tory community partners (IWPA 2008). An example is the Thonga Beach Lodge 
and Mabibi community campsite – cited as benchmarks for the development of 
ecotourism partnerships between the private sector and communities (Sunde and 
Isaacs 2008). Here, normative discourses centre strongly on human rights and 
restorative justice.
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The IWP is also conceptualized as a ‘commercial asset that has the potential to 
help drive the economic revival of a region that was systematically underdevel-
oped in the past’ (IWPA 2008, p. 3). This is typical of an ecological modernisation 
discourse, which views nature as an instrumental resource (Cock 2007, cited in 
Walker 2008).
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife
The IWPA has contracted the provincial conservation agency, Ezemvelo KZN 
Wildlife, as its nature conservation agent (IWPA 2008). The organization con-
sists of the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Board and the KwaZulu-Natal 
Nature Conservation Service. The board is a public entity reporting to the Kwa-
Zulu-Natal provincial Department of Agriculture and Environmental Affairs. The 
service carries out the day-to-day operation of nature conservation in KwaZulu-
Natal and is accountable to the board. In line with its statutory mandate, Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife is responsible for the management of nature conservation within the 
province of KwaZulu-Natal, and the development and promotion of ecotourism 
facilities within protected areas (EKZNW 2009). Most tourist facilities within the 
IWP, such as camping grounds and rustic cottages, are managed by Ezemvelo 
KZN Wildlife, although there are some community-owned and private facilities 
within the park, for example the Thonga Beach Lodge and Mabibi community 
campsite (interview, 14 February 2010).
The mission of Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife is ‘to ensure effective conservation 
and sustainable use of KwaZulu-Natal’s biodiversity in collaboration with stake-
holders for the benefit of present and future generations’ (EKZNW 2009). Since 
democracy, the organization has invested in repositioning ecotourism so that it 
contributes more substantially to provincial growth and development (EKZNW 
2009). The Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife strategy for the period 2009–14 states that 
responsible management of biodiversity conservation is recognized worldwide 
as being a critical factor in the success of sustained economic development, and 
that often protected areas are a catalyst for economic development (EKZNW 
2009). Objectives guiding Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife involve stakeholder partici-
pation, as well as ecotourism and conservation as means for achieving economic 
growth.
uMkhanyakude district and local municipalities
Until mid-2011, the IWP was a district management area6 falling almost entirely 
in the uMkhanyakude District Municipality and contiguous to all five of its 
local municipalities. Since mid-2011, however, district management areas have 
formed part of their adjacent municipalities (uMkhanyakude District Municipal-
ity 2011/2012). This means that the IWP is now geographically split among three 
local municipalities, the Big Five False Bay, Mtubatuba and uMhlabuyalingana 
(uMkhanyakude District Municipality 2011/2012). Local municipalities represent 
a subdivision of district municipalities, usually in rural areas, with district munici-
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palities offering coordination and support to those local municipalities under their 
respective jurisdictions (Frödin 2009).
The South African Constitution declares that the South African government 
is founded on three distinct but interdependent and interrelated spheres, thus 
making local government not just a subordinate level of government, but a sig-
nificant sphere in its own right (Frödin 2008). Local government has considerable 
autonomy and the responsibility to promote social and economic development, 
in addition to providing water, sanitation, roads, stormwater drainage, electricity 
and municipal health services (Cameron 2003, cited in Frödin 2008). Municipali-
ties also provide the linkages to the provincial and national departments that are 
responsible for other services, such as health care and education (RSA 1998b).
Tribal authorities
An important intricacy of the South African Constitution is the provision it makes 
for traditional government, acting through customary law, to function within the 
local governance sphere (RSA 2003). This manifestation of traditional government is 
commonly referred to as a tribal authority, which comprises an inkosi, or chief, and 
indunas, or headmen, who oversee the community. The inkosi is entitled to the posi-
tion through his bloodline, while the indunas are usually appointed by the inkosi.
Formally, the role of the tribal authority is to work with the municipality while 
promoting functions under customary law (RSA 2003, section 4). In practice this 
parallel governance is characterized by unclear roles and questionable jurisdictions 
over the people, necessitating the negotiation of memorandums of understanding 
between the municipalities and tribal authorities (Buchanan 2011). There is thus 
some uncertainty as to how much power and influence they have within municipal 
structures (Buchanan 2011). Nevertheless, data collected from our interviews and 
observations show that the tribal authorities were consistently considered the legit-
imate representatives of local communities in and adjacent to the IWP, by both 
the IWPA and the communities themselves. Tribal authorities functioned as the 
communication link between the IWPA and local people. Tribal authorities also 
oversee much of their community’s affairs, including social rules and regulations.
Governance through tribal authorities comes with its own set of legal, social, 
economic, technical and bureaucratic norms. Though tribal authorities showed 
respect for the ecological system managed by the IWPA, the importance of social 
and economic development – and guarantees to uphold their traditions, including 
the medicinal, spiritual, nutritional and economic uses of natural resources – were 
observed to be their main priorities (Buchanan 2011).
Tensions between normative discourses and resulting 
management decisions around the conservation of World 
Heritage, and social and economic development
Various actors play a role in the governance of the IWP, mandated through policy 
and legislation at all levels – global and regional, national and local. Management 
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decisions taken by these actors are in turn guided by various normative discourses. 
As these discourses can be contradictory or ambiguous, management decisions 
often lead to conflict. This chapter highlights three areas where tensions are vis-
ible: the imposition of restrictions on everyday life for people residing within the 
IWP, the construction of physical conservation measures such as fences and the 
conditions and channels for participatory governance.
Restrictions on everyday life as a source of conflict between the 
public interest and local social and economic development
The consolidation of the IWP has led to the imposition of new rules of governance, 
which constrain the economic and social development activities and opportunities 
of local people falling within its boundaries. Our research in KwaDapha showed 
that negative perceptions of these restrictions are widespread. For example, one 
interviewee stated that: ‘after iSimangaliso came in 1999 they put sanctions on 
us. Life was better before. Now there are sanctions even in the lake. People can’t 
renovate their houses, can’t fish on the lake’ (interview, 6 September 2012).
One example of local perceptions of limitations to social development is the 
accusation that the IWPA was opposed to the building of the KwaDapha Pri-
mary School (interview, 6 September 2011). This is, however, in contradiction 
with the stated position of the IWPA, which aimed to ensure that the school was 
constructed in an ecologically sensitive manner (interview, 3 August 2012). It has 
also been stated that community members have been stopped from renovating the 
(Methodist) church in KwaDapha (interview, 6 September 2012).
Another example of perceptions of restrictions on economic activities and 
opportunities is related to illegal tourism development on the part of individu-
als in the Coastal Forest Reserve section of the IWP. As of 2 August 2011, there 
had been at least three concluded civil cases and one concluded criminal case, 
and there remained one outstanding criminal case, against local people and their 
partners (Savides 2011). The applicants in these cases – the Minister of Water and 
Environmental Affairs, the IWPA and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife – feared that the 
IWP would suffer irreparable damage, that it might lose its status as a World Her-
itage Site and that the communities which could benefit through controlled man-
agement of the park might suffer hardship, unless unlawful occupiers were stopped 
and evicted before it was too late (Kuppan 2009). The IWPA likened these tour-
ism development initiatives to ‘ecological theft’ (Kuppan 2009). Nevertheless, two 
interviewees involved in these initiatives in KwaDapha stated that they believed 
they had gone through the necessary channels for authorisation – receiving the 
go-ahead from the local induna and the owners of the land, the iNgonyama Trust 
(interview, 7 September 2011). One interviewee, quoted in a newspaper report, 
stated that ‘we believe that the court was wrong to rule against us. We followed all 
the relevant channels before we started building’ (South African Press Association 
[SAPA] 2009). In addition to obtaining permission from the local induna, they 
had also submitted their plans to the magistrate at iNgwavuma who allowed them 
to build (ibid.). It was additionally reported that developers would mobilize the 
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community against the IWPA (ibid.). During our household surveys and interviews 
in the area, it was clear that many community members held significant feelings 
of anger and resentment towards the IWPA because of the actions taken against 
tourism development initiatives in the area. The local induna stated in reference to 
this, that ‘we are not free in this area’ (interview, 11 September 2011).
Our interviews, focus group meetings and household surveys in KwaDapha also 
show that many community members had negative attitudes towards the IWPA as 
a result of a perceived lack of jobs in KwaDapha, due to these restrictions on tour-
ism development. One interviewee stated in reference to this: ‘employment gives 
money. Money gives food’ (interview, 11 September 2011). Another interviewee 
stated that,
we want the government to intervene to build big lodges for people to have 
jobs at KwaDapha. People won’t then have a problem with permits or sanc-
tions. . . . We have submitted an application to develop a 4-star diving lodge 
where the community tented camp currently is and to upgrade the Kosi Bay 
Beach Camp. Then iSimangaliso will find it easier to work with communities. 
If iSimangaliso doesn’t stop development, they will find it easier to work with 
the community.
(focus group meeting, 6 September 2012)
The above examples reveal a tension between the IWPA and local people’s per-
ceptions of their socio-economic development opportunities. There seems to be 
a conflict between sustainability norms of intergenerational justice and the con-
servation of World Heritage, on the one hand, and those of intersectional justice 
on the other. Although perceptions from local people of the restrictions placed 
on their livelihoods and social and economic development opportunities might 
be anecdotal, it is important to note the lacking or insufficient communication 
between the IWPA and local people (discussed in more detail in the section on 
democratic participation in the IWP). Negative perceptions of the impact of the 
IWP on everyday life is further complicated in the case of KwaDapha, as the 
area falls under the Coastal Forest land claim, which is yet to be settled. In prac-
tice this means that there has been limited benefit flow from the designation of 
the IWP as a World Heritage Site to local people. Walker (2008) highlights the 
issue of the public interest in protected areas in national environmental legisla-
tion and policy frameworks. She argues that the current orthodoxy for settling 
land claims in protected areas in South Africa, premised on commitment to 
social justice for those who were dispossessed of their rights in the past, tends 
to downplay or disregard the interests of other constituencies who are not 
claimants. Nevertheless, although we recognize the overall benefits of the IWP 
in terms of the public interest, we argue that where local livelihood and socio-
economic opportunities are constrained, in light of South Africa’s post-apart-
heid priorities that include intersectional justice and human rights, but also in 
terms of the policy framework for the IWP, some measure of recompense is 
necessary.
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Fencing as a source of conflict between conservation and 
livelihoods
The IWP is considered a natural asset of global significance that must be con-
served for the people of the region, the country and the world (IWPA 2008, p. 2). 
In order to conserve this asset, conservation and preservation measures have been 
instituted. In many instances, these measures have entailed restrictions on the live-
lihood activities of local communities, resulting in tensions.
A vivid example of such tensions between conservation and livelihoods is the 
construction of a fence between the IWP and adjacent areas. The IWP managers 
use the fence to preserve ecological integrity and endemism at the site in accord-
ance with technical conservation norms (UNESCO WHC 2011). For adjacent 
communities however, access to natural resources in the IWP (for example land 
for grazing and agriculture) has been an important social and economic norm. 
Tribal authority leaders of the Mbila, Makhasa, Nibela, and Mnqobokazi com-
munities adjacent to the IWP have all criticized the construction of a fence as 
potentially limiting their access to natural resources that are considered important 
for traditional use, economic use, health and food. Even where gates allow access, 
the communities are not confident that they will be allowed in.
Representatives of three of these four communities have refused to allow a fence. 
The other community has permitted the erection of a fence, even though the resi-
dents knowingly ignore the IWPA’s rules for access to the park. For instance, a 
tribal authority representative of the Mnqobokazi community explained that the 
tribal authority was not complying with the IWPA’s requests to restrict cattle graz-
ing in the park, because the authority was not ‘listening to them’ (interview, 15 
March 2011). Fences between the IWP and adjacent communities have even been 
cut down at various times and locations, according to the tribal authority lead-
ers interviewed. The Mbila tribal authority representatives confirmed that such 
a fence cutting event occurred at the time of our fieldwork in 2011 (interview, 20 
February 2011).
In a media statement released on 4 November 2009, the committee represent-
ing the Bhangazi, Dukuduku, Western Shores, Sokhulu, Mbila, Mdletsheni, Kwa-
Jobe and Triangle communities expressed their ‘wish to bring to the attention of 
the world and government’, the concern that their ‘rights to access land for graz-
ing, cropping and hunting are severely curtailed’ and that ‘community members 
who are trying to access the land to support themselves and their families are being 
subjected to all sorts of injustices’ (Savides 2009).
Fences have also been a problem for communities residing within the bound-
aries of the IWP. One interviewee recounted an instance when they had been 
denied access to the park at its Coastal Forest Reserve access gate, after returning 
to KwaDapha on foot from KwaNgwanase, late at night. The gate was burned 
down in 2009 (interview, 24 September 2011).
In our surveys, most households reported that they had experienced difficul-
ties with what they called ‘nature’s problem’. Older respondents in particular 
explained that they had detected an increase in forest cover over the preceding ten 
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or so years. They viewed this in a negative light, as they were not allowed to cut 
the trees down for fuel wood, and because hippopotami (Hippopotamus amphibious) 
and vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) frequently destroyed household subsist-
ence gardens.
Depending on one’s perspective, a fence is either a progressive tool for eco-
logical conservation or a stumbling block to local social and economic develop-
ment. The tensions between the elements of sustainability and different normative 
approaches to sustainable development become clear in any attempt to constitute 
a governance structure that brings these together.
Democratic participation in the IWP
‘Democratic participation’ is a normative discourse that appears frequently at all 
levels of governance. The South African Constitution emphasizes ‘cooperative 
government’ and ‘participatory democracy’. This democratic norm has established 
channels and conditions requiring governance to be conducted with consideration 
of the voices of stakeholders, including local residents. In practice, it is important 
to consider the depth of stakeholder engagement or public participation. If partici-
pation lacks depth, either purposely or accidentally, voices from the community 
and/or other actors are excluded. This can result in a bias towards some norma-
tive discourses in preference to others, leaving social justice and democracy in 
question.
The history of nature conservation in southern Africa is complex, with con-
servation more often than not in conflict with democratic values of participation 
(Fabricius 2004). In addition, the demarcation of conservation areas has often 
resulted in forced evictions and exclusion from natural resource use (Fabricius 
2004; Sunde and Isaacs 2008). The IWP is no exception in this regard: there have 
been a total of 14 land claims within the park (interview, 14 February 2011). Three 
of these were settled in 1998 and 2002, six in 2007, and five remained to be settled 
at the time of writing (IWPA 2010). Land claims within the IWP have been set-
tled through co-management agreements. The co-management process includes 
representatives of IWPA and the land claims committee, usually made up of tribal 
authority members in a given community.
At the People and Parks National Conference in 2010, communities presented 
a list of persistent problems and challenges they faced. A major concern related 
to co-management agreements. Many communities represented at the conference 
felt that co-management arrangements were not being implemented in a way that 
allowed communities to participate as much as they would like in local, regional 
and national decision-making processes, and that the government was failing to 
involve them adequately in the management of protected areas (NDEA 2010).
In the case of the IWP, the relationships between the IWPA and land claims 
committees vary from community to community, as our fieldwork revealed. 
They range from cooperative to obstructionist, with co-management agreements 
ignored in the latter case. In an interview with the Nibela tribal authority, the 
relationship with the IWPA was described as good, because both sides respected 
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the co-management agreement (interview, 25 February 2011). In the case of 
Mnqobokazi, however, the community was not observing the rules and regula-
tions established in their co-management agreement, which had not yet been for-
mally signed, and the IWPA was not meeting the community’s expectations. For 
example, according to a Mnqobokazi tribal authority representative, the commu-
nity is not restricting access to the park, while the IWPA is withholding the gate fee 
payout promised to the Mqnobokazi tribal authority (interview, 15 March 2011).
In addition, we find the depth of participation in planning and development 
activities related to the IWP to be lacking. According to various community mem-
bers and tribal authority representatives in the Nibela and Mbila communities, as 
well as officials of the Big Five False Bay Municipality, the views of many com-
munity members are not always heard, since attendance at stakeholder and public 
meetings can be low. Nzama (2009) has found that despite the fact that regular out-
reach workshops are held to foster communication between the IWPA and local 
communities, participation in planning and development activities is still limited. 
One reason elicited by our research for low attendance at stakeholder meetings, is 
that community members know that instead of attending decision-making meet-
ings, they can go to a second, and shorter, informational meeting the next day. 
The result is that those community members have no voice in decision-making.
Another reason is that participation through tribal leaders may favour commu-
nity members close to those leaders and exclude others. Sunde and Isaacs (2008) 
report that the Mabibi community, who reside within the IWP, are adamant that 
they are not able to participate in the management of the IWP – and that the 
community is unaware of the potential benefits flowing to them from the Thonga 
Beach Lodge and the Mabibi community campsite. The fact that some members 
of the community are unaware of this demonstrates the lack of adequate and effec-
tive participation in the planning process (Sunde and Isaacs 2008). One of the 
reasons Sunde and Isaacs (2008) give is the hierarchical structure of the local tribal 
authority.
The depth of participation is further limited by conflicting rationales, including 
sustainability norms and political interests. One such limiting factor observed dur-
ing research was the lack of interaction between the IWPA and the municipalities. 
This relationship is limited at best. Municipal officials from the Big Five False Bay 
Local Municipality stated that they had never had contact with the IWPA (inter-
views, 11 and 22 February 2011). The IWPA, for its part, stated that the roles of 
the authority and the municipalities were ‘separate and unrelated’ (interview, 14 
February 2011). This suggests that differing normative perspectives of sustainabil-
ity – the municipality striving for social development and the IWPA mainly for 
the conservation of World Heritage – can limit participation. Nevertheless, the 
municipalities hold information about the local residents, such as details of the 
areas needing social development more urgently (Big 5 False Bay Municipality, 
2010/2011) that could well serve the socio-economic development objectives of 
the IWPA.
In addition, observations during our fieldwork showed that elected officials have 
been known to steer the municipalities’ social development activities in directions 
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likely to win themselves political favour. For example, both Operation Upgrade 
and the Makhasa Adventist Group, non-profit organizations working in the area, 
stated that the mayor of the Big Five False Bay Municipality took credit for their 
work, without publicly acknowledging them in any way.
Discussion: The iSimangaliso Wetland Park as a place for 
inclusion and exclusion
The IWP’s status as a UNESCO World Heritage Site indicates that normative dis-
courses around the conservation of World Heritage and the public interest play a 
significant role in the management decisions taken by the IWPA, as well as its very 
existence. As the IWP’s integrated management plan affirms, the World Heritage 
concept implies that some sites on earth are important to all peoples of the world, 
irrespective of where they are located (IWPA 2008). In these terms, the IWP is a 
site for global conservation, its declaration as a World Heritage Site is introduced 
and justified in part by UNESCO, a global actor. World Heritage status places 
extra responsibilities on member states and site managers. In this context, ques-
tions arise about who should bear the costs of the IWP’s designation, particularly 
relating to communities living within and adjacent to the park.
The case study presents a local space where we see global, regional, national 
and local normative discourses intersecting (Cox 1998). Norms from all levels and 
all aspects of sustainability (ecological, social and economic) influence the man-
agement of the IWP. This is a space where different agents exert their normative 
beliefs about what is required to achieve sustainability. At the same time, norms 
are embedded in the policies, institutions and management decisions related to 
the IWP. In the context of the IWP, there are tensions between the different goals 
of sustainability, the conservation of World Heritage, and social and economic 
development and livelihoods. The achievement of all of these goals requires some 
trade-offs in decision-making. For example, the fence surrounding the IWP rep-
resents a strategy to conserve biodiversity, but can also be seen as an instrument 
reducing the livelihood options of local communities.
This raises questions of justice in the governance of the IWP. Arguably, South 
Africa’s political and conservation history demonstrates the need to think about 
reducing the injustices of the past, more than aspiring to achieve an ideally just 
society in the present. The theoretical approach to justice we take in this chapter 
is thus realization-focused and comparative, following Sen’s work presented in 
The Idea of Justice (2009). This approach focuses on the pressing need to remove 
identifiable injustices in the world, and is concerned with social realizations result-
ing from actual institutions, actual behaviours and other influences (Sen 2009). 
Specific questions asked around justice in this chapter focus on ‘Who gains what?’ 
and ‘At the expense of whom?’ The divergent goals of the conservation of World 
Heritage, and social and economic development, are admirable and essential for 
sustainable development. This is reflected clearly in the numerous policies that 
speak to society’s conception of sustainability that demands intersectional justice, 
in addition to the maintenance of ecological integrity.
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Achieving environmental governance for social justice is, however, a formidable 
task. Part of the challenge stems from the interaction of the underlying norms that 
guide different actors in trying to achieve this goal. Different normative approaches 
may be in conflict, leading to tensions that result in social injustices.
In the case of the IWP, management choices, decision-making structures, and 
policies, in support of conserving a World Heritage Site, are guided by a normative 
discourse around the global conservation. Although local needs are acknowledged, 
the impetus to ‘think global’ means that some choices have been made beyond the 
bounds of the local area. A question of justice arises not from simply looking at the 
local level, but rather through understanding the interplay caused by the intersec-
tion of several levels – in this case, the implementation of different policies and 
initiatives relating to the IWP. Nancy Fraser suggests that injustices at intersecting 
scales can lead to the social exclusion of the global poor (Fraser 2010).
The IWP’s identification as a UNESCO World Heritage Site raises it above the 
status of the local territory and, sometimes, beyond the decision-making authority 
of local people. There is no prioritization in explicit policy of the global conserva-
tion need over local social and economic development needs. Nevertheless, the 
strength of the global impetus is reflected in the fact that World Heritage status 
privileges certain actors and goals over others. This could lead to injustices of ‘mis-
framing’, in which some issues are framed as being primarily of local importance, 
yet obliged to compete for resources with issues that are considered to be of inter-
national or national importance.
The construction of physical conservation measures can also be regarded as a mat-
ter of distributive justice. According to technical norms of conservation, the fence is 
a logical choice to manage the movement of people and animals in and out of the 
IWP. Legally, the IWPA is well within its rights to erect such a structure. The tension 
arises when we consider the notion of access. People living in and around the IWP 
have had access to the park’s natural resources for decades. Although the question 
of ownership and property rights is still a contested one and will not be addressed 
here, another aspect of access refers to the ‘right to benefit from things’ (Ribot and 
Peluso 2003). In this case, it is a question about not simply a bundle of rights, but a 
bundle of powers. Clearly, the construction of a fence removes the power of the local 
residents to manage their movement in and out of the park. Management of people 
and animals is at the discretion of the IWPA. Building a fence implicitly suggests that 
the local residents will not self-manage their use of natural resources sustainably and 
must be managed instead. This limits the powers of the local community to play an 
active role in governing natural resources sustainably.
Finally, channels for participation and cooperative governance can also be used 
as means of inclusion and exclusion. A wide range of local, national and inter-
national actors operate in the area, and this raises questions of legitimacy and 
accountability. It is not clear whether cooperative governance actually does foster 
democratic consolidation, or whether the multitude of approaches and actors pro-
duces fragmented forms of authority, where the involvement and voice of indi-
viduals, and some groups, are lost (Ribot et al 2008). Local leaders are involved 
in specific decisions that are deemed to pertain to them, but management of the 
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IWP, for the most part, is left to the conservation ‘experts’. Local people are recog-
nized as important constituents of the heritage site, but more as beneficiaries than 
as conservators. In this light, socio-economic development is limited to a model 
based on ecotourism. Benefits for local people are in the form of material gains.
There are indeed present and potential injustices around the IWP, but these 
clearly do not result from explicit strategies to exclude local people. The pervasive 
nature of norms means that there are some fundamental beliefs about how pro-
tected areas such as the IWP should be managed. The World Heritage Conven-
tion Act and the IWPA espouse the goal of recognizing intergenerational equity 
with a level of priority that is not the same for municipalities or tribal authorities. 
Also, the means of achieving intergenerational equity may differ greatly based on 
the normative perspective. For example, to one person intergenerational equity is 
best achieved through conserving biodiversity, while to another person this may 
be done by improving the living conditions of the current generation (Sen 2009).
In this way, norms pervade decisions and actions about the IWP. In the process, 
different groups are recognized and have access differently to resources, decisions 
and benefits. In the end, the way people are included or excluded has implications 
for justice.
Conclusion
The analysis has revealed significant tensions between varying normative dis-
courses of sustainability and sustainable development at different levels: global and 
regional, national and local. First, the conservation of World Heritage is in conflict 
with the IWP as a regional political economy and development project through 
ecotourism development. Second, both of these have an impact upon social justice 
at a local level. These impacts must be addressed if the governance of the IWP as 
a World Heritage site is to be truly sustainable.
In effect, what this case study demonstrates is that management decisions aris-
ing from normative discourses around the conservation of World Heritage, as well 
as social and economic development, and livelihoods, are often in conflict. Effec-
tive governance cannot be negotiated without taking this into account. The study 
also illustrates the complex nature of conservation in the southern African context, 
and highlights important tensions that exist in realizing admirable concepts such 
as World Heritage at a local level, where competing goals exist.
Negotiating the environment-development nexus demands a deeper examina-
tion of diverging values and normative discourses. In this regard, analyses that take 
into account the normative concerns of multiple actors at varying levels (global, 
regional, national and local) are integral to a reflexive and adaptive governance 
regime.
Notes
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states: ‘All spheres of government 
and all organs of state within each sphere must exercise their powers and perform their 
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functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or insti-
tutional integrity of government in another sphere; and cooperate with one another in 
mutual trust and good faith’ (RSA 1996, section 41(1)(g) and (h)).
2 Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) are conservation areas that straddle 
the boundaries of two or more states, aiming to promote regional cooperation and 
development.
3 Cape Vidal State Forest, Dukuduku State Forest, Eastern Shores State Forest, False Bay 
Park, Makasa State Forest, Maphelane Nature Reserve, Maputaland Marine Reserve, 
uMkhuze Game Reserve, Nyalazi State Forest, Sodwana Bay National Park, Sodwana 
State Forest (Ozabeni), St Lucia Game Reserve, St Lucia Marine Reserve, St Lucia Park, 
Coastal Forest Reserve and Lake Sibaya Freshwater Reserve (IWPA 2008).
4 Enkovukeni, KwaDapha, Mqobela, Mbila, Shazibe and Hlabezimhlope.
5 Additional funding for specific projects has been received from the Global Environment 
Facility through the World Bank, among other sources.
6 The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) defines a district 
management area as part of a district municipality which has no local municipality and 
is governed by that district municipality alone (RSA 1998b).
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Introduction
Madagascar has long been renowned for its unique and threatened biodiversity, 
as well as the rich and diverse cultures of the Malagasy people and the severe 
poverty and exposure to natural disaster that they endure. The island has fre-
quently appeared in the media, however, as a result of political turmoil and natu-
ral resource governance dynamics. The infamous Daewoo land deal, subsequent 
political protests and the ousting of the country’s president, Marc Ravalomanana, 
in 2009 were followed by international media attention directed at the illegal rose-
wood and ebony trade, controversial oil sands and iron extraction deals and the 
negative social and environmental impacts of high-profile multinational mining 
projects (see Harbinson 2007a, 2007b; Andrew Lees Trust 2009; Global Witness 
and Environmental Investigation Agency 2009; Ballet et al 2010; Draper 2010; 
Gingembre et al 2010; Vinciguerra, 2010; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 2011; 
Burnod et al 2011).
Beyond these recent high-profile cases, Madagascar has, for the past decade 
and more, been the site of numerous mining ventures, agricultural land acquisi-
tions and new protected areas. The social and environmental impacts of many of 
these initiatives have been questioned in both popular media and academic litera-
ture, and many projects still operate beyond the radar of agencies responsible for 
these matters and do not even feature in regional development planning.1
This burgeoning interest in Madagascar’s resources has not occurred in a policy 
vacuum. Indeed, since the late 1980s, the country has seen numerous public policy 
and institutional reforms concerned with the management of natural resources 
and the governance of revenues gained from them (Fauroux and Blanc-Pamard 
2004; Rochegude and Plançon 2009; Teyssier et al 2009; Evers et al 2011). How-
ever, many of these reforms, as described in this chapter, have been observed to 
suffer serious setbacks and failings when it comes to their operationalization.
The rapid growth of interest in Madagascar – from the private sector in 
the island’s land and minerals, and from global conservationists focused on its 
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biodiversity – has without doubt led to cases of social injustice against the rural 
Malagasy people, whose customary and ancestral lands have been caught up in a 
modern natural resource rush (Fritz-Vietta et al 2011). These incidents are also, 
however, an indication of the potential which exists for more extensive and seri-
ous impacts in future. Both the actual trends and the potential for future impacts 
have led to the emergence of a number of civil society platforms, lobby groups 
and communication networks that have been established because of the rising 
concern about environmental destruction and social ills that neoliberal forces are 
articulating across the island.2 This has been accompanied by an additional focus 
on Madagascar by a number of international environmental and social justice 
campaigning groups,3 as well as significant institutional reviews of the challenges 
of natural resource governance by international agencies and donors including 
GIZ (formerly GTZ), the German technical cooperation agency (Ballet et al 2010), 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (Juttersonke and Cartas 2010), the World 
Bank (Carret et al 2010; Plangemann et al 2010) and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) (Freudenberger 2010). Typical of this 
domain, much additional activism on these issues is also carried out by individuals 
or unnamed groups and coalitions.
This chapter will address issues of social justice in environmental governance 
through its focus on the dynamics of ‘participation’ versus ‘exclusion’. Participation 
has been important in international development thinking for decades (e.g. Cham-
bers 1983) and more recently has begun to pervade discourse and policy in natu-
ral resource management (Randrianalijaona et al 2011). However, the term itself 
is somewhat nebulous, as pointedly shown in Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of 
participation’. Participation has the potential to genuinely empower local actors to 
take control of a given issue, but the term can also be applied to approaches that are 
little more than tools for placating or even manipulating less powerful participants, 
who become subject to outcomes predetermined by the instigators of ‘participa-
tion’. These less desirable manifestations of participation have been called tyran-
nical (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Nevertheless, participation offers a powerful lens 
through which to investigate social justice issues (Berghofer and Berghofer 2006).
The first four sections of this chapter explore four policy areas – agriculture, 
mining, forests and protected areas – which have had, and continue to have, a 
profound impact on the governance of ancestral lands in Madagascar. Each case 
is introduced with a brief description of policy reforms, after which the role and 
depth of participation in the design and implementation of reforms, and the con-
sequences of this for social justice, are investigated. The fifth section reflects on 
conceptions of ancestral land, rights and power and their implications for environ-
mental governance. Finally, certain conclusions are drawn about the overall social 
justice impacts of three decades of policy reform.
Land tenure reform and agribusiness
Madagascar has attracted a large number of investors in the global land rush 
(Burnod et al 2011), partly spurred by reports claiming that the island boasts large 
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tracts of ‘idle’ land (World Bank 2010). According to the Malagasy Ministry of 
Agriculture, a total of eight million hectares of arable land is available on the island 
(Ministère de l’Agriculture, de l’Elevage et de la Pêche [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Fisheries] [MEAP] 2009, cited in Burnod et al 2011) while, accord-
ing to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2007, cited in Burnod et 
al 2011), the true extent could even be 15 million or 20 million hectares. Inves-
tors were also enticed by favourable investment policies under the Ravalomanana 
regime, which prevailed from 2002 to 2009, when, for the first time in Malagasy 
history, foreigners were allowed to buy land.4 They were also offered a facilitating 
structure, the Economic Development Board of Madagascar, a one-stop service 
provider for investors, which ranked agribusiness among its six priorities and was 
empowered to authorize land prospecting and streamline bureaucratic processes 
to catalyse investment.
From 2005 to 2010, more than 50 agricultural projects were recorded, each 
involving 1,000 hectares or more (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 2011). The 
largest was led by the South Korean company Daewoo, which sought to acquire 
1.3 million hectares, and then came the Indian company Varun with 230,000 
hectares. Both were ultimately suspended because of international resistance 
and through the political instrumentalization of the threats these projects repre-
sented to the local landholders (Gingembre et al 2010; Vinciguerra 2010).5 Of 
the 50 or so original projects, only one-quarter are still under way at the time 
of writing, and the total area of land concerned has decreased from three mil-
lion to 130,000 hectares. More than two-thirds of the interested operators are 
foreigners, most focused on leasing rather than buying land. Contrary to what 
the Daewoo case may have suggested, most ongoing investments aim to produce 
biofuel, rather than address food security concerns (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana 
et al 2011).
Madagascar boasts a legal framework that embodies most of the principles 
advocated by the international community in the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Con-
text of National Food Security6 agreed upon in 2012 (Anseeuw et al 2012), and 
is therefore an important site for the study of these corporate land-related invest-
ments. Indeed, the country’s legal framework, in theory, supports best practice 
in commercial farming, including land securitization, the transfer of author-
ity for land matters to local governments, and local participation in natural 
resource management (Teyssier 2010). Madagascar is one of the few southern 
countries where untitled land is no longer considered state-owned (the presump-
tion of state-ownership having been abolished in 2005).7 Moreover, populations 
are provided with affordable tools to secure their land property rights officially, 
an issue that is discussed further later in this chapter. However, initial empirical 
studies have revealed flaws in the procedures for lease issuance, infringements 
of people’s rights under the regime of ‘untitled private property’ and a gen-
erally low degree of understanding among the rural populations of what their 
rights are with regard to these procedures8 (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 
2011).
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Agricultural land tenure and reform
Malagasy legislation requires investors to fulfil a certain number of obligations to 
ensure that their projects do not present any environmental and social risks to the 
localities concerned. Besides providing a business plan, investors need to obtain an 
environmental permit from the National Office for the Environment if their project 
affects 1,000 hectares or more. According to the 1999 decree Mise en Compatibilité 
des Investissements avec l’Environnement (MECIE), which includes provisions on environ-
ment impact assessment,9 such a permit is only granted after the validation of an 
impact assessment that considers environmental and socio-economic issues, while 
also setting out in a management plan how impacts will be monitored and mitigated. 
In December 2010, the central government issued a new letter of instruction to the 
administration, which imposed a strict and lengthy procedure for investors looking 
to acquire or lease tracts of land equal to or greater than 2,500 hectares.10 Although 
this instruction stated that no land should be leased or bought without the popula-
tion and local government having been consulted, it should be noted that only one of 
the 18 procedural steps investors are required to follow involves non-state actors.
In terms of customary property rights protection, the first attempt towards offi-
cial recognition came with a 1998 decree dealing with relative land tenure secu-
rity,11 which was designed for local communities to whom the state had transferred 
management of natural resources through a 1996 law regulating the local man-
agement of renewable natural resources.12 These communities were encouraged 
to demarcate their village land (terroir) and start formally registering their rights 
over it. The procedure remained traditional (boundary marking and area demar-
cation), but opened the possibility of having collective titles to land (Rochegude 
and Plançon 2009). Although the land tenure decree represented progress in that 
it allowed communities to exclude colonizing immigrants from their lands, imple-
mentation was weak and, in any case, did not provide recognition or security for 
individual customary land.
The next major change occurred in 2005, when a thorough land reform process 
established that untitled land would no longer be considered state property, and 
would instead be deemed private property over which current dwellers and/or 
users should have a say.13 This was backed by a decentralization of authority for 
land matters to local communes and by the creation of guichets fonciers (local land 
offices) to whom anyone able to prove an ongoing de facto use or occupation of 
a tract of land within the sovereignty of these institutions could apply for a land 
certificate. The intention was to simplify the procedure by consolidating the proc-
ess in one place, thus reducing the number of agents involved, the time taken and 
the cost, while providing the holder with the same rights and prerogatives as land 
titles (Teyssier et al 2009).
Foreign investment, land reform and social justice
Despite these legal constraints, livelihoods and environmental diversity remain 
poorly protected when confronted with major agribusiness investments. In states 
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such as Madagascar, where power is personalized and regime turnover is high, 
changes in laws and policies are frequent. Natural resource management policies 
are therefore superseded by new policies or preferences before having been prop-
erly rolled out, and responsibilities are regularly transferred from one institution to 
another. In addition to this, land titling procedures in Madagascar are extremely 
long and drawn-out, with an average period of more than six years to obtain a 
title (Malagasy Land Observatory 2008). In practice, this results in complex situa-
tions, incomplete rights (e.g. where an area has been demarcated but is not titled), 
blocked status and competing rights or claims (Evers et al 2011).
In addition, an examination of land access negotiation procedures shows that 
the law-making has not taken sufficient consideration of political structures, socio-
economic conditions, culturally embedded power dynamics and natural resource 
management norms. For instance, the obligation to obtain the mayor’s consent 
before undertaking any land deal does not ensure that the local users’ rights will be 
adequately defended. A review of ongoing land acquisition projects in the country 
demonstrated that no mayors had ever raised objections; this was attributed to the 
hierarchical ‘political and economic pressures’ that constrain the freedom of may-
ors to make real decisions (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 2011). In Madagas-
car, local leaders have very limited autonomy indeed. Some major local officials, 
such as heads of region and sometimes mayors, are directly appointed by cen-
tral authorities,14 while others, thanks to the domination of the ruling presidential 
party, are indebted and therefore loyal to higher-ranked officials.
More importantly, for municipalities with underfunded budgets, private invest-
ments are often a highly welcome source of revenue (in the form of land taxes and 
rental fees) and providers of social service infrastructure (through compensation 
mechanisms). Mayors and other local officials involved may therefore be tempted 
to obfuscate certain land uses and rights in order to ease the way for investment 
(Burnod et al 2013).
The implementation of land reform is also hampered by insufficient communi-
cation and information. The law provides that, before untitled land can be allo-
cated to an investor, a commission has to go into the field and check whether 
there are already established occupants. Observation of this recognition proce-
dure being carried out in recent investment projects confirms that little considera-
tion is given to the status of untitled private property or to the protection of local 
rights (Burnod et al 2011), and that the category of ‘untitled land’ is frequently 
confused with that of ‘state land’. All commissions so far have concluded that there 
is ‘nothing to declare’, even where grazing and/or agricultural activities are clearly 
evident. Even property rights that were formalized through the establishment of 
land certificates or use rights recognized through the GELOSE (Gestion Locale 
Securisée) procedure have, on occasion, been ignored.
Since the maps used by state land titling services do not yet feature these certifi-
cates: the only institutions that can attest to their existence in land claims proce-
dures are the guichets fonciers. However, their teams are not always included in the 
land recognition procedure (Burnod et al 2011). Needless to say, in places where 
there still are no guichets fonciers, including many of the prominent mining areas and 
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the hinterlands of many new protected areas, the private property presumption of 
untitled land is even more remote a prospect.
Legal tools do not always work as intended, and, in certain instances, the rules 
are flouted. Most investors either lack information or do not see the point in engag-
ing in long, complex procedures before they can be certain that their investment 
will be fruitful. Often advised by national brokers, they seem to be aware that fol-
lowing the official institutional pathway is of less importance than securing high-
level political support. Their targets and ethics, and the advice they get, drive them 
to adopt different institutional paths: some strive for support from high-ranking 
officials, whether from the region or from local authorities (Andrianirina-Ratsialo-
nana et al 2011). These contacts are often validated by ‘contracts’ or ‘conventions’ 
which are not legally valid or binding, but can nonetheless help in securing the 
trust of financial backers and ensuring, through respect for patronage networks, 
the approval of other public agencies and leaders (Burnod et al 2011).
Observation of Malagasy realities suggests that securing local land rights is 
a very long and complex process, and that the legal regulation of investment, 
which is called for by many (Cotula et al 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 
2009; World Bank 2010), may not be sufficient to ensure that people’s customary 
property rights are not undermined or flouted.
Mining, centralization and political power
Motivated by the desire to attract foreign direct investment and shaped by institu-
tional reforms advocated by the World Bank, Madagascar, like many other devel-
oping countries, has implemented structural changes to its governance systems, 
as part of a liberalization drive towards manufacturing and urbanization (Pegg 
2003; Kambhampati 2004). These reforms include reducing taxes, royalties and 
other fees; eliminating restrictions on the repatriation of profits; and strengthening 
investor rights (Pegg 2003, 2006). Such economic measures, however, facilitate 
the transfer of profits by large-scale mining companies from the host country (i.e. 
where the mineral reserves are) to where those companies are domiciled, resulting 
in a disconnect from the local economy, since less money is available to stimu-
late the local economy or for government reinvestment in development projects. 
Moreover, although companies benefit from attractive fiscal policies, host gov-
ernments typically receive minimal revenues from mineral extraction (Szablowski 
2007).
Policy reforms such as these, and inherently weak governance mechanisms, have 
enabled large-scale mining to expand into certain vulnerable countries, such as 
Madagascar, without effective regulatory control (Civil Society Structural Adjust-
ment Participatory Review Initiative [SAPRIN] 2002). Dependence on mineral 
wealth can have a negative impact on the political stability and economic and 
social development of a country – the paradox of the resource curse (see Atkinson 
and Hamilton 2003; Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Pegg 2003, 2006; Sachs and Warner 
2001; Stevens and Dietsche 2008). Although large-scale mining operations have 
been the focus of recent discussion, artisanal mining, particularly for gemstones 
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and gold, are not insignificant and have considerable socio-economic and environ-
mental impacts (Cook and Healy 2012).
Access to land by mining companies – as regulated by mining reforms, land 
tenure and environmental legislation – and potential conflicts involving ancestral 
lands are key issues for the industry. Madagascar presents an interesting case study 
for mining operations, as modern titling coexists with informal or ancestral tenure 
systems (Jacoby and Minten 2007), though not always harmoniously. Ancestral 
lands are by far the most significant land ownership category in rural areas and 
‘belong’ to either communities or individual families. Private mining companies 
need to secure their shareholders’ investments with titled land or leases to surface 
rights. The investment law of 2008 states that registered companies in Madagascar 
can acquire titled land for business development,15 however, the process requires 
the support of existing land authorities. Titled land is, of course, the preference for 
the developers of large mines, although some potential foreign mining investors 
may have to be content with a lease, as securing title can be difficult due to the 
persistent resistance of some authorities to selling land to foreigners.
Mining policy reform
An important restructuring of mining policy began in 1998, with further reforms 
in 2005. The principal aims of these reforms were to liberalize the mining sec-
tor and disengage the state (GLW Conseil 2009). These aims coincided with the 
goals of encouraging better governance and transparency in mining through col-
laboration with the Mining Sector Reform Project. The Mining Code also rein-
forced relations between departments in the Ministry of Mines and the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests.16 Meanwhile, the ongoing political crisis has stalled 
further policy reform, which would integrate mining into regional development 
planning, environmental protection and good governance in the artisanal min-
ing sector (GLW Conseil 2009). Although previous efforts by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank did estab-
lish the concept of integrated regional planning in the Anosy region (southern 
Madagascar) through a dynamic mineral resources management scheme and the 
establishment of a regional stakeholder alliance, this process became dependent 
upon the stimulus provided by transnational company Rio Tinto and public-
private partnerships such as that facilitated by the German technical cooperation 
agency, GIZ.
However, the focus of reform was skewed to conserving biodiversity, rather than 
ensuring the well-being of human populations. Mining reform processes in 2007 
created environmental units within the regional departments for mines, which are 
orchestrated by a central unit within the Ministry of Mines. The principal objec-
tive of these environmental units should be to evaluate simplified environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs) and support the National Office for the Environment’s 
technical committees with evaluations of full EIAs. The environmental unit should 
have an important role working with decentralized authorities, focusing principally 
upon regional and local governments, as well as civil society organizations and 
70  Barry Ferguson et al
community associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and regional 
representatives from various ministries, including the Ministry of Lands.
However, the quality of EIAs varies, and they can also be complex or ambigu-
ous. The competence or political bias of associations or civil society groups in the 
EIA process could be prejudicial to or limit constructive participation in EIAs. 
Indeed, the decision over the modalities of public participation in the evaluation 
is left to the National Office for the Environment and barely constrained by law 
(article 15 of MECIE decree). Therefore it is imperative that communities be vis-
ible and proactive throughout the processes.
Meanwhile, the processing of certain EIAs can be fast-tracked where compa-
nies are keen to maintain investment momentum. Land office commissions can 
conduct site assessments under the direction of the specific head of region, who 
does not systematically inform every person affected by the project, as this proc-
ess is delegated to mayors and heads of villages (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 
2011). These local representatives may not understand the processes involved in 
securing lands and instead may focus solely on compensatory measures. Further-
more, the guichets fonciers are scarce in many regions of the country, meaning that 
the dissemination of information about, and provision of, land tenure services are 
limited. However, existing local land offices in some parts of the country are now 
attempting to adopt the National Tenure Programme approach, although empiri-
cal evidence of whether, or how, these have functioned in areas of mining interest 
is not yet available.
Equally problematic are compensation schemes, since the availability of alter-
native cultivable land is sometimes limited for persons affected by the project, 
as was the case in some areas near the Rio Tinto mining project (Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana et al 2011). In addition, the National Office for the Environment is 
centralized in the capital Antananarivo, although it liaises with regional offices of 
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, and the process of creating decentralized 
offices has not been completed. The regulations exist to address tensions between 
mining ventures and community interests, although these are severely constrained 
in terms of good governance and transparency, which are further compounded 
by weak political and institutional capacities (World Bank 1998; Sarrasin 2004, 
2006).
Madagascar’s mining code levies a royalty tax of 2 per cent of a mutually agreed 
initial price of the mined product. This tax is apportioned at two levels: 1.4 per 
cent (ristournes) to the regional government where the mine is situated and 0.6 
per cent (redevance) to the state. Regional ristournes are further distributed at three 
administrative levels: commune (60 per cent), region (30 per cent) and province (10 
per cent) (ATW 2010). Ristournes spending at commune level from the Rio Tinto 
project, however, does not always provide sustainable assistance to the families 
most significantly impacted by the mining project (Smith 2012). This observation 
is in line with evidence from studies in other sub-Saharan countries, which suggest 
that mining revenues rarely benefit the poorest 20 per cent of the population and 
may, in fact, worsen their situation (Ross 2001). Thus, as increased mine produc-
tion releases more money into the regional economy, more equitable ristournes dis-
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tribution at the grassroots will be critical to reducing the risk of an economic gap 
widening between beneficiary and non-beneficiary communities.
Political power, participation and social justice
Motivated by the revenue associated with mining investments, which reduces 
its commitment to the regulation of the country’s extractive industries, the state 
centralizes control of Madagascar’s large-scale mining agenda in certain ways, 
including the manipulation of regional and local government (Smith et al 2011). In 
strategic mineral-rich locations, elections are routinely decided by political patron-
age more than the preferences of the electorate, and this creates a hierarchy of 
dependencies. Local government is further weakened by a decentralization strat-
egy in which budgets and authority are not devolved. Moreover, political pressure 
and funding difficulties militate against the responsibility of the National Office 
for the Environment and the Ministry of Mines to monitor the impact of mining 
activities.
Mediation mechanisms, such as forums chaired by local government officials, 
typically are weak, lack momentum, have few grassroots links and are held in 
low regard by the communities they are intended to represent. This dichotomy 
of local government – that it acts as an agent of national government while also 
being supposed to represent broader society – brings into question the legitimacy 
of certain civil society representatives. In effect, individuals and communities in 
rural Madagascar generally have limited access to mechanisms for consultation 
with, or making representations to, elected politicians. The outcome, in effect, is a 
general suppression of both opposition and community resistance.
Community disempowerment is exacerbated by disconnects at many levels, 
partly due to the relative isolation of rural communities, the economic divergence 
between rural and urban populations and conflict between modern local govern-
ment and traditional values (Marcus 2008). Lack of collaboration and solidarity 
among those with common concerns (Fauroux and Blanc-Pamard 2004) weak-
ens communities’ abilities to negotiate with mining companies. For example, in 
the Anosy region, the site of Rio Tinto’s operations, displaced communities situ-
ated in different neighbouring administrative districts have protested separately, 
not as a group, against the government and mining company regarding land 
compensation.
Madagascar’s official mechanism of public consultation regarding proposed 
mining projects inherently limits community input into the design and develop-
ment of plans. First, consultation typically occurs at an advanced stage of negotia-
tions between the company and government, when permit approval is already 
virtually assured. The power balance is heavily weighted against the community, 
and therefore there is little motivation for the government or mining company to 
invest in expensive community participation processes. The consultation is mostly 
expert-led, rather than participant-driven, entailing issues and concepts beyond 
the experience of most rural communities. Pointing to such power relations, Szab-
lowski (2007) also contests the claim that the World Bank’s voluntary resettlement 
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policy is participatory. Essentially, communities have no opportunity to oppose 
resettlement or development plans for mining projects, so while they might be said 
to have ‘participated’ in the consultations, in reality they have no chance of influ-
encing the outcome, which leaves them, as manipulated citizens, at the bottom of 
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation.
Aiming to emulate successful societies worldwide, the Malagasy government ini-
tiated a network of platforms of civil society organizations to act as regional com-
munity representation forums that could also build capacity within and between 
community-based associations. The intention was to create a framework that 
would link existing grassroots associations to one another and to regional forums, 
and subsequently link those regional platforms to one another, thus strengthening 
civil society.
A key role of these platforms is to represent civil society within the Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is an externally vali-
dated voluntary scheme that advocates financial transparency by governments, 
and addresses the need to develop public understanding of mining revenues and 
expenditure to improve expectations of accountability (EITI 2008). This is a key 
response to concerns about mining companies achieving and retaining a ‘social 
licence’ to operate. However, in Madagascar, mainly large players, including 
the Ambatovy (a nickel and cobalt mine in eastern Madagascar) and Rio Tinto 
projects, participate at present, while many smaller foreign or national mining 
investors remain outside the process. In addition, civil society engagement in 
Madagascar’s EITI process has been limited, as stakeholder meetings were can-
celled when government commitment to the EITI declined during the 2009 politi-
cal crisis (Smith et al 2011). Several platforms of civil society organizations also 
lacked the coherence and motivation to continue functioning autonomously when 
external funding was withdrawn.
Project finance agreements can require companies to comply with a complex 
array of economic, social and environmental standards: that is, economic require-
ments to deliver positive investment returns, social policy objectives regarding 
people issues, and quantifiable environmental performance indicators and impact 
assessments. Of these stipulations, social standards are the least evolved and are 
often based on environmental objectives (Overseas Development Institute [ODI] 
2005).
Moreover, although the extractive industries attract significant research 
interest, little of that research is about the social consequences at the grassroots. 
However, Rio Tinto’s history of environmental and social problems around the 
world is regularly debated (Martinez-Alier 2001; International Longshore and 
Warehouse Union 2010) and, thanks to the unique biodiversity in Madagas-
car, the project there has attracted significant external interest (see e.g. World 
Wide Fund for Nature [WWF] 2005; Friends of the Earth, 2007; Harbinson, 
2007b). Several lobbyists have raised concerns about the quality of the social and 
environmental impact assessment (WWF 2005), particularly the inadequate 
consideration of social issues, such as moving traditional burial grounds, 
health risks, inflation in the cost of living, pressure on already limited natural 
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resources and insufficient focus on capacity-building prior to mining activities 
commencing.17
Nevertheless, since Madagascar is recognized as a biodiversity hotspot, external 
influences and weak governance have combined to perpetuate the unbalanced 
focus on environmental and conservation issues rather than socio-economic devel-
opment (Myers et al 2000; Sarrasin 2006, 2009). For instance, Rio Tinto, the 
first international large-scale mining company to begin operating in the country, 
embarked on environmental research at an early stage of exploration with leading 
international partners such as the Missouri Botanical Garden and Kew Millen-
nium Seed Bank (Ganzhorn et al 2007). Rio Tinto’s environmental department, 
which employs a number of local people as field agents and research assistants, 
has established strong links at grassroots levels and operates a strong, although 
non-transparent, multi-stakeholder biodiversity committee. In contrast, the social 
department – which was established later, has no equivalent social committee and 
consists of a significantly smaller team – has recognized difficulties in ongoing dia-
logue and consultation with local communities and other social sector stakeholders 
(Smith 2012). Weaknesses in Rio Tinto’s social strategy, particularly land purchase 
and resettlement policies, as well as employment practices, are an ongoing source 
of local discontent, manifesting as protests, blockades and demonstrations in and 
around the company’s mining locations (ClientEarth 2010; Friends of the Earth 
2007), which local politicians exploit or incite for their benefits.
Although society expects corporate social responsibility from the industry, invest-
ment in high-profile infrastructure such as schools and clinics is more motivated 
by public relations, aimed at achieving legitimacy, than embedded in firm policies 
designed to achieve measurable social change and poverty reduction (Smith et al 
2011). Such projects are routinely cited in annual reports without consideration 
also being given to the overall net social impacts of company activities.
The Global Mining Initiative, established by nine transnational mining companies 
in the 1990s, aimed to explore the industry’s approach to sustainable development, 
and launched the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development project for that 
purpose. In its report, the project conceded that the industry was not addressing the 
key elements of sustainable development, such as poverty alleviation, employment 
opportunities, capacity-building, good governance and stakeholder engagement, 
and, as a consequence, had failed to convince stakeholders of its ‘social licence to 
operate’ (International Institute for Environment and Development [IIED] and 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development [WBCSD] 2002).
In contrast to the fragility of civil society and weak institutional capacity of 
government, the power and authority of the mining industry and international 
lending institutes give them strategic influence. As Sarrasin (2009) explains, Rio 
Tinto’s influence over the policies developed under Madagascar’s Mining Sector 
Reform Project and Mineral Resources Governance Project, both backed by the 
World Bank, is evidenced by the low levels of royalties and taxes being paid by 
mining companies operating in that country.
In conclusion, civil society’s fragility and low expectation of accountabil-
ity encourages a general acceptance of the lack of enforcement and regulation. 
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Moreover, voluntary standards, such as the EITI, which advocate stakeholder 
engagement as a mechanism to achieve good governance, fail to take account 
of complex power relations between stakeholders and the key motivation behind 
relationships. Given the fragility and neo-patrimonial character of post-colonial 
states such as Madagascar, the significant challenge is to identify what kind of 
pragmatic approaches to improving governance and revenue distribution can be 
developed.
Community forest management and the free lunch
Renewed interest in Madagascar’s biodiversity from the mid-1980s was initially 
manifested in a phase during which the original protected areas were reinforced 
and a small number of new ones established. Then, in the mid-1990s, the donor-
funded National Environmental Action Plan began a process of transferring the 
management of forests to communities18 (Transfert de Gestion [TDG]).19 Community 
forest management (CFM) was expected to promote both ecological integrity and 
social justice in Madagascar, as in other countries, but it has been critiqued on 
both counts (Bertrand 1999; Antona et al 2004; Raik and Decker 2007; Toillier et 
al 2008; Kull 2004; Dressler et al 2010).
CFM can promote ecological integrity and social justice in two ways. First, it 
can convert de facto open-access resources (nominally state-controlled) into com-
mon property, from which communities gain the legal rights to exclude outsiders 
and control exploitation levels. Given appropriate social and ecological conditions 
(Ostrom et al 1999) this may reduce implicit discount rates, shifting harvested 
populations to new equilibria, both more productive and ecologically robust (Tiet-
enberg 2000; Reynolds et al 2001), solving Hardin’s infamous tragedy of the com-
mons (Hardin 1968). Second, CFM may achieve its aims by replacing agents of 
the state (who may lack the capacity or incentive to protect forest resources) with 
communities with greater ability and/or incentive to manage the resources sustain-
ably, due to their knowledge of, proximity to and reliance upon these resources. In 
neither case, however, is it certain that CFM will produce the level or type of forest 
management desired by the external agencies, including the state and conserva-
tion NGOs, which often drive the process forward, as happened in Madagascar. 
Nor can it be assumed that CFM will necessarily advance social justice.
Conception, design and implementation of forest management 
transfers
Madagascar’s TDG or management transfer policy was the product of several 
influences, including the rise of CFM internationally and criticisms of earlier 
conservation paradigms in Madagascar and elsewhere for exacerbating poverty. 
These factors led to a desire to demonstrate that conservation could benefit the 
rural poor, whom conservationists nevertheless held responsible for biodiversity 
loss. More specifically, TDG was part of a process of decentralization and privati-
zation in Madagascar, which sought to make the National Environmental Action 
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Plan more ‘participatory’, and conservation ‘self-sustaining’, by moving the costs 
of conservation from the state and donor community to others, including com-
munities and the private sector. Finally, TDG was shaped by the considerable 
influence of the international donor and NGO community in Madagascar, driven 
to a large extent by biodiversity conservation interests and the desire to increase 
the area of forest under conservation management (see e.g. Kull 2004; Kaufmann 
2008; Corson 2010).
Overall, while no one wanted conservation in general, or TDG in particular, 
to have a negative effect on social justice, the process was dominated by conserva-
tion-oriented organizations, with no comparable representation from community 
or social justice groups. Thus, while TDG was couched in a rhetoric of dual goals 
(ecological protection combined with community participation and poverty alle-
viation), there was in practice an imbalance of intentions and the main focus was 
on achieving conservation cheaply.
Two important features of Madagascar’s TDG policy result from this. First, 
TDG was not necessarily ‘community-based’, since forests could be transferred to 
private operators such as hotels. The emphasis in transferring management was to 
move it away from the state, rather than towards communities. TDG assumed the 
existence of a well-organized ‘operator’, able to turn the forest to more productive 
use while also protecting it. Second, it is important to note that management was to 
be transferred, not ownership – which remained with the state.
Management is a responsibility (in other words, it has a cost), and whether 
changes in management yields benefits to communities depends on the degree to 
which the rights are transferred. Rights to clear forest could not be granted under 
TDG, and rights to the commercial exploitation of forest resources were neither 
automatically nor commonly included, despite being among the central elements 
of the original TDG concept in Madagascar, as formulated by its proponents in 
the French cooperation agencies.
Apart from certain well-funded exceptions, the implementation of TDG was 
often hurried and imperfect, with donors accused of engaging in a ‘race for con-
tracts’ (Josserand 2001). A key feature was the enormous difference between the 
‘oral contract’ proposed to communities and the written contract signed by com-
munities with the state. In some cases the former threatened communities with 
the possible privatization of their forests to outsiders if they did not sign a TDG 
contract, and promised development assistance if they did (Hockley and Andria-
marovololona 2007). The contracts actually signed by most communities imposed 
stringent management and reporting responsibilities on the communities, while 
granting few, if any, use rights and guaranteeing no assistance with their duties, 
nor any development aid. In most cases, in effect, communities won the dubi-
ous ‘right’ to carry out the state’s management work for it, and were implicitly 
expected to reach a higher standard than the state had achieved, yet with no exter-
nal support.
We know very little about the effects of TDG generally in Madagascar because 
there have been no rigorous, quantitative evaluations of either the environmental 
or the socio-economic effects, reflecting the situation internationally (Bowler et al 
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2012). Given the funding allocated to TDG in Madagascar and similar policies 
elsewhere (raised through public donation and taxation), this is surprising. One 
must therefore rely on mostly qualitative case studies of TDG, which may or may 
not be representative of the country as a whole.
What can be said, based on published accounts and work done by the authors of 
this chapter, is that while there have probably were some success stories, it seems 
likely that in many cases TDG had limited positive effects on either the condition 
of the forest or the welfare of local communities. This was not through lack of 
enthusiasm on the part of communities, who often embraced the concept. Rather 
it stemmed from an imbalance in the conception and design of TDG. Those stake-
holders who drove the development of TDG believed that it would provide a 
win-win solution: stopping deforestation and improving local livelihoods. This was 
based on a simplistic view of slash-and-burn agriculture as being primarily a trag-
edy of the commons, rather than a rational use of forest lands, and overestimation 
of the potential of non-timber forest products and ecotourism to generate income 
for communities, without the need to allow logging (which few conservationists 
wanted to do).
As a result, the state and its donors drove too hard a bargain with communi-
ties (who were greatly influenced by the ‘oral contract’) and tried to extract a free 
lunch: better, cheaper forest protection and improved rural livelihoods. When the 
‘oral contract’ proved illusory, communities found TDG to provide little value, 
the written contract became unstable and matters reverted more or less to the pre-
TDG situation (Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007).
Participation and social justice
CFM may improve environmental governance, but good governance will not nec-
essarily pay for itself, besides delivering global public benefits. Where ecological 
integrity does not simply amount to a tragic scramble for open access resources, 
CFM alone will not deliver improved ecological integrity without inputs from other 
stakeholders who stand to benefit: there is no free lunch for conservationists. Nor 
will it deliver social justice gains, unless it transfers significant rights to communi-
ties and allows them to access new, high-value markets for their resources, which 
may impact ecological integrity (e.g. low-impact logging), or to rely on slowly 
developing international markets (e.g. ecotourism or carbon credits). Though well 
intentioned, TDG was destined to perform poorly, suffering as it did from an 
imbalance of interests in its design and an asymmetry of power and information 
in its implementation.
While conservationists may regard the recent ravages of Madagascar’s forest 
resources as an unfortunate and unpredictable ‘blip’ in Madagascar’s environ-
mental governance caused by temporary political instability, they should perhaps 
consider whether the damage was not caused in part by internationally driven 
environmental programmes that refused to significantly alter the forest tenure 
regime inherited from colonial times (Brandon and Wells 1992). If communi-
ties had held widely recognized, comprehensive and long-term property rights to 
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‘their’ forests, the current fire sale of Madagascar’s precious timbers might have 
been more limited or, at the very least, might have generated more value for local 
communities, rather than for corrupt agents of the state.
Participation in creation of new protected areas
One of the newest areas of environmental governance policy in Madagascar is the 
country’s second generation of protected areas, launched in 2003 at the World 
Parks Congress in Durban, South Africa. Under strong donor pressure (Duffy 
2006; Horning 2008), the government declared its intention to triple the coun-
try’s protected area coverage, in line with International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) recommendations, to cover 10 per cent of the country’s total 
land area (Mittermeier et al 2005; Norris 2006). Known as the Durban Vision, 
this ambitious programme required a wholesale rethink of the way in which the 
country looked at its protected areas. The existing strict protected area models 
were seen as unsuitable for most new sites because the remaining natural habitats 
were largely surrounded by rural communities, who were heavily dependent on 
natural resources for their subsistence and household income. Furthermore, the 
national parks agency lacked the capacity to oversee the expansion programme, 
and protected area governance was therefore opened to a range of actors includ-
ing NGOs, local community associations and private landowners, as well as vari-
ous forms of collaboration between these groups.
New policy for new protected areas
Madagascar’s protected area system (Système d’Aires Protégées de Madagascar [SAPM[) 
comprises two parallel sub-networks, each with its own management objectives, 
conservation approaches and systems of governance. The country’s first protected 
area was created in 1927, and by 2003 this network had grown to include 46 
protected areas in IUCN categories I to IV (Randrianandianina et al 2003). Origi-
nally the responsibility of the Waters and Forests Service (now the Minister of 
Environment and Forests), from the mid-1990s the management of these pro-
tected areas was transferred to the parastatal national park agency (formerly the 
Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées, rebranded Madagascar National 
Parks in 2008), which was created in the first phase of the National Environmental 
Action Plan.
Many of these protected areas were established in ‘wilderness areas’ with neg-
ligible human populations (Ferguson 2010), and their management objectives 
focused primarily on the conservation of biodiversity in its natural state, alongside 
scientific research and recreation. As of 2001, the management and use of pro-
tected areas was regulated under national legislation20 which strictly forbade the 
collection or destruction of plants in all categories, although exceptions were made 
for traditional use at some sites.
The implementation of the Durban Vision and the second wave of pro-
tected areas entailed a raft of changes in protected areas policy and legislation, 
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particularly with regard to social justice issues. These changes are defined in 
revised protected area legislation21 and supporting government guidelines, which 
specify procedures for the creation and management of new protected areas. For 
all new protected areas, an environmental and social impact assessment has to be 
carried out, including a census of all neighbouring populations. This is supposed to 
lead to the development of a social safeguards plan, in which all people potentially 
affected by the project (defined as people that depend on natural resources from 
within the protected area and may suffer a loss as a result of restrictions placed on 
access) and materially or socially vulnerable groups are identified (Commission 
SAPM 2007, 2009). A plan should then be developed in which appropriate com-
pensation, usually in the form of development micro-projects and alternative live-
lihood activities, is determined in consultation with the communities involved. In 
order to gain temporary protected status, protected area promoters are required 
to submit the minutes of consultations with all communities potentially affected by 
the project, in which their agreement to the creation of the protected area and its 
associated zoning and internal regulations is explicitly stated.
Although Madagascar National Parks is creating and expanding a number of 
national parks within the Durban Vision framework, the majority of new protected 
areas are intended to be co-managed by local community associations in conjunc-
tion with NGOs (Raik 2007) and are designated or proposed to be in International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) categories III, V and VI, that is to 
say multiple-use protected areas (Gardner 2011). Zoning of such sites typically 
includes a core area for the conservation of biodiversity in its natural state, sur-
rounded by a buffer zone which may include sustainable use zones, controlled 
occupation zones (including the territories of pre-existing settlements within the 
protected area boundaries) and infrastructure development zones. Within these 
zones, the exercise of customary use rights (with respect to hunting, fishing, the 
collection of natural products, and agricultural and forestry activities) is permitted 
as long as these conform to national legislation and the internal regulations of the 
protected area, which is certainly not always the case.
These new protected areas may include management transfers (in terms of 
GELOSE and GCF [Gestion Contractualisée des Forêts]) that either pre-date 
protected area establishment or are created as part of the protected area establish-
ment process. In such cases, the protected area’s internal regulations cannot trump 
pre-established legislation associated with the management transfers.
With the exception of certain Madagascar National Parks sites and private 
protected areas, the governance of new protected areas is intended to be largely 
participatory (Commission SAPM 2006), with governance structures arranged 
according to spatial scale. At the local level, community associations (including the 
management committees of management transfers) are responsible for enforcing 
regulations within their village territories; these associations may be regrouped into 
a union, forming the participatory management committee of the protected area. 
This committee is supported by a steering committee operating at the protected 
area level, composed of representatives of regional authorities, relevant ministries 
and an inter-commune association which brings together the mayors and council-
Governing ancestral land in Madagascar  79
lors of all rural communes affected by the protected area project. The role of the 
steering committee is focused primarily on strategic matters, the application and 
enforcement of protected area regulations and conflict resolution. Lastly, a body of 
supporting organizations (primarily NGOs) provides technical and financial sup-
port, and orients biodiversity conservation strategies.
Internal regulations of new protected areas parallel the spatial arrangement of 
their governance structures, and operate at two levels: at the scale of the village 
territory and at the inter-commune scale of the protected area. Rules are defined 
within dina, traditionally sets of informal, customary rules (Henkels 1999) which 
may also be written and ratified to assume the status of local by-laws. Many new 
protected areas thus have two sets of complementary dina: those applying through-
out the protected area, developed by an inter-commune association, and specific 
dina developed for each village territory or management transfer. The principles of 
good governance (see Graham et al 2003) are promoted for adoption at all levels 
by government guidelines (Commission SAPM 2006).
Participation and social justice in new protected area management
The discourse around the implementation of the Durban Vision suggests clear 
improvements with regard to protected areas and social justice compared to the 
previous protected area network, although strict no-go protected areas and inhab-
ited multiple-use protected landscapes are not strictly comparable. This is illus-
trated by the adoption of a social safeguards policy, the increased participation of 
local communities in protected area governance and management, the relaxation 
of legal restrictions on natural resource use and the emphasis on sustainable natu-
ral resource use for poverty alleviation and development.
Nevertheless, the rapid expansion of the protected area system has received crit-
icism on a number of grounds, partly as a result of the limited time and resources 
available to promoting agencies. Freudenberger (2010) reports that levels of com-
munity consultation and participation have rarely matched the rhetoric, in some 
cases amounting to community approval of externally generated plans and regula-
tions rather than truly participatory decision-making. This applies in particular 
to internal protected area zoning and the definition of dina, which often represent 
externally imposed rules rather than community-developed agreements (Andria-
malala and Gardner 2010; Berard 2011; Blanc-Pamard and Ramiarantsoa 2007). 
Similarly, while many protected areas are nominally managed or co-managed by 
local community associations with the support of NGOs, the capacity and motiva-
tion of local stakeholders remains limited, with the result that the protected area 
establishment and management process remains largely driven by NGOs.
Furthermore, some protected areas have received criticism for failing to suffi-
ciently recognize and integrate customary land tenure or to fully understand local 
social-ecological systems, with the result that proposed development alternatives 
and resource-use restrictions fail to meet the aspirations and needs of local resource 
users (Marie et al 2009). Critically, protected area legislation prohibits the securing 
of private property within protected areas, thereby preventing rural communities 
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from securing legal tenure over either individual or collective customary lands 
within the framework of Madagascar’s national land titling programme (Programme 
National Foncier).
Reflections on the governance of ancestral land
Imagine you saw ancestral land with your eyes, without knowing it was ancestral 
land. You might also see land that your informant says is ancestral, but is not 
actually ancestral. So whether it is ancestral land or not does not depend on what 
your informant says; such a claim simply gives you an indication of what is more 
plausible.22
Thought experiments with subjective reality are central to the environmental 
justice discussion, if only because justice in distribution is relative to social mean-
ings, though not purely and simply so (Walzer 1994, p. 26). Social anthropologists 
infer explanations of culture, understood as symbolic systems with social meanings 
embodied in action, from their own observations of everyday life among the peo-
ple they study, as well as from rules and concepts enacted in rituals or explicitly 
stated by informants. In Madagascar, ethnographies of ancestral land frequently 
report such constructions to involve counter-intuitive contradictions of normal 
understandings of the world. The understanding that the dead differ physically 
from the living and not yet born is negated by the statement that individuals affili-
ated to the same tomb are ‘one person’ (Bloch 1968). The understanding that land 
physically differs from the people who own it is negated by statements that owners 
‘are possessed by the land’ (Goedefroit 1998, p. 183; Ottino 1998, p. 540; Woolley 
2002).
At this point it may not be entirely clear why the understandings reported by 
anthropologists should be relevant to policy experts, legislators or social critics. 
After all, sector-specific policy and land use management across sectors must bal-
ance local needs and interests with the need for global governance, and must do so 
within hegemonic frameworks of thought and action which do not include beliefs 
that living people are consubstantial with material objects or spirits.
What is needed is a method to translate the understandings of rural Malagasy 
into the normal discourses of social science. Law consists of normative and cogni-
tive conceptions in which validity for certain groups of people is asserted (Benda-
Beckmann 2002, p. 48). Differences between transplanted and locally grown law 
concern not only the rules but also the cognitive postulates which guide the inter-
pretation of the rules (Chiba 1987; Greenhouse 1998). These mental schemes 
are culturally inflected. Resource claims by rural Malagasy invoking ancestors or 
nature spirits, for example, mystify the universal concerns of environmental justice 
which are linked to the objective realities of issues such as poverty, marginaliza-
tion, environmental degradation and human displacement.
Land tenure is a less value-loaded term to use when discussing these environ-
mental justice issues. It refers to property relations at the economic, political and 
ideological levels which can be analysed in terms of layered bundles of rights. 
Rights are enforceable claims, though we should note that the enforcing need not 
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come from the state: other organizations are also capable of sanctioning property 
rules (Geisler 2006). Legal pluralism as an analytical concept dissociates law from 
the state; its basic claim is that besides state law there is a whole array of non-
state laws (Benda-Beckmann 2001; Griffiths 2002). Property rights bundles may 
be defined either by state-legal rules or by other legal rules, or by a combination of 
both. If we accept this claim, we can see that the gap separating policy discourses 
from implementation is not a gap between rules and practices – the normative 
‘ought’ and the empirical ‘is’ – but between multiple empirical sets of rules and 
legitimating ideologies, any of which may attain a degree of compliance in every-
day life.
Although Madagascar’s 2005 land use policy follows a worldwide tendency to 
give legal recognition to common property and individual tenure arrangements 
outside state law, one cannot assume that the presumption of ‘untitled private 
property’ – which, as the term indicates, applies to privatized, not communal, 
ancestral lands (Muttenzer 2010) – simply replaces the domain declaration (pre-
sumption of state ownership) and its conceptual divides between public and pri-
vate ownership, protected areas and agricultural land, nature and culture. Indeed, 
the sector-specific policy reviews making up the rest of this chapter suggest that 
these conceptual divisions are now, for the first time in history, influencing the lives 
of rural people.
The environmental policy transition from preservation to so-called integrated 
conservation and development provides a nice illustration, at least to the extent 
that the new protected areas are not merely ‘virtual realities’ or ‘paper parks’ (West 
and Brockington 2006). In spite of common property and legal pluralism hav-
ing been explicitly taken into account, the new forest and environmental policy 
reproduces a style of scientific ecosystem management that excludes humans from 
nature. ‘Coercing conservation’ has been shown to be a source of social conflict, 
and the hope for the future has been that community-based natural resource man-
agement will restore the voice of non-state actors, as well as address the economic 
needs of resource-dependent local populations (Dressler et al 2010). The fact that 
its implementation in Madagascar since 1996 has so far had very limited impact 
therefore requires an explanation.
Community-based natural resource management differs from coercive conser-
vation in its claim to be responsive to other ways of thinking about nature and soci-
ety (Goedefroit, 2006). Its policy narratives typically combine a harmony model 
of society with an equilibrium model of human-environment interactions (Berkes 
2004; Blaikie 2006). Ancestral land is viewed mainly from the perspective of com-
pliance with stable rules that are expected to be well adapted to ecological systems 
and processes. Concomitantly, community-based models associate environmental 
degradation with the market-induced or state-imposed social change, fluid rules 
and low compliance that presumably characterize the individualistic strategies of 
displaced, landless migrants (Aubert et al 2003), as discussed in this chapter in 
relation to community forest management. The implicit rationale of restoring his-
torically constituted land rights is to restrict access to resource frontiers for settlers 
who are perceived to act outside the ancestral order.
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A similarly distorted view of customary tenure characterizes the 2005 policy of 
giving legal recognition to ‘untitled private property’ in non-forest commons. Only 
individual claims to permanently cultivated fields are acknowledged, whereas line-
age or village rights to land on which these fields are located, or rights in the as yet 
uncultivated commons or fields under long and short periods of fallow, are not. If 
implemented, this policy would achieve the transition from communal to private 
property. But such an outcome is unlikely because ‘common property’ systems 
are based on a complementary relationship of separable resource claims of indi-
viduals or families with political authority claims of village or descent group elders 
to oversee property transactions (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2006; 
Muttenzer 2006).
Under these assumptions, statements that people are ‘one person’23 are intended 
to legitimize, or correct, distortions in the normal order of inheritance and succes-
sion. Statements that people are ‘owned by the land’24 are intended to legitimize 
or restrain appropriation by living founders or members of other descent groups or 
communities, as well as contractual transfers of property. Both are obliquely argu-
ments about environmental justice, and ‘odd’ only in the sense of being meaning-
less in the conceptual framework of untitled private property.
It is, of course, individual rural people who deforest, settle, appropriate and 
cultivate land, lend it to others, transmit it to children and so on and who would 
talk about their actions in the language of everyday life, if indeed they were to 
talk about them at all (Bloch 1991, 1992). In certain contexts, these individuals 
would also invoke ‘odd’ beliefs in ancestors and spirits, for instance during funer-
als, agricultural cycle ceremonies or dispute settlements, or in the ritualized setting 
of ethnographic interviews. But these beliefs and post hoc rationalizations cannot 
be considered explanations of property relations. They are abstract concepts to be 
explained by the trained fieldworker’s perceptions of ‘what goes without saying’ 
(Bloch 1992).
What is this evidence of? First, it would seem that the strategy of occupation 
of protected areas and clearing forest for agriculture is not merely a matter of 
economic needs at the household level (Keller 2008). If it were, compensating for 
the opportunity costs of slash-and-burn cultivation might be an effective means 
to reduce deforestation (Pollini 2009). However, clearing forest is also a legiti-
mate strategy to claim new resources and territory, and to become established as 
the founder and recognized as the master of the land by other settlers and local 
officials. Second, it appears that such founder claims may refer to ancestral land, 
meaning places that were settled long ago, while others refer to frontier land whose 
settlers are living (Muttenzer 2008, 2010). Third, there is evidence that the con-
cepts of being ‘one person’ and of being ‘owned by the land’ are shared by prior 
occupants and later settlers. Immigrants can marry earlier settlers and become 
(one person with) ancestral founders by female descent, or they can invoke counter-
legitimacy by demonstrating that the land possesses them (Deschamps 1959; 
Goedefroit 2002).
In what ways do these customary legal concepts relate to the implementation 
of state policies? To what extent are the social organizational outcomes of legal 
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pluralism determined by norms implicit in the customary law? Legal institutions 
and legitimations are not necessarily framed in terms of legal discourses, whereas 
other symbolic genres, such as ritual, or symbols contained in instrumental action, 
do have legal consequences and sanctions (Zerner 2003).
Moreover, villagers interacting with local state officials or with agents of pilot 
projects selectively borrow state-legal rules and procedures (e.g. illicit official 
authorizations to occupy land or clear forest, community-based management con-
tracts, certificates of untitled private property), in addition to traditional property 
rules and legitimations in terms of prior occupancy and descent-based inheritance. 
In this way, illegal squatters in protected areas and state-legal concessions for car-
bon sequestration, agriculture or mining claim recognition as ancestral or living 
founders. Their hybrid claims are ‘legal’ in the sense that the rules are enforceable, 
albeit by non-state organizations or diffuse social pressure, and they are ‘custom-
ary’ in the sense that the rules are not codified.
Given that state public policy and legislation may recognize, as well as be rec-
ognized by, customary legal rules, there can be no strict organizational boundary 
between customary law and state law as a result of their interaction. This bound-
ary exists only in the categorical statements of either legal system, and only in the 
relevant contexts in which such assertions are meaningful.
Accordingly, the local administrative practices before and after the ideological 
shift in state-legal discourse from coercive to community-based natural resource 
management have remained relatively stable. This continuity is explained by the 
previous village-level interactions of local officials of the postcolonial state, who did 
not, in fact, coerce conservation as intended by repressive legislation, but instead 
participated in villagers’ reinterpretations of coercive policy.
Reports of involuntary displacements from ancestral land and forest frontiers 
following large-scale investments, protected area establishment and land-grabs 
call into question the relevance of participation and recognition as effective tools 
of government or means to enhance environmental justice. Local participation in 
sector-specific policy and in land reforms across sectors is usually linked to pre-
existing local practices, institutions and goals that differ from those envisioned by 
NGOs and state agencies promoting the ‘legal recognition of customary tenure’ as 
a sustainable development and conservation initiative (Muttenzer 2008).
Prior occupants, later immigrants and local officials base their complementary 
resource claims on an array of customary legal arrangements (combining prec-
edence in occupation, inheritance, membership in associations, informal authori-
zations and contractual property transfers) whose concepts and rules reflect a local 
theory of justice. Community-based user associations, together with other state-
legal authorization or recognition procedures, are strategically deployed by com-
peting resource users who invoke shared understandings of what it means to be 
one person, or owned by the land.
It seems unlikely that the recognition of customary law in public policy to gov-
ern ancestral land will transform village commons into ancestral enclosures, mul-
tiply open-access counter-claims from landless immigrants or generate voluntary 
concern for the environment among the subjects of global governance.
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Conclusions
This chapter has explored the environmental justice impacts of policy reform 
across four land-use sectors. Certain trends and inconsistencies between rhetoric 
and reality appear common across sectors, and together result in social justice out-
comes that commonly fail to meet the standards that the policies were purportedly 
designed to ensure. Discrepancies between the desired outcomes of policy reform 
and realities on the ground can be largely ascribed to the five key factors discussed 
below.
Good intentions, mixed results
Policy reforms in the natural resources sectors in Madagascar over the past 20 
years have sought to increase participation significantly, with the intention of 
achieving improved environmental governance and social justice, but the out-
comes of these reforms have not always lived up to expectations because of flaws 
in their conception, design and implementation. Some examples of positive out-
comes at localized sites do exist, but more often social justice is not achieved. In 
many cases, seemingly most, the status quo is maintained and policies are largely 
ignored by local people or not operationalized by government authorities in 
local contexts. This implies a need for more effective monitoring and independ-
ent scrutiny.
Power asymmetries and participation
Numerous obligations exist within the various policy reforms outlined in this chap-
ter to ensure that local people are informed, consulted and organized into associa-
tions and committees. However, a critical analysis of what power or say peasant 
participants have in that process is vital to understanding whether it is a genuinely 
empowering, decentralizing process, or simply a case of powerful actors placat-
ing or manipulating local populations. Inequitable or repressive policy has often 
proven to be unstable, to the detriment of both environmental governance and 
social justice.
Capacity to participate
The problems we observe in unsatisfactory social justice outcomes are due in part 
to limited capacity to participate effectively in new structures. Examples include 
local mayors’ lack of legitimacy or of political capital to sign off land-deal papers. 
Limitations of technical capacity, literacy and awareness of laws among local 
actors, as well as the risk and reality of serious politicization, manipulation or cor-
ruption of deals, undermines legal frameworks, however well designed they may 
be. Furthermore, a virtually absent civil society in many natural resource areas 
compounds the difficulties of tackling these problems.
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Fragmentation of governance between sectors and resistance to 
decentralization
The fragmented nature of the governance and monitoring of natural resources in 
Madagascar undermines the capacity to improve standards and therefore meet 
aspirations for social justice in natural resource domains. The regulation of busi-
ness, including environmental and social impact assessments and monitoring sys-
tems, needs to be better coordinated across sectors.
The participation gap
The fact that legal pluralism exists in rural Madagascar – that is, state and cus-
tomary rules coexist – and that the apparatus of the state, democratic structures 
and civil society is virtually absent in many rural parts, or certainly dysfunctional, 
means that regular reality checks are needed of the gap between policy narratives 
and the implementation of policies on the ground. The local perception of rights 
and power when participating in environmental governance processes may be 
very different to the perceptions and techno-narrative of those designing natural 
resource policy (mining companies, land title cooperation programmes, agribusi-
ness companies and conservationists), and the reality of implementation may differ 
greatly from intentions. The cultural lens through which local peoples’ realities are 
scrutinized (be it in the form of social anthropology studies or the testimonies of 
local people) is important to anyone who is trying to understand what the situation 
is really like.
Notes
 1 Useful reviews of international land acquisitions in Madagascar have been carried out 
(e.g. Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 2011), but these reports are not exhaustive and 
have not included various biofuels projects, such as the castor plantations of Flora Eco-
Power and PhileoL in the Amboasary, Ambovombe and Tsiombe districts (Anosy and 
Androy regions). Similarly for mining, regional development spatial planning includes 
the high-profile mining projects of multinational companies such as Rio Tinto, but 
neglects to mention other less well-known mining projects, including the Malaysian sap-
phire mining company Nan Tin Polychrome and British uranium mining companies 
Blue Sun Mining, Bekitoly Resources and Vuna (Anosy 2005).
 2 Alliance Voahary Gasy is a prominent civil society group in this field. Lobbying organiza-
tions include the Collectif pour la Défense des Terres Malgaches (Collective for the Defence 
of Malagasy Land), Human Rights in Masoala, the Comité pour le Droit des Paysans à 
Madagascar (Committee for the Rights of Malagasy Peasants), the Sehatra Iombonana ho 
an’ny Fananan-tany or Solidarité des Intervenants sur le Foncier (Speakers of Land Solidar-
ity), the Syndicat des Organisations Agricoles (Union of Agricultural Organizations), and 
the Firaisankinan’ny Tantsaha eto Madagasikara (Farmers’ Coalition in Madagascar). 
Communication and information networks include Justice et Droits de l’Homme à Madagas-
car (Justice and Human Rights of the Malagasy People) and the Madagascar Environ-
mental Justice Network.
 3 The Global Witness and Environmental Inestigation Agency (2009) and Friends of the 
Earth have renewed their interest due to the illegal trade in precious wood in the eastern 
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forests and the high-profile Total and Madagascar Oil tar sands projects in Bemolanga 
and Tsimiroro.
 4 Law No. 2003-028 of 22 August 2003, extended by law 2007-036 of 14 January 2008.
 5 In 2009, Andry Rajoelina overthrew President Marc Ravalomanana with the support 
of a protest movement and a rebellious army unit. His anti-regime propaganda was 
partly based on various scandals, including the Daewoo land deal, which had caused 
great public outrage. With civil society groups watching him closely, the new leader was 
under pressure to deliver on this issue, and one of the first decisions he took upon seizing 
power in March 2009 was to cancel the Daewoo deal.
 6 After a long discussion process praised for its inclusiveness, these guidelines were 
endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security at its 38th (special) session on 11 
May 2012.
 7 Law No. 2005-019 of 17 October 2005, determining the principles governing the status 
of lands.
 8 Recent investigations were conducted by the International Land Coalition, the Land 
Observatory in Madagascar, the Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Développement and some postgraduate students working with the last-mentioned 
two bodies. Their findings and analyses can be read in Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al 
(2011) and Burnod et al (2011).
 9 Decree No. 99-954 of 15 December 1999, to make investments compatible with the 
environment, modified by decree No. 2004-167.
 10 Circulaire 321-10/MATD/SG/DGSF, ‘Instructions relative to the procedure to follow 
in cases of large-scale land requests’, General Direction of Land Services, 25/10/2010 
(authors’ translation).
 11 Decree No. 98-610 of 13 August 1998, Sécurisation Foncière Relative (SFR), regulating the 
implementation of relative land tenure security.
 12 Law No. 96-025 of 30 September 1996, Gestion Locale Securisée (GELOSE), regarding the 
local management of renewable natural resources.
 13 Law No. 2005-019 of 17 October 2005, determining the principles governing the status 
of lands.
 14 From the establishment of regions in 2004 until 2010, heads of region were nominated 
by the council of ministers, and a mayor could be replaced by a ‘head of special delega-
tion’ (président de la délégation spéciale, PDS), chosen by the President of the Republic him-
self. The Constitution of the Fourth Republic, accepted by referendum on 17 Novem-
ber 2010, stated that heads of region would be elected by the universal suffrage, but no 
such election has yet been held, and a number of cities have had unelected PDSes filling 
the place of mayors since then.
 15 Law No. 2007-036 of 14 January 2008.
 16 Mines-Environment Inter-ministerial Decree of 2000.
 17 The relocation of burial grounds is a highly emotive matter owing to the significance of 
ancestors in Malagasy culture.
 18 Decree 2001/122 completing law 96-025.
 19 This took place in terms of the GELOSE law, which applied to all land, and GCF (Ges-
tion Contractualisée des Forêts), which applied only to forests, and was intended to be 
more streamlined than GELOSE, though the tenure offered was more limited.
 20 Law No. 2001/05 of 11 February 2003, on the management of protected areas.
 21 Due to the ongoing political crisis since 2009, the revised management code for pro-
tected areas has yet to be ratified.
 22 This formulation of the problem is indebted to thought-provoking discussions with 
Jacques Pollini, an expert on Malagasy forestry.
 23 This statement invokes descent-group rights to make use of land.
24 This statement invokes village rights to make use of land.
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5 Exclusionary spaces
 Power, poverty and community-based 
natural resource management in 
West Africa
Marlène Buchy and Roy Maconachie
Introduction
Over the past three decades, participatory natural resource management has 
undergone a significant transformation. Originally conceived as an innovative, 
groundbreaking philosophy and methodology (Chambers 1997), it has more 
recently been subject to accusations of tyrannizing those it is supposed to empower 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001), despite being mainstreamed in the world of interna-
tional development. Indeed, no well-intentioned development project today 
would be given the green light without having some participatory component in 
its programming (Cornwall and Brook 2005). In situations where natural resource 
management is a key aspect of project activities, this rise to institutionalization has 
also taken place in parallel with genuine policy changes in resource governance at 
global, national and local levels.
The devolution of natural resource management structures and the decentrali-
zation of decision-making around resources have also come of age as community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) has emerged in its modern form 
in South Asia – that is, in India and Nepal since the 1970s in the forestry sector 
– and spread to other parts of the world more recently (Larson 2005; Ribot et al 
2006). While CBNRM is an approach to resource management that is designed 
to give communities the legal rights, local institutions and economic incentives to 
take substantial responsibility for the sustained use of their resources, local people 
have of course, in many cases, been managing their resources communally and 
‘sustainably’ for centuries. However, colonial regimes of centralized and extrac-
tive management have often disrupted these pre-existing systems of community 
stewardship. Today, these same local-level processes continue to be shaped by 
wider power structures, most notably the commodification of natural resources 
through global market exchange and the impact that this has on state-level deci-
sion-making. In this chapter, that is the context in which we are concerned by the 
paradoxes contained within the more recent advent of ‘invited spaces’ (Gaventa 
2006) of CBNRM – those created in-country by governments to hand over the 
responsibility for sustainable resource management to local communities.
The benefits and limitations of participatory natural resource management 
have been well documented elsewhere (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Cleaver 1999; 
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Khadka 2009) and much has been written about the need to enhance popular 
participation and empowerment in resource planning and decision-making. How-
ever, it is an unfortunate reality that apart from a few flagship projects (such as the 
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources [CAMP-
FIRE] initiative in Zimbabwe (Alexander and McGregor 2000), CBNRM has 
fallen short of delivering significant poverty alleviation, social and gender equity 
or sustainable management (Buchy and Rai 2008). Even the most widely hailed 
success stories, including CAMPFIRE, have recently come under attack from crit-
ics (e.g. see Alexander and McGregor 2000; Logan and Mosely 2002; Dzingirai 
2003).
Drawing on case studies in the mining and forestry sectors in West and Central 
Africa, we argue that it is the systematic ignorance of power relationships and how 
they shape social structures that compromises the chances of promoting social 
change and poverty reduction in resource-rich communities.
A framework for power relations
To understand how power relations are inextricably linked at different levels and 
places, but are also multifaceted, we draw upon the concept of the power cube 
developed by the Participation Group at the Institute of Development Studies in 
Sussex. Power, according to Gaventa (2006), is three-dimensional: it operates at 
different scalar levels (international, national and local) and within different spaces 
(closed, invited and claimed), and it can be of different dimensions (visible, hidden 
or invisible – i.e. internalized). In this chapter, we explore the notion that CBNRM 
initiatives are invited spaces: within a country, they are initiatives designed and 
launched by the government, and often managed by the state bureaucracy (the 
forest department or the ministry of mines), functioning according to non-nego-
tiable rules. Communities are ‘invited’ to participate in the initiatives, but the 
modality for their participation has already been defined and legislated by more 
powerful actors.
Within such spaces, all three types of power are present. Visible power is situ-
ated within the explicit rules and regulations and the local and state institutions 
represented in the CBNRM initiative. Hidden power is embedded within the tacitly 
observed rules of socialization (for example, women knowing not to speak in pub-
lic in front of their husbands, and especially not to contradict them) which govern 
social relationships in the community. A seasonal labourer who depends on a land-
lord for employment may not be willing to lobby for decisions that would threaten 
the landlord’s status at community level. Invisible power is the internalization of 
defined social orders, often prevalent where one social group has historically domi-
nated another. For example, many Dalits (formerly known as ‘untouchables’) in 
India have internalized and accepted the norm that they are destined to be at the 
bottom of the social hierarchy and thus do not claim the rights granted to them by 
the Indian constitution and law.
Such hidden and invisible forms of power are usually separated by a very fine 
line. For example, in some cultures, many women have internalized that men are 
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superior and should rightly control them (invisible power), and also understand that 
in certain contexts they need a man to access livelihood resources, such as land, to 
ensure household survival (hidden power). This is despite the fact that women may 
have more rights de jure (visible power). Where women can legally inherit land from 
their fathers, in practice they may choose not to claim their share. This is because 
in the case of divorce or widowhood, they would need to rely on their kinship for 
survival, which would be difficult if they had dismantled the family assets. In this 
case, refusal to claim the land that a woman is entitled to is partly an insurance 
policy, but also an expression of the de facto power imbalance.
The motivation to analyse and understand power structures is linked to the 
premise that development interventions and especially CBNRM aim to facilitate 
some form of social change which will ensure more sustainable futures. However, 
the belief that community-based approaches will deliver more equitable outcomes 
for the poor and the marginalized has confused origins and has often been an after-
thought rather than the initial driving factor. The history of wildlife conservation 
practices in southern Africa is a case in point. Management policies that initially 
excluded local populations in conservation practices have gradually elevated those 
originally labelled as ‘poachers’ and ‘encroachers’ by the colonial administration 
to the status of co-managers (Carruthers 1985).
Similarly, Aboriginal people in Australia were initially excluded from the man-
agement of Kakadu National Park because their traditional use of fire as a man-
agement tool was deemed destructive. However, many Aboriginal groups have 
subsequently become co-managers, largely because scientists now realize that fire 
has been used for hundreds of years to maintain the unique Kakadu landscape 
(Baker et al 2001). Such examples of the promotion of local communities to co-
management thus originate in a functional approach rather than an adherence to 
rights principles.
Deeply rooted in conservation policy is the proposition that local people who 
depend on natural resources for their livelihoods will become ‘poachers’ and 
‘encroachers’ if they do not somehow benefit from that policy. As many develop-
ing countries have limited resources to control vast areas of land effectively, the 
tactic of involving local people in management is seen as a win-win situation. The 
substantial international aid contributions – in the form of loans, grants and project 
resources – that support the development of these models also partly explain their 
popularity. In Nepal and, to a lesser extent, India – two countries with a very long 
history of modern community forestry management – the move to involve local 
communities was initially driven by donors (see Khadka 2009).
It can also be argued that the policy shift toward more decentralized govern-
ance is a response to inefficient and centralized systems of state governance and is 
aimed at improving resource conservation and local livelihood benefits. This idea 
hinges on the belief that if local people have an economic incentive to protect their 
resources, they will manage the resources more effectively than the state, and at a 
much lower cost.
There are many different models of CBNRM around the world, but typically a 
CBNRM approach is based on the legally binding handing over of a resource (e.g. 
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a patch of forest, a section of a mine or an area of national park) by the state to a 
formal community group composed of local residents and governed by a board of 
elected committee members. The board usually deals with the day-to-day running 
of the operation, while the general assembly of members meets less frequently to 
deliberate and vote on strategic decisions. The relevant state authority – for exam-
ple, the forest department or the ministry of mineral resources – continues to be 
involved in various ways, as discussed below.
Coupled with the argument that community groups would be better managers 
than many ‘outsiders’ is the view that poverty is the root cause of environmental 
degradation and that participatory management would more effectively benefit 
the poor. The nexus between poverty and environmental degradation has been 
debated for many years (Eckholm 1975; Hobley 2007), but in this chapter we 
take the position that poverty is fundamentally an outcome of social exclusion and 
unequal power relationships which have excluded the poor from equitable access 
to resources. We therefore contend that policy changes in resource management 
which aim to alleviate poverty must first tackle the root causes of unequal power 
relationships.
However, addressing power differentials is not a simple issue. Pearce (2006, p. 2) 
reminds us that while acknowledging the need for change, we also need to under-
stand that ‘knowing when to talk to the powerful, when to challenge the power-
ful and when to confront the powerful, requires a strong understanding of the 
kind of power in particular spaces and structures’. Accordingly, Haugaard (2003, 
p. 109) has argued that there are seven ways of creating power. Here, we would like 
to consider power created by social order (‘causal predictability created through 
the reproduction of meaning; theorized as structuration and confirming structura-
tion’) and power created by system bias (‘order [that] precludes certain actions: 
destructuration’) to demonstrate how, in conjunction with visible, hidden and 
invisible power, CBNRM as an invited space cannot deliver empowerment and 
social change and thus is destined to fall short of its poverty alleviation target.
Diamonds and ebony: two resources, one paradox
Diamonds, power and community-led decision-making in 
Sierra Leone
Concerns for citizen voice and community participation in decision-making proc-
esses over key mineral resources are today particularly acute in policy circles in 
Sierra Leone. This is especially so owing to the country’s unstable past and its asso-
ciation with violent conflict around diamond resources. While there is considerable 
difference of opinion on the specific motivations and causes of the country’s decade-
long civil war in the 1990s, there does appear to be consensus that diamonds 
were a central feature of the conflict, allowing the various fighting factions to fund 
their warring activities. Many commentators also appear to agree that poor gov-
ernance, the overcentralization of power and the creation of a socially excluded 
‘underclass’ were prime factors responsible for fomenting the preconditions 
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for the war. It thus seems that in the case of Sierra Leone, unequal power relation-
ships around diamond management played a central role in the country’s turbu-
lent past.
One well-known recent governance initiative in the diamond sector, the Dia-
mond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), aims to redress the most 
visible unequal power relationships within the diamond industry and make local-
level decision-making over resources more equitable. Building on the popularity of 
previous CBNRM experiments elsewhere in Africa, the DACDF, an invited space 
of participatory governance, was formally approved by Sierra Leone’s Ministry of 
Mineral Resources in December 2001, as part of a broader reform programme for 
the diamond sector following the end of the war. Because it returns a percentage 
of mining revenue to the producing chiefdoms, the fund has been widely hailed 
as providing a considerable incentive for miners and diamond-rich chiefdoms to 
engage in legal diamond mining activities and revenue reporting, thereby enhanc-
ing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds. A small 
portion of the government’s three per cent diamond export tax (amounting to 0.75 
per cent of the total export value) is now put into the DACDF for community-
managed, small-scale development projects in diamondiferous regions.
Since the initiation of the DACDF, an unprecedented amount of diamond 
revenue has been returned to diamond-mining communities. There is also much 
evidence to suggest that the fund has been utilized wisely by some chiefdoms and 
councils for financing community infrastructure, education, health and vocational 
skills training centres (Temple 2005). On the other hand, several constraints, par-
ticularly in the early days of the initiative, have made the implementation of the 
fund a great challenge.
Foremost among these challenges is the inadequacy of the DACDF in circum-
venting the entrenched, unequal power relationships in the diamond industry. 
While the fund aims to make local-level decision-making over resources more 
equitable, it has failed to address many of the underlying invisible power issues. 
This remains a significant threat to prospects for peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction in the country, particularly because pre-war patrimonial relation-
ships endure and continue to subvert fair access to, and control of, the nation’s 
diamond resources (Maconachie 2012). Although the government of Sierra Leone 
acknowledges that the fund has not produced the development results anticipated, 
to the extent that the Ministry of Mineral Resources has, in fact, recently devel-
oped a new set of operational guidelines to address its shortcomings, it is still not 
clear whether this will remedy the underlying issue of how community members 
participate in natural-resource decision-making (Maconachie 2010).
Participatory forestry in Cameroon
The Cameroonian economy is well diversified, with the service industry account-
ing for 44 per cent of 2009 gross domestic product (GDP), agriculture and manu-
facturing for 19 per cent each and oil and mining for 7 per cent (World Bank 
2011). Cameroon’s forests also play an important role in the national economy, 
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with 160,467 kilometres squared of dense lowland forest covering the 466,326 
kilometres squared total land area of the country. The forestry sector generates 
6 per cent of GDP and employs 13,000 in the industrial sector, but estimates put 
the number of people involved in the informal sector at ten times that of the formal 
sector (Karsenty 2007, p. 21).
The forest estate is divided into permanent and non-permanent domains and 
exploited through a number of logging titles. The extractive model of forestry in 
Cameroon, where the state and foreign logging companies hold the majority of 
key concessions and take the lion’s share of the benefits, is profoundly unequal 
and inequitable (Oyono et al 2005). Formal participation by Cameroonians in the 
forestry sector has thus been minimal, with the industry dominated by European 
and Asian groups (Karsenty 2007). While it seems that the number of national 
entrepreneurs may have grown since 1992, these are mainly small operators con-
centrated in the ventes de coupe, which are small logging areas of no more than 2,500 
hectares. To date, there has been little research into the operations of these small 
entrepreneurs, particularly with respect to how they contribute to the sector and 
what share of the local market they represent.
A growing number of Cameroonians are formally involved in and benefit-
ing from the management of forests in two additional contexts. First, participa-
tion occurs in the management of community forests, areas established through 
Cameroon’s Forestry Law of 1994 (Cameroon 1994) in the non-permanent forest 
domain zoned for use by village communities. With technical assistance from the 
Ministry of Forests’ Community Forestry Unit, a village community seeking a for-
est title can identify a zone not exceeding 5,000 hectares and draft a simple man-
agement plan for approval by the ministry. Proceeds from community forest man-
agement are used for community development projects. Second, communities can 
participate in the management of council forests, which are areas zoned within 
the permanent forest domain and managed according to an approved manage-
ment plan. The objectives of a council forest, along with its final boundaries, are 
established during the official classification process. Once allocated, these forests 
become the private property of a commune. However, the commune, which is the 
lowest administrative unit in Cameroon, must abide by the management plan in 
order to retain title to the forest area (Bikié et al 2000).
The Forestry Law of 1994 (Cameroon 1994), seen by many as an innovative 
and progressive piece of legislation, introduced the concepts of sustainable forest 
management through forest management plans, of redistributing forest taxes to 
communities and of council and community forests (Cerutti et al 2010). However, 
many of the decrees needed to enact the law have not yet been written or voted 
on, and this has prevented the law from being implemented. It was almost six years 
before the first community forest licences were finally approved in 2000 (Djeumo 
2001). Community forestry in Cameroon has continued for the decade since then, 
and although empirical research shows benefits for community livelihoods (Beau-
champ 2009), a number of problems have arisen, including an increase in local 
conflicts (De Blas et al 2011) and the appropriation of resources by local elites 
(Cerutti et al 2010).
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An attempt to measure the level of participation in community forestry in Cam-
eroon quantitatively has demonstrated very low participation by local commu-
nities, compared with the Ministry of Forests and civil society organizations, in 
drafting agreements or approving management plans for their forests, and yet the 
communities are much more active than the other two actors when it comes to 
implementation and actual work (Ndibi and Kay 1999). This is a familiar scenario 
for forestry departments, which tend to maintain control of all decision-making 
roles and delegate the physical work to communities.
In the discussion that follows, we examine two cases of CBNRM with enormous 
social and economic potential, but limited impact on the communities to date. In 
exploring the reasons for this, we argue that there is a pressing need to frame com-
munity participation in natural resource management within its broader political, 
cultural and historical contexts, instead of treating it as a romanticized notion of 
democratic space that remains isolated from, and unaffected by, the real world. 
Williams (2004, p. 562) adds that uncritically accepting the notion of ‘community’ 
as the right and proper site for development may depoliticize development, and 
thus reinforce the tendency to direct attention away from the wider power rela-
tionships that frame local development problems. Below we identify the types of 
power at play in these two CBNRM models, in order to show how the different 
dimensions of power operate simultaneously in the invited spaces of community-
based projects.
An analysis of power
Visible power
In the forestry sector in Cameroon, and also in the mining sector in Sierra Leone, 
the state has historically assumed an important role as the protector and facilita-
tor of both natural resources and access to capital. While more recently it has 
been suggested that global capitalism has eroded the ability of the state to make 
autonomous decisions concerning the management of its natural resources, the 
state undeniably remains a visibly powerful actor.
Landownership is the first arena where visible power is exercised. In Cameroon, 
the state owns the land, and since colonial times indigenous rights to land have 
not been recognized beyond access and controlled use for self-subsistence. In 
rural areas in Sierra Leone, the ‘native administration’ grants communal rights 
to land to ‘sons or daughters of the soil’, but the state retains ownership of what 
the soil might contain. Therefore, for companies to gain access to subsoil mineral 
resources, some degree of negotiation with the state is required. Though only the 
state, in theory, has the right to allocate mineral resources for mining, local chiefs 
are also involved in the negotiations.
In both Cameroon and Sierra Leone, government departments that oversee 
forestry and mining have become institutions within the state and have tradition-
ally had very powerful links to political figures. Informal links between the private 
sector, high-level bureaucrats and politicians right up to the presidency are well 
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documented (see Labrousse [2000] for Cameroon and Jackson [2005] for Sierra 
Leone).
In Cameroon, the corruption networks associated with these links affect com-
munity forests in various ways: logging companies that encroach on community-
assigned land do so with the implicit protection of forestry staff, and some company 
officials do not hesitate to strike deals with corrupt village elites, thus depriving the 
wider community of potential benefits from logging. This lack of respect for the 
law fuels conflicts at the local level, which in turn create tension within the com-
munity, and also between the communities and the bureaucracy.
In the case of Sierra Leone, diamonds have long shaped local and national 
politics. Patronage politics associated with diamonds have a well-established his-
tory in the country, with local elites expecting rewards for party loyalty, since their 
own supporters depend on their ability to deliver development resources to their 
local areas. Especially under the leadership of Siaka Stevens, president of Sierra 
Leone from 1971 to 1985, diamonds were a key strategic resource for the All Peo-
ple’s Congress government, and as rent-seeking intensified, the industry became 
a sphere of corrupt, unregulated private enterprise. Today, many politicians in 
Sierra Leone continue to have strong links with the diamond sector: the vice-
president himself, Samuel Sam-Sumana, is a former diamond businessman.
A second arena of visible power is apparent in the manipulation of the legal 
framework, predominantly by powerful actors who control access to resources. 
Though appropriate laws to protect community interests are sometimes passed, 
their implementation can be slowed down. In the Cameroonian context, the 
Forestry Law of 1994 (Cameroon 1994) is widely recognized as a progressive 
framework in relation to community rights and sustainable forest management. 
However, delays in developing the decrees required by the legislation, as mentioned 
above, have resulted in most of the progressive gains remaining on paper only.
One of the challenges of the legal context in both countries is the confusion cre-
ated by the superimposition of different legal frameworks: residual colonial laws, 
postcolonial laws and customary systems overlap, and all of them may be operat-
ing at the same time. This confusion makes it difficult for some people to claim 
their rights, and easier for others to abuse those rights.
In the context of forests, it is the forestry department that determines the size of 
community forests, and by law only forests not in the permanent forestry domain 
(i.e. forests of lesser economic value) can be allocated as community forests. The 
limited size and profitability of these forests often prevent communities from man-
aging them responsibly, as the costs of management are not offset by the benefits 
accrued. The power held by the forestry department also permeates the manage-
ment of community forests, as many management decisions remain the prerogative 
of the department. This can be defended on the grounds of ensuring sustainability 
– though of course, in a context of rent-seeking behaviour, it can also encourage 
more illegal demands on communities by the bureaucracy.
With respect to diamonds, the situation in Sierra Leone is slightly different, in 
that communities are not allocated portions of mines to be locally managed, but 
instead given the right to make decisions about how a small share of diamond 
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revenues is to be spent. While most diamond mining in Sierra Leone is small-scale 
and artisanal, comprising low-tech extraction activities with rudimentary tools, 
high inputs of unskilled labour and low barriers to entry, in recent years there has 
been increasing interest in more capital-intensive modes of mechanized extraction 
by medium-sized companies. Many of these companies have established strong 
relationships with the government and local chiefs. In many respects, these infor-
mal political networks yield much more visible power than that possessed by indi-
viduals in community development committees.
Hidden power
A lack of capacity in remote rural communities is often cited as one of the major 
dimensions of hidden power, as communities have limited financial and human 
resources to control the management process.
In the context of Cameroon’s forestry, communities are responsible for the actual 
management of forests, which is expensive and requires specialized knowledge 
and skills. Though indigenous people may have a wealth of environmental knowl-
edge, this does not mean that all rural communities possess the skills required to 
write management plans and implement them as required by the forestry depart-
ment. Many observers have commented that the costs of sustainable management 
(which includes an onerous bureaucratic process) are prohibitive and slow down 
activities in the field. This also helps explain why community elites, with or with-
out their constituents’ support, have been known to sell off stocks of timber to 
the highest bidder. However, if the money fails to materialize, communities have 
no recourse to the law, because the sale was illegal in the first place. This means 
that the management requirements legally imposed on communities with limited 
capability usually fail to provide those communities with a safe space in which to 
use their resources.
The lack of information available to communities is also a powerful tool: the 
state fails to circulate required information, which elites may obtain by capitalizing 
on their superior literacy skills, and rural people may not be aware of their rights. 
This also makes it easier for local chiefs to mismanage funds without being chal-
lenged by their constituencies.
In Sierra Leone, for example, chiefdoms benefit from the DACDF in accord-
ance with the number of mining licences issued and the value of diamonds recov-
ered from their territory. However, the disbursement of funds and the capacity of 
communities to monitor development projects have been very contentious matters 
among critics. In 2002, industry observers produced a series of ad hoc reports (see 
Temple 2005) which revealed that a number of chiefdoms were not utilizing the 
DACDF in a competent manner. Jackson (2007, p. 100) has highlighted the con-
tinuing misuse of the fund, pointing out that ‘there is no accountability mechanism 
for ensuring that this cash is used for development, and it is extremely common 
to hear that local people complain of the chief’s abuse of the system in pocketing 
this money’. A report produced by the civil society organization Network Move-
ment for Justice and Development (Network Movement for Justice and Develop-
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ment [NMJD] 2006) argues that because the local-level handling of funds has been 
carried out independently through community development committees, with no 
reporting mechanisms in place or any systematic monitoring oversight from the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources, local power abuses have been allowed to flourish.
Similar outcomes have been documented in Cameroon, where the community 
share of the forest land tax effectively diminishes as it transits between administra-
tive levels from capital city to village. By the time the revenue eventually reaches 
the village, much of it has disappeared. This is not only a result of individuals 
appropriating the money, but also because there is no one competent to maintain 
a budget ledger at the local level (Morrison et al 2009).
Likewise in Sierra Leone, local governance factors greatly obscure the trans-
parency and accountability of diamond revenues. A recent impact audit of 
the DACDF carried out in nineteen diamond-producing communities by the 
Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD 2006) notes that a 
‘consistent trend of poor participation by grassroots stakeholders in project deci-
sion-making’ is the reason for most DACDF projects being concentrated around 
chiefdom or district headquarter towns (NMJD 2006, p. 11). With few exceptions, 
the report continues, the single most important implication of this occurrence is 
that the majority of local people do not readily identify with DACDF projects.
A combination of the lack of capacity of communities, their limited sense of 
ownership and pre-existing social norms allows elite capture to occur, while the 
dynamics of hidden power at local level are often overlooked. This has been one 
of the central critiques of the CBNRM process: communities are not harmonious 
entities, but are ridden with power struggles and conflicting interests (Guijt and 
Shah 1998).
In Sierra Leone, a number of civil society organizations, including the National 
Advocacy Coalition on Extractives, a well-known alliance of eighteen national and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working around issues of 
mining and the extractive industries, lobbied for the creation of community devel-
opment committees in order to ensure that project decision-making associated 
with the DACDF was carried out in a more equitable and accountable manner. In 
theory, each community development committee was supposed to include a wide 
cross-section of elected chiefdom residents, representing a broad range of com-
munity interests. In practice, though, reports suggest that these committees have 
more often been composed entirely of rural elites such as section chiefs. This has 
reportedly stifled the concept of local ownership of the fund and further alienated 
many stakeholders, such as women and youth (Temple 2005). The fund has thus 
not been able to address the issue of hidden power differentials.
In the eastern forests of Cameroon, where community forestry is being developed, 
an ethnic dimension also exists: there is a long history of Bantu people traditionally 
exploiting Aka Pygmies as labourers on their farms (Lewis et al 2008; Woodburne 
1997). Though, as far as can be ascertained, no research has been carried out docu-
menting the differential levels of benefits along ethnic lines, it would not be surpris-
ing, given the historical relationships of exploitation, to find indigenous peoples 
proportionally worse off than more sedentarized agricultural groups.
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In Sierra Leone, where unequal power relationships have also always been prev-
alent in rural communities, a recurrent theme in the history of diamond mining 
regions, particularly in Kono District, has been confrontation between ‘big men’ 
seeking greater control over diamond production and indigenous people seeking 
to maximize their own returns from the industry and defend their putative rights 
and entitlements (Fanthorpe and Maconachie 2010). However, since the end of 
the civil war, as mining has started to shift towards more capital-intensive modes 
of extraction and has become increasingly attractive to larger companies aiming to 
pursue mechanized production, community tensions have reportedly worsened.
A final dimension of hidden power that is more directly relevant in the Sierra 
Leone context can be seen in the burden of recent history. Several commenta-
tors have pointed out that in the post-war period in Sierra Leone, the differen-
tial between the rural elite and the community at large has fuelled a rift between 
youths and chiefs in the countryside. Richards (2005), for example, suggests that 
the war was largely a product of this division, and there continues to be consider-
able dissatisfaction among youths with the hierarchical political structures in rural 
Sierra Leone.
However, Brown et al (2006) argue that for all the destruction and disruption 
caused by Sierra Leone’s civil war in the 1990s, its resolution may have opened 
up new spaces for participation that could potentially challenge and alter existing 
social rules and institutional practices. On the other hand, they also suggest that 
many of the patrimonial institutions, practices and networks that were instrumen-
tal in shaping natural resource access and control during the pre-war era may have 
been preserved, and in some cases even strengthened, in the post-conflict period. 
In such situations, warns Cleaver (2004, p. 271), there is a danger of participation 
being based on ‘over-optimistic notions of agency . . . combined with romantic 
ideas about groups and institutions’. In the case of Sierra Leone, it remains impor-
tant to remember that the exercise of agency and citizenship rights is embedded in 
social relations that are defined by highly unequal power positions located within 
a complex web of micro-politics.
Invisible power
The third dimension of power, invisible power, is by definition difficult to see, and 
therefore we need to look closely at the internalized values of social order. Witch-
craft, gender and ethnicity are examples of these value systems, which most often 
remain completely ignored by policy-makers, development professionals and even 
communities themselves.
Witchcraft is a common practice throughout West Africa, but is little acknowl-
edged or discussed because it often evokes feelings of discomfort (Geschiere 1995; 
Golooba-Mutebi 2005). Those who do not believe it exists simply do not see 
or understand that it plays a major role in regulating behaviour; those who do 
believe it exists are too scared to talk about it. And perhaps there are those who 
are prepared to acknowledge its power, but because of its secretive nature, do not 
understand how it works. Yet anthropological work has shown how significant it 
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is: instead of fading away, it has become more prominent in some parts of West 
and Central Africa and has serious implication for development interventions 
(Kohnert 1996).
The point relevant to our discussion, however, is that a complex web of internal-
ized fears or beliefs exists which regulates people’s behaviour. When practition-
ers, planners and policy-makers design community-based management models 
without considering these underlying currents, they ignore a whole facet of reality 
which may influence outcomes negatively. It is in the inherent nature of witchcraft 
that outsiders cannot see how it may affect forest or community management; 
however, the fact that it is practised and has great potential to shape decision-mak-
ing should at least be noted.
While gender has been mainstreamed in development discourse over the past 
decade, in practice very few policies or programmes consider ex ante how the 
gender dimensions prevalent locally may affect a new initiative. It is clear from 
research in Sierra Leone that women are de facto excluded from decision-making 
at the local level. Similarly, in the forestry context in Cameroon, women’s roles 
and rights are completely absent from the literature and, judging from recent dis-
cussions in the field, from people’s minds. Gender, of course, is not just a women’s 
issue: both men and women are trapped in gender constructs. Yet in a context of 
poverty alleviation, it is important to understand how these strictures constrain 
people and communities working towards a more equitable society. If this is not 
understood, there is a risk that inequity will merely be reproduced and reinforced, 
with one group consistently losing out.
Ethnicity is another dimension that is little discussed in relation to develop-
ment (White 2002), particularly because it is a sensitive issue and is rarely seen as 
relevant in the context of natural resource management. Yet, as we have argued 
above, at the local level in Cameroon there is an institutionalized discriminatory 
relationship between the dominant Bantu groups and the indigenous minority. 
At the national level, this relationship translates into a Caucasian-dominated log-
ging industry, with direct roots in the recent colonial past, that controls most of 
the resources owned by Africans. While it would be simplistic and unhelpful to 
paint all foreign foresters as racists, the appalling working and living conditions 
that Cameroonian workers are subjected to in the forest concessions cannot be 
explained solely by a capitalist greed to maximize profits. In the context of com-
munity management, these ethnic hierarchies translate, at best, into subconscious 
attitudes accepting that some groups may be ignored in decision-making or ben-
efit-sharing processes, and, at worst, into conscious beliefs on the part of certain 
groups that other groups have no rights or claims to a share of the proceeds, based 
on some notion of their inferiority (Crew and Fernando 2006). Of course this also 
works the other way around, as subaltern groups internalize power, accept the 
hierarchy as given, and do not seek to claim their rights.
In the case of Sierra Leone, reports suggest that many local residents in diamon-
diferous regions have long felt that they are not receiving a fair share of the wealth 
generated from their land. In the past, concerns have been raised about the ever-
increasing influx into diamond mining areas of migrant ‘strangers’, in particular 
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wealthy members of ethnic trading diasporas (Lebanese, Fula, Mandingo) who 
support mining but are perceived to be reinvesting the profits elsewhere.
Conclusion
It is apparent from an exploration of recent governance reforms in Sierra Leone’s 
diamond sector that invitations to participate in formally defined decision-making 
initiatives, such as the DACDF, do not always translate into ideal notions of demo-
cratic space. Similar lessons can be drawn from the community forestry sector in 
Cameroon.
Consequently, one of the most important lessons to be learned is that such 
arenas of citizen engagement are always mediated by relationships of power 
between actors, and by the modes of influence that participants exercise. Une-
qual power relations – whether they be visible, hidden or invisible – are deeply 
entrenched within communities. This realization yields important insights for 
scholarship concerned with the role that communities can and should play in 
natural resource management, and how these relationships are mediated by 
power. As has been clearly argued in this chapter, an understanding of the 
power web requires a consideration of a diverse range of issues including the 
legal framework and management institutions, prevalent social structures and 
norms, history, capabilities, resources (including access to information), ethnic-
ity and gender.
This, of course, also has broader practical relevance for community-led rev-
enue-sharing programmes initiated for a wide range of natural resources across 
sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. As Cornwall (2002, p. 51) rightly suggests, 
community participation may therefore best be treated as a ‘situated practice’ 
– one that is shaped and defined by actual political, social, cultural and historical 
determinants.
As Khadka (2009) demonstrates so effectively in her case study of Nepali com-
munity forestry, although there is a high level of awareness concerning the unsatis-
factory social outcomes of community forestry, the actors involved in the initiative 
do not consider it their responsibility to focus on these issues. The donors who 
have been shaping community forestry believe that the socio-political issues repro-
ducing exclusion are ones for the country to deal with, rather than for donors to 
interfere in. One of the comments often made by foresters is that their job is about 
looking after the forests and has nothing to do with the socio-political issues in the 
communities. Civil society actors locate the shortcomings of community forestry 
initiatives in the structures and shortcomings of other actors. This tendency to 
deny responsibility stems not only from a lack of understanding of existing power 
relationships, but also from a lack of awareness of how actors themselves support 
and reproduce these inequalities.
In this chapter we have clearly demonstrated how different dimensions of power 
can operate simultaneously and collide with one another, in the process main-
taining or even enhancing situations of power imbalance, social exclusion and 
inequality. However, the next step, we suggest, is to reflect upon how this under-
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standing of power can be translated into a constructive course of action, in order 
to contribute to positive social change.
Our intention here has not been to formulate policy prescriptions or to provide 
a set of tools for change. However, we would argue, based on practical experi-
ence and development work and research, that the exercise of power reminds one 
somewhat of the ‘elephant in the room’ syndrome. Perhaps the first step towards 
change, then, is to call the beast by its name while engaging in community-based 
resource management. Social learning is one approach that has tried to offer peo-
ple the necessary space to explore issues such as power, gender, ethnicity and 
exclusion.
The participatory action research and learning process offers another approach 
to these complex contexts, but the challenge of scaling up and institutionalizing 
meaningful participation remains as real as ever, and this is in no small part due to 
the diverse and contested nature of power and its multiple dimensions.
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6 Wildlife paying its way?
 A critical analysis of community-based 




For several decades, the conservation community has sought ways to transform 
the burden that wildlife represents to rural livelihoods into a benefit, particularly 
in areas where humans and wildlife come into conflict. Rural communities across 
Africa have witnessed the proliferation of community-based models of conserva-
tion – models intended to ensure that protected areas and species yield an eco-
nomic return for local people in particular and the wider economy in general 
(Adams and Hulme 2001). Unlike those former protectionist strategies that have 
often been termed ‘fortress conservation’ (Brockington 2002), community con-
servation is based, in theory, on local participation and partnership. The model 
predicts that if communities are given management responsibility over their local 
natural resources and obtain economic benefits that exceed the costs of manage-
ment, they will be encouraged to use these resources sustainably, so that both 
conservation and development goals can be met.
In most of southern Africa, the community conservation approach has fallen 
under the rubric of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) 
(Child 2009a). CBNRM in Botswana represents an attempt to re-establish wildlife-
based livelihoods1 in rural places where most traditional uses of wildlife (hunting 
for food or sale) were outlawed over a century ago and where agricultural activities 
are now frequently hindered by wildlife. The key principles of CBNRM in south-
ern Africa draw from theories of wildlife economics and common-pool resource 
management (Child 2004). Evidence emerged from southern Africa in the 1960s 
that devolving proprietorship over wildlife to private (mainly white) landholders 
allowed and encouraged them to maximize their profits from using the resource 
sustainably (through commercial hunting, ranching and tourism ventures). This 
led to the slogan ‘use it or lose it’ as an effective, market-based approach to wildlife 
conservation in Africa. It also led to the notion that if communities could be given 
similar rights, through which wildlife could become ‘community private property’, 
then a similar model of sustainable use for conservation and development pur-
poses could be achieved on communal2 as well as on private lands.
In Botswana, the first CBNRM project was implemented in 1993 through the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a strategy for 
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achieving both conservation and poverty alleviation in the Chobe Enclave (Figure 
6.1). This project established the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), a 
community organization set up to manage natural resources in the five enclave 
villages. As in most CBNRM projects in Botswana and much of southern Africa, 
the CECT’s management of natural resources has come to mean engagement in 
wildlife tourism, either directly or through a joint venture business partner.
Case study research in 2009 and 2010 in the Chobe Enclave3 revealed that 
despite 16 years of project efforts, villagers still associate wildlife with the decline of 
agricultural livelihoods.4 This perception is driven by conflict with wildlife such as 
elephants and lions, which eat crops and cattle, respectively. The CECT’s mem-
bers are vaguely cognizant of the fact that safari companies lease land from their 
community and that their organization is involved in the management of tour-
ism-related funds. However, few people interviewed in 2009 and 2010 indicated 
that CBNRM had contributed much to their own survival. The promises of the 
CBNRM project to devolve management and improve wildlife-based livelihood 
activities as a buffer against wildlife-related damages and dangers remain unful-
filled (Alexander et al 1999; Ecosurv 1996; Jones 2002; Rozemeijer 2003). Villag-
ers have not escaped a colonial legacy in which wildlife management remains pri-
marily in the hands of state wildlife officials and wildlife is widely regarded as the 
property of the state. While wildlife tourism has developed in Chobe, its economic 
benefits accrue primarily to experienced non-local safari operations. Indeed, as 
this chapter highlights, CBNRM in Chobe plays a smaller role in compensating 
for wildlife-related damage to livelihoods in the Chobe Enclave than government 
Figure 6.1 Maps of Chobe National Park and Chobe Enclave.
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welfare provisioning policies and the remittances that flow to villagers from family 
members working outside the villages.
Nevertheless, CBNRM remains the dominant paradigm for environmental 
governance in southern Africa (Blaikie 2006). The CBNRM model is particularly 
resilient because when CBNRM projects fail, its advocates interpret this as weak 
implementation of CBNRM principles rather than demonstrating weakness in the 
principles themselves (Child 2009b). This chapter challenges that narrative by sug-
gesting that the fact that these principles have proven so consistently difficult to 
implement indicates that the CBNRM model is flawed and in need of revision to 
make it more appropriate for certain local realities.
CBNRM relies on a number of assumptions about resource tenure, market 
access, cultural plasticity and social organization that are seldom met. Using the 
case of Botswana’s Chobe Enclave, I highlight one set of circumstances in which a 
CBNRM programme may fail to bring a community together to manage a given 
resource. I do this by examining the disabling conditions for this kind of collective 
action on two levels.
First, I analyze livelihoods in Chobe to demonstrate how, in this region, resi-
dents are no longer dependent on wildlife: households here have other ways of 
diversifying their livelihoods that do not require them to re-establish collective 
natural resource management institutions and engage in modern markets. Specifi-
cally, because Botswana is a highly centralized developmental welfare state5 and 
has a historical legacy of strong rural-urban linkages, social safety nets and remit-
tances make a large contribution to household livelihood portfolios in the Chobe 
Enclave. These sources of income can be accessed by individual households and 
do not require collective action or the ability to develop profitable wildlife-based 
enterprises.6
Second, I use an access-analysis framework (Ribot and Peluso 2003) to explain 
how the resource property rights established under Botswana’s CBNRM policy do 
not give communities the ability to use wildlife in ways that would allow them to 
derive benefits from wildlife that outweigh its costs. As a result, livelihoods based 
on direct wildlife use have not been re-created, and a vested interest in the sus-
tainable use of wildlife has not materialized in village communities as it did in the 
private sector.
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the conceptual underpin-
nings of CBNRM – which assume that the ecological and economic success that 
resulted from the devolution of land and resource rights to private landowners 
in Zimbabwe in the 1960s can be replicated in the context of a village or multi-
village communal lands – may need revisiting. Specifically, a market-based model 
for wildlife conservation may not always be the most appropriate or effective 
alternative to fortress conservation. The failure of CBNRM forces us to consider 
whether, in some places, there may be more effective ways to achieve sustain-
able conservation than the ‘use it or lose it’ utilitarian approach that characterizes 
CBNRM in southern Africa and much of international biodiversity conservation 
today (McCarthy 2005; Büscher and Dressler 2007; Igoe and Brockington 2007; 
Igoe et al 2010). This is a critical point because it challenges the discursive power 
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surrounding CBNRM, whose proponents posit a compelling causal argument 
regarding the links between the devolution of ownership over natural resources, 
the creation of benefits and the successful conservation of wildlife (Blaikie 2006).
The fact that the local CBNRM project has done little to create a more socially 
just form of conservation makes clear the need to develop alternative practical 
strategies for environmental management which sustain both people and wild-
life. The point of this chapter is not to argue that welfare provisioning and remit-
tances provide an alternative conservation-development strategy which is better 
than CBNRM, but to highlight conditions under which CBNRM is particularly 
likely to fall short. It is also to encourage the conservation community to consider 
how programmes and policies for sustainable and socially just conservation might 
be designed to build upon existing conditions and institutions: a process that will 
involve thinking outside of the conventional CBNRM model.
Background
Theoretical roots of community-based natural resource 
management: Common property theory and neoliberalism
CBNRM initiatives have gained popularity over the past two decades (Adams 
and Hulme 2001). However, the notion that communities are capable of sustain-
ably managing their own resources according to local custom, knowledge and 
technologies is not new (Blaikie 2006). There is a long history of scholarship on 
the commons showing that resource users often create institutional arrangements 
and collective management regimes that help them allocate use rights and benefits 
over long periods (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990). Common property theorists argue 
that resources can be used collectively and sustainably provided certain principles 
are in place, including the recognition of local resource users by external govern-
mental authorities, tenure rights for local institutions and incentives in the form 
of benefits that exceed the costs of managing resources (Bromley 1992; Ostrom 
1990). This research has influenced how policy-makers think about and make 
policy regarding natural resource management (Agrawal 2001), particularly in the 
global South, where ‘fortress conservation’ and state-controlled management fre-
quently have proved ineffective and/or inequitable.
Demands for ‘local involvement’ in the governance of resource commons have 
been strengthened by scholarship that has analyzed hundreds of case studies of 
successful common-pool resource governance (Agrawal and Benson 2010). Aca-
demics and practitioners use examples of successful self-governing common-pool 
resource institutions to suggest that if local people are given rights to own, use and 
manage natural resources, they are likely to conserve them (Agrawal 2001; Brosius 
et al 2005; Hulme and Murphree 2001; Mbaiwa 2011).
When CBNRM was introduced, practitioners assumed that ‘community-based’ 
natural resource management would entail a process of facilitating and building on 
local interests and management capabilities (Berkes 1989; Berkes 2004; Dressler 
et al 2010; Western et al 1994; Wittayapak and Dearden 1999). In theory, policies 
114  Clare Gupta
that devolved environmental governance to local communities would rebuild local 
natural resource management institutions and, in doing so, create more socially 
just relationships between communities, the state and access to natural resources. 
CBNRM advocates set out to rectify a situation in which centralized state control 
over resources resulted in communities’ loss of ownership and thus of motivation 
to collectively manage resource sustainably.
The CBNRM movement’s push to devolve natural resource management to 
local communities developed out of a rights-based approach towards democratic 
decentralization, but also intersected with the rise of a neoliberal faith in mar-
kets as a means to produce development globally, including in Botswana and 
sub-Saharan Africa generally (Duffy and Moore 2010). In the context of natural 
resource management, neoliberal ideology supposes market principles to be the 
best guide for the efficient management of resources, and a decentralized network 
of stakeholders to be able to govern resources better than the state (Hulme and 
Murphree 1999; Ribot 2004). Implicit in the southern African CBNRM model 
is the neoliberal premise that if institutions can be established that ‘get the prices 
right’ for natural resources, then landowners, including communities, that are 
given property rights over this resource will use it efficiently.
CBNRM’s neoliberal roots in southern Africa lie in 1970s legislation that con-
ferred strong proprietary rights over wildlife on owners of private land in the 
commercial sector. This legislation is credited with promoting successful wildlife 
conservation on private lands (Child 2009c), as ranchers began to sustainably 
utilize wildlife on their property for game ranching, hunting and tourism. After 
independence, leading wildlife officials argued for the extension of these policies 
beyond the commercial and largely white farming sector to black rural commu-
nities (Child 2009b). This effort led to legislative changes that paved the way for 
CBNRM programmes to emerge.
Specifically, the search for an economic unit equivalent to the private land-
holder led to the concept of a collective property regime. Informed by common 
property theory, ‘private community property’ was understood to mean a com-
mon property resource collectively managed and exploited by a community group 
within an (ideally) self-defined jurisdiction. CBNRM proponents thus sought, and 
still seek, to replicate conservation-development success in the private sector on 
communal lands, through the devolution of rights to localized units and through 
the establishment of localized management regimes adapted to operating under 
modern market conditions (Jones and Murphree 2004).
While conservation initiatives in southern Africa were designed to be about 
wise land use overall rather than wildlife conservation specifically (Child 2009b), 
CBNRM programmes to date have focused on the wildlife sector in its various 
forms – hunting, game ranching and photographic tourism. CBNRM practition-
ers have worked to enact policies that enable the wildlife and tourism industry to 
be an economically competitive form of land use through the establishment of the 
infrastructure and competitive pricing required for the wildlife and tourism indus-
try (Jones and Murphree 2004). CBNRM is based on the idea that wildlife must 
‘pay its way’ (Eltringham 1994) if it is to survive and presupposes the existence 
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of an enterprising community ready to capitalize upon its newfound ownership 
of wildlife.
Within this framework, local communities living near wildlife are entitled to ben-
efits from wildlife which are contingent upon their ability to successfully develop 
market-oriented strategies to profit from this resource. CBNRM, like broader neo-
liberal policies, thus places faith in market-based principles to achieve devolved 
community-based conservation (Büscher and Dressler 2010).
Revisiting community-based natural resource management: 
Lessons learned from common-pool resource institutional analysis
As commons scholar Elinor Ostrom has noted, the probability that users will 
engage in collective action is high only when the expected benefits of managing a 
resource exceed the perceived costs of investing in better rules and norms (Ostrom 
2009). Similarly, Robert Wade (1988) has shown that whether or not villages 
organize collectively to manage their common-pool resources is not just about 
the social structure of the community, but also particularly dependent on ecology 
– specifically scarcity and risk. When the individual benefits of organizing to col-
lectively manage a resource are big, and when there are high risks to individuals 
if they fail to come together to manage that resource, stakeholders are more likely 
to organize. In other words, they will organize when intensely felt needs cannot 
be met by individual responses (Wade 1988). Therefore collective action around 
CBNRM is unlikely in circumstances where households have alternative individu-
alized means to meet their immediate needs.
These theories are useful because they help explain why common-pool resource 
regimes have failed to emerge endogenously in rural parts of Botswana such as 
the Chobe Enclave. In Chobe, traditional uses of wildlife have been outlawed for 
over a hundred years, so that people no longer consider wildlife to be an important 
means of survival. Moreover, wildlife-based livelihood benefits from CBNRM are 
relatively inaccessible compared with the availability of livelihood support from 
family members and the government.
Together, these conditions mean that people do not see new forms of collective 
wildlife management as necessary or beneficial. The availability of alternative insti-
tutions that provide financial support to livelihoods means that in Chobe, ‘intensely 
felt needs’ regarding livelihoods and household survival can be met by individual 
responses. That is, villagers can access channels of financial and physical capital 
either through government support programmes or through remittances from fam-
ily members, many of whom work in nearby safari camps and lodges. As Ostrom 
(2009) argues, in successful cases of self-organization, users are either dependent 
on the resource system for a substantial portion of their livelihoods or attach high 
value to the sustainability of the resource. In Chobe and much of the rest of Bot-
swana, other sources of livelihood support remain easier and less costly for most 
households to access than market-based capital from wildlife tourism. Thus people 
are less likely to organize, because the costs of organizing and maintaining a self-
governing system are not perceived to be worth the effort (Ostrom 2009).
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The decline of wildlife-based livelihoods in Chobe
State conservation laws initiated when Botswana became a British protectorate in 
1885 restricted wildlife hunting and use by the local human populations (Spinage 
1991). In northern Botswana specifically, the creation of an extensive network 
of protected areas that culminated in the establishment of Chobe National Park 
shortly after independence in 1968 had major consequences for the lives and live-
lihoods of the human communities living in this region.7 Apart from direct and 
indirect threats to people and livestock from wild predators that were now pro-
tected under conservation law, many farmers had to abandon grazing areas and 
cattle posts located within the boundaries of the game park and forest reserve. 
Hunting wild animals, fishing and collecting natural resources such as wood were 
prohibited within the nearby forest reserves. Outside of the reserves, villagers were 
required to buy a permit from the district government to conduct these activities 
(Gumbo 2002).
In Chobe, as in much of Botswana, households no longer rely heavily on wildlife 
and natural resources for their survival. In 2001, natural resources were estimated 
to contribute only 5 per cent of household total income (including the value to 
households of their own production) from all livelihood activities in the Ngamiland 
and Chobe districts of northern Botswana (Botswana Institute for Development 
Policy Analysis [BIDPA] 2001). As one villager in Chobe explained, ‘The natural 
resources which are supposed to be important to us are wildlife, but government 
took wildlife to make money. Now it’s not important for us, it’s only for tourists 
and government’ (21 October 2009). The Chobe case is characteristic of Botswana 
and other parts of southern Africa, where past state conservation policies and colo-
nial histories largely eliminated human dependence on wildlife and community 
wildlife management.
The legacy of the state taking control over this ‘national’ resource is that today 
in Chobe, most residents do not have a sense of ownership over wildlife. Norms 
regarding reciprocity between villagers and collective responsibility for wildlife 
management have been replaced by an overall sentiment that wildlife is the prop-
erty of the state and that the state, not the villagers, should be responsible for wild-
life management. Interviews reveal that many younger residents do not remember 
a time when communities had collective responsibility for land and resource man-
agement, given that the colonial state took resource use and management rights 
away from communities a century ago. In the pre-colonial era, villages organized 
regiments of men to control flooding to prevent crop destruction, to kill lions har-
assing villagers or to scare elephants away from the fields. Elders in the village 
reported to me that such groups had gradually dissolved under colonial rule and 
no longer existed. When asked if village groups existed today to scare off crop-raid-
ing wildlife, one woman from Kachikau explained:
[T]here is no one. Such things are no longer there [for] my children . . . there 
are no people [in the village] who would do that. People have left. Even the 
chiefs have stopped practicing laws from the past. . . . If they [villagers] would 
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kill the animals, [they would] go to jail . . . it comes down to money. And 
Wildlife Department is the one that takes care of animals. 
(Personal communication 2010)
In Chobe today, not only have wildlife-based livelihoods been curtailed, but 
wildlife now poses a threat to agricultural livelihoods. Chobe’s abundant wildlife 
resources and the extensive Chobe-Zambezi river system make it a primary safari 
destination in southern Africa. This means that today, Chobe Enclave residents 
face the costs of living near a protected area and in a region zoned for wildlife 
management and oriented towards tourism.
Villagers complain that the presence of these reserves limits where they can graze 
their cattle and that their livestock continue to be vulnerable to predation by wild 
animals. Furthermore, the village’s close proximity to wildlife prevents livestock 
owners from certifying their cattle against foot-and-mouth disease and has thereby 
halted the sale of their livestock to the subsidized European Union market (a lucra-
tive market for other livestock producers in Botswana). Crop destruction by wild 
animals is a growing problem. The elephant population in the country has increased 
sixteenfold over the past 50 years to an estimated 133,829, with 70–80 per cent of 
the elephants living outside the national parks (World Bank 2009). Correspondingly, 
the number of elephant conflict reports for the Chobe Enclave has increased stead-
ily from nine reports in 1994 to 144 in 2004 (unpublished data from Dr Kathy Alex-
ander of the Center for African Resource: Animals, Communities and Land Use).
For the past 20 years, the Chobe CBNRM programme has sought to recreate 
wildlife-based livelihoods and re-establish the collective will for sustainable wildlife 
management, but today most village residents still do not view wildlife as acces-
sible or important to their livelihoods. Although people recognize that the CECT 
provides the village with a few community benefits, such as tractors for ploughing 
and financial support for various civic groups in the village, most villagers reported 
in interviews that they did not see the CECT as a source of individual income or 
livelihood support.
In focus group discussions and informal interviews about the national park 
in my two village field sites (N =100), just 11 community members mentioned 
the benefits brought about by wildlife-based tourism in the region, and only one 
directly mentioned the CECT as a stimulus for village development. In my 2010 
survey of two Chobe Enclave villages, neither wildlife nor CECT/CBNRM were 
cited as one of the top three sources of income for a household. Village residents 
accept state-centralized control over natural resources, including land and wild-
life. As a Kachikau man who had moved to the nearby town of Kazangula told 
me, ‘This entire land belongs to the government. This government controls eve-
rything. They tell you where to stay and where to plough . . . the land is under 
government. It is not controlled by us’ (7 May 2010).
The failure of the CBNRM project in Chobe to galvanize residents to develop 
self-organized institutions for the collective governance of wildlife is typical of 
CBNRM programmes in Botswana generally. In a recent assessment of CBNRM 
in Botswana, Rozemeijer reported that for all CBNRM projects in the country,
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it is very unlikely that in these projects benefits to the average community 
member will exceed the costs to the same individual. It is therefore equally 
unlikely that this will prompt the conservation of natural resources, especially 
by those who have reduced access to them for subsistence purposes.
(Rozemeijer 2009, p. 253)
In other words, residents have little incentive to self-organize to manage and uti-
lize wildlife sustainably.8 Not surprisingly, then, there is little evidence that land 
use patterns in resource-rich areas have changed to the benefit of wildlife (e.g. 
through the adoption of less damaging arable agriculture and livestock grazing 
models) (Rozemeijer 2009).
Understanding livelihoods: The role of state transfers and 
remittances in household decision-making
The Chobe Enclave is a place where wildlife is now more of a hindrance than an 
asset to livelihoods. Households in Chobe are poor, but have some mechanisms 
for buffering the costs of living near wildlife. Botswana’s political economy is char-
acterized by strong rural-urban linkages and robust social services provisioning. 
Figure 6.2 Author soliciting community feedback on the accuracy of previous studies of 
livelihood sources in the Chobe Enclave (photo: Prince Mbeha).
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This section highlights the broader political economy within which the enclave is 
situated in order to explain in part why the Chobe Enclave CBNRM project has 
not been more successful.
In Chobe, household decision-making takes place in the context of a relatively 
well-functioning welfare state and in a rural locale tightly linked to the resources of 
Botswana’s urban sphere. Rural household dependence on remittances and gov-
ernment support in Chobe is not unique to the region, but reflects rural livelihood 
strategies in Botswana generally. Chobe Enclave residents are able to draw upon 
these entitlement programmes and kinship networks in order to make ends meet. 
The relationships between the state and its citizens, and between urban and rural 
kin, mean that Chobe residents are able to sustain their livelihoods in ways that do 
not necessarily demand the time, effort and resources that would be required to 
make a common-pool resource regime function effectively.
It is difficult to determine whether the dependence of Chobe Enclave house-
holds on the government, and on family members working outside the village, 
simply reflects national-level relations between the state and its rural citizens and 
between rural and urban kin, or whether it has increased beyond the national 
norm because the community lives near land designated for wildlife conservation. 
However, the larger point is that the choices of Chobe Enclave residents regarding 
participation in CBNRM projects are very much mediated by the availability of 
and access to resources from the state and remittances from family. Below, I elu-
cidate how the political economy of Botswana makes it easier for Chobe residents, 
and thus gives them more incentive, to access capital from the state and urban kin 
than to do so from participation in community wildlife management institutions 
established under CBNRM.
Social safety nets in Botswana
Botswana is often described as a developmental state that provides for its citizens 
in a relatively efficient manner (Acemoglu et al 2001). Botswana’s lucrative dia-
mond mining industry, good governance and relatively small population mean 
that it can provide a level of social services and financial support to its citizens that 
few other African countries can deliver. Since the discovery and exploitation of 
diamonds shortly after independence, and the subsequent surge in the economy 
(Colclough and McCarthy 1980), Botswana has strategically used its economic 
growth and access to donor funds to achieve impressive levels of social service 
delivery. Since 1966 it has invested in the health and education of its citizens and 
guaranteed them access to a number of institutionalized social safety nets.
Today, Botswana’s National Strategy for Poverty Reduction, adopted in 2003, 
comprises three clusters of targeted interventions: income generation strategies 
such as microcredit and agricultural support programmes (e.g. the Integrated 
Support Programme for Arable Agricultural Development, ISPAAD); safety nets 
such as drought-relief food aid and labour-based public works (the Ipelegeng 
programme) and entitlements such as old-age pensions and destitute allowances 
(BIDPA 2001). Other safety nets include school feeding, orphan rations and 
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community home-based care for AIDS patients, all of which has become increas-
ingly necessary since the HIV/AIDS crisis emerged in the late 1980s.
These social safety net programmes are particularly prevalent in Chobe: 71.1 
per cent of surveyed households in northern Botswana (Ngamiland and Chobe 
districts) said that government support programmes provided them with direct 
access to food, in comparison with the national average of 19.6 per cent (BIDPA 
2001). In my survey of the Chobe Enclave, approximately 17.8 per cent of house-
holds stated that their main income source fell into the category of government 
assistance. A 2001 survey conducted by the Botswana Institute for Development 
and Policy Analysis revealed that government transfers contributed 55 per cent 
of the total income from all livelihood activities in northern Botswana (BIDPA 
2001).
Chobe residents access government transfers through a number of different sup-
port programmes. For example, farming is heavily subsidized for Chobe Enclave 
households that decide to farm. Through the agricultural support programme 
Integrated Support Programme for Arable Agricultural Development [ISPAAD], 
the government spends 700 pula (equal to roughly US$100 at the time of writing) 
per hectare during the ploughing season to prepare the soil, plough the fields and 
plant seeds for village farmers in the Chobe Enclave. Agricultural extension agents 
working in the Chobe Enclave report that all farmers in the enclave who have cul-
tivated their fields in the past few years have received support from ISPAAD. Also, 
the Botswana government’s labour-based public works programme, Ipelegeng, 
provides a source of (at least temporary) employment and income to many Chobe 
Enclave residents. Recent records from the Chobe District Council show that in 
the year 2008/09, there were 572 beneficiaries of Ipelegeng in the two surveyed 
villages, or more than one person per household working for Ipelegeng. In inter-
views and focus groups, villagers emphasized the importance of Ipelegeng in pro-
viding temporary work, especially to young people facing a lack of opportunities 
in farming and formal employment.
Rural-urban linkages
Livelihood strategies in Chobe are influenced by the flow of resources, not only 
between the state and rural households, but also between urban and rural kin. 
Botswana has a long history of human mobility and rural-urban social and eco-
nomic linkages dating back to the late nineteenth century (Kerven 1980). At the 
same time that colonial authorities were curtailing villagers’ use of wildlife, urban 
migration was increasing, as men migrated to South Africa to work in the mines in 
order to pay the imposed colonial ‘hut tax’ (Schapera 1948). Ultimately migration 
and movement between the rural and urban or semi-urban areas determined the 
structure of family social relations and household livelihood portfolios in Botswana 
and southern Africa. Since the colonial era in the early twentieth century century, 
residents of Chobe Enclave, like most rural dwellers in Botswana, have relied on 
remittances from wage-earning family members in urban areas for their survival 
(Parson 1984).
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The majority of surveyed households (54.4 per cent) in the Chobe Enclave in 
2010 received remittances from family members, and these remittances made up, 
on average, 20 per cent of household income. Eighty-three per cent of households 
reported that they had at least one family member living and working outside 
the village. The actual percentage of households receiving remittances is likely 
to be higher than the recorded level, given the tendency for the under-reporting 
of income in rural household surveys (Devereux and Hoddinott 1993). Past stud-
ies show that most migrants in southern Africa are expected to send remittances 
back to their family in their home villages (Kerven 1980; Lucas 1978; Pendleton 
et al 2006). Two-thirds of migrants interviewed (including students, who are not 
expected to remit) stated that they regularly sent home remittances to their village 
families (66.7 per cent; N = 147).
The significant flow of funds from the state and from urban kin to the Chobe 
Enclave stands in stark contrast to the minimal contribution of CBNRM-related 
benefits to household survival. Chobe households are accustomed to accessing 
resources through subsidies and safety net programmes provided by the state, and 
through remittances from family members. In comparison with CECT benefits, 
the delivery of social services to villagers in the enclave is regular, reliable and 
transparent (Seleka et al 2007). Botswana is efficient in its social service provision-
ing (Acemoglu et al 2002), and qualifying individuals and households can register 
relatively easily to receive entitlements and various forms of assistance. Norms 
regarding kinship obligations mean that family members who move away to work 
are expected to send money and/or goods home regularly. While social safety 
nets and remittances may not necessarily provide large sums of money, they both 
represent established institutions that villagers know how to access.
As noted above, community members must see great benefits in collective 
organization and great risks in failing to organize for such a community to come 
together to manage a resource (Wade 1988). In Chobe, it is not imperative for 
communities to manage wildlife enterprises collectively in order for households to 
survive. Even without collective action, they can access some indirect livelihood 
benefits from wildlife, including remittances from family members working in the 
safari industry. Some villagers even view government social safety nets as an indi-
rect compensation for living near wildlife. Citizens thus have alternative sources 
of capital with higher (or at least less risky) perceived individual benefits (e.g. cash 
or goods flow to households) and relatively low transaction costs or barriers to 
entry compared with CBNRM engagement. This scenario results in individual-
ized household livelihood strategies that make it especially difficult to garner wide-
spread community interest and involvement in CBNRM.
Evaluating access to capital from wildlife under 
community-based natural resource management
Household decision-making is structured by the perceived availability of alterna-
tive sources of livelihood support relative to that provided through CBNRM. Col-
lective resource management regimes have not emerged in Chobe and the rest of 
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Botswana, not only because households are no longer dependent on wildlife and 
have alternative sources of income, but also because households do not see the 
benefits of new forms of collective resource management.
CBNRM’s failure to re-establish collective wildlife management and livelihood 
benefits from wildlife is generally agreed to be due to several key deficiencies: the 
lack of complete devolution of management authority, the lack of management 
expertise, and the lack of accountability and democratic participation (Agrawal 
and Gibson 2001; Blaikie 2006; Brosius et al 2005; Songorwa et al 2000; Twyman 
1998). I will now review these key challenges in the context of Chobe through the 
lens of an access analysis (Ribot and Peluso 2003).
Access analysis is a method of studying people and resources that differentiates 
access from property. ‘Access’ is defined as the ‘ability to benefit from things’ (i.e. 
resources), which broadens the definition of ‘property’ as ‘the right to benefit from 
things’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003). This theory of access gains traction when applied 
to settings where people may have rights to resources, but are part of broader 
social relationships that differentially constrain or enable people setting out to 
benefit from those resources. In these situations, an analysis of the set of factors 
that constitute and configure access provides a deeper understanding of social and 
environmental outcomes than a focus on property relations alone. An access anal-
ysis of the CECT is useful here because it highlights a shortcoming of the CBNRM 
model: that the devolvement of rights to a resource, especially highly circumscribed 
rights, by no means guarantees access to that resource. Access to livelihood benefits 
from wildlife is constrained under CBNRM in three primary ways. First, com-
munity access to wildlife is circumscribed because community rights to wildlife 
remain incomplete, despite policy shifts towards devolution. Second, mismanage-
ment has deprived the majority of villagers of access to the financial benefits from 
wildlife that accrue to community trusts. Third, most villagers do not have access 
to the social and business networks that facilitate successful entry into wildlife-
oriented enterprises (e.g. tourism, game ranching and commercial hunting).
Barriers to access I: Circumscribed rights to wildlife
As studies of common-pool resource regimes have shown, when users have full 
autonomy at the collective-choice level to craft and enforce their own rules, they 
are more likely to self-organize to manage the resource in question (Ostrom 
2009). Successful commons management depends upon the rights of resource 
users to devise their own institutions without being challenged by government 
authorities and obstructed by minimal recognition of their rights to organize 
(Ostrom 1990).
While CBNRM policies in theory decentralize resource governance to local 
communities, village residents’ management rights in Botswana are, in fact, still 
highly circumscribed. Villagers remain subject to strictly enforced laws prohibiting 
the hunting of globally and nationally protected wildlife species (including prob-
lem animals such as crop-raiding elephants) and the gathering of various forest 
products.
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Communities in a controlled hunting area of Botswana like the Chobe Enclave 
may be granted resource leases over wildlife and tourism on their land for a period 
of up to 15 years by a tribal land board if they have formed a community trust. 
Holders of these leases can be awarded a wildlife quota for hunting purposes by 
the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Legally, they can decide 
how to use this quota: whether to put the quota and the tourism concession lease 
out to tender in the private sector or to manage tourism operations themselves. 
However, the lack of local capacity to run the high-end hunting and tourism safa-
ris that characterize the Botswana tourism industry means that there is essentially 
no option besides the former if the trust wants to maximize its income from wildlife 
and tourism. Also, the trust has no control over the quota-setting process itself. 
Instead, the centralized DWNP decides, based on its animal census data.
Chobe villagers cannot come together to decide, for example, to cull the local 
elephant population. Restrictions upon their ownership rights mean that the rights 
villagers hold to ‘manage’ wildlife are essentially limited to creating and manag-
ing revenue from the wildlife safari industry and related tourism enterprises. As a 
result, it has been difficult for CBNRM projects to engender motivation within the 
villages to self-organize to manage their community trust when the authority over 
wildlife use still remains primarily in the hands of centralized state institutions.
Barriers to access II: Lack of financial management expertise and 
leadership
Not only are rights to wildlife broadly circumscribed, but the few rights that are 
devolved to the community under CBNRM do not translate into access to the 
financial benefits from permitted wildlife use (i.e. tourist photographic and hunt-
ing ventures) for the average villager. Under CBNRM, the community trust is 
expected to manage the revenue generated from the rent paid by the wildlife safari 
industry as a cooperative business might. However, most village residents, includ-
ing traditional village leaders, do not have the financial experience or skills needed 
to manage and invest large sums of money. To say that these tasks require a capac-
ity to exercise management authority not present in the village is not to say that 
village communities cannot organize effectively: the thriving burial societies and 
lending circles are sufficient proof that they can. The real point is that the terms 
of rights granted under CBNRM came from above in the form of a complicated 
recipe (Rozemeijer 2009) not readily compatible with traditional or locally derived 
institutions already in place.
The resulting lack of sound financial management means that funds from 
the trust are frequently misused or inefficiently allocated. As Ostrom (2009) has 
explained, self-organization is more likely when some of the users of a resource sys-
tem have entrepreneurial skills and have gained respected as local leaders through 
prior organizational activities. In Botswana, the village chief and headmen are 
still considered the ‘leaders’ of the village, but in actual fact have little power over 
resource management and generally no experience managing revenue from wild-
life tourism. Those village residents who do possess these skills – those with higher 
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education – generally leave the village for better opportunities to use those skills 
elsewhere. There is a dearth of individuals in the village with the expertise to help 
establish or lead a successful CBNRM trust, and those who are in charge often 
waste or misuse revenue.
Like a number of CBNRM trusts in Botswana, the CECT is prone to elite 
capture by the elected management committees (Suich et al 2009). Involvement 
in CBNRM is complicated, and the CECT is made up of a board of trustees and 
representatives from each village that is not downwardly accountable to its con-
stituents. Community trust meetings are transparent in theory (minutes are taken 
and made public), but most villagers have very little idea of what goes on during 
these meetings, especially since they are always held in the same village, making it 
difficult for most residents of the other four enclave villages to attend.
As a result, although the CECT can decide how to use its income from the rent 
paid by wildlife tourism partners, which can be quite substantial, benefit distribu-
tion within the five enclave villages has been minimal. Under the CECT consti-
tution, 85 per cent of revenue is supposed to be divided evenly among the five 
village trust committees, while 15 per cent is supposed to remain with the CECT 
for operating costs. Each village trust committee decides how to spend its share 
of the revenues, theoretically focusing on investments that provide community 
services or employment. However, in the 2009/10 fiscal year, despite generat-
ing over half a million US dollars in revenue, the CECT had a deficit of almost 
US $40,000, due to operating and administrative costs, many of which the trust 
could not account for (CECT 2010). These figures represent extreme financial 
inefficiency, and demonstrate that devolved (and admittedly limited) management 
rights do not guarantee access to benefits from wildlife tourism for the average 
villager, because skilled and accountable leadership within the trust is lacking.
Barriers to access III: Lack of market-based networks and 
knowledge
Not only is the CECT’s revenue from leasing its land and wildlife quotas difficult 
for most Chobe villagers to access, but CBNRM also offers few viable opportuni-
ties for Chobe households to develop wildlife-based livelihoods. The CBNRM 
model emphasizes the importance of devolved ownership over resources as a pre-
condition for the local entrepreneurial development of products and markets for 
wild resources (International Resource Group [IRG] 2009). But property rights 
over wildlife have little practical value if people do not have access to the skills or 
knowledge to develop that resource in the marketable, revenue-generating way 
that is permitted to and expected of them.
Botswana maintains a high-end, low-volume tourism policy that promotes the 
dominance of the tourism industry by foreign companies with tourism expertise 
(Rozemeijer 2009). These companies typically have connections to international 
markets and start-up capital that local villagers do not possess. This makes it diffi-
cult for villagers to start small-scale tourism businesses, as there is virtually no mar-
ket for budget travel in Botswana. There are also few economic linkages between 
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tourism operations and local businesses of any kind, because of the high quality 
of goods demanded by the tourist clientele. Handicrafts are often imported from 
wholesalers in neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, and lodge employees 
are brought in from other districts of Botswana where training is superior (Chobe 
Game Lodge manager, personal communication, 23 April 2010). There is a wide-
spread sentiment among villagers that they are deliberately excluded from par-
ticipating in the tourism industry and that hiring practices are characterized by 
nepotism. The District Development Plan for Chobe states that the tourism sector 
is still monopolized by foreign-owned safari tourism operators who are believed 
to be racist and intent on keeping the indigenous population away from their 
operations (Chobe District Development Plan 2003). The tourism companies that 
operate on land leased to them through the CECT have not facilitated the develop-
ment of spin-off small enterprises supporting their larger operations, as CBNRM 
advocates predicted would happen. Wildlife tourism therefore remains primarily 
the domain of outsiders with business expertise.
The Chobe Enclave community thus lacks not only the leadership to manage 
trust funds effectively, but also the knowledge to ‘use’ wildlife successfully through 
the type of resource use that CBNRM facilitates: wildlife-based tourism. CBNRM 
fosters the creation of wildlife-derived benefits contingent upon greater market 
integration and intensification, an approach that simply makes poverty more 
complicated (Büscher and Dressler 2010). As a result of these barriers to access, 
the perception of benefits from CBNRM remains low among community mem-
bers. Unlike most government programmes or remittance networks, CBNRM is 
a complicated, risky and newly formed institution that to date has provided few 
household-level pay-offs.
Conclusion
Findings from Chobe, Botswana, challenge the conceptual underpinnings of 
CBNRM: that local people must find a way to benefit directly from a resource like 
wildlife if it is to be conserved. As Adams and Hulme (2001) have argued, there 
may be a number of circumstances in which CBNRM is in fact not the answer 
for conservation policy. The fact that CBNRM programmes have so rarely suc-
ceeded in creating collective units of villagers that behave in similar ways to the 
private landowners who profit from wildlife in South Africa (and previously Zim-
babwe) suggests that CBNRM’s theoretical mix of economic instrumentalism and 
common property theory may contain problematic assumptions about collective 
engagement with markets. CBNRM assumes that the instrument of the market 
can and should be introduced to produce value from common property natural 
resources for local people (Büscher and Dressler 2010). However, most communi-
ties in CBNRM project areas do not have the knowledge, power or social connec-
tions – what Ribot and Peluso (2003) call ‘structural or relational mechanisms of 
access’ – that would give them the ability to benefit from (i.e. to access) a natural 
resource such as wildlife. In Botswana, the community trust is an institution in 
which village-level control over natural resources is still highly circumscribed, and 
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in which the benefit stream that might come from collective organization is not 
guaranteed or obvious.
Instead, the case of Chobe shows that the state can provide a buffer against 
livelihood costs incurred by the presence of a protected area and its wildlife. It 
may be true that these state transfers merely alleviate poverty rather than develop 
productive livelihoods, but the fact that in Chobe state transfers contribute more 
to an average household’s livelihood portfolio than does CBNRM calls into ques-
tion, at the very least, the southern African CBNRM paradigm. It suggests that 
there may be other models for sustainable conservation, especially in places with 
strong central state provisioning and a mobile population that maintains social 
and economic links with its rural kin. While Botswana may be unique in its exten-
sive provisioning of social services to its rural population, it still exemplifies how 
state-led rather than market-led mechanisms can play a role in the amelioration of 
conflicting wildlife and human interests.
Furthermore, remittances from family working in the safari tourism industry 
also provide the enclave with an indirect source of income from wildlife that is not 
contingent upon community-level organization and collective markets. To make 
this point is not to argue that welfare programmes and remittances represent alter-
native pathways to sustainable conservation; what it does is identify the conditions 
under which CBNRM does not function effectively and emphasize that alterna-
tives suited to local political-economic and social conditions must be considered.
State transfers and remittances are not, by any means, ideal vehicles for achieving 
a just form of conservation. While critical to household basic survival, they do not 
spur the creation of institutions for devolved environmental governance. However, 
governmental social support programmes do compensate to a degree for living near 
wildlife, and remittances ostensibly represent an indirect benefit from wildlife (since 
a number of remitting migrants work in the tourism industry in the nearby town) 
– but these economic relationships do not give local villagers a sense of ownership 
or authority over wildlife. Within such relationships, residents of Chobe remain 
passive recipients of indirect wildlife benefits, and have little control over the nature 
or longevity of the benefit stream or over the lucrative resource (wildlife) itself.
Villagers may receive a relatively large amount of state support, but this support 
is often viewed locally as a way to placate villagers living near conservation zones, 
as the conservation of wildlife is given priority over other competing demands for 
land use in Chobe. While important, state transfers and remittances are under-
girded by institutions operating within a centralized form of governance in which 
rural dwellers have little control over the economic health of the state, the tourism 
industry or the management of the natural resource that sustains it.
A socially just form of conservation still remains better formulated in theory 
than in practice. In theory, CBNRM provides a pathway for achieving environ-
mental conservation in a socially equitable way, by designating local people living 
near wildlife to be the managers and beneficiaries of the resource and its market 
value. In reality, these empowered roles for local communities have often failed 
to materialize. Ultimately, to push back against the CBNRM model is to question 
the type of relationship that communities should have with their environment and 
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to interrogate the normative view espoused by CBNRM proponents: namely, that 
for wildlife conservation to be effective and sustainable, local people living near 
wildlife must engage in market relations that make wildlife an economic asset. The 
case of Chobe reveals to us that in some places, it is the overlooked relationships – 
those between state and society or between urban and rural kin, for example – 
rather than market-based relations between communities and wildlife, that pro-
vide the safety net to bolster the livelihoods of those who suffer the costs of envi-
ronmental and, in particular, wildlife conservation.
Notes
1 In this chapter, a livelihood is understood to comprise ‘the assets (natural, physical, finan-
cial, human and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institu-
tions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or 
household’ (Ellis 2000).
2 Communal land in Botswana is referred to as tribal land and constitutes about 71 per 
cent of the country’s total land area. Those who have been allocated land (through one 
of the land boards) do not own it but have usufruct rights (Jones 1999).
3 The data presented in this chapter were collected during nine months of 2009 and 2010 in 
two villages in the Chobe Enclave, where I conducted participant observation, focus-group 
workshops, semi-structured interviews with both village residents and local government 
officials, and a household survey. The survey was administered to a random 30 per cent 
sample of households (sample size: 90 households) selected from a list of village plot holders 
(all residential plots have to be registered, so the list is relatively comprehensive) from the 
district land board office using a random number generator. The survey was administered 
to the head of each household (including female-headed households) and the spouse of the 
head of the household if there was one (for male-headed households). The survey data used 
in this article were collected only from the head of the household, as prior comparison of 
spousal data indicated enough similarity to rely on the household head data as accurately 
portraying the household. Data were also collected from the Botswana National Archives.
4 Thirty-nine per cent of migrants originating from the two villages cited elephants as the 
cause of agricultural decline in their home villages (N = 147 unstructured interviews; no 
prompt regarding elephants or agriculture), and more than half of residents interviewed 
cited wildlife as either a disturbance to livelihoods (11 out of 40 respondents) or an inac-
cessible livelihood source, generally describing current restrictions against the hunting of 
wildlife (10 out of 40 respondents).
5 I am using Bertram’s (2011) definition of ‘welfare-state regime’ as government policies 
and expenditures aimed at securing, to individuals or groups, measurable benefits which 
those individuals or groups could not secure directly through participation in the market 
economy, including payment in cash of income transfers and the provision in kind of key 
basic services, such as health, education and housing.
6 While wildlife-derived remittances may financially link wildlife to rural livelihoods, the 
employment is mainly with safari companies based in a nearby town or on land discon-
nected from the Chobe Enclave CBNRM programme. As such, they provide individual-
ized indirect benefits from wildlife, and do not represent a livelihood derived from com-
munity-based wildlife management.
7 See Gumbo (2002) for extensive historical and contemporary documentation of the 
effects of conservation policy on local economic activities in the Chobe region.
8 The Chobe Enclave falls short not in its general capacity for community organization, 
but in its community organization around wildlife specifically. A number of community 
organizations (church groups, lending circles and burial societies) are active in the enclave, 
demonstrating that Chobe village residents clearly have the capacity to organize.
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Global biodiversity is seriously threatened by widespread habitat loss, overexploi-
tation, invasive species, pollution and climate change. The loss of biodiversity is 
especially acute in the equatorial belt, where the greatest part of the world’s biodi-
versity is concentrated (Western and Pearl 1989). Protected areas, notably national 
parks with strict protection regimes, are widely considered a principal means for 
conserving global biodiversity. However, there is growing recognition that pro-
tected areas cannot effectively achieve the conservation of biodiversity needed at 
the wider landscape levels beyond them. Also, new paradigms in protected areas 
governance are emerging that embrace a ‘humans in nature’ view, recognizing the 
critical roles played by local and indigenous communities in biodiversity conserva-
tion (Phillips 2003; Berkes 2007; Dudley 2008; Borrini-Feyerabend et al 2010). 
There is also an acknowledged need to redress injustices suffered by indigenous 
people in natural resource access and use (Brechin et al 2003).
Many protected areas have been established to advance Western-conceived 
notions of conservation at the expense of social justice and livelihoods for local and 
indigenous communities (Timberlake 1991; Neumann 2002; Dowie 2009). This is 
true in southern Africa, where protected areas, especially national parks, contrib-
uted historically to a racial divide in rights to wildlife resources during European 
colonization and subsequent white minority rule.
Protected areas have been established and managed in Africa with little or no 
regard for local community resource access and use. In fact, local and indigenous 
communities have been disenfranchised and displaced from traditional areas of 
occupancy and resource use, with serious consequences for community livelihoods 
and sociocultural survival (Owen-Smith 1987; Timberlake 1991; Western 2002). A 
fortress approach to conservation in national parks has excluded local and indig-
enous use and management of water, wildlife, forests and grasslands (Adams and 
Hulme 2001). ‘Fences and fines’ measures have contributed to adversarial relation-
ships between local indigenous communities, wildlife populations and protected 
areas, and such polarization can aggravate the loss of biodiversity (Western 2002).
132  Arthur Hoole
Since achieving independence, many African states have extended rights in 
resources to indigenous Africans. The purpose of this chapter is to consider com-
munity-based natural resource management (CBNRM) for wildlife in this context, 
with particular attention to prospects for developing positive institutional rela-
tionships between CBNRM and the state’s management of protected areas. It is 
posited that such prospective institutional linkages could more fully achieve biodi-
versity conservation in southern Africa while restoring or promoting social justice 
in terms of cultural renewal, governance and livelihoods.
The findings presented here are derived from doctoral research carried out in 
Namibia in 2006 and 2007 (Hoole 2008). A qualitative research approach was 
employed (Berg 2004), including detailed semi-structured interviews with a cross 
section of key informants drawn from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
involved in conservation, government ministries, private enterprises and the 
national university, supplemented with extensive archival research in Namibia. A 
community-level case study was conducted in the Ehi-rovipuka communal con-
servancy, paying particular attention to how the conservancy had been formed, 
its essential governance arrangements and the relationships between the Herero 
communities constituting the conservancy and the contiguous Etosha National 
Park (Figure 7.1). The Herero formerly lived in parts of Etosha and were ousted 
early in the twentieth century (Hoole and Berkes 2010). The Ehi-rovipuka Con-
servancy thus provides a specific opportunity to learn about how the designation 
and management of a national park were implicated in displacing local indigenous 
people from their traditional resource base.
The case illustrates how CBNRM and protected areas management might be 
more strongly linked to help restore the local social-ecological system, promoting 
greater biodiversity conservation and social justice. The term ‘social-ecological 
system’ refers to integrated people-environment systems, emphasizing the inter-
dependence and co-evolutionary nature of these interactions (Berkes and Folke 
1998). The concept of ‘coupled systems’, which is invoked later, refers to the feed-
backs between the social and ecological subsystems. The terms ‘decoupling’ and 
‘recoupling’, also introduced later, describe the loss of feedbacks between the sub-
systems on one hand and the restoration of these feedbacks on the other (Hoole 
and Berkes 2010).
The case study research involved participant observation, semi-structured inter-
views with key conservancy informants, structured interviews with 40 conservancy 
villagers and memory mapping exercises with community elders (Chambers 1997; 
Tobias 2000) to elicit indigenous occupancy and use relationships within Etosha. 
An Otjiherero-speaking translator was recruited to assist in these processes, and 
an open community meeting was conducted to verify preliminary findings in the 
field. Further methodology details are available in Hoole (2008).
This chapter first sets out the background to Namibia’s protected area sys-
tem and the evolution of its CBNRM programme and then presents the com-
munity case study findings. Potential linkages between CBNRM and protected 
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Namibia’s protected areas and Etosha National Park
Namibia’s protected areas are established and managed under the enabling 
authority and provisions of the Nature Conservation Ordinance, No. 4 of 1975. 
This legislation was promulgated for the Territory of South West Africa, before 
Namibia’s independence, by the South West Africa Administration. It repealed 
and replaced earlier legislation on protected areas and wildlife management intro-
duced by the South African colonial administration as far back as 1927. The 1975 
Figure 7.1 Case study area in Namibia.
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ordinance continues in force today, notwithstanding Namibia’s independence in 
1990. New protected areas legislation has been under active consideration for sev-
eral years, but has yet to be enacted (Michael Sibalatani, SPAN Project Coordina-
tor, personal communication, 29 March 2011). National parks therefore continue 
to be managed and administered under command-and-control legislation that has 
treated the indigenous peoples of Namibia as illegal users of parks and wildlife. A 
brief examination of the legislation illustrates these points.
The 1975 legislation provides for two types of state-protected areas which are 
not differentiated in terms of protection purpose or management objectives: ‘game 
parks’ and ‘nature reserves’ (South West Africa Legislative Assembly 1975). The 
legislation uses these two categories in conjunction and interchangeably. The min-
ister may declare any area a game park or a nature reserve
for the propagation, protection, study and preservation therein of the wild 
animal life, fisheries, wild plant life and objects of geological, ethnological, 
archaeological, historical and other scientific interest and for the benefit and 
enjoyment of the inhabitants of the Territory and other persons.
(Nature Conservation Ordinance No. 4 1975)
Purposes for which permission may be granted to enter the game parks and nature 
reserves include ‘health, study and recreation, travel or transport along prescribed 
routes and transacting lawful business’. Prohibitions include the hunting of ani-
mals, the wilful or negligent injury, capture or disturbance of animals, eggs or 
nests, the introduction of livestock or any domestic animal, the picking of any 
indigenous plant and the chopping, cutting or destroying of any tree.
A pattern of protected areas’ establishment and management common in south-
ern Africa (Child 2004) is reflected in Namibia’s state-protected areas. Local and 
indigenous peoples have been and remain essentially excluded from the parks, 
with only one or two exceptions arising either from outright defiance by the indig-
enous people (Hinz 2003, p. 48) or from recently evolved, limited co-manage-
ment relationships under CBNRM (Namibian Association of CBNRM Support 
Organisations [NACSO] 2010, p. 95). Traditional uses of plants, animals, vegeta-
tion and water practised prior to protected areas designation are treated as illegal 
uses under the law.
Beyond its provisions for protected areas, the Nature Conservation Ordinance 
is largely devoted to prohibitions or prescriptions for permitted uses of wildlife. 
It sets out a series of rights for the use and enjoyment – by predominantly white 
landowners – of certain categories of wildlife, and these rights are not extended 
to communal area residents. This social and economic injustice was not redressed 
until the emergence of CBNRM in Namibia.
Etosha National Park: A brief retrospective
Etosha National Park is considered the flagship of the Namibian protected 
areas system and is the most important international tourism destination in the 
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country (Turpie et al 2004; Ministry of Environment and Tourism 2007). 
Etosha, at 22,270 square kilometres, is one of the largest national parks in southern 
Africa. It is classified under the Nature Conservation Ordinance as a game park. 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) recognizes Etosha as 
a category II protected area or national park (Protectedplanet.net n.d.).
On 1 April 1907, the precursor to Etosha, Game Reserve No. 2, was proclaimed 
by the German colonial administration (South West Africa Administration n.d.). 
According to the proclamation, hunting was prohibited, traffic of any vehicles was 
only permissible with written permission and a fine of up to 5,000 marks could be 
imposed for a contravention of the proclamation. Game Reserve No. 2 became 
the largest nature reserve in the world at the time (Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism 2007).
Following the ousting of the German administration in South West Africa in 
1915, the South African administration confirmed the borders of Game Reserve 
No. 2 through the Prohibited Areas Proclamation, No. 26 of 1928. This created 
the Police Zone or so-called ‘Red Line’, which could not be crossed without a 
permit (Dieckmann 2007). This was a direct consequence of the rinderpest epi-
demic of 1896 and 1897. The ‘Red Line’ was reinforced in the early 1960s with 
the installation of a veterinary fence running all the way from the Skeleton Coast, 
along the southern boundary of the present-day Etosha National Park and on to 
Botswana. The intent was to prevent the movement of African free-ranging live-
stock from the north and hence the spreading of disease into the commercial farm 
stock of colonial settlers. Indeed, Etosha National Park was completely fenced 
by 1973 (Dieckmann 2003; Berry 1997), and the fences have served to reinforce 
the alienation of indigenous people from the park (Dieckmann 2003; Hoole and 
Berkes 2010).
In 1962, South Africa appointed the Commission of Inquiry into South West 
Africa Affairs, commonly known as the Odendaal Commission (Dieckmann, 
2007, p. 176), which demarcated new apartheid homelands in South West Africa 
and changed the boundaries of the game reserves (Figure 7.2). Game reserves 
were reduced significantly in size to make way for the new homelands (De la Bat 
1982).
This history of Etosha National Park is very much a thumbnail sketch. What 
emerges from various archival accounts is that the park area was occupied, used 
or laid claim to by at least three indigenous peoples: the Owambos residing to the 
north, the Hai//om to the south of the Etosha Pan and the Herero to the west.
Community-based conservation in southern Africa
Community-based conservation assumes that if conservation and development are 
simultaneously achieved, the interests of both can be served (Berkes 2004). In the 
African context, ‘community conservation’ has been defined as principles and prac-
tices stressing conservation goals that emphasize natural resource decision-making 
by local residents (Adams and Hulme 2001). Community-based conservation has 
been practiced in many forms, but in the broadest sense includes conservation by, 
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for and with the local community. The coexistence of people and nature, as distinct 
from protectionism and the segregation of people and nature, is its central charac-
teristic (Murphree 1994; Western and Wright 1994). Community-based conserva-
tion is employed here as an overarching concept that includes CBNRM.
Centrally and internationally conceived approaches in the community-based 
conservation of wildlife emerged in the 1980s in southern Africa (Hulme and Mur-
phree 2001; Fabricius et al 2004). CBNRM programmes were developed in Zimba-
bwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi and Namibia with international donor funding. 
These programmes typically featured the devolution of bundles of certain rights in 
the use of wildlife to local communities, premised on making wildlife pay, the inten-
tion being to obtain local benefits that exceeded the costs of living with wildlife. The 
central theory was that economic incentives would promote conservation by local 
and indigenous peoples. These approaches, while achieving some conservation, 
often entailed more co-optation than empowerment. There was limited recogni-
tion of and support for traditional and indigenous resource management institu-
tions or an indigenous conservation ethic (Callicott 1994; Infield 2001).
Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) and Zambia’s Administrative Management Design for 
Game Management Areas programme (ADMADE) were especially influential in 
Figure 7.2 Boundary alterations to Game Reserve No. 2 and Etosha National Park.
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the design of Namibia’s CBNRM programme (Jones and Murphree 2004; Garth-
Owen Smith, Founding Co-Director of IRDNC, personal communication, 14 
July 2006). A brief overview of CAMPFIRE and ADMADE will therefore provide 
a useful introduction to the more specific consideration of Namibia’s CBNRM 
programme and communal conservancies.
Communal areas management programme for indigenous 
resources in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975 was amended in 1982 to give 
‘appropriate authority’ over wildlife to rural district councils for communal areas 
(Murombedzi 2001). CAMPFIRE was ultimately diffused to many rural district 
councils, but strongly tenurial communal property regimes were not acceptable to 
the councils. They did not want communal lands removed from their authority, 
along with the wildlife revenue potential from those areas.
Rural district ward boundaries in Zimbabwe were used to define areas for col-
lective action, when in fact there were differing and competing community groups 
and interests in such bounded areas (Jones and Murphree 2004). The ‘hard’ 
boundaries created by formal ward designations, land use and zoning plans were 
at odds with the ‘soft’ boundaries that communities traditionally used to enable 
overlapping and negotiated rights of resource access. Furthermore, the institu-
tional forms adopted in CAMPFIRE tended to be outgrowths of higher-level 
government agencies and did not originate within or reflect traditional, customary 
and less formal institutions at the community level.
Bond (2001) concluded that CAMPFIRE needed to achieve a much higher 
level of proprietorship at the community level. Other research echoed this, noting 
that communities were not given the right to use wildlife, but only allowed to share 
some of the benefits from its use by others (Murombedzi 2001). There was little use 
of local and traditional conservation institutions for land and resource manage-
ment. CAMPFIRE was quite top-down and did not effectively devolve authority 
to manage wildlife below the district level. Consequently, it did not comply with 
the subsidiarity principle: as much local solution as possible and only so much 
government regulation as necessary (Berkes 2004).
Administrative management design for game management areas 
in Zambia
ADMADE was initiated by Zambia’s National Parks and Wildlife Service in 1987 
in the Luangwa Valley with donor assistance from the World Wildlife Fund (US) 
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Gibson 1999). 
ADMADE explicitly tried to create a shift from the command-and-control style of 
colonial administration to a more community-based approach to wildlife manage-
ment. Revenue from safari concession fees, hunting licences, donor contributions 
and the profits of activities like wildlife culls were to be shared at community level, 
to promote wildlife conservation and curtail poaching.
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ADMADE ended up creating another layer of bureaucracy for local communi-
ties, alienating them with increased enforcement (Gibson and Marks 1995). The 
programme attempted to change individual behavior by offering incentives that 
mimicked public goods, such as schools and clinics. However, the programme did 
not fully appreciate the social significance of hunting, and hunters continued to 
poach (Marks 2005). Increased enforcement simply altered their tactics and prey 
selection. For game scouts, the pay and jobs were positive incentives to enforce, 
but for hunters, the public goods nature of incentives led to free-riding (Gibson 
1999). Game scouts were also under considerable social pressure from neighbours, 
who were often their friends and relatives.
Chiefs oversaw the community projects funded by their communities’ share of 
wildlife revenue, and they selected the individuals to be trained and employed as 
village game scouts. These practices produced predictable problems of question-
able benefits distribution, nepotism and alienation of the game scouts from their 
communities (Gibson and Marks 1995). The boundaries of the ADMADE pro-
gramme were drawn according to nationally defined game management areas, 
not locally negotiated patterns of access and use reflecting local traditions and 
cultural practices. Thus ADMADE, like CAMPFIRE, did not meet the subsidi-
arity principle.
As noted above, the experiences with CBNRM in Zimbabwe and Zambia were 
specifically considered by those implementing CBNRM in Namibia. Steps begun 
in the early 1980s led to Namibia’s CBNRM programme receiving statutory 
authority over a decade later, in 1996 (Nott and Jacobsohn 2004).
Namibia’s community-based natural resource management 
programme and communal conservancies
The Namibia Wildlife Trust, a national conservation NGO, concerned about 
severely depleted wildlife in north-west Namibia, appointed Garth Owen-Smith 
as a conservator for the region in 1982. He possessed long experience in the region 
and engaged local headmen, who shared the concern about the loss of wildlife 
(Owen-Smith, personal communication, 14 July 2006). The headmen appointed 
their own auxiliary game guards, later to be known as community game guards, 
who were all respected hunters from local communities. The aim was to stop 
poaching (Margaret Jacobsohn, Founding Co-Director of IRDNC, personal com-
munication, 14 July 2006), so the game guards monitored wildlife, reporting sus-
picious activities and poaching incidents to the headmen, who in turn informed 
government wildlife enforcement personnel.
By the late 1980s, regional wildlife populations had noticeably recovered. The 
ending of armed conflict and improved rainfalls made important contributions to 
this, but the community game guards were a major factor in stopping poaching, 
which also helped wildlife to recover. These early successes led to the formation of 
a new Namibian NGO, Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation 
(IRDNC), which continues to facilitate and support the further development of 
CBNRM in the Kunene and Caprivi regions of northern Namibia.
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With independence in 1990, Namibia’s black majority government extended 
rights in wildlife to communal area residents that had previously only been granted 
to white farmers on private lands by the South African administration. CBNRM 
in Namibia received statutory authority under the Nature Conservation Amend-
ment Act, No. 5 of 1996. This legislation did not repeal or replace the Nature 
Conservation Ordinance as the statutory authority for protected areas designation 
and management. Rather, it had the more circumscribed purpose of providing 
for the devolution of certain rights and uses of wildlife to communal area resi-
dents. These included rights to hunt, capture, cull and sell ‘huntable game’ such 
as springbok, oryx and kudu under quotas established by the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Tourism, as well as the right to use quotas of protected game such as 
elephant for trophy hunting.
Communal area residents are required to form a common property resource 
institution called a conservancy if they wish to participate in CBNRM and enjoy 
the rights in wildlife and related tourism development devolved under the legisla-
tion. Conservancies must be approved by and registered with the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and Tourism. Conservancy registration requires a defined conservancy 
boundary, an identified membership, a representative conservancy committee, a 
constitution recognized by the government and a commitment to producing a 
benefits distribution plan (Long 2004; World Resources Institute et al 2005).
Key linkages and partnerships have evolved in Namibian CBNRM, from a few 
simple ones between local communities, the national conservation NGO and the 
national government wildlife agency during the initial community game guard 
programme, to multiple linkages and networks involving several international 
donors, multiple national NGOs, the University of Namibia, private enterprise, 
and the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (Hoole 2010). There has been a 
rapid scaling up of communal conservancies in Namibia, from an initial four in 
1998 to sixty-six in 2011 (NACSO 2012).
Design principles for long-enduring common property institutions at local levels 
(Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2002) provide an organizing framework for summarizing 
the comparable and contrasting characteristics of Namibia’s CBNRM, Zimba-
bwe’s CAMPFIRE and Zambia’s ADMADE programmes (Table 7.1).
Namibia’s CBNRM programme and conservancies explicitly consider and 
apply many of these recognized design features and principles, including defined 
conservancy boundaries, a defined membership, external legal recognition and 
government-approved rights to organize. There has been a deliberate effort to 
avoid predetermined delimitation, such as CAMPFIRE’s use of rural district ward 
boundaries and ADMADE’s use of nationally defined game management area 
boundaries. Rather, communities are required to self-organize and negotiate their 
own boundaries, thus helping ensure the genuine devolution of wildlife use rights 
and benefits to the community level.
Another important feature is the formal registration and gazetting of conserv-
ancy members, which reinforces the principle of external recognition for com-
munity level institutions – again a significant departure from both CAMPFIRE 
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accrue to conservancy committees and are not shared with the central govern-
ment or regional authorities, as they were under CAMPFIRE and ADMADE. 
The advantages of devolving the rights and benefits of managing wildlife to the 
community level were learned from CAMPFIRE, but so too was the lesson that 
all revenue from wildlife should be retained at the community level (Jones 2001; 
Owen-Smith, personal communication, 14 July 2006).
The recognition of local rights to organize by institutions and authorities beyond 
the local level implies that relationships are needed with other institutions at dif-
ferent levels, beyond local institutions. The term ‘nested enterprises’ describes dif-
ferent levels of collective action that are organized in mutually reinforcing layers 
(Ostrom 1990). Clearly, the external recognition of conservancies as provided for 
in Namibia’s legislation, the omnipresence of international donor assistance, the 
evolution of multiple national NGOs facilitating and supporting community-based 
conservation, and conservancy partnerships with private enterprises are all evi-
dence of this principle. Multiple linkages and increasingly dense networks among 
international, national and local agents are all evident in Namibia (Hoole 2010).
The Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy case
Ehi-rovipuka – the name means ‘place of wildlife’ in Otjiherero – was officially 
registered as a communal conservancy in January 2001. It has an overall area of 
1,980 kilometres squared (NACSO, 2010) and is irregular in shape, extending 
more than 100 kilometres from north to south, with a variable width ranging up to 
about 20 kilometres (Figure 7.3). The Herero population is approximately 2,500, 
with densities ranging from less than one person per square kilometre to about 
ten in the larger village areas such as Otjokavare. There are approximately 30 vil-
lages, most of them in the northern half of the conservancy. Generally the villages 
are very small, with between 50 and 100 persons comprising only a few extended 
family groups.
People move from village to village, depending on marriage and family relation-
ships, as well as localized drought conditions and available grazing for their cattle. 
The Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy has about 700 registered members (Asser Ujaha, 
Field Officer for Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy, personal communication, 17 May 
2007). Membership, which is voluntary, is open to all adults (18 or older) who 
have lived in the conservancy for at least three years (Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy 
2000). Members must also hold Namibian citizenship, be permanent residents in 
the conservancy area and not be members of another conservancy. Membership 
is gained by signing a registration form signifying that the member accepts the 
conservancy’s constitution and its land use and wildlife management plans, and is 
willing to uphold them.
The Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy is situated on an upland plateau lying east of 
the north-western escarpment and along the western boundary of Etosha National 
Park. Elevations range from about 1,400 metres above sea level to 1,200 metres 
above sea level along its shared boundary with the Etosha National Park. The 
conservancy lies within the upper reaches of the Hoanib River watershed. Several 
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tributaries of the Hoanib River drain from east to west, notably the Ombonde 
River and its tributary the Otjovasandu River, as well as the Okawerongo River 
further north. These are ephemeral rivers that flow only during the rains and pro-
vide important connectivity corridors for wildlife, livestock and people. Ground-
water springs and riparian vegetation are also concentrated along these rivers, 
both within the conservancy and throughout the wider Kunene region. Annual 
Figure 7.3 Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy and west portion of Etosha National Park.
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precipitation ranges from about 250 millimetres to 350 millimetres (Jacobson et al 
1995) with higher rainfalls on the eastern margins, declining to the west. Drought 
is a regular occurrence, and the entire area of the conservancy is semi-arid.
Conservancy governance, wildlife conservation and community 
benefits
The constitution of the Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy at the time of this research 
(2006 and 2007) made provision for a conservancy management committee of 
12 members elected every three years by the conservancy membership at large 
(Ujaha, personal communication, 17 May 2007). Ten of the management com-
mittee members represent five different village blocks, two representatives for 
each block, and two additional members are appointed by the two traditional 
authorities that share territory with the Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy area (Figure 
7.4). Recent accounts suggest that these governance provisions remain essentially 
the same (NACSO 2010).
The village blocks are each named after a wildlife species, reflecting both the 
prevalence of different species and their importance to the conservancy purpose 
(Figure 7.5).
The conservancy management committee is responsible for approving the poli-
cies, programmes and projects of the conservancy, and is financially accountable 
to community members. The committee must develop and uphold the conservan-
cy’s constitution, prepare land use and management plans, compile a benefits dis-
tribution plan and conduct regular meetings and consultations with conservancy 
members, including an annual general meeting (AGM). A small administrative 
staff reports to the committee, carrying out activities such as community game 
guard patrols and annual wildlife monitoring (Figure 7.6). The conservancy game 
guard programme, the annual monitoring of wildlife populations and the com-
munity use of wildlife within quotas set by the central government have all helped 
sustain and increase wildlife populations in the conservancy and wider Kunene 
region (Stuart-Hill et al 2005; Hoole 2008; NACSO 2010).
Figure 7.4 Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy governance structure.
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The Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy receives most of its operational funding from 
international donors, channelled through IRDNC as lead regional conservation 
NGO. Villager and key informant interviews confirmed that the most important 
community benefits from the conservancy were wild meat distributed from a tro-
phy hunting operation, some direct revenue from the shooting and sale of wild 
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game, and a few full-time jobs in the conservancy management. More recent data 
on the status of communal conservancies in Namibia shows that these field find-
ings remain generally accurate, although there has been an increase in own-use 
hunting for wild meat (NACSO 2010, p. 28).
Joint venture tourism premised on wildlife has produced the greatest overall 
benefits for conservancies (NACSO 2006; NACSO 2010). Interviews with key 
informants in the Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy, including conservancy staff and 
management committee members, revealed the strong shared goal of developing 
a joint venture tourism lodge, as other conservancies had done successfully. Con-
servancy members particularly wanted to establish such a venture within the Eto-
sha National Park. This goal was not met during the period of field research and 
evidently it remains unfulfilled (NACSO 2010). Reportedly (Brian Jones, Envi-
ronment and Development Consultant, personal communication, 29 December 
2011) the conservancy recently concluded an agreement for a tourism enterprise 
within the Hobatere state tourism and hunting concession area, which is contigu-
ous with Ehi-rovipuka and Etosha National Park (see Figure 7.3).
Institutional effectiveness of Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy
A specific research objective was to learn what level of community self-organiza-
tion and participation had contributed to the establishment of the conservancy. 
External interventions proved to have been of central importance: the early col-
laboration of Garth Owen-Smith with headman Kephas Muzuma in the early 
1980s was well known to all villagers interviewed, reinforcing the importance of 
leadership and cross-cultural communication in initiating community-based con-
servation (Stern et al 2002). In fact, Kephas Muzuma was one of four headmen 
that Smith had worked with during the 1980s in the precursor community game 
guard programme.
Figure 7.6 Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy organizational structure.
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The roles played by the central government and NGOs were also reinforced in 
villager responses. Most noted that a community task force of villagers had been 
created by the traditional authority and received training from IRDNC. This task 
force, which included both men and women, took the conservancy idea out into 
the conservancy villages, promoting understanding of and support for the con-
cept and helping negotiate the boundaries with neighbouring communities. An 
important point emphasized by some villagers was that conservancy boundaries 
defined rights of access to wildlife only, and the conservancy included only those 
communities that had agreed to share wildlife: access to grazing, water and other 
resources was not subject to the exclusivity defined by conservancy boundaries. 
Villager interviews confirmed that the boundaries were well known at the commu-
nity level: 80 per cent of those interviewed indicated that they knew the bounda-
ries, or at least which villages made up the conservancy.
In sum, conservancy start-up had both top-down and bottom-up dimensions. 
The idea originated and was legally enabled from outside and at higher levels of 
organization than the local community level. Yet there was a high degree of self-
organization and collective action at community level in the implementation of 
conservancy institutional arrangements, notably in negotiating the boundaries.
The participation of conservancy members in decision-making was also 
explored. Villager responses emphasized AGM attendance, participation in other 
meetings with the conservancy management committee, and direct representation 
on the conservancy management committee as the principal means of partici-
pation. Actual registered membership of the conservancy was not mentioned by 
many, and some expressed frustration at difficult access to meetings, including the 
AGM.
Villagers were asked if they thought the conservancy would be working well in 
ten years’ time. Most felt that this depended upon whether or not there was proper 
management, capacity and transparency. Others thought the conservancy would 
be working well and would increase revenues to the conservancy from more tour-
ism enterprise projects. These and other responses revealed that villagers recog-
nized some early benefits from the conservancy, including increased wildlife num-
bers, an improved meat supply, more positive attitudes towards wildlife and a few 
revenue-producing projects. However, some villagers interviewed reported that as 
conservancy revenues and infrastructure started to build (e.g. a local conservancy 
office and vehicles for community game guard patrols), they had experienced frus-
trations concerning poor financial management, accountability and transparency 
in decision-making by the management committee. Nevertheless, the villagers 
remained hopeful about future prospects for the conservancy and for community 
livelihoods based on wildlife conservation at the time of the field research.
Overall, the Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy has developed positively as a common 
property institution for wildlife conservation since its inception in 2001, and con-
tinues to do so (NACSO 2006; NACSO 2010). The conservancy has offered com-
munities a voice in wildlife conservation and has begun to realize benefits in terms 
of direct revenues from wildlife-based enterprises, as well as food security contrib-
uted by wild meat. It has fostered positive attitudes towards wildlife as well. The 
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conservancy has developed fruitful and reciprocal working relationships with the 
government, donors and conservation NGOs in Namibia, most notably IRDNC.
Capacities in financial and programme management were relatively weak at the 
time of this research, and community members were seeking greater transparency 
in decision-making from their elected representatives. There was also an inherent 
limitation evident in the negotiated boundaries between neighbouring conservan-
cies. The communal conservancies all depend upon wildlife species that range 
widely across the semi-arid Kunene region. Just as there has been a rapid scaling 
up in the number of communal conservancies successfully negotiated and gazet-
ted to date, there remains an important challenge in further developing effective 
regional collaborations among conservancies and central government based upon 
sustaining and improving ecological connectivity for wildlife and biodiversity in 
the wider landscape. In other words, the small size of individual conservancies 
such as Ehi-rovipuka creates a scale mismatch with the fugitive nature of the wild-
life upon which they are premised (Cash and Moser 2000; Stern et al 2002). This 
point is also highly pertinent to prospective conservancy relationships with Etosha 
National Park.
The Hereros and Etosha National Park
Through stories and memory mapping, conservancy elders attest (Hoole 2008; 
Hoole and Berkes 2010) that the Hereros occupied the western parts of Etosha 
prior to its original designation as a game reserve in 1907. Indeed, elders’ stories 
relate how Herero people occupied and used the western part of present-day Eto-
sha National Park prior to game reserve designation up to about 1928 or 1929. At 
the time of the field research there were surviving Herero elders in the conserv-
ancy villages from this earlier period, some of whom were interviewed and shared 
memory maps. Younger residents testified that their parents or grandparents had 
been born in the park area, suggesting that Herero people lived there before mov-
ing into central Namibia, and their descendants returned during the German-
Herero war. Elders reported that their families moved back into the western part 
of Etosha in 1907 and 1908, doubtless as part of the Herero diaspora that resulted 
from the genocide by the German colonial forces around 1905 (Pakenham 1991).
An especially significant revelation in elders’ stories was the reason given for 
the initial displacement of the Hereros from present-day Etosha. Specifically, the 
people were ‘chased out of the park’ when ‘whites’ came from Angola in 1928 and 
1929. In other words, the potential competition for place and space with colo-
nial settlers was the pretext for relocating the Hereros from present-day Etosha; 
they were not initially displaced by a Western conservation agenda. These stories 
revealed that the Hereros were relocated to the Ombombo area, which at the time 
was still within Game Reserve No. 2 (Figure 7.2). The Hereros were not removed 
from the original game reserve but relocated to a more remote part of it, away 
from the area intended for colonial farm settlements and cattle production.
It was only with the evolution of a park conservation agenda following the Sec-
ond World War and the fencing off of Etosha in the early 1970s that the Hereros 
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were denied access to the park area on the grounds of wildlife conservation (Hoole 
2008). Where once they had grazed and watered their cattle as semi-nomadic 
pastoralists, hunted wild game, gathered ‘field foods’ such as mopane worms and 
honey and tended their ancestral graves, the Hereros were denied access to the 
places and practices of their culture and livelihood within the park. In fact, it 
became an unfulfilled vision of successive headmen to return the Hereros to their 
ancestral birthplaces, burial sites and traditional use areas in Etosha (Hoole 2008; 
Hoole and Berkes 2010).
One villager’s comment captures the message from most respondents when the 
topic of living next to Etosha National Park was introduced in interviews: ‘There 
you come to the wound. People get much pain when they hear of the park’.
Table 7.2 summarizes ‘decoupling’ and ‘recoupling’ mechanisms for the cou-
pled social-ecological system that existed between the Herero and Etosha National 
Park. Decoupling mechanisms reflect the felt consequences of the Herero being 
excluded from Etosha. Recoupling mechanisms are based upon the prospective 
benefits from Etosha that Ehi-rovipuka villagers strongly seek, as identified in 
interviews.
The findings underscore a divide between the recently formed common prop-
erty conservation institution, the Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy, and the state con-
servation institution of Etosha National Park. In the circumstances this divide is 
ironic – even more so when one considers that the national CBNRM programme 
and Namibia’s protected areas are enabled under statutes administered by the 
same Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Yet mechanisms such as those sum-
marized in Table 7.2 could prospectively help recouple the local social-ecological 
system (Berkes and Folke 1998; Hoole and Berkes 2010). Such mechanisms could 
link CBNRM and protected areas more strongly, promoting biodiversity conser-
vation and social justice.
Most of the recoupling mechanisms identified in Table 7.2 demand more col-
laborative and adaptive management on the part of the conservancy and the 
national park authorities, at multiple levels (Cash et al 2006; Armitage et al 2009). 
Indeed, such an approach should extend beyond the individual case to region-
wide collaborative and adaptive management approaches among multiple com-
munal conservancies, conservation NGOs and central government ministries.
Summary and concluding remarks
Figure 7.7 illustrates trajectories for institutional relationships between state-
protected areas and community-based conservation in southern Africa, and serves 
to summarize and generalize findings and ideas in this chapter.
What follows is an explication of the trajectories set out in Figure 7.7. Local 
and indigenous resource-use systems for collective action long preceded Euro-
pean colonization and the designation of protected areas in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (historical traditional period). Protected area designations by 
colonial powers then truncated these local resource use systems, disenfranchis-
ing indigenous peoples from their natural patrimony (twentieth-century period). 
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Community-based conservation emerged in the late twentieth century in south-
ern Africa in the form of CBNRM programmes, but disconnects persist between 
CBNRM and protected areas as two solitudes in shared biodiversity space (late 
twentieth century).
Different futures are needed for the twenty-first century; futures that more fully 
acknowledge humans as an integral part of ecosystems, the complexity of social 
and ecological systems, collaborative resources management and increasingly 
participatory, empowering approaches in conservation. Several such ‘futures’ are 
envisioned: a first scenario (Future 1) in which community-based conservation 
Table 7.2 Decoupling and recoupling mechanisms between Herero communities and 
Etosha National Park
Historical decoupling mechanisms Prospective recoupling mechanisms 
Forced relocation from the park 
area to Ombombo, with fences 
and fines later preventing return.
Complete removal or selective gating of the park fence 
to permit community access and wildlife connectivity 
corridors; hence a more porous park boundary for 
people and wildlife.
Lost reliable water and grazing 
for livestock inside the park.
Managed emergency grazing for community livestock 
during periods of drought.
Lost cultural access to Herero 
birthplaces and ancestral graves 
inside the park.
Community access to Etosha to visit, tend and 
commemorate ancestral graves there.
Lost opportunities to hunt 
wildlife for domestic use and 
cultural sustenance inside the 
park.
More park-based wildlife translocations and meat 
sharing; no need to hunt inside the park with the Ehi-
rovipuka Conservancy in place.
Lost opportunities to gather field 
foods and medicinal plants inside 
the park.
Managed community access to the park for harvesting 
field foods such as mopane worms, wild honey and 
medicinal plants.
Loss of social memory preserving 
traditional rules of resource use 
and environmental knowledge of 
the park.
Management collaboration between park and 
conservancy – a real ‘voice’ in park management; 
employment in the park.
Increased vulnerability to wildlife 
due to sedentary lifestyle.
Increased local security around school sites, livestock 
kraals and water boreholes in collaboration with park 
managers, mitigating conflict between humans and 
wildlife.
Loss of community memory and 
community-based management 
practices relating to the park 
area.
Empowerment through the conservancy’s common 
property institutions; collaborations in park and 
wildlife management, merging science with local and 
traditional knowledge.
Lost and foregone opportunities 
for livelihoods inside the park.
Partnerships in ecotourism enterprises in Etosha 
National Park; wildlife management.
The social injustice of forced 
relocation from the park.
Social justice through community empowerment, 
selective and managed access to the park, and 
collaborative management between conservancy and 
park.
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is more directly linked and overlaps with protected areas, much in the manner 
suggested for the Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy and the Etosha National Park; a sec-
ond (Future 2) in which community-based conservation is thoroughly embedded 
within a given protected area, or the community’s area is formalized as a protected 
area in its own right; and a third (Future 3) in which protected areas are more 
fully integrated with community-based conservation institutions in wider regional 
landscapes.
These scenarios are not mutually exclusive, nor are they founded on some 
romantic notion of returning to past indigenous resource management institu-
tions as they may have existed prior to protected areas designations. In fact, 
while these future scenarios are presented here as theoretical abstractions, they 
could draw upon and give effect to the most current definition for protected 
areas and the different protected area management categories now recognized 
by IUCN (Dudley 2008). They could take advantage of the growing recognition 
of indigenous and community conserved areas (ICCAs) – that is, indigenous 
Figure 7.7 Trajectories of community-based conservation (CBC) and protected areas (PA) 
in southern Africa.
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conservation territories and areas conserved by indigenous peoples and local 
communities (Borrini-Feyerabend et al 2006; Borrini-Feyerabend et al 2010), 
as well as protected area management categories such as the IUCN Category V 
(Protected Landscape/Seascape) and Category VI (Protected Area with Sustain-
able Use of Natural Resources) (Dudley 2008).
The evolution and progress of CBNRM in Namibia, drawing on early experi-
ence with a community game guard programme in northern Namibia and les-
sons learned from regional models such as CAMPFIRE and ADMADE, are very 
promising for community-based wildlife conservation on the commons. Namibia’s 
maturing communal conservancies, as exemplified by the case of the Ehi-rovipuka 
Conservancy and Etosha National Park, warrant greater recognition by manag-
ers of state-protected areas striving to strengthen collaborative wildlife conserva-
tion partnerships in order to achieve greater biodiversity conservation and social 
justice.
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 Micro-governance and face-to-face 
participatory democracy
Brian Child, Patricia Mupeta, 
Shylock Muyengwa and Rodgers Lubilo
Introduction
This chapter introduces the concept of micro-governance in community-based nat-
ural resource management (CBNRM). The central argument is that wildlife-based 
CBNRM is good at delivering conservation benefits and generating income. How-
ever, we need to understand much more about micro-governance if the goal is also 
to ensure that CBNRM delivers public participation and equitable benefit sharing. 
CBNRM is a strategy by which groups of people collectively manage resources that 
cannot be managed individually because they occur in diverse and scattered configu-
rations or are mobile, or both. Thus CBNRM tends to occur in forests, drylands and 
mountain environments where individualized agriculture is ecologically difficult.
CBNRM emerged independently and spontaneously for different resources 
and in different regions of the world in the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
as rapid demographic growth brought politically and economically marginalized 
people into increasing interaction with conservation initiatives, while centralized 
systems of management were failing to provide positive conservation or develop-
ment outcomes. Participation therefore emerged into the narrative of the develop-
ment agenda (Chambers 1994). Thus, we see community forestry arising in Mexico 
in the 1970s (Bray et al 2006; Charnley and Poe 2007), south Asia in the 1980s 
(Pomeroy 1995; Arnold 2001; Poffenberger 2006), the Amazon and Africa in the 
1990s (Charnley and Poe 2007) and community fisheries in south east Asia in the 
1990s (Pomeroy 1995; Nasuchona and Charles 2010), with remarkably little cross-
referencing or sharing of experiences between these somewhat separate contexts.
CBNRM is complex, but operationally, three issues are critical:
• the economic viability of the natural resources in question
• the willingness of the central government to devolve and protect the rights of 
local people to manage, benefit from and sell wild resources
• the ability of local people to manage these rights, or micro-governance.
The economics of CBNRM is seldom considered in the literature. In this chapter 
we take it as given that local collective action can create value in diverse ways. 
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edy of the commons, creating synergies and cooperation between local uses and 
users or specializing in and selling wild resources in a global market as we see in 
the wildlife sector.
Second, we agree with the literature that CBNRM is often better than what 
proceeded it (Naughton-Treves et al 2005; Ostrom and Nagendra 2006), even if 
performance has mostly not lived up to expectation (Hulme and Murphree 2001). 
Genuine devolution is a necessary condition for CBNRM, and the most important 
reason for underperformance is the failure to devolve to communities sufficient rights 
to use, manage and benefit from natural resources, or what Marshall Murphree has 
termed ‘aborted devolution’ (Murphree 2004; Ribot et al 2006; Nelson 2010).
The third issue, and the focus of this chapter, is micro-governance: where a 
resource is economically viable, and most rights have been devolved to the com-
munity, what conditions need to be in place to govern it effectively?
Community-based natural resource management, public 
goods and scale
We define CBNRM as an institutional approach which crafts new economic and 
political institutions for the purpose of simultaneously achieving both conservation 
and development. We further suggest that the outcome of CBNRM can be meas-
ured in terms of the provision of four sets of public goods (Figure 8.1), namely:
Figure 8.1 CBNRM outcomes and the scale paradox.
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• economic growth, by turning environmental raw materials into more highly 
ordered goods and services
• environmental conservation, via the mechanism of local incentives and 
empowerment
• more local and more equitable distribution of costs and benefits (i.e. distribu-
tive, economic and social justice)
• greater freedoms and choices for people, in the manner of Amartya Sen (i.e. 
liberal democracy).
Experiences with wildlife-based CBNRM in southern Africa, and especially the 
well-managed programmes in Namibia and Botswana, show income from tourism 
and safari hunting in communal areas rapidly increasing, and wildlife populations 
also increasing or being sustained in the face of population pressure, where before 
they were rapidly disappearing (NACSO 2008; Rozemeijer 2009; Taylor 2009). 
A concern is that these benefits often do not reach ordinary people, and that the 
level of participation in these programmes by ordinary people is low. It appears 
that CBNRM is often effective at scaling up to generate income through hunting 
and tourism, and to manage and monitor wildlife and natural resources, but that 
weaknesses in benefit sharing and participation reflect the challenge of scaling 
down and the fact that human interactions are better managed on smaller scales 
(Murphree 2000).
Participatory versus representational governance
Scaling down constitutes micro-governance, and this chapter introduces a frame-
work based on the differences between participatory and representational govern-
ance as a way of analysing micro-governance and performance.
Most CBNRM projects, like development programmes generally, work with 
moderately sized communities on the assumption that this is logistically necessary. 
These communities typically comprise some 500–5,000 adults. Representational 
forms of micro-governance are invariably adopted, in which component villages 
elect or appoint representatives to an overarching management committee with 
executive responsibility and control of the budget. In these multi-village community-
based organizations (CBOs), the primary mechanisms of accountability are an 
annual general meeting (AGM) and elections held every two or three years.
In the absence of effective top-down oversight, however, these mechanisms may 
reflect the trappings of democratic accountability rather than its substance, accord-
ing to the five criteria recognized by democratic theorists: effective participation, 
voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion 
of all adults (Dahl 1998; Tilly 2007). In large communities, effective participation 
is logistically difficult, and most people cannot attend or participate in meetings 
effectively. More serious problems involve the manipulation of the agenda and 
information to circumvent accountability. For example, the authors of this chap-
ter have witnessed AGMs at which, after two long days of discussion on non-core 
issues, the budget is read out in a manner that is too complicated and quick for 
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community members to follow, and in which the haziness of procedures is used to 
protect people in office that the community clearly wants to remove.
Although AGMs and elections have been adopted ubiquitously, they remain, 
unless they are deliberately structured to fulfil democratic criteria, more important 
as ceremonies than as genuine mechanisms of downward accountability. Thus, 
despite the rubric of CBNRM, multi-village communities are subject to ‘committee-
based’ rather than community-based management. It is not surprising that such 
processes are associated with low levels of participation and benefit sharing, and 
high levels of elite control or even elite capture.
Participatory governance exists where the whole community (or at least most of 
it) meets together to discuss issues and make decisions, and instructs (rather than is 
instructed by) the committee on matters of implementation. Formal and informal 
interactions are more frequent, meetings are less hierarchical and information is 
more egalitarian. Logistically, participatory democracy can only occur where peo-
ple are able to meet face-to-face – that is, in single-villages or, in the case of larger 
villages, in village sub-units that are small enough for face-to-face interactions, and 
to which authority and finances can be devolved.
Superficially, participatory governance in practice may not look too different 
from representational governance, with anything from 100–300 rural people 
meeting under a tree, AGM style. However, as described later, there are actually 
profound differences.
The distinction between participatory and representational governance is not 
new. According to Madison and de Tocqueville, a democracy is where everyone 
meets together to represent themselves (as in township government in New Eng-
land), whereas a republic is where people’s interests are represented by elected 
persons (Mansfield and Winthrop 2000).
Interestingly, the early CBNRM literature emphasizes the importance of scal-
ing down to the level of face-to-face interactions (Murphree 1994; Martin 2009). 
The cases used to promote CBNRM also typically describe single-village commu-
nities, such as Masoka, Mahenye and Chikwarakwara in Zimbabwe (Child et al 
1997; Bond 2001; Murphree 2001; Rihoy et al 2007; Taylor and Murphree 2007), 
even though most CBNRM communities are multi-village. However, the distinc-
tion between participatory and representational governance is seldom recognized 
in theory or in practice: when CBNRM has been implemented programmatically, 
it has invariably adopted systems of representational governance, perhaps not rec-
ognizing the distinction. It is therefore not surprising that CBNRM is said to be in 
crisis, with ubiquitous challenges of elite capture, financial mismanagement and 
low levels of participation.
Evidence for the importance of micro-governance
The authors’ understanding of micro-governance has grown inductively over 
more than two decades of managing and researching CBNRM programmes, 
mainly in Zimbabwe (for the Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources [CAMPFIRE]), Zambia (in Luangwa Valley and around 
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Kafue National Park), Botswana and Namibia (mainly Caprivi). In these situa-
tions, two factors have been particularly important in promoting social benefits: 
face-to-face participatory governance at the scale of single-village CBOs and the 
power of simple operational procedures that protect the rights of the community to 
manage their affairs through participatory, accountable and equitable processes. 
In this section, we present six case studies that demonstrate differences between 
participatory and representational governance.
Chikwarakwara village and the communal areas management 
programme for indigenous resource in Zimbabwe
In the late 1980s, private wildlife ranching was expanding rapidly in Zimbabwe. 
Communal lands had better wildlife than private land, yet the high-value wildlife 
was disappearing. This led to the establishment of CAMPFIRE (Martin 1981, 
1986), which aimed to replicate the economic success of private land wildlife con-
servation (‘game ranching’) by devolving similar rights to communities and devel-
oping them as ‘village companies’ to manage their wildlife collectively.
In 1989, a workshop was held on Colin Bristow’s Sentinel Limpopo game ranch 
to discuss conflicts between his wildlife operation and neighbouring communi-
ties, whose primary livelihood was cattle, but who were poaching Bristow’s grass 
and wildlife. When Bristow explained why his father, a prominent cattleman, 
had switched to wildlife, leaders in the Beitbridge District Council became deter-
mined to experiment with community wildlife management. Councillors travelled 
around the district as a team with the wildlife agency: the district’s wildlife was 
depleted, and the challenge was to persuade ordinary villagers that their future lay 
in managing wildlife sustainably.
A key subject of discussion in these travels was the paradox that livestock, which 
were unprofitable on private land, were the dominant herbivore in communal 
lands, whereas wildlife was rapidly disappearing. It was noted that when a farmer 
sold a cow, he received the income with full discretion as to its use. By contrast, 
although a buffalo filled a similar ecological niche, the financial flow associated 
with a buffalo sale was completely different. If it had been hunted by a foreign cli-
ent, the revenue would go to the government or the district: it would probably be 
used to build schools or clinics, but no one really knew how it was distributed.
At a critical meeting, the Beitbridge District Council therefore resolved to treat 
wildlife in exactly the same manner as livestock, which involved two momentous 
decisions. First, when an animal was shot, that money would go to the village in 
which it had been harvested, rather than be used more generally for district devel-
opment. This became known as the ‘principle of producer communities’. Second, 
as with the sale of a cow, people would be encouraged to use the income from 
wildlife as they saw best, including the option of household cash. In this way people 
had ‘free choice’ of how to use wildlife revenues, with the proviso that the decision 
should be made collectively by the whole village.
The council and wildlife department tested these principles in Chikwarakwara 
village. First they defined ‘household’ and compiled a register of households 
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eligible to share the benefits from wildlife. Second, they listed the wildlife shot 
by foreign hunting clients the previous year and the prices charged. Villagers 
were very surprised that a warthog, for example, was worth more than an ox, 
and struggled with large numbers like the Z$10,000 paid for an elephant. At that 
time, the Zimbabwean dollar was close in value to the US dollar, so this was a 
lot of money. In 1990, Chikwarakwara earned Z$60,000 (US$1=Z$2.5). There 
were 149 households, so each household’s share was Z$400. However, before 
the money was handed out, a long debate was held about how best to use it. 
This meeting to organize the community and allocate wildlife revenues took four 
days, and the community decided that each household would get Z$400 in cash, 
after which they would be taxed Z$170 to build a grinding mill and Z$30 for the 
school.
The council and wildlife agency returned to Beitbridge to collect the Z$60,000 
but met strong opposition from the district administrator. He said it was his job, 
not that of the community, to control the Z$60,000 for district development. The 
councillors argued against this with some ingenuity, saying that if the cash pay-
ment was to be cancelled, the district administrator would have to do so in person 
because it contradicted the policy of the wildlife agency.
Three days later, the revenue distribution went ahead (Child and Peterson 1991), 
with the district administrator opening the ceremony. The councillors (Messrs 
Nare, Modeme and Mulaudzi) then entered the meeting, carrying Z$60,000 in 
an open-mesh wire basket, and placed this large pile of cash on the table in front 
of the whole community. All the registered members came up to receive their 
Z$400, and each then placed Z$170 in a bucket for the grinding mill and Z$30 for 
the school, and put their signature or mark on a payment voucher, taking home 
Z$200. This process is illustrated in Figure 8.2.
The philosophy behind CAMPFIRE was to transform wildlife from a national-
ized resource into a private good – as on private land, but instead managed col-
lectively and face-to-face at the level of a village (Martin 1986). This argument 
was used to galvanize the CAMPFIRE programme in over 80 communities and 
12 districts, and over the next four years the proportion of revenue allocated to 
producer communities reached 73 per cent (Child 1993). This happened because 
the wildlife agency insisted that the producer communities be the primary benefi-
ciaries, and monitored this closely, backing the requirement up by encouraging 
districts to report the share of revenues getting to communities at national CAMP-
FIRE workshops. These key financial ratios are still reported by the CAMPFIRE 
Association (CAMPFIRE 2007).
In retrospect, conformance monitoring was a powerful element of protecting 
fiscal devolution and the evolution of local collective action, and CAMPFIRE 
remained quite robust even when technical support dissipated after 2000 (Moinud-
din et al 2002). In the early 1990s, the key concern in CAMPFIRE was that district 
councils were retaining too much income, so financial monitoring focused on the 
proportion of income devolved from district council to producer community. The 
allocation within the community was assumed to be non-problematic and was not 
systematically monitored.1
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We are able to reconstruct records from three districts to measure equitable ben-
efit sharing, defined as the proportion of the money that reached the community 
and was used for cash dividends or community projects. In seven wards in Tshol-
otsho District (i.e. multi-village CBOs), 64 per cent of CAMPFIRE income was 
shared equitably. In Binga District, 61 per cent was shared equitably in 11 wards 
within six months (with the rest still unspent in bank accounts). In Hurungwe Dis-
trict, 95 per cent was shared in nine single-village and five multi-village producer 
communities. This implies that some 60 per cent of benefits was allocated equita-
bly in CAMPFIRE districts, albeit with significant exceptions (such as the highly 
centralized Nyaminyami District and the disorganized Hwange District).
After 2002, however, fiscal devolution was undermined by Zimbabwe’s emerg-
ing political culture of leadership impunity (Mapedza and Bond 2006), and by run-
away inflation which decimated the value of wildlife accruing to communities until 
the economy was dollarized in 2011. Fiscal devolution between the district council 
and producer communities declined to well under 50 per cent from 2002 to 2005, 
as underfunded district councils coped with Zimbabwe’s financial crisis by captur-
ing revenues from communities (Murphree 2005). Importantly, this was reversed 
through internal political processes facilitated by the CAMPFIRE Association, with 
district councils accepting that at least 50 per cent of revenue was to be retained by 
producer communities (CAMPFIRE 2007; Taylor and Murphree 2007).
Communities meet face to face
to define membership and make
financial decisions
Revenues allocated to whole
community using flip chart and
activity-based budget formatValue of wildlife maximized
through open, competitive








People pay back portion
of money into buckets as
agreed by the whole
community
District administrator hands
each member their full share
of wildlife revenue in cash
Councillors Nare and
Mulaudzi carry Z$60,000
in cash into the meeting
Figure 8.2 Illustration of face-to-face participatory revenue allocation and fi nancial control 
(photo: Brian Child).
Community-based natural resource management  163
District councils were always perceived as a double-edged sword, however: while 
they did extract money from communities, they also provided long-term capacity. 
In some communities, capacity in areas such as quota-setting and management 
that was developed through the laudable participatory technology development 
process of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) in the late 1990s (Goredema 
et al 2006) is still evident ten years after most technical support ceased.
Community-based natural resource management in the Luangwa 
Valley, Zambia
The next example reviewed, in the Luangwa Valley in Zambia, was a quasi-exper-
iment: CBNRM was initiated in the form of six representational CBOs, then re-
engineered as 43 participatory democracies, and later re-centralized to the same 
six CBOs.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, extensive elephant and rhino poaching led 
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, a lover of wildlife but suspicious of his own 
wildlife agency, to set up the semi-independent Luangwa Integrated Resource 
Development Project (LIRDP) in his wife’s home area in partnership with the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. The project encompassed 
the 4,500 kilometres squared Lupande Game Management Area (GMA) and the 
9,050 kilometres squared South Luangwa National Park. Under the leadership 
of Fidelius Lungu and Richard Bell, the LIRDP brought poaching under control 
and embarked on an ambitious integrated rural development project. Forty per 
cent of the total revenue from tourism in the park and hunting in the GMA was 
returned to the community in a process controlled by the six chiefs (Dalal-Clayton 
and Child 2003).
By 1996, it was clear that these revenues were not benefiting ordinary people. 
Participatory rural analysis showed that ordinary people could hardly name any 
community projects, and when they did they often raised concerns about misman-
agement or worse. At this time, the project was managed as six chieftainships, and 
decisions were made largely by the six chiefs sitting together with indunas (coun-
sellor of a tribal chief) and women’s representatives.
In 1996, the fiscal and governance structure of the project was altered funda-
mentally. Somewhat surprisingly, this radical proposal was accepted by the five 
government ministries overseeing the LIRDP in April 1996 with almost no dis-
cussion. The transformation is illustrated in Figure 8.3, which replicates LIRDP 
documents.
The shift to fiscal devolution at the village level was re-emphasized in many vil-
lage meetings using both role-plays and flip charts, as shown in Figure 8.2. Under 
the ‘old’ policy, 40 per cent of revenues were allocated to the chiefs and their area 
development committees. How this money was spent was never clear. Under the 
‘new’ policy, 80 per cent of wildlife revenues were devolved to 43 village action 
groups (VAGs) because this was the ‘action’ level. The area development com-
mittees got three per cent for meetings to coordinate the programme. The chiefs 
each got 1.5 per cent and fought hard for extra money, receiving approximately 
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10 per cent of total GMA income as personal and non-accountable payments. The 
remainder was kept in the bank account as a buffer for contingencies.
The chiefs, supported by district and provincial politicians, strongly resisted fis-
cal devolution, but participatory revenue distribution was initiated in the Malama 
community in 1996. Following four days of community meetings, Zambian and 
Norwegian officials and dignitaries travelled from Lusaka to the remote Malama 
community to witness the first revenue distribution ceremony. Despite their pres-
ence and considerable pressure from an excited community, the cash payments 
were cancelled when the meeting was boycotted by Chief Malama. This nearly 
ended the policy of fiscal devolution in its tracks. However, the LIRDP was work-
ing simultaneously with Chief Msoro, who was often at odds with his fellow chiefs. 
He allowed revenue distribution to proceed in his area. This was publicized by 
local radio stations, and popular pressure soon ensured that all 43 VAGs received 
their benefits, with Chief Malama later asking the LIRDP to facilitate cash distri-
bution in his community.
The process of participatory revenue allocation resembled that developed in 
Beitbridge, but was managerially more rigorous. A constitution was developed for 
each community which emphasized that all decision-making, especially on budg-
ets, was to be done face-to-face by the community, and that it was for the commu-
nity to give instructions to the committee, not the other way around. Committees 
were to be elected annually, and the constitution clearly specified that finances 
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and progress on projects and wildlife management were to be reported to and 
approved by the community every quarter.
Two technical procedures strengthened this process. First, the use of a stand-
ardized format for activity-based budgeting clarified whether money was to be 
used for cash or community projects and activities, or wildlife management and 
administration. This made the second procedure easy, which was to quantify the 
variance between the budget and actual expenditure at quarterly meetings and 
present an obligatory financial variance analysis. The constitutions also limited 
the share for administration to 10 per cent of the budget, to combat the problem 
of rising and unproductive sitting allowances.
Expenditure data for 43 VAGs over six years (Figure 8.4) shows that communi-
ties invested an increasing proportion of their income in wildlife management. 
On average, 40 per cent was allocated to both projects and cash, but this varied 
over time and geographically: in drought years people favoured cash, and some-
times communities allocated all their money to complete an important project. 
But when they did not trust their leaders to conduct their bank accounts properly, 
they allocated more money to cash to reduce temptation. Most money ‘borrowed’ 
by chiefs was, with difficulty, recouped, except in 1998, when the chief in ques-
tion died suddenly, reportedly having taken community money to treat his HIV/
AIDS. Some chiefs continued to try to extract more money from the communities. 
The project did not intervene in the struggles between chiefs and their ‘subjects’, 
despite demands from the latter, but used a strategy of extreme financial transpar-
ency, which appeared to work.
Figure 8.4 Expenditure allocation in 43 village action groups in Lupande GMA 1996–2001. 
During this period the kwacha was unstable, varying from ZK1,207 (1996) to 
ZK1,862 (1998) to ZK3,848 (2001) to the US$.
166  Brian Child, Patricia Mupeta, Shylock Muyengwa and Rodgers Lubilo
As North argues, the structuring of rules – and especially the political institu-
tions and third-party enforcement of such rules – is a serious challenge to the 
transition from ‘big-man’ to rule-centred governance (North 2003). In CBNRM, 
fiscal devolution requires managerial rigour, as well as rigour in the application of 
participatory principles. In the LIRDP, participatory processes and the rights of 
ordinary community members were protected by a system of conformance moni-
toring implemented by the project. A VAG’s annual payment was only released to 
it once it fulfilled procedural requirements aimed at ensuring that the community 
made all key decisions and had the information it needed to do so. It was a rule 
that all key decisions (especially budgets) had to be made by the community (not 
the committee or the chief). Finances had to be properly kept and reported to 
the community every quarter through a comparison of expenditure and budget. 
These finances were also audited and had to be formally approved by the com-
munity. Elections were held every year, and the membership list was also regularly 
updated.
These procedures reflect the loose-tight processes in excellent American cor-
porations (Peters and Waterman 1982): the community was strictly accountable 
for the processes through which they made and monitored their choices, but the 
decisions on how they allocated their money were entirely theirs.
We learned three useful lessons:
• The bottom-up accountability provided through general meetings was critical 
for financial accountability.
• It was easy to train all 43 communities to use double-entry bookkeeping, but 
critical to involve both leaders (i.e. the committee and/or treasurer) and ‘fol-
lowers’ in this, so that at least 30 members of any community understood the 
finances.
• ‘Friendly’ and formal audits were essential for integrity.
The project tracked key performance indicators on a quarterly basis. Figure 8.3 
summarizes the improvement in performance from the top-down representational 
to the bottom-up participatory phase of the programme. Quarterly audits showed 
that less than 1 per cent of the money was not accounted for. The 43 communities 
embarked upon 262 projects that included constructing and repairing schools, 
clinics, teachers’ houses and water wells, food relief in drought years and soc-
cer and sewing clubs. Within three years, 78 village scouts had been employed 
and were patrolling regularly, and the Msoro community had built two dams to 
supply water for wildlife. Meetings were generally well attended and dynamic, 
and gradually conflicts with chiefs were resolved internally. Fully 82 per cent of 
revenues benefited ordinary people directly through cash payments and commu-
nity projects and activities. There were also considerable public benefits, including 
better allocation of scarce revenues, participation, empowerment and other forms 
of social capital.
Unfortunately for the community, this quasi-experiment entered a third phase 
when it was re-centralized. The parastatal Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) 
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replaced the National Parks and Wildlife Service in 2001 and was expected to 
become financially viable immediately, with the result that even salaries were 
often not paid. ZAWA ‘standardized’ CBNRM and retained the majority of hunt-
ing revenues from GMAs to fund itself. Formally it retained 50 per cent of tro-
phy revenues and 80 per cent of concession fees, but in the absence of transpar-
ent records it is hard to confirm that communities got the money owed to them, 
which was now about 30–40 per cent of hunting fees. ZAWA also re-centralised 
CBNRM at the level of chiefdoms by paying revenues to representational Com-
munity Resource Boards (CRBs) rather than directly to the five or more VAGs 
that make up a CRB.
This re-centralized CBNRM in the Lupande GMA (Lubilo and Child 2010) and 
performance immediately plummeted (Lubilo 2007). The average understanding 
of community finances declined from 72 per cent in the 1996–2001 period to 20 
per cent in 2007 (Lubilo, 2007), and support for the programme declined from 
over 90 per cent to 39 per cent. In the only community for which we have financial 
records, the CRB used 63 per cent of income for administration, allocating 28 per 
cent to wildlife management and only 9 per cent to community benefit, compared 
to 82 per cent previously.
The one community that runs counter to these trends is Malama. This is the 
smallest and most remote community, and the switch to CRBs did not change 
its size. Malama was the weakest community during the bottom-up phase, with 
members only understanding 50 per cent of finances, compared to an average 
of 72 per cent in all six areas (Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003). But in the top-
down phase, 56 per cent of community members in Malama still understood their 
finances, while the average in the entire GMA dropped to 20 per cent, suggesting 
that Malama was also the only community that maintained some level of financial 
transparency. Support for CBNRM, at 57 per cent of respondents, was much 
higher than the GMA’s average of 39 per cent, despite Malama having the most 
problem animals.
From this experience, it can be concluded that CBNRM is a highly beneficial 
and energizing process, with benefits at many levels, including wildlife conserva-
tion, economic growth, poverty reduction at household level and rural democrati-
zation. Three factors contributed to effective performance here: fiscal devolution 
to the village level; mechanisms for face-to-face choice, deliberation and perform-
ance control; and external support that facilitated experiential capacity creation 
and held communities procedurally accountable to the principles of CBNRM 
through conformance monitoring and sanctioning.
Performance of community-based natural resource management 
according to individual community members
This account now turns from local case studies to a broad analysis of CBNRM in 
the region. To understand how ordinary people were participating in and ben-
efiting from CBNRM, an action research process called the ‘governance dash-
board’ was developed and applied to more than 1,500 households in CBNRM 
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communities in Tanzania (three communities), Zambia (nine), Namibia (seven), 
Zimbabwe (two) and Botswana (five) from 2005 to 2010.
The governance dashboard is an adaptive management process, and very 
deliberately not an extractive research process. Following an introductory work-
shop with communities, data is collected using normal survey questionnaires 
administered by local school leavers who have been trained in survey methods. 
Critically, data is presented and discussed with communities in the same week it 
is collected, using flip charts and bar charts. Participants are asked if they agree 
or disagree with what the data says. They then discuss the data, and all com-
ments are written up on the flip chart (i.e. a group memory). Red is used to sug-
gest that an outcome like elections is problematic, amber that it could become 
so, and green that the community is performing well. Verbal explanatory models 
are sought from participants to explain the data. Visualization distances com-
munities from the personal or emotional content of the data, encourages them 
to discuss issues logically (Van der Riet 2008), and often leads to suggestions for 
corrective action.
After the community feedback meeting, the data is compiled into a report 
which is given back to the committee and key support organizations. The 
process requires a considerable commitment to developing relationships with 
stakeholders, and care and sensitivity in feeding back data as the results can be 
explosive.
Currently reports are available for more than 20 communities in Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Namibia and Botswana, and only an illustrative summary of this data will 
be presented here for the purposes of argument. Figure 8.5 compares results from 
two CBOs in the same country: a typical multi-village CBO with representational











DO you trust your committee with your finances?
Multi-village CBOs
Single-village CBOs
Figure 8.5 Perceptions of performance in single- and multi-village CBOs in Botswana.
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governance and a well-functioning, single-village CBO with participatory govern-
ance. The variable ‘financial trustworthiness’ has been selected to illustrate how 
starkly single-village and multi-village systems differ. However, many other vari-
ables – such as satisfaction with AGMs, clarity of decision-making, knowledge of the 
value of wildlife, receipt of benefits and even knowing the names of elected leaders 
– also show clear differences between the two systems in levels of understanding 
and participation. For instance, in a subsample of three single-village and three multi-
village CBOs in Botswana and Zambia, 85 per cent of respondents from single-
villages attended AGMs, compared to 34 per cent of those from multi-village 
communities.
This chapter’s general conclusions, based on five years of fieldwork, are that 
wildlife is generating considerable and increasing benefits in all the countries 
covered here, and is being conserved better than it was, especially in Namibia 
(Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations [NACSO] 2008) and 
Zimbabwe (Child et al 2003), but less so in Botswana, for reasons not related to 
CBNRM, including veterinary fences. The negative exception is Zambia, where 
poaching is still rife. However, ordinary people, to a great extent, are not benefit-
ing or participating or getting information. CBNRM is therefore earning a lot of 
money from improved wildlife populations and commercial arrangements, but 
the spending of this money is problematic. At worst there is corruption, though 
more often than not money seems to be used wastefully rather than illicitly, and 
even the best programmes could use money better. For example, in a number 
of programmes half or more of the expenditure is targeted at a small number of 
employees relative to the size of the community.
This indicates that CBNRM is performing reasonably well in the dimension of 
scaling up, providing public or collective goods including improved wildlife man-
agement and income (Table 8.1). But in the dimension of scaling down, equitable 
benefit sharing and participation, CBNRM is underperforming and is disappoint-
ing at the household level.
CBNRM is much better at generating revenue than at spending it effectively. 
Early experiences, such as the Beitbridge and Luangwa cases described above, 
seem to be exceptions, and only three of the communities surveyed by the authors 
showed similar attributes. In the small single-village communities of northern Bot-
swana – Sankuyo, Mababe and Khwai – dashboard surveys show much higher 
satisfaction with governance, and clear evidence of people getting household and 
Table 8.1 General conclusion on the performance of 20 CBNRM communities in southern 
Africa
Provision of public goods through collective action Scale dimension General rating 
of performance 
1. Natural resource management (wildlife populations) Scale up Good
2. Gross income (‘earning money’) Scale up Good
3. Equitable benefit sharing (‘spending money’) Scale down Poor
4. Participation/democratization Scale down Poor
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collective benefits. This suggests that the practice of measuring the performance 
of CBNRM in terms of wildlife populations and overall income may fail to take 
account of important deficiencies in household participation and benefit.
Elite capture and low participation are certainly not unique to CBNRM in 
southern Africa. These challenges are associated with CBNRM globally and for 
different resources (Arnold 2001; Poffenberger 2006; Charnley and Poe 2007; Fri-
zen 2007; Tacconi 2007; Larson and Soto 2008), and are also widely reported for 
district decentralization processes (Crook 2003; Frizen 2007; Grindle 2007).
Action research and devolution in Wuparo Conservancy
In the fourth example, action research was used to change the structure of Wuparo 
Conservancy from a representational to a participatory form of governance, and 
the impacts of this change were measured. Feeding back the results of governance 
surveys needs to be handled very carefully, as it creates a demand for change that 
is not always welcomed by community leaders or even CBNRM support agen-
cies. However, in one community (Wuparo, Namibia), results catalysed a demand 
for corrective action in the form of more devolved systems of governance. This 
change was supported by CBNRM support organizations, especially Namibia’s 
Legal Assistance Centre, but also WWF and Integrated Rural Development and 
Nature Conservation.
Some of the authors of this chapter helped develop new institutions similar to 
those described in relation to Zambia’s Luangwa Valley. Wuparo Conservancy 
was reorganized through the establishment of seven single-village suborganiza-
tions to which half of the wildlife revenues were allocated (Lubilo 2011). Again, the 
data shows large benefits associated with participatory governance. Thus, in 2010, 
1,386 community members received cash dividends of N$50–400 (US$6.50–50) 
for the first time. Before this, the wildlife income was absorbed by the conservancy 
committee, including meeting costs and salaries for community game guards. No 
funds were invested in community projects between 2000 and 2007, and a trifling 
amount of N$2500 (US$325) was donated to the school in 2008. By contrast, 
in 2010 and 2011 (the bottom-up phase) 25 community projects were initiated, 
although not all were successful. Meat from hunted animals was also shared more 
equitably, according to reports, and specific support was provided to elderly peo-
ple, orphans and vulnerable children.
Following the money
Data on community income from wildlife generally shows rapid growth, and is 
a positive aspect of CBNRM that is often highlighted (NACSO 2008; Taylor 
2009). However, categorized expenditure (i.e. ‘spending money’) is difficult to 
find. A data set was compiled with expenditure information for five single-village 
and multi-village sites representing 24 CBOs, specifically differentiating between 
expenditure directly benefiting ordinary community members (i.e. cash dividends 
or local projects) and money used centrally by committees for management (e.g. 
100% 
~ 90% z 
~ 
-- Single-village ( BOs ",,-1: 80" .. c: • 
. ~ ~ 70% 
f-- r-- r-- c:::::::::J Multi -vill age ( BOs 
f-- r-- r--
.s;;; ~ 
'" ~ g 60% 
~ 
~ c: 50" .. '" CO oK 
'" 40% :c ~ 
"'-Ii .'!::: e 30" .. 
" 0 tT-
f-- r-- r--
f-- r-- r-- r-- -
f-- r-- r-- r-- -
f-- r-- r-- r-- -
W ~ 20% 
o~ 
10" .. '0 
~ 
0" .. 
f-- r-- r-- r-- - n f-- r-- r-- r-- -
[ [ r 1 n n n n 
Name of community (date of financial data) (number of single- or multi-village ( BOs) 
Community-based natural resource management  171
administrative expenses, money not accounted for, payment of a small number 
of employees and management expenditure). This data is summarized in Figure 
8.6. This data admittedly does not reflect considerable complexity or important 
achievements, especially related to conservation, income generation and capacity-
building, but it nonetheless paints a very clear picture.
• In single-village CBOs, some 80 per cent of revenue is converted into com-
munity benefit.
• In multi-village CBOs, less than 20 per cent of expenditure benefits commu-
nity members.
• However, regular monitoring of the adherence of communities to democratic 
decision-making processes (i.e. ‘conformance monitoring’ as described on 
p. 166) is also important.
• Without conformance monitoring, community benefits in single-villages 
dropped to 60 per cent (e.g. in Sankuyo) and probably less, judged from anec-
dotal evidence out of Mababe and Khwai.
• With conformance monitoring in multi-village CBOs, the solitary case of 
CAMPFIRE in the early 1990s suggests that benefit sharing improves from 
20–60 per cent of community expenditure.
Overall, the distribution of allocations suggests an 80:20 rule:
Figure 8.6 Allocation of within-community expenditure to ‘equitable benefi t sharing’.
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• Where sound procedures are implemented in single-villages, 80 per cent of 
income benefits people (e.g. Lupande, Masoka).
• In multi-village CBOs, in the absence of conformance monitoring, benefit 
sharing falls to less than 20 per cent of expenditure. The committee uses most 
of the money for ‘management’ (e.g. Caprivi, Kafue).
• Single-villages with weaker procedures (e.g. Sankuyo), and multi-villages with 
strong procedures (e.g. CAMPFIRE), fall somewhere in between.
However, it is important to be cautious in assigning the ‘failure’ label to pro-
grammes that have not benefited people, because judging success or failure depends 
on one’s perspectives and objectives. Thus, CAMPFIRE and the Lupande GMA 
emphasized multi-dimensional poverty reduction (Sen 1999) as much as conserva-
tion, and achieved both (Sen 1999; Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003; Taylor and 
Murphree 2007). Caprivi originated as a community game guard programme 
(Owen-Smith 2012). More than half the money is spent employing game guards 
and resource monitors, and the positive trends in wildlife populations and income 
reflect success in terms of the original objectives, although we suggest this may ulti-
mately be undermined because participation by, and benefits for, ordinary people 
are low. In Sankuyo, people were happy with their benefits and rights to partici-
pate. Unpublished data suggests they were twice as well off as nearby communities 
that depended on flood agriculture and livestock, and that their income was more 
equitably distributed. However, the community had few rights to manage wildlife, 
and consequently took little action to do so. Recent surveys have shown that wild-
life in the Okavango delta was in decline (Chase 2011), albeit for a multitude of 
reasons largely beyond the control of the community (Fynn and Bonyongo 2010; 
Child et al 2011).
In the above case, CBNRM achieved some combination of conservation and 
development objectives. However, in multi-village programmes which are not 
well managed, CBNRM can fail on all counts. In the eight CRBs near Kafue 
National Park in Zambia, the combination of representational governance with 
weak oversight and capacity building left scope for elite capture and mismanage-
ment. Community benefits were negligible (6 per cent), most money was absorbed 
by the ubiquitous administration and ‘sitting allowances’ (35 per cent), or was not 
accounted for (40 per cent). The main added value was the 25 per cent of income 
used to pay the salaries of a few village scouts, but conservation outcomes were not 
measured (Malenga 2004).
What workshop games reveal about community budgeting 
processes and scale
The results of simulations of participatory and representational budgeting proc-
esses in training games lends support to findings that there are important differ-
ences between the two processes.
At governance training workshops in Maun, Botswana, the participants were 
divided into groups of 10–15, including community leaders, district officials and 
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NGO support agencies. First, we simulated a representational budget process. 
The group elected three or four people to represent them. The representatives 
constructed a budget on a flip chart in front of the ‘community’ (but with no input 
from them). In a simulation of a community AGM, the representatives presented 
the budget back to the community, who were allowed to make changes. Surpris-
ingly few changes were made, because the ‘committee’ either defended its deci-
sions or did not change the flip chart budget in response to comments by the 
community.
Then a participatory budgeting exercise was conducted. The composition of 
the groups was not changed, but this time the ‘community’ sat in a circle and made 
a budget on a flip chart. The budget was messier, with many changes and cross-
ings-out in response to community discussions.
In the representational processes, an average of 36 per cent of the budget was 
allocated to community benefits (i.e. 20 per cent, 44 per cent, 43 per cent) com-
pared to 72 per cent in the participatory process (80 per cent, 67 per cent, 69 per 
cent). This approximates the 80:20 rule hypothesized from field data.2 The social 
dynamics in the participatory budgeting were more positive than in the represen-
tational budgeting exercise, and on a scale of one (terrible) to ten (wonderful), nine 
participants ranked representational and participatory budget processes as two 
point zero and seven point seven respectively.
These CBNRM training workshops also included exercises to understand scale. 
Participants listed on cards the functions that needed to be performed to manage 
their resources. They pinned these cards hierarchically next to labels that repre-
sented scale (individuals, villages, multi-villages, districts and so on), following the 
instruction that functions should be managed at the lowest level where the costs 
and benefits were internalized at a single locus of management. Cards for the 
management of fields, trees, small animals, community projects and finances were 
usually placed opposite household or village. Those for elephant management, 
tourism concessions or river management were placed higher, at area, district or 
even national level. The cards formed a triangle with a large base because most 
functions were considered to be best managed locally.
In the next exercise, participants placed cards at the level where functions were 
currently located. The triangle was turned on its head, with more cards at higher 
levels and relatively few lower down. This supports Murphree’s (2000) principles 
of jurisdictional parsimony. Where scale is built through upward delegation, it 
is parsimonious in terms of the number of functions aggregating at higher levels. 
But when scale is built through expropriation from above (rather than delega-
tion from below), many functions accumulate at higher levels of administra-
tions, which become overwhelmed by, and unable to manage, the associated 
complexity.
Discussion and conclusion
The data presented suggests that processes of representational and participatory 
governance are profoundly different, with only the latter resulting in equitable 
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benefit sharing and high levels of participation. These, at least rhetorically, are 
important goals of CBNRM.
There is theoretical support for these results. Subsidiarity is a key principle for 
building up complex, hierarchical systems of governance (Handy 1994; Mead-
ows 2008), with management theorists and new institutional economists agreeing 
that complex systems need to be constructed from the bottom-up and to serve 
the bottom. For example, Douglas McGregor’s (1960) observation that people 
are self-actualizing (Theory Y versus Theory X) lies at the heart of a paradigm 
shift from the centralized task management of Henry Ford and Frederick Taylor 
to the devolved, self-managed teams and knowledge economy of modern man-
agement practice (Drucker 1973; Peters and Waterman 1982; Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge 1998).
Similarly, new institutional economists find a strong association between eco-
nomic performance, individual freedoms, property rights and the unprecedented 
prosperity of liberal democratic nation states. North makes this point by showing 
that of 30 countries with a per capita GDP exceeding US$20,000, 23 are liberal 
democracies (North 2005; North et al 2009). The others are four small oil produc-
ing states and three city states. This reinforces our observation that participatory 
governance both organizes and releases human energy, including the freedom 
to choose (Sen 1999), and is critical to the multi-dimensional performance of 
CBNRM.
Given the magnitude of the differences that we have presented between partici-
patory and representational governance, why is participatory democracy so rare 
in CBNRM and in development more widely? One argument is that small com-
munities face significant diseconomies when it comes to obtaining technical and 
administrative skills (Overdevest 2000). A more cynical argument is that because 
participatory democracy can unleash the power and potential of the people, gov-
ernments and even facilitating agencies are threatened by it. A third reason is 
logistical: that support agencies prefer to work with fewer, larger communities. 
Also, the importance of participation and pro-poor benefit may be recognized 
more in rhetoric than in practice, with implementing agencies favouring clear-
cut outcomes like conservation, income and projects over much fuzzier social 
processes.
Finally, in a world of increasing scale, change and complexity, many commen-
tators wonder if it is realistic to promote face-to-face processes of decision-making 
and accountability. Our counter-argument is that poverty, mismanagement and 
elite capture are most closely associated with states and meso-institutions that are 
democratically hollow, and that, having accepted the logistical challenges, maybe 
we really do need to build new social institutions from the bottom up and not just 
from the top down.
Returning to Murphree’s (2000) seminal paper on scale, we may be able to 
have our cake and eat it too, if we think more carefully about the sequencing and 
structuring of scale, and take especial care not to assume meso-level institutions 
into place, but rather to build them carefully from the bottom up. Of course many 
functions need to be managed at higher scales than individuals or single-villages. 
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The problem is that meso-level institutions like district wildlife or forestry commit-
tees are democratically hollow, with weak roots in the community.
Murphree argues eloquently that nested hierarchies should not be constructed 
from above by usurping rights from landholders. This alienates people who live 
with wildlife, and it is deterministic about land use outcomes, overwhelms man-
agement capacity by aggregating too many functions at higher levels and weakens 
accountability by lengthening feedback loops. The aggregation of functions should 
rather occur through a process of upward delegation (Murphree 2000), with the 
critical Tocquevillian implication that rights and governance should originate in 
the people (Mansfield and Winthrop 2000).
The common response to this proposal is that participatory democracy is all 
very well, but at any significant scale, governance has to be representational. The 
argument put forward in this chapter is that building scale comes later in the 
sequencing of rural governance. If we are to achieve the socio-politico-economic 
objectives of equitable benefit sharing, empowerment and participation, we need 
to build hierarchical systems from the bottom up to ensure that choice and govern-
ance originate in the people. Indeed, what if we think of communities as independ-
ent jurisdictional units with the same rights as private landholders, rather than as 
part of bureaucratic hierarchies?
At the beginning of CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe’s chief economist, Norman Rey-
nolds, proposed that the basic unit of governance should be the (single) ‘village com-
pany’. While most CBNRM initiatives have drifted into structures that resemble 
district governments, there would be merit in returning to Reynold’s suggestion. 
Ideally, CBNRM should be based on the devolution of rights to benefit, manage 
and allocate (or sell) wild resources, preferably in the form of collective title. If we 
were to constitute such communities as village companies, we would be emphasiz-
ing the entrepreneurial and productive nature of CBNRM, and not just its regula-
tory functions. We would also be adding critical protection of the rights of ‘share-
holders’, especially minorities and marginalized groups, using modern and legally 
enforceable corporate legal documents, not just legislation, policy or administrative 
arrangements. Perhaps this is a way of addressing North’s challenge: that we need 
to find a way to protect new institutions, including processes for managing, sharing 
and allocating dividends, information and participation in decision-making.
In conclusion, it should be accepted that the main challenge to CBNRM is 
failed devolution. However, in places where devolution has occurred, the social 
performance of CBNRM is closely related to the configuration of micro-govern-
ance. Specifically, CBNRM will remain disappointing in terms of equitable benefit 
sharing and participation unless it is rooted in well-designed face-to-face processes 
of decision-making and accountability, and unless these conditions are protected 
by external conformance management and monitoring.
Implementing participatory democracy is probably easier than many people 
imagine (Child and Dalal-Clayton 2004), but even if it is difficult, do we really 
have an alternative? Can we succeed in either conservation or development if we 
do not create robust institutions that empower ordinary people to participate in 
and receive an equitable share of the benefits from CBNRM?
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Notes
1 The data are based on unpublished financial records for 12 CAMPFIRE districts. The 
principal author of this chapter was responsible for the monitoring between 1989 and 
1995.
2 The results probably underestimate differences between participatory and representa-
tional processes because most participants were community leaders; much of the training 
emphasized community benefit and may have biased results in this direction; and the 
communities concerned were required to employ qualified managers, which imposed 
fixed costs that might have exaggerated administrative costs in the other direction.
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Introduction
Floodplain fisheries are prone to conflict (Charles 1992). Conflict in such natu-
ral resource systems is caused by ‘rising populations and/or a decreasing natural 
resource base’ (Bennet et al 2001). Generally this becomes an issue when there are 
competing interests for the same resource and one party tries to assert its ‘inter-
ests’ over those of other parties (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations [FAO] 1998). Fundamentally, these conflicts can be defined at three lev-
els: intra micro-micro conflicts, inter micro-micro conflicts and micro-macro con-
flicts (Warner 2000). These definitions apply to conflicts occurring respectively 
within communities (intra micro-micro), among communities (inter micro-micro) 
and between communities and external groups such as government agencies or 
private and civil society organizations (micro-macro). Charles (1992) attributes 
some of the fishery conflict to policy failure, arguing that a management attempt to 
increase or introduce efficiency in a fishery generally equates to social well-being, 
as a management objective, to rent maximization from the fishery, which may 
cause conflict due to conflicting philosophies.
Management of the Okavango Delta fishery was based on a centralized 
approach (Department of Wildlife and National Parks [DWNP] 2008; Mosepele 
2008) which failed to resolve conflict among resource users (Mosepele 2008). 
Indeed, this top-down management approach, which excludes traditional man-
agement (i.e. customary governance) systems, unwittingly contributed to conflict 
in the fishery (Cassidy et al 2011). While most of the conflict was predicated on 
allegations of overexploitation of fish stocks by commercial fishing (Haggett 1999), 
Mosepele (2000) showed that the Delta’s key fish stocks (e.g. Oreochromis anderso-
nii, Oreochromis macrochir, Tilapia rendalli, Hydrocynus vittatus, Clarias gariepinus) were 
not being biologically over-exploited. Preliminary investigations revealed that 
the real source of conflict was competition for access rights (Mendelsohn et al 
2010) that is intrinsic to common property resources (Pinho et al 2012). Moreover, 
Setswalo (2007) found that conflicts increased when floods receded in the upper 
Delta, before the next flooding season. Understandably, unresolved conflict may 
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ultimately affect the socio-economic livelihoods of the poorest members of society 
(Bennett et al 2001).
It was against this background that the Building Local Capacity for Conser-
vation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Okavango Delta [BIOKA-
VANGO] Project was developed, to mainstream biodiversity conservation into 
three production sectors in the Delta (water, tourism and fisheries). The project 
was funded by the United Nations Development Programme and the Botswana 
government. Because conflict had been identified as a barrier to sustainable devel-
opment (Warner 2000), which would therefore hamper sustainable biodiversity 
conservation in the Delta, conflict resolution in the fishery was one of the project’s 
major interventions (Global Environment Facility [GEF] 2006).
Co-management has now been established as a mainstream approach to small-
scale fisheries management (Branch et al 2011; Evans et al 2011), and has been 
implemented in fisheries around the world – for example, Zambia (Ticheler et al 
1998), Samoa (King and Faasili 1999) and Laos (Baird 2003; Nsiku 2003) – with 
varying degrees of success (Gutiérrez et al 2011) and failure (Evans et al 2011). It is 
increasingly seen as a way to ‘move away from past management failures’ so that 
the people and the state can collaborate in management and share responsibilities 
in the governance of fish resources (Jul-Larsen and Van Zwieten 2002). In what 
Jul-Larsen and Van Zwieten (2002) call a ‘genuinely democratic process’, local 
governance structures and central government can develop and implement an 
‘adaptive’ co-management paradigm. The ‘adaptive’ aspect is important because 
it allows for a feedback system that gives local community structures an opportu-
nity to reflect upon, discuss, modify and improve management decisions (Baird 
2003).
Adopting a co-management approach to fisheries also promotes (potentially) 
the utilization of indigenous fisher knowledge, which is an important pre-condi-
tion for sustainable fisheries management (e.g. Johannes et al 2000). Indeed, while 
community-based management of natural resources is not necessarily a panacea 
for all the ills hampering sustainable resource utilization, it can, where it works, be 
a vehicle for sustainable development (Charles 2008), and also a conduit for biodi-
versity conservation, environmental sustainability and social justice. This manage-
ment paradigm is in line with new trends in resource management that favour the 
devolution of governance to local communities or resource users (e.g. Jul-Larsen 
and Van Zwieten 2002; Charles 2008).
The co-management of natural resources in Botswana has been codified within 
the concept of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM), which 
started in Botswana in 1989 (Thakadu et al 2005). Its main focus was to pro-
mote local participation in natural resource management and tourism develop-
ment (Mbaiwa and Thakadu 2011). CBNRM has had both successes and failures 
in Botswana. According to Mbaiwa (2011), the misappropriation of funds and 
the lack of a culture of entrepreneurship are among the key factors in the fail-
ure of CBNRM projects. Notable successes of CBNRM include improved socio-
economic benefits to local communities and improved custodianship of natural 
resources (as evidenced by significant decreases in poaching) by local communities 
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(Mbaiwa 2011). However, notwithstanding the long history of co-management of 
natural resources in Botswana, there are no CBNRM activities based on fish, a 
fact that Mbaiwa (2011) highlights.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide an overview of the development 
and implementation of a fisheries co-management model designed expressly for 
the Okavango Delta, primarily as a conflict intervention model and secondarily 
to empower local governance of natural resource management in fisheries. This 
has been a four-step process: (i) consultations and the identification of key stake-
holders; (ii) the formation of a local governance structure, the Okavango Fisheries 
Management Committee (OFMC); (iii) the adoption of an adaptive system as a 
model for fisheries management (including conflict resolution); and (iv) negotiation 
and debate on some key fisheries management issues in the Delta.
Development of a co-management fisheries model: 
The approach
The upper portion of the Okavango Delta panhandle was the site of the BIOKA-
VANGO project to pilot a series of interventions in the fish sector from 2007 to 
2010. Compared to the rest of the Delta, the panhandle is a well-defined meander-
ing single channel (Wolski and Murray-Hudson 2005; Figure 9.1) which is reached 
around November by annual seasonal floods that peak between March and April 
(Murray-Hudson 2009; Mendelsohn et al 2010). The highest population density 
in the district is found in the upper panhandle because that is where approxi-
mately 62 per cent of villages in the entire district with populations of over 1,000 
(based on 2001 national census statistics) are found. It is possibly due to this high 
population density that the highest numbers of fishers are also found in the upper 
panhandle (Mendelsohn et al 2010). In fact, Mosepele (2001) notes that out of the 
3,289 fishers in the entire Delta in 1998, just over 52 per cent were in the upper 
panhandle.
The Okavango Delta, the world’s largest Ramsar1 site, is a large inland wetland 
created by the Okavango River (Ramberg et al 2006), where the total flooded 
area varies annually, depending on the size of the flood (Wolski et al 2006). It is 
a dynamic ecosystem, characterized by a regular, but highly variable, flood pulse 
(Ramberg et al 2006; Murray-Hudson 2009), which supports the largest fishery 
in Botswana (Merron and Bruton 1988; Mosepele 2000). Therefore, while the 
Delta’s waters might be oligotrophic (Cronberg et al 1995), this seasonal flooding 
enhances aquatic primary production (Mosepele 2008; Mosepele et al 2009) by 
trapping nutrients of terrestrial origin in the aquatic habitat in a process termed 
the ‘flood-pulse concept’, originally in relation to the Amazon (Junk et al 1989).
The seasonality of the flooding has created three major hydro-ecological zones 
in the Delta (Ramberg et al 2006), which in turn have brought about diverse habi-
tats in the system. According to Smith (1976), the Delta is divided into several 
main habitats: perennial swamp, perennial and seasonal swamp, floodplains, riv-
ers and water courses, lagoons, islands and mainland edges. This system supports 
approximately 71 different fish species (Ramberg et al 2006; Mendelsohn et al 
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2010), distributed heterogeneously throughout the different habitats (Mosepele 
and Mosepele 2005; Mosepele 2008; Mosepele et al 2009; Mosepele et al 2011). 
Apart from supporting thriving subsistence (Ngwenya and Mosepele 2008) and 
small-scale commercial fishery (Mosepele and Ngwenya 2010), the Delta is crucial 
to Botswana’s tourism industry (Mbaiwa 2003) and supports the subsistence of the 
local population (Wolski and Murray-Hudson 2005).
The species mainly targeted for recreational fishing are the ‘trophy sized’ Hydro-
cynus vittatus (tigerfish), Serranochromis robustus (nembwe), Clarias gariepinus (sharptooth 
catfish), Clarias ngamensis (blunttooth catfish) and Oreochromis andersonii (threespot 
tilapia) (Mosepele et al 2003; Mendelsohn et al 2010; Thomassen 2011), for which 
most fishing is done in the main channel and large lagoons (Setswalo 2007). Sub-
sistence fishers target a wide range of fish species (from smaller ones such as Barbus 
afrovernayi to the larger sizes, including Clarias gariepinus), primarily for household 
consumption (Mosepele et al 2003; Mosepele et al 2006), but sell a small propor-
tion of their surplus catch (Mmopelwa et al 2009). Conversely, the small-scale, 
yet profitable, commercial fishery (Mmopelwa et al 2005) harvests market-sized 
Oreochromis andersonii, Tilapia rendalli and Oreochromis macrochir (Mosepele et al 2003). 
Both subsistence and commercial fishing are key resources for household food and 
nutrition security (Mosepele et al 2006; Ngwenya and Mosepele 2008; Mosepele 
and Ngwenya 2010): children from fishing households are healthier than those 
from non-fishing households (Nnyepi et al 2007). Essentially, fishing is a social 
safety net during times of socio-economic hardship (Mosepele 2000; Mbaiwa 
et al 2011).
These different exploitation regimes, coupled with the different use values of 
the Delta, resulted in conflict in the fishery (Mosepele 2000; Bokhutlo et al 2007; 
Setswalo 2007; Mosepele et al 2009). In fact, Bokhutlo et al (2007) revealed that 
some of the conflict based on access occurred not only between local fishers and 
tour operators (inter micro-micro conflict), but also among local fishers themselves 
(intra micro-micro conflict).
Process of developing co-management
Identification of stakeholders
Participation was at the core of the strategy adopted in developing the OFMC 
model. Key stakeholders were identified through consultative meetings and 
interviews with selected informants. These included various local governance 
structures at community level (e.g. village development committees and local 
headmen), as well as officials in the Fisheries Division of Botswana’s Department 
of Wildlife and National Parks and the Department of Environmental Affairs, 
which was the major driver of the Okavango Delta Management Plan.2 As the 
plan unfolded, the department conducted frequent and intensive kgotlas (con-
sultative community meetings) throughout the Ngamiland district, which put it 
in a good position to identify key issues and actors in the fish sector. The Fisher-
ies Division, on the other hand, is the government agency tasked with the overall 
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management of Botswana’s fish resources and is therefore acquainted with all 
the main stakeholders in the fish sector.
The philosophy behind this process was to maximize the involvement of all 
stakeholders and engage all community structures through a series of meetings 
and workshops. This inclusive participatory approach falls within the framework 
designed by Welcomme (1998) for the development and management of inland 
fisheries. Furthermore, a capacity-building approach (based on training needs 
assessment) was used in a three-pronged strategy to enhance the capacity of the 
key stakeholders in the sector.
Capacity building
The first strategy entailed capacity building in the Fisheries Division (the regula-
tors) through a series of training programes in fish identification and monitoring. 
Concurrently, steps were taken to build the capacity of the resource users (fishers) 
through focused group discussions, indigenous knowledge mapping and training 
programmes tailored to their needs (e.g. boat maintenance, business and financial 
procedures, fish monitoring). Existing fisher institutions and community-based 
organizations were strengthened: for example, the Okavango Fishers Association 
was helped to revise and amend its constitution, primarily to make it relevant to 
current issues and concerns. The third strategy was to build the capacity of the 
Figure 9.1 Okavango Delta and panhandle with study site marked.
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private sector, mainly lodge owners, who were engaged in a range of meetings, 
training courses and workshops (data collection on key fish species targeted by 
tourists, fish monitoring, etc).
This process of bringing together stakeholders who had previously been at log-
gerheads, empowering them through, for example, capacity-building interven-
tions, assisting them to identify common issues, sharing information and devel-
oping ‘local-level, ecologically oriented management initiatives’, is similar to the 
‘Turning the Tide’ initiative in Canada’s maritime provinces described by Charles 
(2008). This initiative addressed the efficacy of building community-based fisher-
ies management approaches and creating linkages between the community and 
non-community actors. The approach corresponds with that of Chuenpagdee and 
Jentoft (2007), who observe that the success or failure of co-management depends 
on the pre-implementation processes followed.
Figure 9.2 Graphic representation of the process followed to form the OFMC.
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Formation and composition
The OFMC was formed through the steps depicted in Figure 9.2. The first step 
involved a series of consultations, which culminated in participants’ buy-in of 
the idea of forming a local co-management structure that was inclusive and that 
embraced greater understanding of the need to co-manage the fish resources. The 
next major step was a facilitation process that inculcated greater involvement in 
and ownership of the process by all stakeholders. A final meeting then discussed 
the composition and mandate (roles, responsibilities and functions) of the pro-
posed OFMC, whereupon the committee was finally set up.
The OFMC is composed of a diverse group of stakeholders including both state 
and non-state actors (Figure 9.3). All the state actors are government institutions 
mandated with implementing sector policies relevant to the management of the 
Delta fisheries. These include water resources (Department of Water Affairs), 
environmental issues in general (Department of Environmental Affairs), local gov-
ernment (North West District Council), land use planning and zoning (Tawana 
Land Board) and tourism activities (Department of Tourism). The Fisheries Divi-
sion, which is the sole government institution mandated to manage Botswana’s 
fish resources, was allocated the position of committee secretary. The Okavango 
Research Institute, an institution of the University of Botswana, was given the 
chair, based on the assumption that it would be impartial with regard to resource 
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Figure 9.3 Composition of the OFMC indicating state and non-state actors.
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management. Effectively, these two bodies have become the anchors of the OFMC. 
Moreover, it was assumed that both the Okavango Research Institute and the 
Botswana Tourism Board, as parastatal entities (semi-autonomous because they 
get funding from government but have a high degree of independence in decision-
making), would play a mediating role in the committee.
Non-state actors also cover a wide range, from tour operators and fisher organi-
zations – for example the Okavango Fishers Association and the Teemashane 
fisheries syndicate, who are key stakeholders and were major opponents in the 
fishery sector – to village-based government structures such as the village devel-
opment committees and some individual community members who had strong 
feelings about fisheries management in the Delta. Many of these individual com-
munity members were also embroiled in some of the conflicts observed in the area. 
The only major group missing from the OFMC are the women basket fishers. 
However, the representatives of the Trust for Okavango Cultural and Develop-
ment Initiatives are women and currently represent the interests of women basket 
fishers. The OFMC’s extensive membership is in line with Chuenpagdee and Jen-
toft’s (2007) observation that ‘fishers, community members, government officials, 
scientists and environmental groups’ should be included in a participatory process 
to develop a co-management regime.
Distillation of key management issues
A series of intensive meetings and workshops were held with stakeholders in the 
study area. The convenors were instructed to follow a strictly democratic and 
inclusive process in which care was taken, especially in the case of women, to 
give all participants an equal chance to give their input. The Fisheries Division 
and Okavango Research Institute facilitated this exercise in order to ensure strict 
adherence to democratic procedures.
These consultative, participatory meetings were conducted over three years, 
from 2007 to 2009, their objective being mainly to motivate stakeholders to appre-
ciate the various management issues regarding the fishery and, furthermore, to 
help them understand the functions of a co-management structure and the con-
cepts of sustainable development and sustainable resource use.
The key issues discussed included the socio-economic dimension (for local fish-
ers and tour operators) of the fishery, indigenous knowledge issues (primarily for 
local fishers), a biological and ecological understanding of the fisheries, biodiver-
sity conservation (BIOKAVANGO interventions) and a regulatory management 
approach by the Fisheries Division. This approach to appreciating indigenous 
knowledge issues is based on the work of experts such as Robin Welcomme (1998), 
who advise that the cultural dimension of inland fisheries needs to be taken into 
account as part of the management paradigm, because ignoring fishers’ knowl-
edge in fisheries management may put the resource at risk (Johannes et al 2000). 
King and Faasili (1999) adopted a similar approach in the development of a com-
munity-based fisheries management system in Samoa. The basic philosophical 
construct underpinning the formation of the OFMC was that it would be guided 
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by the principles of fisheries co-management, focused primarily on conflict resolu-
tion. It was also envisaged that the OFMC would introduce a self-policing initia-
tive, which should be both popularly supported and acceptable to the Fisheries 
Division.
These meetings culminated in a final workshop where all the issues and con-
cerns surrounding the fishery were distilled into the ten problem areas summa-
rized in Table 9.1. These issues were not restricted to overfishing, as had initially 
been assumed, but rather covered an array of management concerns affecting the 
Delta’s fishery, ranging from general concern about the impact of certain user 
behaviour on the Delta ecosystem’s functioning (e.g. boats with excessively large 
Table 9.1 Summary of confl ict issues raised by stakeholders
Conflict issue Explanation or description 
Boats with powerful 
engines (e.g. 150 h.p.)
These boats create big waves that could destroy nests of 
endangered birds (e.g. African skimmer) and fish breeding sites.
Houseboats Stakeholders don’t know where these boats come from, whom 
they belong to and whether they are appropriately licensed 
for what they do. There are also concerns about the potential 
impact of the sewage and other waste that they generate.
Fishing competitions These events bring many boats of different sizes and shapes 
to the area, some probably not inspected. Stakeholders are 
concerned that these boats may exceed the limits of what the 
Delta can support and may be the source of invasive species.
Fishing methods Gill-net fishing (mostly commercial) is not properly regulated. 
This practice might be detrimental to fish stocks because there is 
no daily allowable catch limit.
Disturbance Noise allegedly caused by night-time fishing affects stakeholders 
who live or have property near fishing grounds (mostly next to 
lagoons).
Double netting and 
drive fishing
These terms describe the practice of beating the water to drive 
fish into a net and that of placing a second net to catch the fish 
in case they escape the first one. It is thought that these methods 
might ultimately be destructive to fish populations.
Legislation The applicable laws are based on classic fisheries management 
regulations (e.g. closed seasons, gear restrictions), which do not 
address conflict issues.
Multiple use This refers to the use of lagoons by different stakeholders, 
and fishing in relation to other forms of usage of the lagoons. 
Different land uses adjacent to the river invariably result in 
competition for a limited resource – and hence conflict.
Carrying capacity Concerns about the increased density of boats and lodges in 
the upper panhandle has created friction between some of the 
lodge operators. This has spilled over into recreational fishing 
operations, where tour operators feel there might be too many 
new entrants into the area, saturating it.
Limited scientific 
information on fish 
stocks
This lack creates friction among various fish resource users 
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engines disturbing breeding fish and aquatic birds) to specific concerns about the 
carrying capacity of the panhandle for tourism-related activities, and the dissemi-
nation of scientific information to stakeholders.
Implementation of co-management
Adaptive co-management
Democratic ideals and participatory procedures were advocated and employed as 
underpinning philosophies of the OFMC. It was envisaged that the committee’s 
decision-making would be highly interactive and democratic, allowing all mem-
bers the opportunity to contribute their ideas and voice their opinions. During the 
OFMC’s meetings so far, the chair has deliberately solicited opinions from every 
member on any issue under discussion. This generally results in heated debates, 
but consensus is always reached eventually.
The decision-making process, which contributes to the overall fisheries man-
agement of the Okavango Delta, follows a feedback loop system as illustrated in 
Figure 9.4. The large arrows follow the committee’s decision-making procedure, 
and the smaller arrows indicate that the OFMC can intervene at any point. The 
key processes of the feedback system are decision-making, implementation, moni-
toring and analysis, then revision and modification if and when necessary. This 
Figure 9.4 Adaptive management strategy used by OFMC in decision-making.
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is the process that was followed when the OFMC developed a ten-point code 
of conduct for responsible fishing (Table 9.2). The first three items are intended 
to regulate certain practices in the river in order to minimize conflict situations 
among stakeholders, while the fourth and fifth aim to regulate human behaviour 
so as to minimize, respectively, the risk of wildfires and the rate of boat collisions. 
The primary purpose behind items six and seven is to inculcate environmental 
awareness, particularly in the marking of nets in the water, and hence minimize 
pollution (thereby increasing the aesthetic value of the system). Items eight and 
nine endorse government regulations, and the last item requires an affirmation by 
all parties that they will adhere to the code.
The procedure described here highlights some of the elements of the co-
management process and how it is supposed to operate when it is fully functional. 
In essence, the code of conduct is a blueprint that the OFMC will use in its co-
management of the Delta’s fishery.
The OFMC also demarcated ‘fishing-free zones’ in the upper panhandle 
(Figure 9.5) as one of its management interventions. These zones were primarily 
designed to address the stakeholders’ concern about limited scientific information 
(Table 9.1). Subsequently, the OFMC instructed the Fisheries Division to initiate a 
Table 9.2 Ten-point code of conduct developed by OFMC for confl ict resolution
Item Code description 
1. Fishing of any form in front of lodges is restricted. A buffer zone, along the main 
channels, shall be: 100 metres on either side of the lodge along the channel and 200 
metres in front of the lodge.
2. There shall be ‘no wake zones’ in the Delta next to vertical banks (which are 
normally used as bird nesting areas), lagoons, sand banks, in front of lodges and 
upon meeting traditional craft such as mekoros and rafts.
3. For personal safety, mekoros, other traditional craft and heavily laden boats shall wait 
for other faster motorized boats to pass them before they continue on their way.
4. All campfires must be extinguished after use and when abandoning camps on 
islands or any part of the Delta.
5. Anybody driving a boat shall not drink any form of alcoholic beverage.
6. There shall be no littering in the river, on the banks or on any island in the Delta.
7. Marking nets with plastic bags shall not be allowed, and only items made out of 
natural material (e.g. cotton, grass, papyrus) can be used for this purpose. Factory-
made floats or any factory-made marker can also be used.
8. Any fish taken or harvested from the river or water, either by hook, gill net or any 
other form of fishing gear (by all fisher groups), shall be recorded accordingly to 
assist the Department of Wildlife and National Parks – Fisheries Division (and other 
institutions and stakeholders) in medium- and long-term monitoring of fish stocks 
and fisheries in the Delta.
9. All stakeholders in the Delta’s fishery take it as their individual responsibility to 
observe and uphold the Fish Protection Regulations of 2008 as promulgated by the 
Department of Wildlife and National Parks – Fisheries Division.
10. All stakeholders in the Delta’s fishery agree to observe and uphold this code to 
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long-term monitoring protocol in the site so that the committee could be informed 
regularly on the status of the fish stocks.
It needs to be emphasized that these were the initial issues raised by the OFMC, 
and more are expected to come up in subsequent meetings. It is quite evident from 
the code of conduct that the OFMC is concerned about a broad suite of fisheries 
management issues in the Delta, so it follows that the committee will make further 
recommendations on the monitoring of issues of concern.
Discussion
This study has proven that the establishment of fisheries co-management in flood-
plain fisheries like the Okavango Delta is a viable undertaking. While the OFMC 
was formed primarily as a conflict intervention tool, this study has shown that 
the issues range well beyond what was documented before (e.g. Kolding 1996; 
Mosepele 2000; Tweddle et al 2003; Setswalo 2007) and encompass a broad array 
of management issues in the Delta’s fishery. Initially, the main cause of conflict 
Figure 9.5 Main fi shing areas in the upper panhandle and fi shing-free zones (lagoons, or 
ledibas in circle) demarcated by the OFMC as long-term fi sh monitoring sites.
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was perceived to be fish stock depletion by commercial ‘over-fishing’ (Kolding 
1996; Haggett 1999; Mosepele 2000), but later analysis revealed that the major 
conflicts were precipitated by the lack of well-defined property rights in the fish-
ery (Kgathi et al 2005). Indeed, the first documented cases of fishery conflict in 
the Delta were between commercial and recreational fishers (Bills 1996; Kolding 
1996; Haggett 1999). Conflict incidences between commercial and recreational 
fishers are highest when the water levels in the Delta are low (Setswalo 2007), 
which suggests that reduced fishing space is the major source of conflict between 
these two groups. It was against this background that the majority of fishers (67 per 
cent) felt that the fishery should be regulated by both traditional (local) authorities 
and government.
This sentiment – that the fishery should be regulated through a collaborative 
regime by government and traditional authorities (local structures) – laid the founda-
tion for the development of the OFMC as a Delta-centric fisheries co-management 
model. Ultimately, this information indicates that the process of collaboratively 
identifying issues of concern can enhance understanding of the fishery system 
and provide guidance for possible management strategies which can then be 
jointly devised. In this proposed model, the Fisheries Division and the Okavango 
Research Institute would play a facilitation role in the management discussions of 
the OFMC.
The key planning steps – that is, the consultative and facilitation processes – in 
the formation of the OFMC ensured that there was a high degree of buy-in, own-
ership, participation and understanding by the key stakeholders. These steps were 
underpinned by a deliberate decision to initiate consensus-building (Warner 2000) 
among the previously antagonistic parties. In this respect, special care was taken 
to ensure that a win-win philosophy was created, so that none of the stakehold-
ers would feel that they had to compromise for the benefit of other groups. This 
notwithstanding, both sides (i.e. both recreational and commercial fisheries) made 
some compromises during the negotiations.
The philosophical differences between consensus and compromise in this context (i.e. 
fisheries conflict resolution in the Delta) are explicitly defined by Warner (2000), 
who explains that the latter involves ‘trade-offs’. Deliberate steps are then taken 
to avoid trade-offs by adopting consensus as the main conflict resolution strategy. It 
was perhaps against this background that the ‘fishing-free zones’ were demarcated 
in the upper panhandle (see Figure 9.5), where all forms of fishing (commercial, 
recreational and subsistence) are prohibited. The key objective of this demarcation 
is to minimize conflict between the recreational and commercial fishers. Gener-
ally, the small-scale commercial fishers target their preferred species in floodplain 
habitats (Mmopelwa et al 2005; Mosepele et al 2006), so this will not have any sig-
nificant negative effect on their fishing operations. The tour operators also benefit 
because their ‘contentions’ against noise from nightly ‘drive-fishing’ operations by 
commercial fishers in the periphery of their lodges (Tweddle et al 2003) will now 
be addressed through the code of conduct.
Moreover, the other reason behind this decision to declare fishing-free zones is 
the intended implementation of a long-term monitoring programme to monitor 
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fish populations. It is envisaged that this will give the OFMC control and owner-
ship, and will also create a platform for local fishers to integrate their traditional 
ecological knowledge into the management of the fishery. All these management 
procedures will then form part of the basis for future assessment of the co-manage-
ment regime in this fishery.
What is particularly striking about the key conflict issues identified in this study 
is that they range from biological and ecological concerns to communication prob-
lems among stakeholders. The high diversity of management issues in the Delta’s 
fishery is possibly related to that of the stakeholders constituting the OFMC. This 
is different from previous research (e.g. Tweddle et al 2003), which studied conflict 
issues only among commercial, subsistence and recreational fishers.
Nonetheless, concerns about ‘potential overfishing’ through what some OFMC 
members, especially recreational fishers, describe as ‘destructive fishing methods’ 
(e.g. double netting and drive fishing methods as described in Table 9.1), highlight 
a conservation ethic based on Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’. This man-
agement approach is the key precursor to the prevailing centralized or top-down 
governance model of the Delta’s fishery (Mosepele 2008). The basic philosophy 
behind this model is that local communities invariably over-exploit their resources 
in an open-access regime. This philosophy is also reflected in the ‘conservation 
paradigm’ described by Charles (1992), which views fishers as predators who ‘act in 
their self-interest’. Moreover, as noted by Johannes et al (2000), a centralized man-
agement paradigm ignores the traditional and indigenous knowledge of fishers.
The formation of the OFMC essentially devolved power from the Fisheries 
Division and gave the local community a platform on which to participate actively 
and directly in the management of ‘their’ resources. Through a consensus-build-
ing exercise like that described by Warner (2000), coupled with capacity-building 
and empowerment through democratic ideals, the ten-point code of conduct was 
developed.
This co-management approach developed for the Okavango Delta was based 
upon the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO 1995), which 
advocates the inclusion of local communities in the management of their fisher-
ies resources. Co-management is now used extensively to achieve a more holistic 
approach to fisheries management issues (Jul-Larsen and Van Zwieten 2002), even 
though Caddy (2002) acknowledges that setting up a ‘decision-making process’ is 
the most difficult, and yet important, aspect of fisheries management process. Sip-
ponen and Gréboval (2001) argue that a forum based on a co-management para-
digm can be created for commercial and recreational fishers to communicate as 
a conflict resolution mechanism. One such forum, involving a highly democratic 
approach, was established in Samoa (King and Faasili 1999) and culminated in a 
village fisheries management plan that was adopted by most community groups, 
including women.
Therefore co-management has indeed ‘become the buzzword of contemporary 
fisheries management’ (Schreiber 2001; see also Gutiérrez, et al 2011) and has 
subsequently been adopted or proposed as a major strategy in fisheries manage-
ment, globally (e.g. Sipponen and Gréboval 2001; Evans et al 2011).
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However, Pinho et al (2012) emphasize that cultural and political factors are 
major barriers to the successful implementation of fisheries co-management. They 
are certainly potential impediments to the success of the co-management approach 
in the Delta, where recreational fishers have more economic and political power 
than the local commercial and subsistence fishers. Moreover, there are cultural 
distinctions and differences in economic-political power between the commercial 
and subsistence fishers (Setswalo 2007) which need to be overcome to ensure suc-
cess and sustainability for this management approach in the Delta.
Jul-Larsen et al (2003) argue that co-management is one of the best tools for con-
flict resolution in African freshwater fisheries. Moreover, Van Ginkel and Steins 
(2001) argue that compliance with regulations to solve multiple-use conflicts can be 
sought and negotiated at the local level before these regulations are eventually cod-
ified into law, which agrees with Overby’s (2000) observations on the integration 
of zoning, based on self-regulation, into federal law in the Gulf of Mexico. A more 
fundamental step towards co-management is recognizing the interests of groups 
that have been historically disadvantaged, such as women fishers (Haraldsdottir 
2000). This observation is relevant in the Okavango Delta, where women basket 
fishers are not organized into any formal grouping and are therefore not part of 
any management process. Therefore, while subsistence fishing is a major source of 
livelihoods in the Delta’s communities (Mosepele et al 2006), especially for basket 
fishers, to whom fishing is also a form of cultural expression (Mmopelwa et al 2009), 
their concerns still need to be integrated into this co-management paradigm.
It should be emphasized, however, that co-management is not a panacea for all 
management problems in the Delta’s fishery. There is ongoing debate about the 
efficacy of this approach in fisheries management globally. While Gutiérrez et al 
(2011) extol the success of co-management in fisheries, they admit that the success 
of this approach is limited in inland fisheries due to ‘weaker social capital and short-
term co-management arrangements’. Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2007) suggest that 
the success or failure of fisheries co-management regimes depends on the steps 
taken preceding implementation. Therefore a plethora of issues needs to be taken 
into account to ensure the success of this management approach in fisheries.
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated the potential of local governance structures with demo-
cratic ideals to resolve conflicts through a participatory co-management system in 
floodplain fisheries, using the case of the OFMC in the Okavango panhandle. The 
OFMC is multi-stakeholder in character, which makes it appealing to stakehold-
ers. With its democratic approach to dealing with fisheries management issues, it is 
potentially an effective local governance structure that could, with support (especially 
financial), become a focal point for fisheries management in the Okavango Delta.
By their nature, floodplain fisheries have diverse management issues (Wel-
comme 1998) that centralized management alone is generally insufficient to 
address (Mosepele 2008). The efficacy of multi-stakeholder involvement within a 
co-management paradigm, initially in conflict resolution and ultimately in overall 
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fisheries management, makes it a more promising approach to floodplain fisheries 
management.
To enhance the sustainability of the OFMC, especially during its faltering initial 
steps, it was anchored in two institutions, the Fisheries Division (which appointed 
the secretary) and the Okavango Research Institute (which provided the chair) as 
illustrated in Figure 9.3. This was a prudent decision by the committee to ensure 
the continued existence of this initiative, before it assumes complete financial inde-
pendence in future. The feedback philosophy of its decision-making process gives 
the committee an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the relevance and appro-
priateness of its decisions in relation to certain set goals.
Notwithstanding the initial successes since the establishment of the OFMC, it 
is not necessarily the final answer, either for conflict resolution or comprehensive 
fisheries management, in the Okavango Delta. Several challenges remain at the 
implementation and operational levels that will invariably affect its sustainability. 
Therefore the long-term sustainability of such structures depends not only on their 
existence, but also on their functionality.
At the operational level, the multi-stakeholder composition of the committee 
presents the risk of a lack of common interest, participation and drive in the long 
run. Currently, the structure is driven by the stakeholders’ shared interest in resolv-
ing conflict and managing the fish resources. However, this ‘collective drive’ might 
reach an optimum level at which conflicts are invariably minimized through effective 
implementation of the code of conduct, routine fish stock monitoring and judicious 
adherence to all the management decisions made by the committee. The greatest 
challenge then would be to maintain the interest of stakeholders in the initiative, and 
to come up with innovative approaches to fisheries management in the Delta. Other 
challenges include the need for constant mentorship and capacity-building, the lack 
of a visible improvement in livelihoods, the absence of a clear understanding of fish-
eries dynamics and global issues such as climate change, and the failure to include 
other groups, namely women and young people. A deliberate effort should be made 
to showcase and integrate indigenous knowledge and cultural values relating to fish-
eries so that issues of conflict resolution, good governance, long-term monitoring 
and the management of resources are embraced and sustained by all stakeholders.
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Notes
1 This designation was made in terms of the Ramsar Convention, whose mission is to 
ensure ‘the conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local, regional and national 
actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving sustainable 
development throughout the world’ (Ramsar n.d.).
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2 The overall goal of this plan is to ‘integrate resource management for the Okavango 
Delta that will ensure its long-term conservation and that will provide benefits for 
the present and future well-being of the people, through sustainable use of its natu-
ral resources’ (Department of Environmental Affairs [DEA] 2008). Subsequently, the 
BIOKAVANGO project was designed to address some of the knowledge gaps identified 
through the planning process of the Okavango Delta Management Plan. This resulted 
in the current study, whose main goal was to find a solution to the conflict that had been 
identified as a major impediment to sustainable development in the Delta’s fishery.
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10 Shifting gear
 A new governance framework for 
small-scale fisheries in South Africa
Merle Sowman, Serge Raemaekers and Jackie Sunde
Introduction
South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 precipitated a law reform process 
that sought to address past injustices and give a voice to marginalized communi-
ties. This process was guided by the new South African Constitution (Republic of 
South Africa [RSA] 1996) and applied to all sectors of society including the fishing 
industry, following decades of discrimination and exclusion from legal access to 
marine resources. The new democratic government faced the huge challenge of 
transforming an industry in which the ownership of marine resources was vested in 
a handful of large, white-owned companies. Transformation had to take place in a 
complex policy environment that included balancing the opportunities created by 
South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy and adoption of neo-liberal 
economic policies with a historically strong conservation agenda, as well as various 
new social development policies (Van Sittert et al 2006).
However, despite a progressive Constitution that upheld the protection of, and 
respect for, a range of socio-economic, cultural and environmental rights, and the 
recognition of ‘living customary law’,1 the traditional small-scale fisheries sector in 
South Africa continued to be marginalized. Decisions regarding rights of access, 
the use of resources and institutions for the management of marine resources were 
centrally located, and a powerful, market-based ideology influenced the governing 
system in favour of commercial fishing interests (Sunde et al 2013).
Although policy reforms from 1998 to 2006, and in particular the promulgation 
of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) in 1998, resulted in improved access 
to marine resources for many disadvantaged South Africans (Crosoer et al 2006; 
Isaacs 2012), these reforms were considered ‘window dressing’ (Nielsen and Hara 
2006), because thousands of traditional fishers still could not gain such access. 
Therefore, in 2005 a group of traditional fishers took legal action against the min-
ister responsible for fisheries, which culminated in a court ruling that required the 
minister to develop a policy to address the socio-economic needs of this hitherto 
excluded group.
In June 2012, nearly five years after the court order, a new small-scale fisher-
ies policy was promulgated in South Africa (Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries [DAFF] 2012). This chapter offers a critical review and analysis of 
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the new policy and its formulation process. It also examines the new small-scale 
fisheries governance framework against the backdrop of a set of normative ‘good 
governance’ principles derived from international best practice. The final section 
highlights key implementation challenges and offers suggestions for overcoming 
some of them.
Governance of small-scale fisheries
Internationally there has been a growing realization that small-scale fisheries, both 
marine and freshwater, play a critical role in the provision of food, employment 
and livelihoods for millions of people (Berkes et al 2001; FAO 2005a; Béné 2006; 
Sharma 2011). Although there are no reliable figures on the actual number of 
people dependent on small-scale fisheries, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO 2005a) estimates that 90 per cent of the 38 million fishers and fish farmers 
in the world are small-scale, collectively harvesting half of the world’s fish catch 
for consumption, and that 135 million are directly or indirectly employed in small-
scale fisheries and aquaculture.
Globally, however, many coastal fisheries resources are declining, habitats are 
degrading (Pauly et al 1998; FAO 2005b) and food and livelihoods derived from 
fisheries are as a consequence increasingly at risk (Andrew et al 2007). Given the 
complexities, uncertainties and challenges prevalent in these coastal fishery sys-
tems, conventional top-down, science-based and resource-centred management 
is no longer considered appropriate: new forms of governance that address both 
societal and resource sustainability issues are required (Kooiman et al 2005; 
McConney and Charles 2008; Sowman 2011). These new approaches are systems-
orientated, embrace complexity thinking, recognize the plurality of socio-legal sys-
tems and are integrated, interdisciplinary, participatory, responsive and adaptive.
As Chapter 1 explains, governance is increasingly being seen as one of the most 
critical factors in promoting sustainable resource management and human devel-
opment and in eradicating poverty (United Nations Development Programme 
[UNDP] 2002; Borrini-Feyerabend 2008). It is concerned with interactions and 
processes that occur in a diverse group, including non-state actors, in the proc-
ess of addressing societal issues and needs (Kooiman et al 2005). Central to this 
governance approach is respect for human rights as well as the participation of all 
relevant parties in planning and decision-making.
The South African Equality Court’s order to the government in 2007 to develop 
a small-scale fisheries policy that would address the socio-economic needs of tra-
ditional small-scale coastal fishers provided an opportunity to embrace this new 
approach to governance – one that was underpinned by a set of ‘good governance’ 
principles, as summarized in Table 10.1.
In this chapter, we examine the extent to which the new small-scale fisheries 
policy in South Africa – as well as the process through which it was developed 
– embraces the principles and approaches of good governance. We discuss the 
implementation challenges and practical changes required to move fisheries onto 
a different trajectory: one that embraces coastal fisheries in South Africa in all 
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their complexity and diversity, recognizes the plurality of socio-legal governance 
systems and seeks to facilitate governance systems that are appropriate to the con-
text and committed to pursuing social justice and environmental sustainability 
objectives.
Overview of small-scale fisheries in South Africa, past and 
present
South Africa’s productive and diverse marine environment provides food and live-
lihoods for thousands of coastal dwellers and supports a thriving industrial sector 
mainly in the south-western region of the country. Extending from Alexander Bay 
in the north-west to Kosi Bay in the east, the 3,000 kilometre coastline is flanked 
by the cold, nutrient-rich waters of the Benguela current on the west coast and the 
warm nutrient-poor waters of the Agulhas current on the east coast (Figure 10.1).
Historical evidence indicates that people have been harvesting resources along 
the coast for many thousands of years (Parkington et al 1988; Lasiak 1993; Jeradino 
and Yates 1996). Today, diverse small-scale fisheries operate along the South Afri-
can coast, ranging from the shore-based harvesting of intertidal resources to the 
targeting of migratory line-fish stocks using motorized vessels. Based on data from 
the fisheries authority and research conducted in several small-scale fishing com-
munities along the coast, approximately 110 geographically distinct fishing com-
munities can be identified, varying in size from small villages to larger towns (Sow-
man et al 2011b) (Figure 10.1). Some of these fisheries are still informal, operate 
under regulations for recreational fisheries or have only certain components rec-
ognized by the fisheries authority (Environmental Evaluation Unit [EEU] 2010).
Table 10.1 Principles of good governance
1. Respect for and protection of human rights
2. Equality
3. Recognition of and respect for the plurality of socio-legal systems
4. Recognition of the rule of law
5. Promotion of intercultural engagement
6. Inclusivity and participation
7. Representivity




12. Embracing of complexity
13. Cross-sectoral coordination, integration and contextualization
14. Integration of indigenous and local knowledge
15. Responsiveness, flexibility and adaptiveness
16. Sustainability
17. Subsidiarity
18. Access to justice and appropriate systems of mediation, conflict and dispute resolution
Atlantic Ocean 
Sma ll-scale fishing 
• communities 
Indian Ocean 
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While the MLRA identified ‘subsistence’ as a legal category of fishers, the defi-
nition only permitted the harvesting of low-value species for local consumption. 
The new law failed to recognize the range of small-scale fishers that were engaged 
in fishing for livelihoods and derived an income from these activities. Both gov-
ernment and scholars have agreed that the more encompassing term ‘small-scale 
fishers’ should rather be used to cover the range of fishery types taking place along 
South Africa’s coast (Harris et al 2002; Sowman 2006; DAFF 2012).
Small-scale fishing along the west and south-west coastal areas is predominantly 
boat-based. Generally it is conducted close to shore, boats are launched in local 
waters and the duration of trips is restricted to one day. The gear used is low-tech-
nology and thus does not require large outlays of capital. The fishing activities are 
labour-intensive. Men usually (but not always) do the harvesting, while women are 
mainly involved in pre- and post-harvest activities. It is often impossible to disen-
tangle the threads that link one individual to a range of fishing activities spanning 
the large- and small-scale sectors.
A different scenario has evolved along the east coast of South Africa, where the 
harvesting of inshore resources by indigenous people was largely regulated by Afri-
can customary law despite national regulations restricting access and use (Sunde et 
al 2013). In these areas, there was limited interference by the colonial and apart-
heid governments in the allocation of access rights and management of resources. 
This was largely due to the remoteness and inaccessibility of vast stretches of the 
Figure 10.1 Location of small-scale fi shing communities in South Africa. 
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east coast and the relatively low commercial value of coastal resources there. Fur-
thermore, during the apartheid era large stretches of the eastern seaboard were 
declared ‘homelands’.2 In these traditional authority areas, rights to access marine 
resources were inextricably linked to relations of land tenure and social relations 
within the community (Sunde 2011).
There is not much literature on this, but evidence from recent research on 
coastal resource use suggests that customary systems constituted the de facto legal 
dispensation during the twentieth century in many parts of the country (Sunde et 
al 2013). A consequence of cultural practices involving the ocean, and of resource 
characteristics, is that coastal communities are engaged in a range of livelihood 
activities, with fishing contributing to household food and income.
Fisheries reform, 1994–2007
In 1994, South Africa embarked on an extensive law reform programme, guided 
by the new South African Constitution (RSA 1996), with the human rights prin-
ciples contained in the Bill of Rights (Witbooi 2006) at its core. All organs of state 
were required to align their policies, laws and implementation actions to these 
fundamental rights, as well as to other relevant constitutional provisions.
In the poor coastal fishing communities, expectations were high that the new 
democratic government would deliver on its promises of an improved life for all. 
However, although various sectors did participate in deliberations regarding a 
new fisheries policy in 1996, historically disadvantaged communities were not well 
represented. Instead, the deliberations were dominated by the fishing industry, 
which formed an alliance with organized labour to press for the allocation of long-
term individual rights. This alliance was strongly opposed to state interference in 
the redistribution of resources to traditional fishers (Nielsen and Hara 2006).
The three-year law reform process culminated in the promulgation of the 
MLRA (RSA 1998), which sought to achieve three broad objectives, namely sus-
tainability, equity and economic stability. Transformation of the industry was a 
further key requirement of the Act, although no clear guidance was given on how 
this should be achieved (RSA 1998, section 2[j]). The recognition of subsistence 
fishers as a legal category of fishers and the declaration of coastal areas for their 
exclusive use, were further indications that a new fisheries dispensation was in the 
making (RSA 1998, section 19).
Thus, while the restructuring of the fishing industry and the opening up of access 
to it resulted in a significant increase in new rights holders, and a degree of black 
economic empowerment in the industry (Isaacs 2006; Nielsen and Hara 2006; 
Van Sittert et al 2006; Isaacs 2012), there have been serious criticisms regarding 
the achievement of equity objectives. In particular, many of the quotas allocated 
to new entrants were considered unviable, and thousands of traditional small-scale 
fishers were overlooked (Isaacs 2006, 2012; Sowman 2006). A further key criticism 
has been that the individual rights allocation process largely benefited big industry 
players and their new black economic empowerment partners (Nielsen and Hara 
2006), but failed to address the socio-economic and cultural needs of poor fishing 
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communities (Isaacs 2006; Sowman 2006). Furthermore, there is no evidence to 
suggest that this approach generated the surplus envisaged for pro-poor develop-
ment (Isaacs et al 2007).
Although a subsistence category was created, very little progress has been made 
with respect to the allocation of rights to the subsistence sector, although in the 
KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provinces, fishing permits (not rights) have been 
allocated annually since 2002 (Harris et al 2007). However, this arrangement has 
been cumbersome and uncertain and, in some cases, has entrenched an individ-
ual-rights-based approach that is in conflict with living customary systems which 
still prevail in many coastal areas of South Africa (Sunde et al 2013). These failures 
can be attributed in part to institutional inadequacies and the MLRA’s narrow 
definition of subsistence (Sowman 2006; Isaacs 2006, 2012). Certainly the African 
National Congress’ (ANC) objective of ‘the upliftment of impoverished coastal 
communities through improved access to marine resources’ was not achieved in 
the first decade of democracy (African National Congress 1994, 4.5.3.2).
The small-scale fisheries policy development process in 
South Africa (2007–12)
The failure of the new fisheries regime to formally recognize and cater for small-
scale fishers resulted in mass action, including marches to parliament and protests 
(Sunde 2003; Isaacs 2006), an increasing disregard of formal rules and regula-
tions (Hauck and Kroese 2006; Hauck 2008; Sowman et al 2011a), the holding of 
Fisher Human Rights Hearings3 (Masifundise Development Trust [MDT] 2003) 
and, finally, legal action by a group of fishers from the Western Cape against the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.4 The fishers were assisted by the 
MDT, a non-governmental organization (NGO) supporting fishers’ rights, and 
represented by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC). A key argument in the case 
was that the government’s failure to allocate rights to traditional small-scale fishers 
had violated their fundamental constitutional rights, resulting in significant socio-
economic hardship. According to the Legal Resources Centre, ‘these violations 
were not reasonable and could not be justified in an open and democratic society 
based on equality, dignity and freedom’. A ruling by the Equality Court in May 
2007 required the minister responsible for fisheries to develop a policy that would 
address the needs of this group of fishers and immediately provide ‘interim relief’ 
through access to marine resources until such time as the policy was finalized.
A narrative which emerged as fundamental through the advocacy campaign was 
that fishers’ rights were human rights. Fishing communities began articulating the 
linkages between their right to access resources and their human rights enshrined 
in the Constitution, and stating that the upholding of these rights was a precondi-
tion for sustainability in its broadest sense. Following the Equality Court Ruling 
in 2007, a national task team and, later, a technical task team were appointed that 
included representatives from the government, fisher communities, researchers, 
NGOs and community-based organizations whose task it was to develop a small-
scale fisheries policy. At the same time, the fisheries authority at the time (Marine 
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and Coastal Management, a component of the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism), instituted an interim relief system.
The process of formulating the draft policy was lengthy and difficult, due to the 
widely differing perspectives of the many stakeholders involved. An overriding fear 
in the government, marine science establishment, industry and recreational sector 
was that marine resources were insufficient to cater for all those seeking access, 
and that addressing the socio-economic needs of these fishers would require exist-
ing rights to be redistributed, which would destabilize the industry. Yet, although 
the policy formulation process was hampered by bureaucratic delays, procedural 
flaws and an inability to reach consensus on a number of ‘sticky issues’, the process 
led to a greater understanding among participants of the needs and circumstances 
of small-scale fishers, as well as the resource opportunities and constraints that 
needed to be taken into account when decisions were made.
While many of the so-called ‘sticky issues’ remained unresolved, political pres-
sure from DAFF, which took over responsibility for fisheries management in 2010, 
led to the submission of a draft policy to the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council in November 2011. This advisory body, comprising repre-
sentatives of government, labour, civil society and business, debated various policy 
issues for four months in pursuit of agreement on contentious issues. A key focus 
was inserting provisions that would ensure that constitutionally entrenched cus-
tomary rights would be recognized and catered for in the policy. After a further 
Figure 10.2 Fishers and other stakeholders engaged in policy discussions in the Eastern 
Cape (photo: Jackie Sunde).
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six months of public and political review, the policy was eventually promulgated 
in June 2012 (DAFF 2012).
The new small-scale fisheries policy: A shift to ‘good 
governance’
The process of formulating this policy, the principles and approaches guiding it, 
and a number of its provisions, suggest a fundamental paradigm shift in the gov-
ernance of small-scale fishers in South Africa. This is clearly articulated in the 
introduction to the policy, which states that the aim is ‘to provide redress and rec-
ognition to the rights of small-scale fisher communities in South Africa . . . in order 
to fulfil the constitutional promise of substantive equality’ (DAFF 2012, section 1). 
It refers to South Africa’s ‘obligation in terms of Article 1 of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights to . . . give effect to the protection of the rights 
enshrined in the Charter’ (DAFF 2012, section 1). This call for the realization of 
human rights in its broadest sense is a theme that recurs throughout the policy, as 
is the requirement for redress, equity and equitable access (in terms of race, gender 
and disability) to, and enjoyment of, benefits from living marine resources, as well 
as participation in decision-making.
The realization of these rights requires the government to change its stance 
towards the small-scale fisheries sector in certain fundamental ways by adopting
a developmental approach and an integrated and rights-based allocation sys-
tem which recognizes the need to ensure the ecological sustainability of the 
resource; identifies small-scale fishers as a category of fishers for the purposes 
of the MLRA in law; and provides for community orientation in the manage-
ment of the marine living resources harvested by these fishers.
(DAFF 2012, section 3.2)
This shift in position is evident from the principles that underpin the policy (Table 
10.2) and its strategic policy objectives (DAFF, section 3.2), which seek to give 
effect to this developmental and human-rights based approach.
In keeping with the Equality Court ruling that the new policy should ‘take 
into account international and national legal obligations and policy directives to 
accommodate the socio-economic rights of these fishers to ensure equitable access 
to marine resources’, the new policy clearly draws on principles and statements 
contained in a number of key international instruments such as the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
(FAO 1995), the Convention on Biological Diversity (United Nations Environ-
ment Programme [UNEP] 1992) and the Bangkok Statement (FAO 2008).
The most critical shift from previous policies is that the new small-scale fisher-
ies policy recognizes the rights and needs of small-scale fishers and affords them 
respect and legal protection. It expands the narrow category of subsistence fishers 
defined in the MLRA (RSA 1998, section 19) to include a continuum from subsist-
ence fishers to formal small commercial enterprises (Sowman 2006). This clarifies 
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the range of activities that can be categorized as small-scale and includes fishers 
involved in pre- and post-harvest activities, who are often women. The critical 
role of women in the fisheries value chain and the need to give them support and 
protection is highlighted throughout the policy.
Of particular importance for equity and poverty alleviation is the requirement 
that these fishers be granted preferential access to marine resources, especially 
where such communities have historically depended on them. Thus, the principles 
Table 10.2 Principles of small-scale fi shing policy in South Africa.
The state must:
1. Recognize the existence of any rights conferred by common law, customary law or 
legislation to the extent that these are consistent with the Bill of Rights.
2. Recognize rights guaranteed by custom and law, and access to and use of natural 
resources on a communal basis, to the extent that these are consistent with the Bill of 
Rights.
3. Adopt an integrated and holistic approach which is based on human rights principles.
4. Recognize an approach which contributes to food security, local socio-economic 
development and the alleviation of poverty.
5. Promote biodiversity and the sustainable use and management of marine living 
resources and associated ecosystems.
6. Recognize that the disturbance of the ecosystem and biological diversity is to be 
avoided or, where it cannot be avoided, minimized.
7. Recognize the interdependency of the social, cultural, economic and ecological 
dimensions of small-scale fishery systems.
8. Adopt an approach of empowerment through co-management that builds the 
capacity of fishers through education, training and skills development in all aspects 
of fisheries.
9. Develop accountable and transparent structures and mechanisms.
10. Promote effective participation in policy development, management and 
decision-making.
11. Promote equitable access to and involvement in all aspects of fisheries, noting in 
particular past prejudice against women and other marginalized groups.
12. Promote preferential access for fishers who are part of a small-scale fishing 
community, derive their livelihood from the sea and are aligned to a community-
based legal entity, to harvest marine living resources.
13. Ensure that small-scale fishing communities are not denied physical access to 
infrastructure and amenities that are central to exercising their right to fish.
14. Incorporate a community-based rights approach to the allocation of marine living 
resources.
15. Recognize that resources may be allocated through a multi-species approach.
16. Recognize the complementary value of indigenous and local knowledge.
17. Where tenure to coastal land involves coastal communities and affects the 
implementation of this policy, ensure that there is liaison with the relevant organs of 
state to resolve such issues.
18. Contribute to the development of small-scale fisheries by promoting initiatives that 
improve and support the entire value chain, and improve and support the capacity 
of small-scale fishing communities to access and optimize the entire value chain.
Source: DAFF 2012 section 3.1
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of redress, respect and protection of human rights and equality before the law are 
firmly embedded in the new policy. Furthermore, the policy affirms the state’s 
responsibility, in terms of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to 
protect the rights of fishing communities to pursue the social and development pol-
icies that they have ‘freely chosen’ (Organization of African Unity [OAU] 1981, 
article 20). This, together with a commitment to the application of international 
and regional law on the rights of customary and indigenous communities, gives 
effect to the principle of free, informed, prior consent which is now recognized as 
international ‘good governance’.
Furthermore, the policy recognizes the contribution of small-scale fisheries to 
economic development, poverty alleviation and food security and proposes mech-
anisms to give effect to this contribution through, for example, support for infra-
structure development, the provision of facilities in coastal communities, subsidy 
schemes for fish storage and training and skills development. It also recognizes the 
important role that small-scale fisheries play in food security and sustaining many 
poor coastal fishing households that rely on fishing, part-time or full-time, as their 
main source of food and livelihood. Equally important is the role fisheries play as a 
safety net in poor communities, especially where households do not have access to 
land or other capital, and also during times of environmental or economic crisis.
While the potential for job creation and value adding in this sector is recog-
nized, the government realizes that incentives will be required to stimulate these 
activities and that alternative livelihoods need to be explored and developed. The 
new policy thus offers the potential to locate fisheries in the broader context of 
local economic development. This is a significant shift from a sectoral approach 
to fisheries management and calls for greater coordination with other govern-
ment departments and sectors, the development of other livelihood opportunities 
– especially in stressed areas – and a recognition of the need to take a holistic, inte-
grated and developmental approach to the fisheries sector. It also recognizes the 
importance of understanding the fishery context and the linkages between socio-
economic, cultural and ecological systems. In this respect, the policy embraces the 
principles of complexity as well as cross-sectoral coordination and integration.
The policy acknowledges that some communities have retained their custom-
ary fishing systems (DAFF 2012, p. 11). The principle that requires respect for 
and recognition of customary institutions and practices indicates respect for the 
plurality of different socio-legal systems operating in South Africa. Fishing com-
munities with customary systems of resource use will be able to harvest resources 
according to customary rules and practices in so far as these practices are sustain-
able and comply with the Bill of Rights. This applies in particular to customary 
communities in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, since communities with 
customary rights are protected by the Constitution,5 which recognizes customary 
law as an independent and equal source of law. Precedents set down in the Rich-
tersveld case,6 to the effect that customary systems can give rise to access and use 
rights to resources, as well as a recent magistrates’ court judgement,7 confirm that 
a customary fishing community has a constitutionally protected right to practice 
its customs in this regard (LRC 2012).
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Although not elaborated on in the new policy, the principles described above 
that give recognition to customary systems and practices, coupled with the prin-
ciple of recognizing the complementary value of indigenous and local knowledge, 
create the requirement for a policy implementation approach that promotes inter-
cultural engagement. Where customary rights to marine resources have been 
restricted due to, for example, the declaration of ‘no take’ marine protected areas, 
such rights may need to be reviewed, and in some cases restored, and appropri-
ate management measures will need to be identified and negotiated with local 
resource users and local leadership structures. In other cases, customary rights to 
resources may have been lost or restricted because permits have been allocated 
to other user groups such as the recreational sector. The new policy requires that 
preferential access be granted to communities that have been excluded in this 
manner. In this respect, traditional fishers hitherto excluded from access to marine 
resources will be able to access resources on a just and equitable basis, although 
ecological sustainability considerations would need to inform the levels of harvest-
ing that could be sustained.
The new policy has been developed in the context of post-apartheid democratic 
governance, in which a range of mechanisms exist to ensure that policy-making 
takes place according to a publicly accountable, participatory and transparent 
process that respects the rule of law. Similarly, the policy itself requires new gov-
ernance institutions to be representative, transparent and accountable (see DAFF 
2012, section 3.1(i)). The involvement of fishers and other stakeholders in planning 
and decision-making is considered vital to the establishment of participatory gov-
ernance arrangements (DAFF 2012, section 3.1(j)).
Mechanisms, structures and processes to enable this shift to take place are 
outlined in section 6 of the new policy (DAFF 2012). It proposes a step-by-step 
approach to the declaration of a fishing community, the establishment of a legal 
entity to hold fishing rights and criteria for individuals to gain and exercise their 
fishing right. Rights will be allocated to a community-based legal entity that com-
prises individual fishers from a particular fishing community. The policy sets out 
how to identify such fishers: this includes criteria such as demonstrating a long 
direct involvement in fishing (ten years) and not being engaged in other perma-
nent employment. DAFF issues the right to fish or to operate a processing facility, 
but the fishing community determines how these rights will be exercised (DAFF 
2012, section 6.2). Most significantly, the policy recognizes that past and existing 
power relations with respect to the market affect the distribution of benefits from 
the sector, and hence the policy includes a commitment to introduce mechanisms 
that will strengthen communities’ powers in negotiating with markets, thereby 
maximizing the redistributive potential of the sector.
The policy recognizes that local contexts and environments differ along the 
coast, and that management arrangements need to be tailored accordingly. Each 
fishing community will have to establish a local co-management structure and 
work with the government to manage local resources. The proposed devolution of 
decision-making powers to local-level institutions through the community entity 
and the co-management structure suggest that the powers of the minister and 
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the department have been diminished and real decision-making powers are being 
devolved downwards (LRC 2012). According to section 5.2.1 of the policy (DAFF 
2012), these local co-management structures will be nested within a multitiered 
institutional system comprising a consultative advisory forum at the national level, 
a dedicated small-scale fisheries management working group acting as a vehicle 
for interaction between the sector and the national department, and, at the local 
level, co-management committees and community-based legal entities to deal with 
issues affecting the local fishery. The use of local and indigenous knowledge to 
complement scientific assessments and to inform decision-making is crucial to this 
new management approach, which is based on the principle of subsidiarity and 
aims to be locally responsive, context-specific and adaptive.
In accordance with the principles of the rule of law, the policy accommodates 
access to procedural justice for any persons who may wish to appeal decisions 
(DAFF 2012, section 6.2.7). Specific mechanisms for protecting the rights of indi-
vidual members and managing and resolving conflicts are provided for in the 
process of establishing governance institutions at local level. Where such conflicts 
cannot be resolved at that level, provisions exist for requesting mediation assist-
ance from the national level.
With respect to the sustainability of resources, the policy sets out requirements 
for the department to undertake regular assessments of the state of resources, to 
identify resources which can be allocated to this sector, and to develop holistic 
management plans, although the scope of these plans will be determined through 
regulations still to be developed. Although the policy proposes a number of con-
ventional fisheries management tools such as total allowable catch, total allowable 
effort, closed seasons and bag limits, it requires the participation of resource users 
in determining appropriate measures and in decision-making processes. Thus 
concerns for resource sustainability are fundamental to this policy, but resource 
users will now participate in assessment and decision-making in that regard.
This new policy, which is clearly underpinned by a set of good governance prin-
ciples developed by a diverse group of fisheries actors, suggests a distinct shift in phi-
losophy and approach to the governance of the small-scale fisheries sector in South 
Africa. It signals a shift to a human-rights, community-oriented, participatory and 
developmental approach. The intention is that this new approach will promote local 
socio-economic development through community-based institutions and benefit-
sharing marketing structures such as cooperatives. It will also encourage resource 
stewardship and the revitalization of the culture of community and sharing that 
characterized many coastal fishing communities in the past. Finally, the new policy 
will promote the organizational development, capacity development and empower-
ment of fishers, equipping them to work collaboratively with the government and 
other agencies. This will lead to the progressive realization of human rights.
Implementation challenges and prospects
While the policy signals a significant paradigm shift, the extent to which this 
change in philosophy and approach is actually implemented and leads to more 
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equitable, just and environmentally sustainable outcomes depends on a number 
of factors. Barriers to implementation and suggestions on how to overcome these 
are briefly discussed below.
Mismatch between overarching policy frameworks
There are significant tensions between South Africa’s neoliberal macroeconomic 
policy, its conservation policies and the social justice imperatives of fisheries ‘trans-
formation’ (Sowman 2006; Van Sittert et al 2006; Isaacs 2012). The adoption of a 
neoliberal economic policy after 1994, reinforced in the recently released National 
Development Plan (NPC 2012), confirms the government’s historical bias towards 
a capital-intensive, export-driven fishing industry, constraining the state’s ability to 
transform the sector to accommodate small-scale fisheries under a plurality of gov-
ernance systems. Crosoer et al (2006, p. 23) argue that the market-based approach 
to fisheries governance will ‘favour incumbency and accelerate export orientation 
in order to maximize the returns for state and capital from the fisheries, both ten-
dencies inimical to the broad aims of populist fisheries transformation’. Without 
serious economic reform, South Africa’s macroeconomic orientation will continue 
to act as a barrier to the realization of the social justice imperatives outlined in the 
small-scale fishing policy.
Coexistence of customary systems with statutory systems
The need to develop a legal and policy framework that accords customary law its 
rightful place as an equal, independent body of law presents a considerable chal-
lenge to the fisheries sector. Although the Constitution now protects customary 
systems in so far as they are consistent with the Bill of Rights, the implications of 
this provision are not yet understood within the fisheries sector. Customary sys-
tems of resource management provide opportunities to give substance to a range 
of the principles of ‘good governance’ inherent in the new policy.
In customary systems, rights to access and use resources are nested at the level of 
local users. Decision-making on and the administration of these rights are usually 
devolved to this level, which promotes accountability and provides mechanisms for 
local users to be involved directly in decisions about the resource. These customary 
mechanisms can be utilized in the implementation of the new policy as the basis 
for beginning to create a more equitable, bottom-up approach to fisheries manage-
ment. This, however, requires trust in the adaptive potential of local-level, commu-
nity-based processes to ultimately evolve sustainable and equitable systems. Closely 
linked to this principle is the recognition of the value of local knowledge, and of the 
value of diverse cultural interpretations of the meaning of natural resources.
Responsiveness to different local contexts and needs
The diversity of fishery contexts along the South African coast requires governance 
proposals to be tailored to suit particular circumstances. DAFF’s limited capacity 
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to experiment with and apply new governance models means that it will tend to 
advocate generic approaches and models. Clearly, a one-size-fits-all approach is 
not workable in the small-scale fishery sector in South Africa.
Furthermore, the new policy indicates that geographically defined fisher com-
munities will need to identify and co-manage their ‘community fishing area’, 
with set boundaries and regulations dependent on traditional fishing practices 
and sustainable harvesting limits. While these fishing zones can be identified for 
many rural communities along the coast, at least for the harvesting of sedentary 
resources such as shellfish and even lobster, the boundaries are not so clear for 
small-scale fisher groups residing close to urban centres, where there is often 
competition for resources across fishery sectors. In such cases, agreement will 
need to be reached between fisher communities who wish to target common 
resources.
Restoring rights, redistribution and fair allocation of rights
While the policy requires the restoration of rights and redistribution of resources to 
address the socio-economic and cultural needs of marginalized fishing communi-
ties, procedures and mechanisms to achieve these objectives have not been clari-
fied. Where customary rights to resources have been restricted due for example 
to the presence of a marine protected area, procedures will be required to review 
the status of such an area, in terms of the rights of the community on one hand 
and resource sustainability considerations on the other. In cases where customary 
rights to resources have been lost or restricted because permits have been allocated 
to other user groups such as the recreational sector, procedures to ensure fair and 
equitable access will need to be developed. No such procedures and mechanisms 
have yet been developed and implemented. It is anticipated that there will be 
resistance to any form of harvesting in ‘no take’ marine protected areas. However, 
multiple-use marine protected areas may need to be created to ensure preferential 
access to local bona fide fishers, as well as mechanisms for enhancing benefit flows 
to local fishing communities.
The inclusion of women in the fishery value chain
One of the critical challenges facing the sector is how to create opportunities for 
women to participate in and benefit from the small-scale fisheries sector equitably 
and without discrimination. There is potential for this sector to empower women 
in many ways, enabling them to create livelihood opportunities for themselves 
in the fisheries. This, however, requires a paradigm shift on two levels. First, the 
value of people’s lives cannot merely be reduced to the economic ‘value chain’. 
Rather, policy approaches must recognize the mix of social, cultural and eco-
nomic values associated with people’s enjoyment of human dignity and freedom. 
For women in the small-scale sector, this means acknowledging the multiple ways 
in which women contribute towards sustaining life and livelihoods beyond the nar-
rowly defined ‘value chain’ from ‘hook to plate’.
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Second, a shift in the current dominant model of development and marketing 
is required. Poor women will only be able to enter the value chain if the existing 
control of the value chain by the industrial sector is shifted in favour of small-scale 
producers, who can increase their share of the market either through the power of 
collective action or by creating niche markets. This will require substantial state 
intervention in the market through mechanisms such as subsidies to women for 
local value-adding activities and infrastructure.
The shift from an individual to a community-based approach
The shift to a community-based approach to fisheries management, with the allo-
cation of rights to a community-based legal entity, may not be practically feasible 
in all fishing communities. This is especially the case where fishers have gained 
access to resources through individual rights over the past several years. The inten-
tion of the community approach is to include more fishers in the fishery system, 
enhancing their opportunities, as a collective, to add value to fisheries products. In 
some contexts, there is significant resistance to the setting up of community-based 
entities to hold fishing rights, and there are concerns that the elite and powerful 
groups in the community will benefit as they have done under previous transfor-
mation efforts. There are also fears about the difficulties of establishing and main-
taining legitimate, transparent and accountable local level institutions without 
support from the government and NGOs. This raises questions about the capacity 
of the government and of NGOs involved in supporting small-scale fisheries – as 
well as that of local institutions – to implement the policy.
Capacity of government and local-level institutions to embrace 
responsibilities
To realize the ambitious goals of the policy will require considerable institutional 
capacity at both government and community level. DAFF will need to build 
capacity among fisheries managers and scientists and restructure its institutional 
arrangements affecting small-scale fishers. At the same time, fishing communities 
will need to become more organized so that they can play a central management 
role and run their own enterprises.
Yet there are already concerns regarding government and grassroots capacity to 
implement the governance arrangements envisaged in the policy. DAFF is under-
staffed, under-resourced and bound by an institutional culture that is technocratic, 
regulatory and based on natural science. These constraints hamper DAFF’s ability 
to embrace the paradigm shift proposed in the new policy. Fishing communities, 
in many cases, lack the capacity to fulfil their new roles and responsibilities, and 
there is a danger that neither DAFF nor people in fishing communities will have 
the capacity to play their respective developmental and co-management roles dur-
ing policy implementation. This indicates an urgent need for a national training 
and community development programme.
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Small-scale fisheries in the context of broader governance
If the new fisheries governance regime is to be effectively and judiciously imple-
mented, a complete overhaul of the current regime and, in particular, the MLRA 
is required. Also, governance actors will need to look beyond the fisheries sector 
for solutions to small-scale fisheries problems. Interaction with other government 
departments at different levels, as well as with stakeholders from different sectors 
and contexts, will be needed to address problems and find solutions to the many 
challenges facing poor fishing communities.
Andrew et al (2007, p. 228) note that ‘managing the interface between fisheries 
and the wider external environment’ presents an immense challenge. For example, 
concerns regarding the overexploitation of coastal resources due to food security 
requirements may best be addressed by local economic development initiatives or 
amendments to marine spatial plans, which fall under the mandate of a different 
government agency. Another solution may be private-sector assistance in the ben-
eficiation and marketing of fishery products – which implies the need to include 
other private, state and civil society actors in governance. Better communication 
and coordination are needed across the various agencies and actors with a stake in 
the issue under consideration.
Conclusions
The lengthy process of challenging the previous fisheries regime on the grounds 
that it was not participatory, and then of developing a new small-scale fisheries 
policy that reflects small-scale fishers’ needs and rights, has involved the slow and 
steady inversion of the fisheries governance structure in South Africa. Through 
the deliberations towards the new policy, both in the policy debates and in the 
tough and conflict-ridden process of managing the interim mechanisms, fishers 
and others have started doing governance differently – from the bottom up. The 
new governance practice that is being developed in villages and coastal towns up 
and down the coastline is messy, inconsistent, incomplete, complex and fumbling. 
Superficially it does not look good, and conflicts appear to be increasing as the 
real power relations of the past are destabilized. This apparent increase in conflict 
is the downside. The upside is that at last many ordinary men and women from 
fishing communities are participating in discussions about the future and content 
of the new policy in a way that has never happened before.
The very first step towards putting into place the conditions necessary to realize 
the ambitious principles of the policy has thus been taken. The legacy of colonial 
and apartheid capitalism demands visionary leadership, collective action and an 
enormous leap of faith to transform the current conditions. Small-scale fishing 
communities and their civil society partners have taken that leap and, in so doing, 
are transforming ‘government’ into ‘governance’. Real, good governance is in 
progress, albeit embryonic right now.
This review has revealed a definite paradigm shift in fisheries governance in South 
Africa, one that aligns with the principles and approaches of good governance. 
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However, as Siegele et al (2009, p. 69) conclude, ‘good policy is just a starting point 
– good practice is more difficult to achieve’. Like many policies in South Africa, it 
is implementation that will bring the severest challenges. However, there is room 
for optimism when one reviews the progress made in clarifying provisions in the 
South African Constitution through policy development and implementation, legal 
challenges and the development of jurisprudence to guide decisions. Similarly, the 
implementation of this policy will be a matter of trial and error, muddling through, 
learning by doing, and may well require legal intervention to clarify the meaning of 
certain principles and provisions.
The development of strategies and administrative procedures to give effect to 
the principles and provisions in the policy will be an important next step. This will 
require the involvement of all governance actors, as well as collaboration across 
sectors, disciplines and actors that have not, in the past, worked together.
Notes
1 ‘Living customary law’ is the term used by South Africa’s Constitutional Court to refer 
to customary law that is ‘actually observed by the people who created it’, as opposed to 
‘official customary law’, which is ‘the body of rules created by the state and legal profes-
sion’ (Bennett, 2008, p. 138).
2 ‘Homelands’ were the areas to which Africans were given obligatory citizenship under 
apartheid.
3 Organized by the Masifundise Development Trust, a non-governmental organization, 
the Fisher Human Rights Hearings were held in 2003 to give fishers an opportunity to 
tell how existing fisheries policy and legislation were affecting their lives and livelihoods. 
4 George K and others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (EC1/05).
5 Section 211(3) of the Constitution of South Africa (RSA 1996) states that the courts are 
obliged to apply customary law when it is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any 
legislation that deals with customary law.
6 South Africa’s Constitutional Court has recognized customary law as a source of law in 
several cases, for example S v Makwanyane and Another 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) and Alexkor Ltd 
v Richtersveld Community, 2004(5) SA 460 (CC) (Wicomb and Smith 2011).
7 S v Gongqoze, E 382/10, not yet reported.
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11 Legal pluralism and the 
governance of freshwater 
resources in southern Africa
 Can customary governance be 
embedded within the statutory 
frameworks for integrated water 
resources management?
Sharon Pollard and Tessa Cousins
Introduction
Echoing wider political transformations, the last two decades in southern Africa 
have seen major changes in policies concerning natural resources, especially 
water, reflecting deepening concerns regarding resource scarcity. Taking account 
of the interconnectedness of land and water, the emergent view is that freshwater 
systems need to be managed more holistically: on a catchment basis and in a way 
that explicitly involves stakeholders. The guiding framework and philosophy for 
this are captured in the concept of integrated water resources management, which 
is regarded as a process rather than an end in itself, and one that can be reflexive 
and adaptable so as to embrace change and learning (Pollard and Du Toit 2011).
Notwithstanding this progress, there are still issues to be addressed. Western 
norms continue to shape the reform process so that there is almost no recogni-
tion of a parallel suite of customary laws that govern water in many areas – and 
that these generally consider water part of a system rather than a separate entity. 
While statutory frameworks are widely accepted as ‘the law of the land’ govern-
ing a nation’s affairs, the reality is that in many areas under communal tenure, 
locally derived rules and norms shape the day-to-day access, practices and use of 
the resources (Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2007). Such dual governance, or legal 
pluralism, is widely evident in many countries where customary law exists along-
side the statutes usually adopted during the colonial period (Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan 2002). Nonetheless, although this is well documented in the literature on 
community-based natural resource management, the focus has been largely on 
terrestrial resources, and there is virtually no meaningful discourse on legal plural-
ism and water (see Van Koppen et al 2007).
Another issue is that statutory frameworks view different natural resources as 
separate entities managed under different institutional arrangements, which cus-
tomary systems generally do not. Despite evidence that it is problematic, this ‘silo’ 
approach has continued as government departments struggle to regulate activities 
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that cut across different natural resources (e.g. mining). The ‘resolution’ has been 
to emphasize cooperative governance, which, in practice, has proved enormously 
challenging, given the resource constraints on the state (Murphree 1991; Pollard 
and Du Toit 2011).
Legal pluralism has a particular bearing on the praxis of sustainable use and 
management and the norms that shape it. The concept that freshwater systems, 
especially wetlands, could be used sustainably first entered the literature more 
than two decades ago (e.g. Heeg and Breen 1982; Claridge and Callaghan 1997), 
and since then interest has grown (e.g. Ramsar 2007; Wood et al 2013). However, 
in the case of wetlands, the focus has remained largely on practices and their man-
agement, following the reasoning that improved practices lead to improved sus-
tainability, while water resources management has remained largely technocratic. 
This fails to recognize two critical issues. First, freshwater systems do not exist in 
a vacuum but are part of broader, mutually influencing systems that also affect 
sustainability (Pollard and Du Toit 2013). Second, governance, both statutory and 
‘customary’, lies at the heart of how freshwater systems in communal areas are 
accessed, used and managed.
Yet the discourse on the local-level management of freshwater resources is sur-
prisingly inadequate, and, where water has been considered, the focus has been 
almost exclusively on the management of water supply (e.g. Sithole 2001; Man-
zungu and Machiridza 2005). Indeed, some authors have pointed to the absence of 
any discourse regarding indigenous water management experiences in policy, even 
in postcolonial states with their professed orientation towards stakeholder involve-
ment, or ‘indigenization’ in the case of Zimbabwe (see for example Mohamed-
Katerere and Van der Zaag 2003; Chikozho and Latham 2005; Meinzen-Dick 
and Nkonya 2007).
The first real attempt to discuss and document customary water law was an 
edited volume of experiences from different countries (Van Koppen et al 2007). 
Even there, many of the case studies focused on customary law in the context 
of water allocations. This chapter aims to step back and examine experiences of 
the customary management of freshwater systems, such as wetlands and lakes, as 
a whole. The Lozi in Zambia, for example, manage the Barotse floodplain for 
multiple uses and not just the allocation of water. Since systemic approaches of 
this kind are theoretically the central tenet of statutory reforms such as integrated 
water resources management, we have also briefly examined how and where these 
can be embraced in evolving arrangements, rather than ignored. Importantly, this 
should be done judiciously and without a simplistic idealization of customary laws, 
since those systems can entrench differential power relations, often at the cost of 
the marginalized or vulnerable, such as women (Bruns 2007).
With that as the background, this chapter seeks to review cases of customary 
governance of freshwater systems in a number of countries in southern Africa 
undergoing water reform (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa: 
see Figure 11.1) in order to broaden the discourse on water governance arrange-
ments. Before moving to the case studies, which demonstrate the dynamic, varied 
and pervasive nature of legal pluralism, we provide a brief overview of the major 
Lm 
Durban 




Ba Baleni spring 
Barotse floodplain 
Dande dam 
Kb Kosi bay 
Lake Mweru 
Mp Machangulo peninsula 
Manalana wetlands 
Po Pongolo floodplain 
Zv Zambezi valley 
Gwayi Major water catchment 
222  Sharon Pollard and Tessa Cousins
water-related statutory reforms in the countries under consideration, and of the 
key conceptual ideas which informed the framework used for the analysis of case 
studies.
Figure 11.1 Map showing location of case studies.
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Key concepts in the customary governance of freshwater 
systems
A number of concepts are central to understanding the customary governance of 
water resources. While a detailed account is beyond the scope of this chapter (see 
Chapter 2 of this volume), some of the key points are highlighted here. Although 
the term ‘customary’ is adopted, we note that the literature treats it as interchange-
able with the terms ‘indigenous’, ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ and ‘local’. None of these 
is entirely satisfactory: ‘traditional’ can imply a naive and obdurate adherence to 
unchanging values, and ‘informal’ is highly pejorative, suggesting a quality inferior 
to that of the formal system, which carries an implied legality purely through codi-
fication. This chapter favours the term ‘customary’ for its connotation of historical 
continuity, bearing in mind the concerns described above. Importantly, it does 
not suggest immobility, but recognizes that governance systems are dynamic in 
space and time. The term is not synonymous with ‘community-based’, which can 
describe systems that are not customary, but the two do overlap to some degree.
Definitions of ‘governance’ vary, but here it is regarded as ‘a socio-political 
process to manage affairs’. It thus describes the relationships between people and 
the rules and norms that are set up to guide their interactions (Meinzen-Dick and 
Nkonya 2007). The nature of the resource informs governance arrangements 
(Murphree 1991), and freshwater systems such as wetlands are interesting since 
they represent the nexus between water and land. This is important because a key 
characteristic of African communal tenurial systems is that they are nested and 
have multiple and flexible boundaries (Cousins 2007). Hence rights are held at 
different scales depending on the resource, the user and the season. In wetlands, 
for example, each resource – reeds, fish or water – has different boundaries that 
overlap in space and time, and is accessed by different users at different times, 
illustrating a key difference from Western norms. Moreover, rights are inclusive, 
flexible and adaptive, and can be renegotiated (Cousins and Claassens 2004). Cus-
tomary law is based on the notion of community membership rather than that 
of individual rights, so that customary systems include layered and shared rights 
of access and use, the institutional nestedness of family, clan and tribe, and the 
normative values that inform the basis of resource entitlement. The principles are 
well understood by a local community, but may not conform to the country’s legal 
procedures.
Underlying the discourse on governance is the issue of property regimes: here 
property is viewed as the bundle of entitlements defining rights and responsibilities 
for use, decision-making and usufruct – or institutional arrangements (Schlager 
and Ostrom 1992; Agrawal and Angelsen 2009). Central to these is the concept 
of institutions which have been described in multiple, ambiguous and often con-
flicting ways. In general we adopt the ideas of Ostrom who describes institutions 
as ‘shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, 
norms and strategies’ (Ostrom 2007, p. 23). Importantly, institutions are socially 
constructed; they have normative and cognitive, as well as regulative, dimensions 
(Jentoft et al 1998), and hence are about the relationship between people. Rules, 
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regulations and sanctions reflect a complex interplay of beliefs, cosmologies and 
world views and the organizational arrangements for reconciling these. ‘Resource 
tenure’ refers to all the ways in which people gain access to natural resources. 
Lavigne-Deville (2004) defines ‘tenure regulation’ as ‘a set of practical decisions 
regarding rights including governance, management and operation’.
Finally, in line with a growing body of work that advocates a holistic view (e.g. 
Cilliers 1998; Berkes et al 2003; Ison 2010; Ostrom and Cox 2010), this chapter 
uses a systemic lens to examine both the biophysical and socio-political elements 
of the governance regime (see Pollard and Cousins, 2008, for details). It also exam-
ines the literature for reference to issues of learning, flexibility, feedback and risk 
minimization in local governance systems and practices, since these elements are 
regarded as critical to management strategies that are adaptive and build resil-
ience (see Folke et al 2002; Janssen and Ostrom 2006).
Case studies
Water reform processes and policies
Although a detailed review of the statutory water reform process is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, some of the most pertinent changes are summarized in Table 
11.1.1 The principle of equitable access – and, to a lesser extent, sustainability 
– has guided water reform in all cases, and water is now regarded as a public 
asset (under the custodianship of a government minister). In most cases, although 
the current statutes offer opportunities for stakeholder participation, this does not 
explicitly address opportunities for communities to govern their own freshwater 
resources, with the possible exception of Zambia.
South Africa
Despite the global interest in community-based natural resource management, the 
coverage of these issues for freshwater systems in South Africa is negligible. This 
may reflect the lack of acknowledgement of local-level governance systems in gen-
eral until recently, as well as the fact that globally the focus of community-based 
natural resource management studies has tended to be on terrestrial resources. 
Even in larger systems that have attracted development, community governance 
arrangements are poorly understood. The broad alluvial Pongolo floodplain close 
to the border with Mozambique (McCartney et al 2004), which supported an esti-
mated 40,000 AmaThonga people in 1980 (Heeg and Breen 1982; and see Kosi 
Bay case study) is a case in point. Despite growing contestations around access and 
use, there is a surprising dearth of substantive work on common property regimes 
and their transformation in this important floodplain. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that the colonial interference of the past century and the deep distrust 
bred then make exploring any of these issues extremely difficult.
Furthermore, in most areas tribal leaders have held little practical power over 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Legal pluralism and the governance of freshwater resources in southern Africa  227
spring is in a wetland near the Klein Letaba River under the authority of Chief 
Muhaumani. The site includes salt-making activities next to the river (Pollard and 
Cousins 2008). Through myth and legend, salt production has been gendered, 
so that it is for the exclusive use of certain Tsonga women, and highly ritual-
ized religious and spiritual practices govern the extraction and production of salt 
(P. Terblanche, curator, Muti wa Vatsonga Museum, personal communication, 
July 2010). Until recently, Baleni was isolated and subject to little outside influ-
ence, but in 1998 it was identified as an African Ivory Route campsite. Although 
this is seen as a source of revenue for the local community, it has been conten-
tious and is bound to bring change. Theoretically, statutory protection is afforded 
through the area’s proclamation as a national heritage site, although no recogni-
tion has been given to the customary system that has afforded protection over the 
past century.
Craigieburn: Wetland governance in a transforming and plural legal milieu
One of the most detailed systemic explorations of freshwater local-level govern-
ance regimes has been on the 365-hectare Manalana wetlands of Craigieburn 
village in the upper Sand River in north-eastern South Africa (Cousins et al 2007; 
Cousins and Pollard 2010). Like many other wetlands of the communal area, they 
play an important role in catchment water security and local livelihoods, where 
they are used principally for small-scale cropping, reed harvesting and livestock 
grazing (Pollard et al 2005). Nonetheless, wide-scale use combined with certain 
land use practices has resulted in extensive erosion and desiccation, impacting in 
turn on users’ livelihoods (Pollard and Du Toit 2013) The questions raised here 
regarding norms and rules governing access, use and care catalyzed a detailed 
examination of community and statutory governance.
Various collaboratively developed conceptual and planning tools were used to 
examine the local governance systems (see, for example, Figure 11.2). First is the 
recognition that no discussion on natural resource management would be com-
plete without an examination of history and the influence of apartheid in South 
Africa. Prior to democratization in 1994, controls were effected through ‘chiefs’, 
who were imposed by the white government and dealt with transgressors through 
a system of ‘tribal police’. After 1994 the authority of such individuals, considered 
to be lackeys of the apartheid state, was contested (this should not be conflated 
with a contestation of ‘traditional systems’ per se). Consequently, in many com-
munal areas such as in Craigieburn, this system weakened (Shackleton et al 1995), 
and today various bodies such as the local government, ward councillors and pro-
vincial staff all lay claim, erroneously, to authority over natural resources and their 
use (Cousins and Pollard 2010).
Today a number of issues are striking. The first is that natural resource manage-
ment arrangements are fundamentally shaped by plural tenure systems, so that 
rights and authority derive both from custom and from statutory laws. However, 
while customary rights are well understood locally, statutory rights are not. The 
authors have concluded that major local and systemic constraints to effective 
Power and authority 
Who has authority to 
do what over which 
resources? 
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governance exist, not least of which is that natural resources are not prioritized 
and hence residents are apathetic about committing time and resources.
Wetlands, as part of the commons, have weaker tenure arrangements than 
other land uses and, as noted by Lahiff (1997) in the northern Venda-speaking 
area of South Africa, there is little evidence of ‘traditional’ practices or institu-
tions concerned with the regulation or conservation of water resources, nor insti-
tutionalized forms of cooperation between different tribal areas sharing the same 
resource. The prevailing sense of individual autonomy around wetland use poses 
particular challenges for collective, community-based governance (Cousins and 
Pollard 2010), a situation also reported in other wetlands (Kotze et al 2002; Pollard 
and du Toit 2013).
Moreover, 16 years on, land tenure reform, which is intimately linked to natu-
ral resource use, is regarded by many as being in disarray (Cousins 2007). The 
insecurity created by such ambiguity, confusion and uncertainty has fostered an 
environment ripe for opportunism and is likely to reverberate in local efforts to 
manage natural resources. Ultimately this will impact on livelihoods, especially of 
the vulnerable people, and on sustainability.
Kosi Bay
Kosi Bay in northern KwaZulu-Natal is well-known for its extensive network of 
wooden fish traps built by the AmaThonga fishermen, who pass their fish kraals 
from father to son (Felgate 1982; Webster 1991). They are placed in the shallows 
between the estuary and lakes, mainly to catch migrating marine fish. The Kosi 
system falls under the Tembe Traditional Authority, which covers the largest com-
munal area in South Africa (Jones 2006) and is part of the 11,000-hectare Kosi Bay 
Nature Reserve proclaimed in 1987. Indeed, Kosi Bay’s recent history has been 
largely dictated by the proclamation and expansion of various reserves that did not 
Figure 11.2 Four critical aspects of natural resource governance.
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take into account local needs, and relationships have been marked by conflict ever 
since (McGregor 1997; Guyot 2005; Kloppers 2005). About 40,000 fish are caught 
for local consumption annually. Kyle (1995) notes that the demand for and value of 
Juncus sedge (or incema) are increasing, drawing entrepreneurs from as far as Johan-
nesburg. When sickles came into use, in contrast to traditional hand-picking meth-
ods, and exploitation increased markedly, the authorities – later with the support of 
local users – advocated the ban of sickles in 1992. Aside from this restriction, there 
are today no limits on the areas of collection, numbers of collectors or season.
Notwithstanding the area’s scenic and economic importance, discussions per-
taining to traditional property regimes in the Kosi system almost never happen. 
Any discussion of management focuses on statutory instruments alone, shedding 
little light on the common property arrangements used by the residents themselves 
– this despite simmering conflicts in the area over the past three decades. For 
example, Kyle (1995) notes that the fish trap system is well controlled, but gives 
no further details about how people gain rights of access. Views on local participa-
tion vary widely, from the suggestion that stakeholder participation is central (e.g. 
Kyle 1995) to the assertion that all moves by the state are duplicitous and hide real 
political intentions (see Guyot 2005).
Zambia
Even though there has been some sophisticated analysis of legal pluralism in the 
Zambian context, many studies fail to pinpoint the underlying drivers behind 
increasing resource depletion and livelihood vulnerability. While these studies 
recognize the increasing impacts of economic growth and population pressures, 
they make scant mention of transforming governance regimes (see, for example, 
International Union for Conservation of Nature [IUCN] 2003; Emerton 2005). 
In some cases described below, notably those of the Barotse Royal Establishment 
and Lake Mweru, local-level governance systems are well documented. In others, 
however, despite the prominence of freshwater systems in Zambia, many of the 
governance systems, especially in the smaller dambos or wetlands, are poorly under-
stood. With over 70 different tribes, these systems are potentially highly diverse.
The Lozi kingdom and the Barotse floodplain
The Barotse floodplain, which covers some 1.2 million hectares (IUCN 2003), is 
outstanding in its vastness and beauty, and for the long-standing and continued 
relationship between the communities and their wetland. As noted by Thole and 
Dodman (1997), ‘strong traditional systems have rarely lasted as in the Barotse 
floodplain’. The four districts of the floodplain are estimated to house about 
225,000 people, or about 30 per cent of the population of Zambia’s Western Prov-
ince’s (based on figures in Lewanika 2002). Most of the people depend on a mixed 
livelihood strategy of crop farming, livestock, fishing and natural resource exploi-
tation. More than 75 per cent of the 265,000 cattle are pastured in the floodplain 
and over half of the floodplain residents are involved in fishing.
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Zambia’s Western Province is distinct for a number of reasons, not least of 
which is the role of the Lozi kingdom in safeguarding natural resources. Each 
natural resource – fisheries, land, water, forests and wildlife – has a designated 
induna (representative of the chief) to supervise its use and management, and they 
are led by a Lozi paramount chief, or king, the litunga (Lewanika 2002). The legal 
system is based on five cornerstones, which also govern natural resources: milao 
(laws), liswanelo (a body of rights and responsibilities), lituekelo (rights of a particu-
lar position or social status), mikwa (methods or ways of doing things) and mulatu 
(offence or wrongdoing).
The Lozi are recognized for their unique traditional methods of wetland 
cultivation, fishing, hunting and forest use. Most notably, the Lozis continue 
to practice an annual transhumance, when the entire kingdom undertakes a 
migration marked by the Kuomboka ceremony, in which, at the height of the 
floods, the litunga relocates from the dry-season to the wet-season capital (Fig-
ure 11.3). Importantly, the benefits accrued from natural resources are shared 
between local people and the authorities (Lewanika 2002). Concerns have been 
expressed that with increasingly centralized authority, this system is increasingly 
under threat. Although the Lozi kingdom had occupied the Barotse floodplain 
since the late eighteenth century, the arrival of the Europeans led to change. In 
1890, Barotseland became a British protectorate and enjoyed a certain degree of 
autonomy. Then, in 1964, the paramount chief renounced the special treaty rela-
tionship with the British and accepted integration into the new state of Zambia. 
Figure 11.3 Transhumance of Lozi people across the Barotse fl oodplain.
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Before the enactment of the Forest Act in 1974, the Barotse forest reserves were 
protected under the customary law of 1939, but after 1974 powers of control were 
placed almost exclusively in the hands of Zambia’s forest department.
This sparked the resentment of the local community, which manifested in mas-
sive forest destruction and losses of wildlife. Numerous organizations have since 
attempted to facilitate new governance arrangements, with varying degrees of suc-
cess. Local people argue that a tenable traditional management system is being 
eroded by government policies that have largely ignored them (Pollard and Cous-
ins 2008). Undoubtedly recent planned developments outside the Barotse flood-
plain, including hydropower schemes, reservoirs and dams along the Zambezi 
River, will affect the wetland status and local livelihoods (IUCN 2003).
Lake Mweru-Luapala: ‘Owners of the Lagoon’ and changing beneficiaries
Lake Mweru holds some valuable insights into common property theory because 
of the role of the ‘Owners of the Lagoon’ (or ‘Bamwine Kabanda’) in local-level 
management, and the well-documented conflicts that accompanied colonial inter-
ests and the resultant collapse of the lake’s fisheries (Gordon 2003). The 4,650 
square kilometre Lake Mweru is situated on the border of Zambia and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo in the Luapula Valley. The fish of the lake, Luapula 
River, floodplains, swamps and lagoons provide the basis for food, employment 
and income for the estimated 400,000 people that live there (Van Zwieten et al 
2003). Unlike the Barotse floodplain, this area has a unity determined primarily by 
geography: it is a valley bounded by escarpments to the east and west.
Gordon (2003) provides a detailed account of changing governance and benefi-
ciaries in a system driven by major external influences. He points out that in con-
trast to the present day, Mweru-Luapula was not an a priori open-access common 
resource. Rather, both spiritual and political sanctions were developed and upheld 
by the Owners of the Lagoon. However, this governance system collapsed with the 
arrival of two colonial administrations: the Belgians (who regarded the resource as 
open to all) and the British (who held the resource in trust for Africans).
Widespread exploitation of the fisheries by these newcomers, together with a 
formal state authority (colonial chiefs, administrators and fisheries officials) that 
held little standing locally, led to the collapse of the fisheries in the 1950s. Gor-
don concludes that the colonial administration, apparently increasingly concerned 
about the growing numbers of fishermen, imposed regulations through a system 
that sought little coherence with that of the original ‘Owners of the Lagoon’ – a 
significant factor, he asserts, in the demise of a tenable governance regime.
Mozambique
Currently, only a very limited body of research work exists for Mozambique, most 
of it undertaken after the end of the civil war in 1992. Also, in common with most 
of the countries examined, the focus is mainly on terrestrial or coastal fisheries 
common-property regimes or on ecological studies (see, for example, Brito 1998; 
232  Sharon Pollard and Tessa Cousins
Boyd et al 2000; Chilundo and Cau 2000; Tique 2000; Anstey and Sousa 2001; 
Virtanen 2001; Schafer and Bell 2002; Durang and Tanner 2004). Although the 
demise of common-property regimes in some of the prolific muchongos or coastal 
lakes is mentioned (Chilundo and Cau 2000), there is little discussion of why this 
is so.
Machangulo Peninsula
The case of the Machangulo Peninsula flanking the bay of Maputo involves a 
range of resources including the sea, adjacent floodplains and mangroves, forests, 
farmland and a series of lakes. In his examination of private and common interests, 
Brouwer (1998) provides a history of the area, which remained relatively obscure 
until 1995, when proposals for tourism prompted growing economic interest.
Legal pluralism is widely evident, and each of the natural resources is subject to 
different statutory laws and traditional arrangements (Brouwer 1998). In practice 
the suite of statutory laws (such as land, forest and environmental legislation) that 
govern the various resources is given little weight in practice, with locals following 
their own rules for resource-use rights (Roland Brouwer, Faculty of Agronomy 
and Forest Engineering, Universidade Eduardo Modlane, personal communi-
cation July 2010). For example, a strong local system exists for the tidal plains 
and mangroves, parallel to the official law. Here locals have mounted gamboas 
(extended nets) which, although creating (temporary) private ownership rights, are 
constantly encroached upon by the various parties involved.
Brouwer shows not only that the mix of entitlements varies with the nature of 
resource, but also that the use of these common property resources is subject to two 
restrictions: it should serve the satisfaction of immediate consumptive needs (i.e. not 
be for trade), and the user should be a member of the community. For example, 
access to the lakes for subsistence fisheries is restricted to the inhabitants of a ‘cell’ 
(or community group) around the lake. Brouwer points out that up until the late 
1990s, when entrepreneurial interests in the area started, the local framework of 
rules regarding lakes, land, mangroves and the tidal areas existed parallel to, and 
hardly affected by, the state system. However, growing economic interests mean this 
situation is likely to change, particularly for the local population, for whom fishing, 
together with remittances, constitutes the main source of cash and dietary protein.
Zimbabwe
Despite the large body of work regarding community-based natural resource man-
agement in Zimbabwe, little of it mentions water resources and even less talks 
specifically to issues of governance. However, there is mention of customary 
relationships with the landscape, such as in the case of the Zambezi Valley (see 
McGregor 2003). Chikozho and Latham (2005) focus on the disjuncture between 
customary and statutory approaches introduced by Zimbabwe’s water reform 
process and what this means for integrated water resources management. Both 
cases are discussed below.
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The river people: The exclusion of the Tonga from the Zambezi valley
The Zambezi Valley is well known for the removal of 80,000 Tonga people upon 
the construction of the Kariba Dam in 1958, and the impact that this upheaval 
had on their livelihoods. The people who lived along this part of the Zambezi 
referred to themselves as the ‘river people’ or bamulwizi. McGregor (2003) provides 
a striking account of contested identities, describing how the Tongas’ own identity 
as the ‘river people’ contrasts with the simplistic and erroneous one constructed 
by Europeans. The notion of the ‘River God’ – heavily commodified for tourists 
at the Victoria Falls – is, she suggests, central to the appropriation of the river and 
lake for tourism and conservation and to the marginalization of those who lived 
there.
Even today these communities invoke their relationship with the river. The 
19th-century riverine political economy was one of east-west linkage, with the 
Zambezi as a fearful barrier – and the ‘river people’ were known for their com-
mand of the river crossing. Although the riverine society was not a tightly bounded 
or centralized political authority, strong sanctions existed for the Zambezi River, 
which was (and is) viewed as a provider for all, offering sacred places, refuge, 
fish and gardens for cultivation in retreating floods. Although McGregor does 
not deal with water resources management per se, she notes that local people 
mediated their relationship with the river through ancestral spirits. The invoca-
tion of sacred places placed limits on activities such as fishing under instruction 
from those responsible for shrines. The agricultural strategies – using floodplains, 
riverbanks and rains – provided multiple options for food security which were lost 
once they were translocated to semi-arid lands, when they became a food-deficit 
people (Magadza 2003).
The identity of ‘river people’ is relevant to conflicts over resources evident 
today. After the construction of the Kariba Dam, the focus on development 
through tourism and commercial fishing took precedence over local livelihood 
issues. Today there is increasing anger, especially regarding the breaking of prom-
ises that the state would provide new sources of water (McGregor 2003). This 
never happened, and water shortages are among the most acute problems faced by 
people. In Hwange the Dombe and Nambya have only just secured rights to have 
fishing camps, after two decades of prohibition, and are still struggling to cultivate 
riverbank gardens, something that was deemed illegal.
With reference to the inland fisheries, Jackson (1995) asserts that ‘the quest for 
a long-established customary inland fisheries tenure’ is now inappropriate. How-
ever, McGregor contests this, pointing out that local communities feel marginal-
ized from a natural resource that was theirs, and so exclusion from the commer-
cialization of the resource is the issue at hand. Residents were ignored when new 
commercial fishing ventures were established, while whites and other newcomers 
received preferential treatment. She makes the case that marginalized and dispos-
sessed minorities have invoked a relationship to the landscape that they continue 
to hold to as part of a claim for rights over resources that they regard as having 
been taken from them.
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The Shona world view and the management of water resources in the Mazowe and 
Manyame catchments
The Guruve Communal Land, traversed by the Dande and Manyame rivers, which 
flow into the Zambezi, is home to the Shona, who are thought to have moved there 
around the second century AD. In recent years the Zimbabwean government has 
embarked upon an ambitious project to build a dam at the site to irrigate the Zam-
bezi Valley. However, local support for the dam has been less than enthusiastic, with 
many of the potentially displaced questioning the benefits (Chikozho and Latham 
2005). Consultation has been minimal, and the flooding of sacred sites has elicited 
wide-scale opposition and resistance led by the ancestral spirits (mhondoros).
These contestations reflect the hardships already suffered as a consequences of 
the Mid-Zambezi Rural Development Project, a top-down intervention by the 
government in the 1980s to rationalize settlement patterns and provide agricul-
tural land to ‘outsiders’. The highly controversial forced removal of people away 
from the riverbanks, where they had lived for centuries, and the prohibition on the 
use of riverine alluvial soils for cultivation led to a protracted struggle in which the 
state prevailed (see also Sithole 2001). The use of the sacred Mushongaende Pool 
as a storage and abstraction point also met with resistance, and the scheme has not 
materialized due to ‘cultural problems’ (Chikozho and Latham 2005).
These contestations highlight differences in governance, with the (local) man-
agement of natural resources being intimately linked to the Shona world view, 
encapsulated in dictums such as ‘the land is the people’ and ‘the chief is the peo-
ple, the people are the chief’. These reflect an institutional reality of governance 
through consensus and the notion of humans as part of, not separate from, their 
environment. Traditional Shona religion, still strong today, centres on the belief 
in a supreme being who is approached through a hierarchy of ancestral spirits 
called mhondoros, whose ‘districts and provinces’ are concerned with the care and 
management of the earth and community well-being.
This world view, so fundamental to resource use, is quite contrary to the tenets 
of Western statutes. Indeed, Chikozho and Latham (2005) make the point that 
where laws prohibit certain local practices, they are simply disregarded. They 
suggest that the customary institutional arrangements are better suited to water 
resource management, thanks to their characteristic flexibility and local sanction. 
Interestingly, anecdotal evidence suggests that given the current political and eco-
nomic climate in Zimbabwe, people are relying increasingly on customary systems 
as statutory arrangements, such as catchment councils (Table 11.1), weaken or 
collapse (Dr C. Chikozho, International Water Management Institute, personal 
communication, January 2012).
Implications: Opportunities and challenges for integrating 
statutory and local-level management of freshwater 
resources in communal areas
The literature informing this review was written for a variety of reasons, so the 
treatment of governance issues varies considerably. Nonetheless a number of 
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common characteristics and principles can be discerned. Notably, customary sys-
tems are highly dynamic and varied in their own right. For example, Phiri (1999) 
points out that with over 70 tribes in Zambia, we can expect their associated bod-
ies of ‘law’ to be very varied. Yet all share a central feature: first and foremost, 
the customary laws are grounded in the notion of community membership and 
responsibilities, whereas Western systems place individual rights at centre stage. 
Moreover, as Derman (1998) notes, the key to understanding customary water 
resources management lies in grasping the fact that water is part of a social and 
religious system that is at complete odds with the view that individuals can hold 
exclusive property rights. These attributes set the customary system apart from 
Western law. Indeed, the overlapping scales of user rights and responsibilities led 
Jackson (1995) to conclude that colonial planners found the system confusing and 
felt the need to ‘tidy it up’.
This review finds legal pluralism clearly evident in all four countries, both 
within the statutory system, where the jurisdictions of multiple laws intersect and 
overlap, and between the statutory and the customary governance regimes. In all 
countries, the de jure situation contrasts sharply with the actual circumstances: 
people are either unaware or unsupportive of state legislation, preferring to use 
locally derived rules (as the Lozi do) or a blend of statutory and customary (as in 
Craigieburn).
In areas too remote for state intervention, people rely on local-level com-
mon-property arrangements. Much of the work on common-property resources 
suggests that local-level governance arrangements persist in times of uncertainty 
and political change. For example, customary systems continued throughout 
the civil war in Machangulo Peninsula, but are now feeling the impact of exter-
nal entrepreneurial interests. In areas such as Zimbabwe, where, in the face of 
political instability and the high transaction costs of statutory institutions such as 
catchment councils (which are now dysfunctional in many areas), people have 
fallen back on customary arrangements (Dr J. Latham, Centre for Applied Social 
Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, personal communication, February 2012). 
This points to the more resilient nature of locally derived norms, which, as many 
assert, are better suited to water resource management, given their inherent flex-
ibility, adaptability and congruence (e.g. Cousins and Claassens 2004; Agrawal 
and Angelsen 2009).
In all cases the dynamic nature of governance is evident – often with local sys-
tems weakening as they intersect with Western laws and norms. This is particularly 
true in the case of Craigieburn in South Africa, where the legacy of apartheid and 
dispossession, combined with uncertainties introduced by reforms in land, water 
and natural resources, has led to a vulnerable situation in which opportunism – at 
the cost of the vulnerable – is rife (Cousins and Pollard 2010).
Another feature of the state’s attempts to impose statutory systems is that they 
may take place on highly contested terrain. The forced removal of the Tonga 
continues to reverberate even today, and in Zambia, the backlash against state 
imposition – which took the form of widespread and uncontrolled harvesting of 
wood and wildlife – had exactly the opposite effect to the one intended in the 
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state’s ostensible quest for sustainability. In South Africa, legal pluralism is widely 
evident in the former Bantustans, but the legacy of apartheid, together with the 
uncertainties of transformation, has meant that locally based systems, such as they 
are, are weakening or contested.
Moreover, the contemporary landscape is set to change with the introduction of 
new laws concerning communal areas. Critics of the process offer some valuable 
insights, pointing out that these statutes are problematic because of their definition 
of ‘community’, their bureaucratization of community rules and the patent lack 
of capacity to provide meaningful and sustained support for implementation. It is 
argued by many that this undermines the very basis of common-property regimes 
that are, by nature, flexible and dynamic.
In none of the cases reviewed here has the central government recognized – let 
alone made any meaningful attempt to embrace – customary systems, perhaps 
with the partial exception of the Western Province of Zambia. This is surpris-
ing, given the constraints faced by the state in implementing its own laws and the 
move towards wider stakeholder participation. Nonetheless, the desire to obtain 
participation should not be confused with a willingness to share governance: the 
former encourages consultation and involvement, while the latter places the locus 
of power in the hands of a community and embraces the notion that the power to 
control rights of access and use should be locally based.
Yet, even mindful of these concerns, opportunities do exist to devolve gov-
ernance responsibilities within the overall frameworks for integrated water 
resources management, but mechanisms for this would need to be explored and 
debated. We suggest, as others have done, that since legal pluralism is a reality, 
and given the quest for appropriate and lasting governance arrangements in 
support of sustainability, it is incumbent upon practitioners and academics to 
consider the potential to embrace customary or local systems within wider statu-
tory frameworks. This is particularly pressing in view of the resource constraints 
the state faces in managing and regulating water resources alone, since many 
states have taken on far more resource management authority than they can 
exercise (Murphree 1991). Indeed, Pollard and Du Toit (2011) argue that given 
such constraints, and the move to more holistic approaches such as integrated 
water resources management, the only choice for the state is to embrace self-
organization and self-regulation through local-level management actions and 
governance systems.
Finally, as indicated earlier, no systems are static, and all should be subject 
to scrutiny against the principles underscoring the democratic reform processes 
– especially those of equity and sustainability – since, like statutory systems, cus-
tomary arrangements can entrench power relations at the cost of the vulnerable 
(Bruns 2007; Derman et al 2007). We must be cognizant of the concerns that 
have been raised by scholars and practitioners in the field of common-property 
management, especially in the context of land reform. Thus we should strive to 
develop, with the requisite simplicity, what is meaningful and appropriate – and 
no more.
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baobab in eastern Zimbabwe
 Impacts of state-led interventions
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Introduction
Zimbabwe has undergone a number of intense governance changes as it has pro-
gressed from the colonial to the postcolonial period. These include initiatives to 
centralize, decentralize, recentralize and democratize the governance of natural 
resources, as well as economic and land reform policies that have had far-reaching 
effects. Despite a multitude of statutory laws and policies overlaying existing cus-
tomary rules, resource degradation continues and pathways towards sustainable 
natural resource use and the equitable accrual of benefits to local communities 
remain unclear. This calls for a well-defined resource governance framework that 
ensures both effective conservation and the enhancement of livelihoods.
The iconic baobab tree (Adansonia digitata), reportedly able to live as long as 
5,000 years (Sidibe and Williams 2002), has a host of consumptive as well as non-
consumptive uses. These uses have a long history, but in the past decade this has 
changed, with a strong drive to commercialize baobab products which has fol-
lowed the opening up of new markets in Europe and the USA (Schreckenberg et al 
2006; Addy 2009). Most baobab trees in Zimbabwe are located in communal areas 
which are governed by customary rules and practices (Ribot and Oyono 2005). 
In response to increased commercialization, however, the Zimbabwean state has 
intervened by putting in place statutory measures aimed at ensuring ecological 
and economic sustainability to regulate access, use and trade. Along with new eco-
nomic and land reform policies, the statutory arrangements governing baobab use 
have contributed to a somewhat overcrowded institutional landscape.
This chapter describes the coexistence of customary and statutory systems 
that govern the use and conservation of the baobab tree, and discusses drivers of 
change in customary rule. In doing so, it examines the conundrum of multilayered 
authority or governance systems in communal areas of Africa. It draws from broad 
arguments posited by Ostrom (1990) and Murphree (1991) in relation to common 
property resources, but goes further to locate these in Mamdani’s (1996) theoriza-
tion about the African state.
At the core of this conundrum is the history of integrating traditional authori-
ties into state institutions during colonial rule. This is argued by Mamdani (1996) 
to be peculiar to British colonial practice, which was marked by the principle of 
indirect rule. In this way, the colonial government was able to use customary law 
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as the means for enforcing its own policies of control over the African population 
resident in the rural periphery. Consequently, the government incorporated cus-
tomary forms of governance as a central element of its functioning (see also Cous-
ins 2008; Mnisi-Weeks 2011). Postcolonial governments, including Zimbabwe’s, 
have tried to find ways of democratizing governance systems in communal areas, 
especially in relation to natural resources. The overarching question is whether 
tinkering with local governance has resulted in enduring, robust and effective sys-
tems (Ostrom 1990; Murphree 1991).
Study site
This chapter is based on research undertaken in the Chimanimani District of east-
ern Zimbabwe, and focused in particular on the people of the Gumbu clan in the 
Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga wards (see Figure 12.1). The study site has a higher 
concentration of baobab trees than other areas in the district (Mudavanhu 1998), 
with between 60 and 70 per cent of adults in Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga directly or 
indirectly involved in the use of baobab products (Mukamuri and Kozanayi 1999; 
Veeman et al 2001; Mutasa 2008).
Background to the Gumbu clan
Oral history and archival records show that upon settling in the Nyanyadzi and 
Gudyanga areas, the Gumbu people spread out to present-day Buhera, across the 
Save River (Latham 1966; Sinclair 1971). This migration was to provide a vital 
umbilical cord for the Gumbu people, who would use kinship ties to access scarce 
baobab products from Buhera. The leader of the Gumbu people was a proficient 
salt-maker, and he supplied this commodity to neighbouring chiefs, carrying it in 
a gumbu (soft beaten-bark container). Thus the residents of Nyanyadzi and Gudy-
anga were called VaGumbu, ‘those who carry salt in a fibre bag’. The making of 
gumbu from baobab and other trees seems to have been the starting point of what 
was later to become a lifeline craft-making business for the locals.
Politically, Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga fall under the leadership of ward council-
lors and a member of parliament for the Movement for Democratic Change, at 
the time of writing the main opposition party in Zimbabwe. This is important, as 
politicians from the country’s ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union 
– Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), tend to interfere with how traditional leaders – the 
guardians of traditional values and rules – discharge their duties, and have been 
known to coerce traditional leaders into acting as party appendages, making politi-
cally partisan rulings (Virtanen 2000; Mtimba 2011).
More people have settled in the study area since 2008, thanks to the discovery 
of diamonds in the vicinity. People displaced by the diamond fields had the option 
of being relocated by the government to areas where they would be provided with 
housing and basic infrastructure, but some families decided to move to neighbour-
ing Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga in the hope of being recruited to work on the mines. 
The increased population and mingling of peoples and cultures has increased 
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pressure on the resource base and has also led to greater contestations of baobab 
use, because people have different cultural and historical backgrounds and 
approaches to resource management.
Data collection methods
Data was collected through interviews with individuals involved in the regulation 
and use of baobab: local traders and those selling crafts across national borders, 
sellers at local craft markets and traditional authorities and government officials 
at local and district level. Group discussions with resource users and other com-
munity members were an additional source of information. One of the authors, 
Witness Kozanayi, grew up in the study area and thus has a profound knowledge 
of the people involved. Historical records at the National Archives in Harare pro-
vided more information. The study also benefited from earlier research in the 
study area in which two of the authors, Witness Kozanayi and Frank Matose, had 
participated (Hot Springs Working Group 1995).
Figure 12.1 Map of Zimbabwe showing the location of the study site.
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Baobab use and trade
Much of southern Africa is tropical with infertile soils (Frost and Mandondo 
1999), which limits agricultural production. Consequently, the majority of rural 
people harvest forest or ‘veld’1 resources for subsistence and commercial purposes 
(Cavendish 2000; Campbell et al 2001; World Resources Institute [WRI] 2005). 
The baobab tree has gained prominence due to its use for both subsistence and, 
increasingly, commercial purposes.
The gigantic size of the baobab tree appears to reflect the multiplicity of its 
uses, of which there are reportedly more than 300 (Sanchez 2011). Not only are 
components of the tree utilized, such as the fruit, bark, leaves and roots, but the 
very shape of the tree makes it a good site for water storage, prisons, toilets, bur-
ial grounds, sleeping, shelter, ritual and prayer (Mukamuri and Kozanayi 1999; 
Wickens and Lowe 2008).
Even within the study site, baobab trees are used for many purposes, both non-
consumptive and consumptive. The most frequently observed non-consumptive 
uses relate to traditional rituals and worship, and some trees are used as burial 
sites, because symbolically the tree offers shade or rest for the spirits of the dead. 
Most parts of the tree can be used consumptively: the fruit are eaten raw, the 
leaves are cooked and served as a vegetable and the roots are taken as a snack. The 
pulp can be added to maize or sorghum flour to make porridge. Some residents 
collect the fruit and sell it to local makers of ice lollies2 and in urban areas. A key 
product is the bark fibre, which is used in handicrafts such as mats, hats and bags 
for the urban and export markets.
Apart from these handicraft products, which have been exported mainly to 
South Africa since the 1990s, the main baobab exports are the fruit pulp, which is 
marketed as a novel food ingredient, and the seed oil, used in the cosmetics indus-
try. The commercialization of baobab has long been touted as an opportunity 
for rural development. The Southern African Development Community Protocol 
on Forestry, for example, recommends commercial utilization of natural prod-
ucts in the region, based on the premise that the ‘promotion of innovative forest 
resource utilization technologies’ will ‘generate income for smallholder farmers’ 
and ‘reduce forest destruction’ (Mubaiwa 2004, p. 31).
The existence of a ready market has contributed significantly to the fast growth 
of the baobab industry. The granting of ‘novel food’ status for baobab in the Euro-
pean Union in 2008, and ‘generally regarded as safe’ status in the USA in 2009, 
opened up new and bigger markets for baobab products (Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Union [OJEU] 2008; Addy 2009). The Overseas Development Institute has 
projected that the European market could generate more than US$750 million 
annually from baobab products for producer countries in southern Africa, mak-
ing it the highest earner of all traded non-timber forest products in the region 
(Schreckenberg et al 2006). With increased volumes, this annual income could rise 
to an estimated US$1 billion, benefiting more than 2.6 million people along the 
marketing chain (Bennett 2006; Regional Trade Facilitation Programme [RTFP] 
2007).
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A review of baobab governance frameworks
A closer look at the governance arrangements for baobab reveals the legal plural-
ism frequently found in the regulation of non-timber forest products. As a ‘low-
value’ non-timber forest product, baobab is regulated by customary systems, but at 
the same time increasing commercial use labels it a ‘high-value’ resource, meaning 
that statutory systems also apply to its governance (Laird et al 2010).
Unpacking customary systems
Anthropologists, sociologists and policy researchers have written extensively on 
customary systems (Weinrich 1971; Ranger 1992; Chanock 1998; Piot 1999). 
Such a system is understood to be ‘a code of conduct approved by tribal tradition, 
the hereditary body of established conduct, taboos and belief systems which has 
been observed, recognized and enjoyed from time immemorial, and handed down 
by the forefathers’ (Mohamed-Katerere and Van der Zaag 2003, p. 2).
Many early anthropological studies romanticized customary systems, viewing 
them as unique to local communities. However, as noted by scholars of complex 
systems (see, for example, Scheffer et al 2001; Mitchell and Newman 2002), no 
system exists on its own, and what is considered customary at a local level might 
well be a ‘hybrid’ of different cultures resulting from the networks between the 
local and the outside world (Anderson 1996; Piot 1999).
Although the role of customary systems in the governance of natural resources 
is, in most cases, confined to domestic and not commercial purposes (Mohamed-
Katerere and Van der Zaag 2003; International Institute for Environment and 
Development [IIED] 2009), that role is central in regulating the use of the baobab 
tree in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. As the governance of the baobab in east-
ern Zimbabwe shows, however, customary systems can be used in combination 
with statutory laws – which then falls within the realm of legal pluralism (Bavinck 
2003). Such systems of dual governance can both strengthen and weaken efficacy. 
For example, Murombedzi (1998) argues compellingly that the state’s attempt to 
elbow out customary systems and usurp the governance of natural resources in 
Zimbabwe has resulted in resource degradation in communal areas.
The role of customary systems in managing the baobab tree
A range of customary systems regulate access to baobab products in eastern 
Zimbabwe. Such systems include use of taboos, belief in autochthonous spirits and 
ascribing the value of sacredness to the tree. As a cardinal rule, anyone wishing 
to collect baobab products for commercial purposes first has to seek permission 
from traditional leaders and, when the baobab trees are located in crop fields or 
around homesteads, from the field or homestead owners themselves. Different 
rules regulate the use of the different baobab products, but most rules regulate 
bark and fruit collection.
Depending on the tenure system, different rules may apply to the same product. 
For example, fruit collection for domestic use is generally allowed, but is forbidden 
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in the case of sacred baobab trees. The belief is that the area around a sacred tree 
and the products of such a tree are also sacred and therefore untouchable. How-
ever, high demand for baobab products and disobedience on the part of outside 
harvesters have resulted in the opportunistic redefinition of ‘sacredness’ so as to 
enable harvesting to take place. Some argue that only the tree is sacred, not its 
products or the land around it, or that the degree of sacredness differs from tree to 
tree: for example, trees in the burial grounds of the ruling family are deemed more 
sacred than trees in the burial grounds of commoners.
In one village in Nyanyadzi, trees in a cemetery were heavily debarked and 
some harvesters even stood on top of graves to debark the higher parts of baobab 
trees (Mukamuri and Kozanayi 1999). This is believed to have been the work of 
fly-by-night bark harvesters from outside the area (P. Matute, former craft maker, 
personal communication, 2 November 2011). Local leaders are adamant that such 
behaviour must not go unpunished and that the spirits will strike in ways that are 
not readily comprehended by mortals. The local adage ‘Chisi hachieri musi wachar-
imwa’ (‘Punishment for working on the field on a traditional resting day is meted 
out on a later day’) aptly encapsulates this belief system. However, sometimes the 
traditional leaders punish errant behaviour, rather than waiting for the local spirits 
to do so. Local elders, for example, noted the case of a villager in Gudyanga ward 
burning down a sacred muucha tree (Xanthocersis zambeziaca) in his field to get wood 
to fire his kiln of bricks: he was fined a goat and had the firewood annexed by 
the village head. Much as the spirits of the land protect the sacred trees, it is also 
incumbent upon the traditional leaders to do so.
Role of autochthonous spirits
Native inhabitants of the study area strongly believe that if residents abuse resources, 
the spirits of the land will mete out punishment at two levels, and more so if such 
resources are sacred. The first punishment will be targeted at the offender and the 
second at the community. The offender may face misfortune such as the death 
of livestock or the mysterious illness of a family member. At community level, 
punishment can come in the form of droughts or marauding wild animals such as 
baboons destroying crops. The fact that the whole community can be punished 
by an avenging spirit forces residents both to restrain themselves and to monitor 
their peers.
Adult informants claim that the onset of black soot disease, frequent droughts 
and spates of cyclones are examples of enraged spirits expressing their anger over 
something extremely wrong, such as the spilling of innocent blood during local 
and national elections, the wanton destruction of natural resources and people 
working in crop fields on chisi.3 During field work in the Gudyanga area in 1997, 
an account was given of how a construction company that had uprooted sacred 
baobab trees ended up brewing beer to appease local spirits after the company 
faced many ‘unexplained’ accidents involving machinery and the death of staff 
(Mukamuri and Kozanayi 1999). A second example, from Nyanyadzi, was the 
hacking down by the United Methodist Church of the sacred tree Xanthocersis 
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zambeziaca to make way for a crèche in 2010. The roof of the church was alleg-
edly blown off by mysterious winds on two occasions, forcing the church elders 
to approach the local leaders for purposes of rapprochement with the angry 
spirits of the land (M. Mukute, Church Elder of the Nyanyadzi United Meth-
odist Church branch, personal communication, 15 June 2011). Residents thus 
tend to respect the spirits of the land more than any kind of customary or state 
authority. The nearest representative of state authority is located 120 kilometres 
away, whereas it is believed that the spirits of the land are omnipresent and wit-
ness all offences. 
Other cultural practices that have been useful in managing the baobab trees 
include moral self-restraint on the part of harvesters. For example, those caught 
harvesting fibre without permission voluntarily surrender all the harvested mate-
rial to local leaders. Some may also offer an apology and pay fines. This tends to 
be the case with culprits from within the ward or village, whereas those from other 
wards usually run away. Residents are under a lot of pressure to conform to local 
customs in the name of good neighbourliness. Those who are quarrelsome ‘with 
the community’ find themselves punished by losing the cooperation of the com-
munity in critical times, for example when residents refuse to attend the funeral of 
a troublesome neighbour. Having neighbours boycott the funeral of one’s family 
member is a serious disgrace to a family and can oblige it to migrate to a far-off 
village.
Use of kinship ties
There has been widespread use of social relations to access resources outside the 
Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga areas. In some villages in Gudyanga and Nyanyadzi, 
baobab bark is now difficult to get for two main reasons: first, trees have been 
severely debarked and no longer produce good-quality bark; second, some tradi-
tional leaders have banned debarking, especially in grazing lands, which are the 
worst-affected areas. As several village heads have become very strict about who 
can access baobab products, craft makers now travel outside their ward and dis-
trict and go to collect baobab fibre in Buhera and Marange districts, where some 
of the Gudyanga people have settled. Local residents argue that the two districts 
are just an extension of their own area, because they are closely related to the peo-
ple there, so they have a right to access those resources.
This results in a disjuncture between administrative and traditional boundaries, 
however, as such an arrangement contravenes the provision of the Communal 
Land Forest Produce Act, which stipulates that natural resources in a community 
may only be harvested by local residents for their own use. Although the definition 
of ‘community’ has been contested (Mamimine and Mandivengerei 2001), the Chi-
manimani and Buhera Districts fall under different local government authorities 
and their identification as a community may therefore be difficult. Trans-district 
sharing of resources can only be explained and facilitated with reference to kinship 
ties, which can be crucial in times of critical resource scarcity (Nemarundwe and 
Kozanayi 2003).
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Guarding traditional values
Positions of authority give their incumbents leverage to influence events and assert 
their interests (Kozanayi 2007). This accounts for the fact that traditional leaders 
or their next of kin tend to occupy all key influential positions in the study area. For 
example, the ward councillors for both Gudyanga and Nyanyadzi are the sons of 
local village heads. Bringing this about was a tactical move by traditional leaders 
to make sure that local customs were well articulated even at rural district council 
(RDC) level, where policies are formulated. As one traditional leader aptly put it, 
‘Kana unewako ari kunzou, haushai mapapu’, literally meaning, ‘If you have a member of 
your family at the hunting front, at least your meat needs are well taken care of’. In 
the face of dramatic political changes, this strategy appears to work, especially con-
sidering that the councillor for Gudyanga ward occupies the powerful post of deputy 
council chairperson in the Chimanimani RDC. Nonetheless, issues of fiscal responsi-
bility remain the preserve of the RDC, and traditional leaders do not have the power 
to handle levies from natural resources on behalf of the RDC (see Table 12.1).
Table 12.1 Key laws that potentially affect customary systems and baobab use patterns






(Act No. 13 of 
2002)
As the principal law, provides 
a broad framework for the 
conservation and sustainable use of 
all natural resources. It makes explicit 
the rights of communities to have 
access to, and enjoy the benefits of, 
the country’s biodiversity.
Obliges every council to have 
an environment management 
subcommittee.
The Environmental Management 
Agency, the implementing arm, has 
arresting powers.
This Act has the potential to 
support local management of 
baobab.
However, implementation of 






(Act No. 25 of 
1998)
Empowers traditional leaders 
to participate actively in the 
conservation of all natural resources 
that fall within their jurisdiction.
Confers a wide range of powers on 
traditional leaders.
Provides for the appointment of 
traditional leaders, from village head 
to chief, based on lineage.
Very few traditional leaders are 
conversant with this law.
The Act has been ignored by 
politicians in the appointment 
of traditional leaders, so 
appointment is sometimes done 






Vests RDCs with powers to raise 
revenue from any business activity in 
the district.
Resource users feel that the 
Chimanimani RDC is taking its 
fiscal power too far by collecting 
annual levies – especially from 
impoverished traders of baobab 
products.
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Use of threats by the marginalized
Some women say that if collectors stole bark from trees owned by them, they would 
consider enlisting the assistance of a particular popular magician. The women, 
mainly widows, allege that when they go to traditional leaders for arbitration, they 
sometimes do not get a fair trial, because some bark collectors bribe the traditional 
(Act No. 8 of 
1988)
Sections 56 and 59 mandate RDCs 
to set up environmental management 
committees at village and ward 
levels which have powers to arrest 
anyone found violating district 
environmental by-laws.
Village and ward environmental 
management committees are 
sometimes in conflict with 
traditional authorities about 
which authorities should grant 





(Act No. 20 of 
1987)
Regulates the exploitation of timber 
resources in communal areas by 
restricting the utilization of natural 
resources by local communities to 
own use.
Commercial harvesting is regulated 
by RDCs through the issuing of 
concessions.
Provides for the gazetting of certain 
tree species, largely on the basis of 
extinction threats.
Criminalizes commercial use of 
natural resources. Sometimes 
used by the Forestry Commission 
to prosecute those who harvest 
baobab products for commercial 
use.
The baobab tree is not gazetted 
despite its importance and the 




(Act No. 37 of 
1949)
Deals with all forestry resources in 
the country, regardless of tenure.
Sets up the Forestry Commission as 
the regulatory authority which grants 
permits to all timber and non-timber 
resource harvesters.
The Forestry Commission is seen 
as usurping the fiscal role of the 
traditional authority by collecting 




Residents in Gudyanga and 
Nyanyadzi, with the help of 
EAfrica (a local non-governmental 
organizations [NGO]), the RDC, the 
Environmental Management Agency 
and the Forestry Commission, have 
crafted by-laws that govern the 
management of baobab resources 
at the local level. Among other 
provisions, these stipulate a resting 
period of two years after each bark 
harvesting session.
Enforcement of the by-laws is 
problematic because there are 
few incentivized personnel on the 
ground.
Logistical problems include the 
need for the ward councillor, 
village head and ward 
environment management 
committee to approve the 
harvesting of baobab products, 
especially fibre, yet these 
institutions are usually located 
far from each other.
Sources: Mamimine and Mandivengerei 2001; Mandondo 2001
Table 12.1 Continued
Act Key provisions Implications for customary systems and 
baobab use 
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leaders, or are their relatives, and are promptly exonerated. This has resulted in an 
unusual practice of ‘forum shopping’, in which the aggrieved parties consult vari-
ous arbitrators in pursuit of a fair trial. Though no one has consulted the magician 
over environment-related conflicts, the mere mention of his name in a society that 
believes deeply in the world of spirits is enough to deter would-be offenders. Thus 
it is not uncommon to find baobab trees around widows’ homesteads untouched 
by the voracious bark collectors.
The statutory landscape
The use of natural resources in Zimbabwe is regulated by a range of laws that 
impinge on customary systems governing natural resources in general and baobab 
products in particular. Table 12.1 summarizes these laws and their implications 
for baobab use.
As Table 12.1 indicates, a multiplicity of statutory interventions have introduced 
a variety of laws, institutions and rules which sometimes compete with traditional 
authorities and are often difficult to implement. For instance, many of the laws in 
the framework for natural resource management in Zimbabwe recognize the role 
of local people and make a case for the involvement of traditional authorities. How-
ever, as Table 12.1 illustrates, statutes such as the RDC Act and the Forest Act 
vest considerable powers in rural district councils and the Forestry Commission as 
regulatory bodies – in effect excluding traditional authorities from involvement in 
decisions such as the granting of permission for harvesting. Additionally, certain 
technical officials view local people as agents of resource degradation (Matose 2002), 
not as potential co-managers, thereby thwarting the umbrella Environmental Man-
agement Act’s objective of involving local people in natural resource management.
A further example of tension between a statutory intervention and its imple-
mentation is the possibility of a complete ban on craft making in terms of the 
Communal Land Forest Produce Act. In an attempt to relieve pressure on the 
resource base, the state may use this instrument to prohibit craft making, while try-
ing to identify alternative livelihood options for forest-dependent residents. How-
ever, such options are limited in the study site, as rain-fed agriculture, the most 
likely option, is not feasible due to frequent and prolonged droughts, and irrigated 
farming is threatened by old and dilapidated infrastructure. Moreover, craft mak-
ing is an integral part of the Gumbu people’s cultural identity and, thanks to co-
mingling, has spread to other tribes too – something the government would have 
to take into consideration before embarking on such drastic action.
The state has used an approach best described as ‘walking softly but carrying a 
big stick’. In the early 2000s, this took the form of banning trade in baobab prod-
ucts, which entailed mounting roadblocks and arresting and fining all those found 
with baobab fibre and fruits. Not much progress was made, as offenders simply did 
not pay their fines. For example, a review of RDC ticket books for environmental 
fines showed that of 140 fines issued by April 2011, fewer than 20 had been paid 
six months later. This kind of approach led local people to view the state with mis-
trust, in the belief that its main aim was to extract fines and levies from them.
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In 2004 the state changed its tactics, and instead reached out to the residents 
of Nyanyadzi and Guyanga, involving them in formulating by-laws and creating 
village environment management committees (VEMECs) and ward environment 
management committees (WEMECs).
To facilitate monitoring, the state encourages resource harvesters to form 
groups or cooperatives, but traders claim that there is an ulterior motive, in that 
these structures make it easy to collect levies. Meanwhile, the state still makes 
sporadic raids on those who do not comply. Some traditional leaders believe the 
RDC is attempting to usurp their legitimate roles in baobab management. Others 
welcome the state’s involvement, but only if the RDC shares part of the proceeds 
from fines with them.
Purportedly good policy has thus resulted in unintended consequences – and 
it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the various effects of regulation. For 
example, Gudyanga by-laws restrict bark collectors from harvesting a debarked 
portion until at least two years have passed, giving the tree time to recover. 
Local people have therefore traditionally debarked the lower part of the tree, leav-
ing some vertical strips intact to allow for nutrient and water uptake. Increasingly, 
however, the upper parts of the baobab tree, including branches, are being har-
vested, stressing the tree and predisposing it to disease (Figure 12.2). 
Figure 12.2 Over-harvesting of baobab bark can severely stress the tree and predispose it to 
disease (photo: Witness Kozanayi).
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Drivers of changes in customary systems and use of the 
baobab tree.
In addition to the statutory laws described above, a number of macro- and micro-
level processes have shaped customary systems over time. Below we discuss some 
of the key processes that have taken place and had a bearing on the efficacy of 
customary systems of baobab governance.
Government interference drives population growth
There has been a marked increase in population in Gudyanga, from 874 adults (tax-
payers) in 1966 (Latham 1966) to over 3,500 households (about 10,000 adults) in 
2002 (Central Statistical Office [CSO] 2002). Nyanyadzi’s population has shown a 
similar trend. Some of the people who settled in the area came from former commer-
cial farms which were annexed by the government under its land reform programme 
from 2000, ostensibly to correct historical imbalances in landownership between the 
minority of whites and the majority of blacks (Masiiwa and Chigejo 2003).
The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early to mid-1990s 
saw many people being retrenched and going to reside in rural areas, increasing 
their reliance on the environment to support their livelihoods (Mukamuri et al 
1998). The influx of retrenched people in rural areas resulted in the weakening 
and sometimes breakdown of local rules and customs for natural resources, as 
those who were retrenched often did not respect established traditional rules and 
customs (Braedt and Standa-Gunda 1998). Local leaders allege that unsustainable 
bark harvesting practices such as the debarking of branches started during the 
period of retrenchment. With more people displaced from former commercial 
farms that have been annexed, and newly opened up diamond fields, it is likely 
that local systems of natural resource governance will weaken even further.
Operation Murambatsvina (‘Remove the Filth’), a government programme initi-
ated in 2005 to remove people forcibly from slum areas, led to over 700,000 people 
being displaced from urban areas into rural areas (Tibaijuka 2005). Murambatsvina 
also saw the demolition of former baobab marketing stalls along the portion of the 
highway from Mutare to Beit Bridge that passes through Nyanyadzi. Market surveys 
in 2011 showed that of the 41 marketing stalls that had been located between Nyan-
yadzi and Gudyanga (Veeman et al 2001), only three remained after Operation 
Murambatsvina. Such unpopular policies and actions by the state have led to deep 
resentment on the part of local residents. Therefore the residents view any attempt 
by the state to engage locals in the management of the baobab tree, however well 
meaning, with disdain. The impact of these macro-level processes has thus put pres-
sure on the resource base and, at times, weakened the traditional leadership.
Macro-economic pressures
Trade liberalization was a key World Bank recommendation as part of the broader 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme implemented during the early to 
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mid 1990s. A positive spin-off was a tourist boom and concomitant rise in handi-
craft marketing in Zimbabwe (Braedt and Standa-Gunda 1998; Campbell et al 
2001). Data collected for Nyanyadzi and Gudyanga over a 24 kilometre stretch 
of highway on 12 occasions between 1995 and 1999 show that of the total of 41 
marketing stalls for baobab products (Veeman et al 2001), the majority (64 per 
cent) entered the baobab business during the trade liberalization years (Veeman 
et al 2001).
The harvesting of baobab fibre products increased as the state was withdrawing 
funding for the forestry sector as part of the structural adjustment programme. 
Traditional authorities took over the management of natural resources, including 
the baobab tree, and tightened rules regulating the collection of fibre. Anyone 
wanting to harvest fibre had to first report to the village head and get instructions 
on debarking before being allocated trees to harvest. While most residents obeyed 
instructions from the traditional leaders, those from urban areas often did not.
Zimbabwe experienced unprecedented inflation of over 500 billion per cent 
and unemployment of over 90 per cent from 2007 to 2009. At the height of the 
economic meltdown in 2008, many unemployed people migrated to neighbour-
ing countries to seek employment. The net effect of this was a reduction in the 
harvesting and processing of baobab products. At the same time some of the 
former city dwellers who had settled in rural areas started to see the economic 
potential of baobab and to question – or disregard – the customary systems 
governing its use.
Disempowerment of traditional leaders
Traditional leaders, supposedly the guardians of customary systems, have under-
gone episodes of empowerment, disempowerment and re-empowerment at the 
hands of colonial and postcolonial governments (Mohamed-Katerere 2001). 
Upon the attainment of independence in 1980, the new Zimbabwean government 
stripped traditional leaders of their powers because of their alleged cooperation 
with the colonial government. That period was also characterized by a ‘freedom 
frenzy’, as people misconstrued freedom to mean that they could now do what-
ever they wanted without any interference from the state or traditional leaders 
(Nemarundwe et al 1998).
Although the enactment of the Traditional Leadership Act in 1998 returned 
powers to traditional leaders, the ‘rights’ agenda also had unintended negative 
consequences. As one village head remarked to researchers:
[T]hese days everyone is obsessed with rights: they tell you, ‘I have a right 
to the environment, I have a right to this and that.’ It is like the 1980s, when 
everyone could do anything in the name of exercising their freedom!
(Muzviziyi, village head, personal communication, 1 April 2011)
Rights are claimed by the locals regardless of their attendant duty to care for the 
environment and the regulatory powers of traditional leaders.
Customary governance of baobab in eastern Zimbabwe  255
Some traditional leaders in Gudyanga and Nyanyadzi have remained sympa-
thetic to the Movement for Democratic Change, the opposition political party 
that dominates elected positions in administrative structures. Consequently such 
leaders tend to gain the allegiance of the majority of the residents who, going by 
the results of national elections since 2000, support the opposition political party. 
Winning the allegiance of the residents helps traditional leaders when it comes to 
the governance of natural resources, as residents are then more cooperative.
Politicization of institutions
Political challenges in Zimbabwe over the past decade have resulted in the state 
‘re-orienting’– a euphemism for ‘politicizing’ – traditional authorities. This is 
driven by an ulterior motive: to make the re-oriented traditional authorities func-
tionaries of the state rather than guardians of local customary systems. Generally 
such politicization has impaired the integrity of traditional leaders, and residents 
have reacted with rebelliousness, manifested by, for example, not observing cus-
tomary ways of harvesting baobab.
Another challenge is that elected leaders such as ward councillors have to make 
sure that they do not undermine their political capital by implementing policies 
that are unfavourable to the electorate, especially if they anticipate campaigning 
for re-election in future. ‘If we were to implement the local by-laws to the word 
in such times of distress, we would literally choke people to death,’ said one such 
leader (Mr. C. Dirikwe, councillor in Nyanyadzi ward, personal communication, 
6 June 2011). As an elected leader, Mr Dirikwe will give the welfare and survival 
of his subjects high priority, even if it means slackening the enforcement of some 
by-laws.
The RDC and the Forestry Commission also explain that at times they have to 
show a human face by ‘looking the other way’ in order to let people survive: ‘All 
we require of the harvesters is that they do it sustainably and plant more trees’ (Mr.
W. Sibanda, Forestry Commission district officer for Chimanimani, personal com-
munication, 3 February 2011). However, the state’s failure to take action could be 
due more to a lack of resources than to moral obligation. For example, the RDC, 
the Environmental Management Agency and the Forestry Commission have only 
one old truck between them.
Changing practices
Customary practices have changed in a number of ways in response to the effects 
of legal pluralism and increased pressure on the resource base.
Conflict over fiscal responsibility
WEMECs are supposed to operate side by side with traditional leaders. In theory 
the two are complementary, but in practice they are often antagonists. Tradi-
tional leaders believe they have absolute authority over resources under their 
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jurisdiction, while WEMECs claim that they are empowered by the RDC Act 
and local by-laws to oversee the utilization of the baobab tree. All the WEMEC 
chairpersons are young men, whereas the traditional leaders are mostly older men, 
so the ‘battle’ between the two assumes an ageist dimension – young versus old 
– with the young accused of being responsible for the violation of local customs. 
This tends to weaken the role and credibility of WEMECs, the grassroots repre-
sentatives of the state.
The Achilles heel of effective joint management of the baobab tree by tradi-
tional and state authorities is fiscal responsibility. Both want to control the revenue 
or fines accruing from the use of baobab trees. The WEMECs ticket offenders and 
the RDC collects the imposed fine. Local by-laws, on the other hand, refer to a 
trust fund in which all fines and revenue from baobab use accrue. This is in direct 
contrast with the RDC Act, which states that the RDC is the responsible authority 
for all fiscal issues related to use of natural products.
Traditionally, all fines and revenue accrue to the traditional leader and his 
aides. Such fines include marime (money for the convenience of the court), which is 
shared by the council of elders who try the case. Anyone who is found guilty pays 
matenda ndaa (admission of guilt) and then the fine, which, depending on the gravity 
of the case, can be a goat or the equivalent. In cases of arrest by the state police 
and prosecution by a magistrate, the village head can impose a second fine for 
‘holding the name of the village in disrepute’. Once someone has been fined, the 
case is publicized at the community court in the spirit of ‘naming and shaming’, to 
deter any future offenders.
The 2004 ward by-laws usurp some of the fiscal responsibilities which were the 
preserve of the traditional leaders in that they provide for the creation of a trust 
fund into which all fines have to be deposited. The village head and headmen 
hold the funds on behalf of the community. While the object of this arrangement 
is to democratize fiscal accountability, it has promoted corruption among some 
traditional leaders. Former offenders report that they had to buy their freedom by 
purchasing ‘scuds’4 for the village heads after being caught collecting baobab bark 
without prior permission. Though it is not publicly admitted, there are reports of 
resource harvesters who pay ‘expedite fees’ to village heads in order to get permis-
sion to harvest baobab bark.
[W]hy should I not pay the village head if the Forestry Commission forces me 
to pay them for selling my crafts by the road side? At least the village head 
manages the baobab tree that is important for me to remain in business.
(Peter Sithole, a craft maker in Gudyanga ward, 11 April 2010)
Commercialization of baobab around homesteads
Another changing practice that is gaining prominence is that of harvesting trees 
near and at homesteads. This is a negotiated process, with the homestead owner 
normally setting the terms of harvesting. Usually it entails the bark harvester ced-
ing 50 per cent of the harvest to the homestead head. There is a ready market for 
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bark at US$0.50 per bundle. Preliminary results from an ecological survey in the 
area show that in some Nyanyadzi villages, trees around homesteads are increas-
ingly becoming debarked, especially since the creation of local by-laws for baobab 
trees and the election of the WEMEC in 2004.
Population pressure and the increased value of baobab products have led to 
other changes in harvesting practices, such as the use of sticks and stones to dis-
lodge fruit, whereas traditionally only fruit that has fallen to the ground is sup-
posed to be collected. There is also the practice, described above, of collecting 
fruit and fibre from trees in cemeteries, something that historically would have 
been seen as taboo.
Discussion and conclusion
As customary systems for the governance of the baobab tree in eastern Zimba-
bwe weaken, largely due to unfolding socio-political and economic developments 
and the increased commercialization of baobab products following the opening 
up of export markets, there has been a spate of statutory interventions aimed at 
regulating the use of the tree. While the state’s involvement could be viewed as a 
welcome development for the sustainability of the tree, the way in which the state 
has intervened has created mistrust among residents – a mistrust arising from the 
fact that the state wants to achieve many goals at the same time: ecological sustain-
ability, levy collection, co-managing the resource base with the local people and 
penalizing offenders.
Mamdani (1996) concludes that postcolonial states perpetuate the colonial leg-
acy that created a bifurcated state and decentralized despotism. Empirical evidence 
from this case study, however, challenges that conclusion. Traditional authorities 
have integrated themselves into the structures of statutory governance systems (for 
example, by becoming ward councillors) for purposes of safeguarding and articu-
lating their customary systems, and several key natural resource laws acknowledge 
their role. In Mamdani’s conundrum of authority of governance under indirect 
rule, there are two distinct systems that govern the rural populace (subjects) and 
the masters. But despite efforts to democratize and modernize customary systems, 
the rural Zimbabweans who use the baobab tree and other communally owned 
natural resources still remain sceptical about the state’s sincerity in trying to create 
an enabling environment for the sustainable and equitable utilization of baobab 
products. In their view, the state is more interested in collecting levies.
Creating an enabling environment for the baobab remains a challenge, as dual 
governance of the tree and its components has weakened the efficacy of pre-exist-
ing customary systems, while degradation of the resource continues. Traditional 
leaders have controlled use of baobab for decades, using systems that include 
sacredness, taboos and supernatural beliefs. Different parts of the tree are gov-
erned by different rules, but permission to collect baobab products has to be 
granted by traditional authorities and homestead owners. Disregard for these rules 
is rising, driven in part by the escalation in population in the study area, eco-
nomic hardship and a growing export market for baobab goods. Concomitantly, 
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the state’s intervention in the form of a host of laws and by-laws has been hindered 
by a lack of capacity and a myriad of unpopular policies embarked upon as part 
of the broader political agenda. Such interventions include the politicization of 
traditional authorities for political expediency, an apparent latter-day version of 
Mamdani’s ‘indirect rule’ by British colonialists. Locals have resisted all interven-
tions by the state, however well intended.
Several challenges remain. Firstly, diverse and conflicting administrative and 
traditional boundaries result in customary systems conferring user rights that over-
lap with those offered by the state, resulting in confusion and a disregard of rules. 
Secondly, re-empowering traditional authorities through instruments such as the 
Traditional Leadership Act will remain ineffective as long as traditional leaders 
are unaware of these provisions. Monetization of the industry has brought with 
it corrupt tendencies among some of the leaders, and has led to the emergence 
of new local arrangements such as the privatization of trees around homesteads. 
Invoking kinship ties to access resources in neighbouring areas is another develop-
ment that arises from governance systems that fail to allocate available resources 
equitably, and from the sheer over-utilization of baobab products. Use of such ties, 
if unchecked, may facilitate resource degradation in unaffected areas.
Customary and statutory systems of governance are both crucial in the manage-
ment of the baobab tree. The argument for respecting customary systems hinges 
on the fact that these systems have been among the foundational elements of the 
laws of all states in Africa (McAuslan 2005; Wynberg and Laird 2007), but whether 
it is workable to have these two governance systems operating together depends 
on many factors, not least of which are the timing and degree of intervention by 
the state (Mandondo 2006). The roots of the inefficiencies in the customary system 
of governance, or its amalgam with statutory systems, can also be found in the 
postcolonial state’s desperate recent attempts to rope in traditional authorities to 
buttress waning political support. The traditional authorities’ prime mandate is 
to safeguard customary systems, not to be an extension of political parties or, as 
Mamdani puts it, ‘for indirect rule’ (Mamdani 1996: 18). Such a change in focus 
compromises the integrity of the traditional leaders and their ability to influence 
resource governance.
Despite its weaknesses, the state could still play a key role in the management 
of the baobab tree – for example, by carrying out sound ecological surveys and 
helping communities plant baobab trees. The state would also be performing an 
important function if it harmonized the roles of traditional leaders with those of 
WEMECs, because it is imperative for the two to complement each other.
The revered baobab tree offers more than economic opportunities to local people; 
it also has profound religious meaning. It forms a link between the living and the spir-
itual or ancestral. It is believed that when the living mismanage the baobab tree, the 
spirits of the land punish the living; on the other hand, when the living behave well, 
the spirits take care of them. The tree also defines the nature of the multiple political 
and administrative links between the state and the peasants (natural resource users). 
When baobab users are unhappy with particular government policies, they do not 
cooperate with the state in the management of the baobab tree. The survival of the 
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tree thus signifies the survival of these important links between the living and the 
spiritual and between the state and local baobab users.
The state of Zimbabwe should take note of powerful connections such as these 
between local communities and the natural resources in their vicinity. With the 
value of baobab products likely to rise in the near future, a well-defined govern-
ance framework to guide sustainable use and enhance livelihoods, without eroding 
effective existing customary practices, is critical.
Notes
1 Grassland or grazing.
2 These confections are made of sugared baobab pulp frozen on a stick. Milk can be added 
to improve the flavour.
3 Chisi is a traditional rest day when everyone is expected to stop working in their fields or 
tilling the land. However, with the advent of NGO-funded community gardens, some 
residents no longer observe chisi on the pretext that such days for residents do not apply 
to community projects.
4 Traditional opaque beer is sold in containers called ‘scuds’.
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The semi-arid, diamond-rich coastal plain of Namaqualand in the north-western 
corner of South Africa is the stark setting of conflicting views on the potential for col-
laborative environmental governance. A desktop study in 2010 funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) identified Namaqualand 
as one of four case studies in Africa demonstrating that collaboration between a 
mining company and a conservation non-governmental organization (NGO) could 
contribute to significant conservation outcomes (Smuts 2010). The report argued 
that a partnership between Conservation International (CI), a Washington-based 
NGO, and De Beers, the world’s largest diamond mining and marketing company 
and owner of the largest mine in the area (called Namaqualand Mine), had made 
a ‘significant contribution . . . towards conservation planning in an internationally 
recognized biodiversity priority area (namely the Succulent Karoo hotspot)’ (Smuts 
2010, p. 27). Furthermore, a ‘multi-pronged approach to the partnership, which 
assisted in rehabilitation, job creation and protected area establishment, assisted in 
realizing the conservation vision. CI engaged the local and provincial government 
authorities in tandem to engaging the mining company’ (Smuts 2010, p. 27).
This partnership thus seemed to illustrate the potential of collaborative govern-
ance, more generally, to proactively combine contributions from business – moti-
vated in part by corporate social responsibility (CSR) – with those of government 
and civil society in the pursuit of common or compatible objectives and in support 
of sustainable development (Business Partners for Development [BPD] 2002; Don-
ahue 2004; Esteves and Barclay 2011; Huxham and Vangen 2000; Moon 2002).1 
Yet starkly opposing assessments exist. Van Wyk et al (2009) lament the social and 
environmental legacies of 80 years of diamond mining along this coast, highlight-
ing local communities’ high levels of poverty, exacerbated by the more recent 
downscaling of on-shore diamond mining and resulting retrenchments.2 They 
argue that ‘CSR driven development is rendered ineffective unless the national 
and provincial governments take the necessary steps [to enforce improved compli-
ance with relevant legislation]’ (ibid: vii).
Similarly, Blair (2011) finds that neither De Beers nor the government have 
lived up to the ideals of the South African Constitution or notions of corporate 
social responsibility, and that both have shown scant regard for commitments 
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to environmental rehabilitation and procedural or substantive justice for local 
communities. With reference to Swyngedouw (2005) she argues that ‘govern-
ance-beyond-the-state’ may promise to be inclusive and democratic on the basis 
of more proactive governance contributions from business and civil society, but 
actually contributes further to entrenched power relations and the marginalization 
of the poor and disenfranchised.
In the wake of efforts by De Beers to sell the Namaqualand Mine in 2010 and 
2011, even CI (now known in South Africa as Conservation South Africa, or CSA) 
has become critical of De Beers, arguing in a press release that ‘De Beers’ claim 
that the sale is part of their commitment to a “lasting contribution to the communi-
ties in which they live and work” is unsubstantiated given their lack of meaningful 
engagement with key stakeholders in the process of selling the mine’ (CSA 2011, 
p. 1). CSA’s point person argues that there had been a positive partnership between 
CSA and De Beers in developing a plan for post-mining land use and economic 
development opportunities, but ‘there was a change of management and a change 
of heart’ in the company, which led to a tenser relationship and even threats of 
legal action (Frazee, personal communication, 24 August 2011; Centre for Envi-
ronmental Rights [CER] 2011).
The shift from partnership to acrimony was not limited to corporate and NGO 
offices. A visit to this remote area made the significant conflict potential quite appar-
ent, with local community representatives distrusting the willingness or capacity of 
either De Beers or the government to respond effectively to their concerns and griev-
ances. One interviewee gave vent to a common refrain: ‘De Beers is so mighty – the 
community is in despair’ (Markus, personal communication, 26 September 2011).
Is this a story of a collaborative relationship gone sour in the wake of changing 
management or economic circumstances, suggesting practical limits to cross-sector 
partnerships? Or does it demonstrate more fundamental constraints to collabora-
tive governance, supporting critics such as Swyngedouw (2005)? This chapter dis-
cusses both the initial CSA–De Beers partnership and the more recent controversy 
surrounding the sale of the mine, as well as related concerns pertaining to post-
mining economic development, land rights and environmental rehabilitation.3 For 
our purposes, the Namaqualand Mine is an illustrative case (Flyvberg 2006) that is 
used here to aid understanding of collaborative governance and define its oppor-
tunities and boundary conditions. In setting all this out, the chapter emphasizes 
that partnership between role-players can be an important and effective govern-
ance mechanism, but only if certain conditions are met. If these conditions change 
beyond a certain point, a partnership may become untenable.
Specifically, the chapter argues that collaborative governance based on com-
mon interests is constrained in the context of historical legacies of social injustice 
and environmental degradation. A particularly important constraint is the lack of a 
clear and predictable framework of government regulation, which is vital in keeping 
open the ‘negotiation space’ among potential collaborators. For local communities, 
a more accommodating space needs to be created, with recourse to rights (including 
in particular the right to threaten or take legal action) and power (such as protest 
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Such engagement can also function to increase the scope of the company’s definition 
of self-interest.4
The Conservation South Africa–De Beers partnership and 
its demise5
The Namaqualand mine is situated in the north-western corner of South Africa 
(see Figure 13.1), an area characterized by very low rainfall and entrenched pov-
erty. Most residents eke out a living farming livestock or working on the mines. 
Ecologically the region is known as the Succulent Karoo: it has the richest variety 
of succulent plants in the world, with nearly one-third of its floral species found 
nowhere else, and it is also a centre of endemism for reptiles and many groups of 
invertebrates. It is under significant pressure from overgrazing, illegal collection 
of fauna and flora, climate change and mining: in particular, it overlaps with De 
Beers’ 80-year-old mining operations in Namaqualand.
Figure 13.1 Case study area.
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In 2001, CSA facilitated the development of the Succulent Karoo Ecosystem 
Programme, a ‘long term, multi-stakeholder bioregional conservation and devel-
opment partnership programme’ with government and non-government part-
ners.6 De Beers staff members from corporate offices and the Namaqualand Mine 
participated in these discussions, with a particular focus on the transfer of De Beers 
coastal properties (between the Groen and Spoeg rivers, south of Hondeklip Bay) 
for the purpose of extending the existing Namaqualand National Park conserva-
tion area on land donated as a 99-year lease to the South African National Parks 
Board in 2008. These conversations also considered environmental rehabilitation 
aspects of the planned closure of the Namaqualand Mine, which had been envis-
aged for some time already. (University of Cape Town students had conducted 
environmental and social impact studies on mine closure as early as 1992 (Gosling 
1992).) Environmental rehabilitation methods were developed in collaboration 
with researchers at the University of Cape Town’s Namaqualand Restoration Ini-
tiative, and subsequently applied by De Beers.
Recognizing that the success of conservation would rely on the creation of via-
ble socio-economic development and job creation opportunities, CSA organized 
a five-day ‘charrette’ (collaborative design exercise) in Namaqualand in 2006. In 
this design workshop, experts and stakeholders were invited to discuss options for 
linking conservation and socio-economic development in the area, with a focus on 
ecotourism. De Beers representatives participated, and the relationship between 
the two organizations strengthened on the basis of a shared recognition of the need 
to link conservation and livelihood opportunities.7 Inspired by the Eden Project in 
Cornwall, UK, in which a post-mining landscape had been transformed into an 
ecotourism attraction,8 CSA proposed a similarly ambitious programme of devel-
oping ecotourism and ‘green industry’ projects in Namaqualand under the banner 
of the Living Edge of Africa Project (LEAP).9
Two further charrettes were held in September 2007 and February 2009 to 
develop ‘sustainable livelihoods’ projects, the second part-funded by De Beers. 
CSA was contracted by De Beers to develop the LEAP concept further. Strictly 
speaking, therefore, the CSA–De Beers relationship was a contractual one, rather 
than a collaboration based on common interests (Wickens, personal communica-
tion, 16 September 2011), but common interests clearly were a vital motive for 
both parties. The charrettes and CSA’s subsequent work led to a pre-feasibility 
report published in May 2009, suggesting a number of projects focused on mari-
culture, wind energy, environmental rehabilitation and land art.
There are divergent accounts of the degree to which local communities were rep-
resented in these charrettes, or indeed the LEAP process generally. Frazee (personal 
communication, 24 August 2011) mentioned that many community members had 
been involved, especially representatives of local and provincial government, but De 
Beers interviewees highlighted the role of experts and architects in these workshops 
and suggested that ‘local communities were not really involved’ (Wickens, personal 
communication, 16 September 2011). The local community members interviewed 
by the author also expressed some uncertainty regarding community involvement 
in LEAP. Markus (personal communication, 26 September 2011) noted, ‘I’ve heard 
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about LEAP, but no one from Hondeklip Bay was involved . . . it is very vague, 
we don’t know what is going on.’ But later on, he argued that CSA had made an 
effort to involve the community in issues such as environmental rehabilitation. In 
this case there may have been some confusion regarding the definition of LEAP. 
Pienaar and other community members from Komaggas (personal communication, 
27 September 2011]) claimed that they had not gone to LEAP workshops, nor had 
other community members, and they noted that language barriers generally made 
participation in such processes difficult for them.
Community participation in the LEAP process thus seems to have concentrated 
on representatives of local and provincial government ‘at the end, at the closing 
function’ (Pisane, personal communication, 27 September 2011) of the workshops. 
This reliance on elected representatives and government officials was made more 
problematic by changes in local government resulting from the elections of May 
2011.10
Frazee (personal communication, 24 August 2011) emphasizes the excitement 
about the proposals in the LEAP pre-feasibility plan and the subsequent dis-
appointment when De Beers ostensibly decided to abandon the plan in early 
2011. This was triggered, she argues, by a change in corporate leadership, with 
Nicky Oppenheimer stepping down as chair of the board, and also changes in 
mine-level leadership. The sale of the mine, discussed below, is seen by Frazee 
(personal communication, 24 August 2011) as a convenient means for De Beers 
to avoid making the more committed investments in the social and natural envi-
ronment envisaged in the LEAP document. Furthermore, while the land uses 
proposed by the company in its amended environmental management plan 
(EMP) in preparation for the sale of the mine do include some of the LEAP 
proposals, they also include arguably incongruent proposals such as correctional 
services (i.e. a prison) and hazardous waste facilities (Frazee, personal communi-
cation, 24 August 2011).11
De Beers staff, however, describe the situation differently, denying that LEAP 
has been abandoned. Pisane and Wickens (personal communication, 16 Septem-
ber 2011) emphasize that the process of developing a pre-feasibility report for 
LEAP projects was a success and that some of the proposals were considered fea-
sible in the subsequent De Beers investigations (specifically the wind farm and 
the abalone mariculture project) and are currently part of the amended EMP 
that awaits approval from the government (at the time of writing). Some, such as 
the wind energy plant and a mariculture project, are already being implemented 
(see Creamer 2011). They argue that other options discussed in the pre-feasibility 
plan, such as the land art and tourist accommodation proposals, were not con-
sidered feasible because of the remoteness of the area, among other reasons, so 
they have not been taken further.12 Furthermore, Wickens (personal communi-
cation, 16 September 2011) points out that the responsible government depart-
ment, the Department of Mineral Resources, will only approve the post-mining 
land use options if their feasibility is proven, a process for which no precedent 
exists in South Africa, so there is still significant regulatory uncertainty involved. 
Generally, however, Wickens (personal communication, 16 September 2011) 
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characterizes the partnership between CSA and De Beers as a positive one that 
has achieved its purpose: specifically, CSA had been able to provide a vision for 
the area and ‘made us think differently’.
Mine sale controversy
As noted, the closure of Namaqualand Mine had been planned for many years. 
More recently, it was decided to sell the mine instead, based on the premise that 
a smaller company with lower overheads might yet be able to operate the mine 
profitably. A further incentive is likely to have been the desire to respond to the 
South African government’s requirement to see mines operated by black economic 
empowerment companies. (The sale conditions emphasized the ‘empowerment’ 
credentials of preferred bidders.)
A bidding process managed by one of the country’s big banks attracted bids from a 
significant number of applicants. The shortlist consisted of six companies, out of which 
Transhex was eventually chosen.13 This choice in itself was criticized by CSA and oth-
ers, because the company was seen as having a bad track record in the Namaqualand 
region (CSA 2011; Pienaar, personal communication, 27 September 2011). More 
fundamentally, however, the concern has been that the sale of the mine will dilute the 
social and environmental commitments and liabilities associated with the mine.
CSA (2011) argues that the sale of the mine has not involved sufficient stake-
holder consultation and, in particular, that pertinent information about the social 
and environmental commitments associated with the sale has not been made 
available. Specifically, the financial commitment required by law for environmen-
tal rehabilitation has not been publicized, in the absence of which, argues Frazee 
(personal communication, 24 August 2011), the inclusion of broad principles and 
commitments in the amended EMP for the mine is futile. Some of the substantive 
conditions themselves have also been criticized, such as the reportedly insufficient 
density of proposed netting (Frazee, personal communication, 24 August 2011).
Blair (2011: 92) also suggests ulterior motives in the mine sale:
What mine sale might mean in practice is that De Beers will attempt to dis-
pense with the social and environmental responsibilities they had initially 
agreed to take on, selling on instead to a smaller company without pretensions 
to, or capacity to achieve high corporate responsibility standards.
Wickens (personal communication, 16 September 2011) and her De Beers 
colleagues (personal communication, 27 October 2011), however, reject this pos-
sibility because all remaining liabilities associated with the mine, as specified in the 
EMP, are transferred to the new owner.14 She does accept that limited government 
capacity to enforce adequate rehabilitation may mean that liabilities are, in prac-
tice, diluted, but maintains that this is not so here, with the Department of Mineral 
Resources having adopted a ‘very diligent approach to approving the EMP’.
Furthermore, De Beers interviewees emphasized that the financial commitments 
for environmental rehabilitation could not be made public because the depart-
mental review of the EMP was still in progress. Indeed, De Beers was reportedly 
Partnerships are not forever  269
asked by the department not to make public the financial commitments associated 
with the amended EMP (Wickens, personal communication, 16 September 2011).
De Beers interviewees also noted that there had been engagement with local 
communities regarding mine closure, going back as far as the studies conducted by 
University of Cape Town students in the early 1990s. In addition, the mine closure 
plan and social and labour plan required by mining legislation were developed 
according to pertinent regulations, which meant that they would respond to the 
priorities identified in the local integrated development plans (IDPs) published by 
the municipalities (which ought to have been compiled on the basis of local com-
munity participation).15 These interviewees mentioned that there was continuing 
interaction between De Beers and local communities with regard to the company’s 
corporate social investment spending in the area, specifically in the form of a ‘local 
area committee’ established for this purpose (Pisane, personal communication, 16 
September 2011). Furthermore De Beers representatives are reportedly partici-
pating in local municipalities’ local economic development forums.
Yet company interviewees emphasized the difficulties in identifying and com-
municating with legitimate and recognized community representatives, a task 
apparently made more difficult by local government elections in May 2011, which 
saw control of the local council shift from the African National Congress to a 
rival political party, the Democratic Alliance. ‘Now previous agreements are ques-
tioned all over again . . . . We cannot be seen to be favouring any particular politi-
cal party’ (Pisane, personal communication, 27 October 2011).
Local resentments
Notwithstanding these structures and mechanisms ostensibly for communication 
between local communities and De Beers, company interviewees’ remarks regard-
ing the priorities of local community groups (e.g. ‘They want a new boat launch 
. . .’) cannot be reconciled with the level of frustration and the fundamental nature 
of the grievances among community members interviewed. In particular, local 
community members spoke of long-standing grievances with regard to land grabs 
before and during the apartheid period, which had benefited the mining com-
panies but left local communities disenfranchised, poor and dependent on wage 
labour. The retrenchments of recent years had made these grievances more acute 
(see also Bregman 2010).
Since the transition to democracy in 1994, there have been attempts to use the 
statutory land restitution process to reclaim some of this land, spurred on by the 
legally successful land claim lodged by communities in the Richtersveld, some 150 
kilometres north of the study area (Ramutsindela 2003; Barry 2004; Blair 2011). 
According to Markus (personal communication, 26 September 2011), a land claim 
that included five farms owned by De Beers was lodged on behalf of 40 families 
in Hondeklip Bay in 1998, was gazetted in 2008, and is still under review by the 
regional land claims commission (this was confirmed by the land claims commis-
sion based in Kimberley). The land is estimated by De Beers to contain nine mil-
lion carats of diamonds (Jordan 2011). Quite apart from the absence of substantive 
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benefits for the local people from the diamonds mined from these areas, Markus 
(personal communication, 26 September 2011) emphasizes grievances related to 
the loss of grazing land and livestock, as well as harassment and beatings by secu-
rity guards in instances of trespassing. The poverty of residents in Hondeklip Bay, 
with unemployment estimated at 80 per cent, is contrasted with the wealth that 
has been extracted by De Beers (Markus, personal communication, 26 September 
2011).
Concerns regarding the land claim have become more pressing in the context 
of De Beers’ attempts to sell the mine. As noted by Markus (personal communica-
tion, 26 September 2011), ‘De Beers never engaged the community with regard 
to the sale – you cannot sell land that is in dispute; the land claim has been totally 
ignored.’ A De Beers spokesperson was quoted in March 2011 as saying that the 
company had not received any notification from the Land Claims Commission, 
‘with the result that De Beers has not been placed in a position to properly evalu-
ate the claim. De Beers, accordingly, has placed on record with the Land Claims 
Commission that it disputes the merits of the claim’ (quoted in Jordan 2011). The 
same stance was reported by company interviewees in this research. Markus (per-
sonal communication) noted that De Beers representatives (including one of the 
interviewees) had reportedly come to talk to him about the company’s corporate 
social investment projects in the town, but had refused to talk about the land claims 
as these were not within the ambit of their responsibilities, as ‘their focus is on CSI 
[corporate social investment]’.
The De Beers interviewees subsequently emphasized that the land claims 
needed to be seen in context, and that the company was willing to engage with 
local communities about their concerns. They pointed out that De Beers had 
granted three farms each to the towns of Hondeklip Bay and Komaggas, through 
the municipality, as a positive response to community members’ requests for land 
(see also Bregman 2010). The company’s opposition to the Hondeklip Bay land 
claim, they argue, needs to be seen in the context of a Chamber of Mines resolu-
tion to oppose land claims as a matter of course, and is motivated by a concern that 
‘just giving the land . . . will lead to a precedent that will make other communities 
around the country say, what about us, we also have a claim?’ (Ngcobo, personal 
communication, 27 October 2011). However, the existence of such a resolution 
was denied by the Chamber of Mines (van Achterbergh, personal communication, 
10 July 2012).
In Komaggas, a town with a particularly close relationship to the Namaqualand 
Mine because the majority of the mine’s workers were from there, Pienaar and fel-
low community members16 (personal communication, 27 September 2011) also 
emphasized the importance of historical injustice and their attempts to regain some 
of their land through a land claim. Their claim, which is under development and has 
not been lodged (at the time of writing), is particularly challenging because it relies 
on the principle of aboriginal title, which, though it contributed to the legal victory 
of the Richtersveld community mentioned above (Barry 2004), is difficult to prove 
and furthermore can create a problematic legal precedent given South Africa’s his-
tory (Blair 2011; though more supportive arguments are given by Bregman 2010 
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and Smith, personal communication, 7 July 2012). The claimed land includes many 
farms currently owned by De Beers, as well as land transferred by De Beers to the 
national park, which has further contributed to the exclusion of community land 
use (Pienaar, personal communication, 27 September 2011; Blair 2011). Pienaar 
(personal communication, 27 September 2011) said they have been trying to discuss 
their claim with De Beers, but ‘they just say, “show us your title deeds”’.
But the relationship between De Beers and Komaggas community members 
has not always been tense. Referring to the time of a certain former mine man-
ager, Pienaar (personal communication, 27 September 2011) notes, ‘we started 
to have neighbourly relations’. In response to the community’s high court chal-
lenge against De Beers’ plans to sell two farms in the late 1990s, De Beers report-
edly yielded and sold the land to the government, and the land is currently being 
used for grazing by the community (see also Bregman 2010). However, a change 
in the management (particularly that of Kleinsee itself)17 and the planned mine 
sale have reportedly led to a more tense relationship. The very fact that the 
retrenchment packages were reportedly twice as valuable as the legal require-
ment has been interpreted as reflecting the company’s desire to ‘entice’ employ-
ees to accept them. More time and support was expected to prepare the town 
for the shock of the retrenchments (Pienaar, personal communication, 27 Sep-
tember 2011).
Komaggas interviewees emphasized that they had lost hope of De Beers or 
the government making substantive commitments in response to their concerns 
related to their land claim, as well as broader issues including unemployment and 
lack of infrastructure. They therefore embarked on a public campaign to air their 
grievances, similar to the efforts by Hondeklip Bay activists prominently featured 
in media reports in October 2011 (e.g. Blaine 2011). In addition, the socio-eco-
nomic hardships and a sense of injustice are reportedly contributing to illicit dia-
mond mining.18 
[C]ommunity members are now up in arms; some of our people are starting 
to defy the rules and taking the law into their own hands; there are allegations 
that some of the former De Beers employees are involved in illegal digging, as 
well as others who come from further away.
(Pienaar, personal communication, 27 September 2011)
Such illegal mining is very dangerous, both in immediate physical terms, as dem-
onstrated by the deaths of two illegal miners when their tunnel collapsed in July 
2011 (Nicholson 2011), and in relation to the associated criminal marketing activi-
ties. The risk is that an escalation of illicit mining, coupled with increasingly force-
ful action by security guards, may lead to further deaths.
Discussion and conclusion
In a previous version, this chapter started off as a ‘good news story’ of how a mul-
tinational corporation and an international conservation NGO could collaborate 
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in the interests of both conservation objectives and local community interests. It 
was framed as an example of how collaborative governance could contribute to 
addressing governance gaps created by challenges faced by the state.
However, recent controversy and more detailed investigations have turned this 
into a more critical account. One lens through which to interpret these devel-
opments is negotiation theory, recognizing that negotiation based on interests 
takes place in the context of critical rights and power relations (Lytle et al 1999; 
Covey and Brown 2001). Each collaborative relationship thus relies on a ‘negotia-
tion space’ based on a certain set of converging or at least reconcilable interests, 
and that space is created and maintained by a system of rights and power-based 
relationships.
In the erstwhile De Beers–CSA partnership, the relationship was built upon a 
convergence of interests specifically involving conservation objectives, with links to 
community development opportunities (Smuts 2010). De Beers’ motivation in this 
regard was based on its explicit and relatively ambitious conservation policies, as 
well as compliance with government law and regulations, specifically with regard 
to mine closure.
However, even though the conservation–development link was an explicit 
objective of the partnership, it is not clear to what extent the partnership actually 
involved local communities either procedurally or substantively. Procedurally, it is 
not apparent that they were a prominent and influential role player in the LEAP 
process. Substantively, the environmentally friendly development options were 
clearly meant to encourage much-needed employment generation, but commu-
nity interviewees’ primary concerns relating to land claims were not a prominent 
feature of the LEAP discussions. The negotiation space within which both the 
NGO and the company could engage thus relied on a relatively specific set of con-
verging interests, which could not substantially include the land claims.
This negotiation space contracted significantly and rapidly as a consequence of 
the company’s decision to sell the mine. It could be argued that the recession in 
2008–10 also had a significant influence, but although this is likely to have dimin-
ished resources available to the company for corporate responsibility activities in 
that period, it ought not to have had long-term, strategic implications, considering 
the positive market outlook for the company.19
The company’s interest calculus thus moved from a mine closure scenario to 
one of mine sale. The claim by critics that this was part of an effort to minimize or 
even avoid existing social and environmental commitments and liabilities cannot 
be fully substantiated, though crucial information is still outstanding while the final 
government ruling on the sale (and the associated EMP) is awaited.20 In particular, 
the financial commitment to environmental rehabilitation, which will be part of 
the new owner’s commitments, needs to be commensurate with the substantive 
content of the EMP, and the government will have to enforce that conscientiously. 
De Beers’ decision to sell the mine has arguably not been the only or even primary 
cause for tension between the company and CSA. Another has been the problem-
atic regulatory framework governing the sale, specifically with regard to the lack of 
disclosure requirements for financial rehabilitation commitments.
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This is yet another compelling illustration of why collaborative governance 
arrangements cannot function as a replacement for state regulation, but rather 
require a clear regulatory framework to operate effectively and legitimately (see 
also Hamann 2004). Clear rules about the ‘basics’ – in this instance, with regard 
to environmental liabilities in the case of mine sales and corresponding trans-
parency requirements – need to be established and enforced in order to create 
a negotiation space for partnerships. In the absence of such enforced rules, the 
negotiation space contracts and no negotiation in search of converging interests 
can take place.
So the negotiation space between company and NGO with regard to conserva-
tion and post-mining land uses has changed as a consequence of the company’s 
decision to sell the mine, and the state’s governance framework has been unable to 
keep it open. On the other hand, it was never really large enough to include local 
communities’ land claims, which seem to have been more fundamentally at odds 
with the company’s interests (notwithstanding some interviewees’ comments to the 
contrary). This could be interpreted as an illustration of the fundamental limits to 
collaborative governance in the context of historical injustices.
However, again it is the regulative framework that ought to clarify the status of 
such rights – in this instance with regard to the land claims process, hampered by 
significant bureaucratic inefficiencies. Implemented more effectively, this regula-
tory framework would create a new negotiation space, this time including local 
communities in the negotiations more substantively.
It is clear that the adjudication of land claims is a complicated and controversial 
process, but nevertheless much of the uncertainty and tension in the case study 
area could probably be attenuated if the Land Claims Commission implemented 
a more structured and transparent process. Again, therefore, the negotiation space 
in which the company is motivated to find more amenable outcomes for local 
communities is effectively closed down by weak or haphazard state regulation.
In the absence of compelling interests inducing the company to respond to local 
community grievances, and in view of uncertain government regulation and regu-
latory enforcement, the local communities face the greatest risks in the mine sale. 
Recognizing that they are likely to have greater influence over De Beers, a com-
pany with a significant brand reputation to protect, than Transhex, the communi-
ties approach the mine sale as something of an ‘end-game’ scenario, which raises 
the stakes. Engagement options thus move from interests and rights to power-
based approaches, and this explains the launch of media campaigns in October 
2011, in which community members teamed up with NGOs, including CSA and 
the Bench Marks Foundation, which had copy-writing and other expertise and 
contacts in the local and international media.
This may have brought some limited success in the form of a more commit-
ted company response, demonstrated by an almost week-long visit to the area by 
a team of senior managers, including De Beers South Africa’s corporate affairs 
director. A significant element of the company’s response has been a media 
campaign, including media releases and even a video responding to an NGO-
sponsored video, but company interviewees emphasized their commitment to 
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responding positively to legitimate concerns. An important motive is clearly the 
company’s reputation and standing in its market, with customers increasingly 
expecting a credible source with a clear conscience in the wake of numerous human 
rights controversies linked to diamond mining (Ngcobo, personal communication, 
27 October 2011). Yet even if later developments in 2011 suggested a renewed com-
mitment by the company to addressing stakeholders’ concerns, and even though 
local community interviewees emphasized the power of De Beers, the contraction 
of the negotiation space brought about by the sale of the mine and the weakness of 
state regulation creates a difficult context for any collaborative efforts.
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Notes
 1 ‘Governance’ here is interpreted as ‘organised efforts to manage the course of events in 
a social system’ (Burris et al 2008, p. 3) and more specifically as the structures and proc-
esses through which commonly binding rules are established, and through which public 
goods or services are provided (Risse 2011). The notion of collaborative governance 
thus suggests that rules are established and enforced, and public goods and services are 
provided, not only by the state on the basis of its position of hierarchical power, but also 
by other actors in civil society and business, commonly premised on negotiation proc-
esses seeking consensus decisions and various actors’ contribution of complementary 
resources.
 2 Retrenchments in connection with mine downscaling commenced in 2003, and min-
ing operations were suspended altogether in early 2010. At the time of this research in 
2011, De Beers employed about 130 people in the area in environmental rehabilitation 
work (MacDonald, personal communication, 16 September 2011).
 3 There are, of course, other controversial issues in this case, such as the proclamation of 
the Kleinsee town, which has been a private, De Beers-owned settlement since its estab-
lishment in the late 1920s (Carstens 2001), but they will not be discussed in any detail in 
this chapter.
 4 This chapter is based on a review of literature and documents such as media reports, 
press releases and research reports, and on semi-structured interviews and more infor-
mal discussions with representatives from CSA and De Beers, as well as with local com-
munity members and officials in the area, some of whom insisted on anonymity, given 
the controversial nature of the issues. Face-to-face interviews or discussions were held 
with, among others, the individuals listed under ‘Personal Communications’ in the ref-
erence list at the end of this chapter. Additional communication with some interviewees 
took place via email. As for sampling, identifying interviewees from the NGO and com-
pany was relatively straightforward: most of the key individuals involved in the initial 
partnership and the more acrimonious correspondence that followed were interviewed. 
The sampling of local community interviewees, however, was more complex. These 
individuals were initially recommended by Frazee (personal communication, 24 August 
2011) and also identified by company interviewees as outspoken community members 
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who enjoyed a significant degree of respect among the communities generally. The 
latter judgement was partly substantiated through casual conversations with diverse, 
randomly identified community residents.
 5 The description of the partnership is based largely on Smuts (2010), while the discussion 
of more recent developments is based on interviews.
 6 www.skep.org.za
 7 Indeed, CSA’s interest in Namaqualand Mine was triggered when an increase in 
livestock grazing was observed in the upland area of the Kamiesberg, conducted by 
retrenched workers from the mine looking for alternative livelihood options (Frazee, 
personal communication, 24 August 2011).
 8 http://.edenproject.com
 9 The collaboration in Namaqualand led to a decision to establish a global partner-
ship between CI and De Beers, including the signing of a collaboration agreement in 
December 2007. This led to, among other things, the involvement of CI in the review 
and benchmarking of De Beers’ environmental policies. Wickens (personal communi-
cation, 16 September 2011) describes De Beers’ objective in this collaboration as being 
‘to gain the knowledge of an outside organisation’ with specific reference to the compa-
ny’s policy commitment to no net loss of biodiversity.
 10 However, Pisane (personal communication, 16 September 2011) argued that, from De 
Beers’ perspective, limiting the involvement of community members in the charrettes 
was probably a good thing, because ‘it is important not to raise too many expectations 
among community members – you need to develop feasible projects first, then go to the 
communities’.
 11 The amended EMP was completed in early 2010 after the completion of the mine clo-
sure plan (Pisane, personal communication, 16 September 2011).
 12 Wickens (personal communication, 16 September 2011) points out that De Beers has 
had significant experience in developing tourism projects as a means to provide post-
mining employment and economic development opportunities (see, in particular, www.
diamondroute.co.za and http://coastofdiamonds.co.za), and that this experience had 
demonstrated the need to carefully assess economic feasibility based on accessibility.
 13 The selection criteria were technical, including financial capability to mine alluvial 
deposits (considering the associated uncertainties and difficulties), black economic 
empowerment criteria, and community and sustainability issues, with the latter com-
prising about 30–40 per cent of the total weighting of the conditions (MacDonald and 
Wickens, personal communication, 16 September 2011).
 14 In fact, some of the commitments have been retained by De Beers because they are 
close to fulfilment. The mariculture project, for instance, was due to be opened before 
the end of 2011 (MacDonald et al personal communication, 16 September 2011).
 15 A general concern has been the challenges faced by municipalities in actually preparing 
IDPs according to the regulatory guidelines, which emphasise community participa-
tion. Another has been their capacity to implement the activities and attain the goals 
consequently envisaged in the IDPs. (For a discussion on the development and imple-
mentation of IDP policy, see Harrison 2006.) This was echoed by community interview-
ees: ‘The Kamiesberg Municipality [incorporating Hondeklip Bay and Komaggas] has 
an IDP but doesn’t have the capacity to implement it . . . They had IDP meetings, but 
they’re just empty promises’ (Markus, personal communication, 26 September 2011). 
A more specific concern that has been prominent in some of this author’s previous work 
on related issues is the lack of systematic involvement by mining companies in the public 
deliberations that are meant to feed into the preparation of IDPs (e.g. Hamann 2004; 
Hamann et al 2011).
 16 Andy Pienaar is the founding director of the Komaggas Advice Centre, a local NGO 
focused on community education and development. The other interviewees (Thomas 
Cupido, Johan Cloete and Christine Cloete) were affiliated to the ‘Karusab Commit-
tee’, which was involved in developing the community’s land claim, but emphasised that 
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they were participating in the interviews as community members, not having received a 
mandate from the committee to speak on its behalf.
 17 The De Beers managers identified by community interviewees as having caused ten-
sions in the company’s relations with the community did not include any of the manag-
ers interviewed for this research.
 18 Illicit diamond mining has been a prominent feature of this area since diamonds were 
first discovered in 1927 (Carstens 1962).
 19 It is this positive outlook that underpinned the sale of the Oppenheimers’ stake in De 
Beers to Anglo American for US$5.1 billion (Seccombe 2011).
 20 At the time of writing, the amended EMP had not been made public – and indeed, this 
was one of the main concerns raised by CSA. De Beers argued that the amendment did 
not require public consultation and that it should not be published due to the commer-
cial aspects of the sale (citing section 68 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act) 
(Webber Wentzel 2011). This was vigorously disputed by CSA and its lawyers (CER 
2011).
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14 Governance, equity and 
sustainability in non-timber 
forest product value chains
Rachel Wynberg and Jaci van Niekerk
Introduction
The past two decades have seen growing attention given to the economic potential 
of biodiversity, spurred in part by dramatic scientific developments in biotech-
nology, such as the potential to transfer genes between species through genetic 
engineering, increased consumer demand for ‘natural’ products and a regulatory 
environment that facilitates the patenting of products and processes based on bio-
diversity (Dutfield 2011; Laird and Wynberg 2012). Intended products include 
new drugs, climate-resilient crops, industrial processing tools and novel ingredi-
ents for the food, herbal medicine and personal care industries. These products 
generate significant benefits for society, financial returns for the companies pro-
ducing and marketing them and a range of benefits for countries that provide the 
biological material.
At the same time, livelihood opportunities have opened up for rural communi-
ties engaged in commercially harvesting and producing species with high value in 
global and local markets. Indeed, several million people in sub-Saharan Africa earn 
their primary cash income from the sale of non-timber forest products (NTFPs)1 
(Kaimowitz 2003), which, in addition to providing income, play important roles 
as natural subsidies for food, medicines, building materials, crafts and a multitude 
of other purposes, fulfilling the role of safety nets in times of scarcity (Shackleton 
and Shackleton 2004; Timko et al 2010; Shackleton et al 2011). More often than 
not, however, the primary producers involved in NTFP harvesting and processing 
are among the poorest in the world (Neumann and Hirsch 2000). This is especially 
the case for internationally traded products, in which primary producers are typi-
cally represented ‘invisibly’ in exploitative trade chains that, in keeping with the 
nature of extractive markets, tend to keep wages and prices for producers low, 
while profit-sharing rises with increased processing as the product moves closer to 
the consumer (Southgate et al 1996; King et al 1999; Neumann and Hirsch 2000). 
Such inequalities have intensified with the rise in the power of supermarkets and 
transnational corporations (Gibbon and Ponte 2005; Harilal et al 2006).
Increasing consumer demand for the natural products derived from NTFPs 
also means that sustainability questions have become central. Consumers want to 
know that they are purchasing a product that is ecologically sustainable, compa-
nies are under increasing pressure to demonstrate that they are making a positive 
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environmental and social impact, and regulators want to be sure that the species 
is used sustainably and is not threatened by trade. Overharvesting is a common 
concern, especially for species that are used commercially (e.g. Ticktin 2004; Rijk-
ers et al 2006; Ticktin and Shackleton 2011), typically leading to a shift from wild 
harvesting towards cultivation of resources and a ‘transition from without agricul-
ture to within, from nature to culture’ (Dove 1995).
While cultivation is touted by some as arguably an environmentally benign 
alternative to wild harvesting (e.g. Anderson 1992; Homma 1996), its environ-
mental impact can be significant due to land transformation, pollution and deg-
radation (Schippman et al 2002). Moreover, small producers are likely to be at 
best marginalized, and at worst excluded entirely, from activities that require 
significant capital, land and infrastructure (Homer-Dixon et al 1993; Sunder-
land et al 2004).
As awareness grows of the problems of overharvesting, inequality and unfair 
labour practices, a string of mandatory measures have unfolded, aiming to bring 
greater ethical and sustainability standards to trade in biological and genetic 
resources.2 This has been due in large part to the 1973 Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the related 2010 Nagoya Protocol 
on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization.3 As a result of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, 
companies and researchers wishing to obtain access to biological material and 
associated traditional knowledge are now required to show how the providers of 
resources and knowledge will benefit. Moreover, such access is conditional on 
benefits being fair and equitable and on the prior informed consent of provid-
ers. These activities are encapsulated in the term ‘access and benefit sharing’, 
with the conclusion of benefit-sharing agreements between users and providers of 
resources and traditional knowledge premised on sustainable use and biodiversity 
conservation.
Growing consumer pressures have also led to the parallel development of a range 
of voluntary social and environmental certification schemes, developed largely at 
national and regional levels by several different industry-affiliated and independ-
ent labelling organizations to address consumer demands for fair and sustainable 
supply chains (Shanley et al 2008). Certification schemes relating to the sourcing 
of raw materials include those for fair trade and for organic and ecological or sus-
tainable harvesting. FairWild,4 for example, focuses on the sustainable and ethical 
sourcing of ingredients and incorporates the International Standard for Sustain-
able Wild Collection of Medicinal and Aromatic Plants.
Despite a prodigious number of international meetings and workshops on 
topics relating to access and benefit sharing, NTFP trade (or ‘biotrade’5 as it 
is commonly referred to) and rural livelihoods, and a significant investment of 
development aid to facilitate CBD implementation, there is little evidence that 
policies and laws on access and benefit sharing have achieved greater equity 
(see, for example, Wynberg and Laird 2007). Moreover, little attention has been 
given to the governance of these value chains, ways in which different actors 
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benefit from the natural product trade, and how value chains might be modi-
fied to bring greater benefit to the poor. In addition, although several studies 
describe the biological characteristics of different commercially used species 
and the implications for their conservation and sustainable use (see Ticktin and 
Shackleton 2011, for a review), few have examined the interface between gov-
ernance, ecological sustainability and equity.
Strong state involvement – in the commercialization of a species, for example 
– may well lead to a rigorous regulatory environment for conservation, but could 
also act against the interests of rural producers and the effective involvement of 
the private sector (Ribot 1995; Lele et al 2010; Novellino 2010). An exclusively 
market-driven and corporate approach, on the other hand, is unlikely to cater ade-
quately for environmental considerations or for social equity. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) may play a major role in assisting producer communities to 
negotiate fairer trade terms, but could also be considered an unsustainable option 
in the long term because of social and financial dependencies that may arise, as 
well as potential conflicts of interest. Producer organizations and cooperatives may 
be critical in facilitating more equitable trade, but their effectiveness may require 
strong external support and hinge upon internal robustness. Emerging ethical and 
fair-trade initiatives for natural products introduce an additional layer of networks 
and power relations to these trends.
This chapter aims to enhance understanding about the influence of these dif-
ferent governance arrangements in NTFP value chains on ecological sustain-
ability and equity outcomes. We do this through the lens of two plant species 
endemic to southern Africa (see Figure 14.1). In the first case, we explore the 
commercialization of Hoodia gordonii, a succulent plant developed as an appe-
tite suppressant based on traditional knowledge of the indigenous San peoples. 
Thereafter, we examine the progression of Pelargonium sidoides from a widely used 
traditional remedy to a successful global phytomedicine. We examine the evolv-
ing dynamics of actors involved in the governance of these value chains, changes 
in governance over time and implications for equity and sustainability. Southern 
Africa is a hub for biodiversity commercialization, and trade in these two plant 
species has been caught up in the turbulent world of access and benefit shar-
ing, intellectual property rights, traditional knowledge, uncertain land tenure, 
unclear regulatory regimes and tension between producers, the private sector, 
NGOs and traditional authorities on one hand and democratically elected gov-
ernment structures on the other.
Hoodia and the intricacies of governing across cultures, 
nations and interests
Hoodia value chains
In a world where obesity is an escalating problem, the commercialization of spe-
cies of the succulent plant Hoodia is particularly interesting because of the plant’s 
traditional use to stave off hunger and thirst by the indigenous San peoples, the 
BOTSWANA 
[] Pelargonium sidoides 
[ill Hoodia gordonii 
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oldest human inhabitants of Africa (Pappe 1862; White and Sloane 1937). Bring-
ing Hoodia to market as an appetite suppressant involved a complex chain of events 
and multiple actors, including the indigenous San, Nama and Damara peoples; 
national and provincial government departments in several different countries 
sharing the resource; the South African-based Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR), a parastatal research organization; Hoodia growers from South 
Africa and Namibia; NGOs supporting the San and acting against biopiracy;6 the 
British-based company Phytopharm; and large corporations, including the phar-
maceutical and consumer giants Pfizer and Unilever. It also sparked a chain of 
regulatory and policy measures with wide ramifications.
Figure 14.2 illustrates the two Hoodia value chains that emerged through this 
process. The first value chain (Figure 14.2a) was structured around an agreement 
between the CSIR, Phytopharm and Unilever based on material cultivated, mostly 
by commercial farmers, with the San acknowledged as knowledge holders and 
thus beneficiaries but not having any specific role in the production process. The 
second value chain (Figure 14.2b) was initially based on wild-harvested material, 
but is now almost entirely cultivated, supplied by commercial farmers in South 
Africa and Namibia to herbal supplement markets, mostly in the United States. In 
some cases, but not all, the San received a proportion of sales income in this value 
chain, but again have seldom been involved in the production process.
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Initial commercialization of Hoodia
Comprehensive reviews of the Hoodia case are recounted by Wynberg (2004) and 
Wynberg and Chennells (2009), who describe how colonial botanical accounts of 
the traditional use of Hoodia lent the impetus for the CSIR to instigate an intensive 
research and development programme into the plant’s properties. As Figure 14.3 
illustrates, this led to the 1997 filing of a patent by the CSIR for active compo-
nents of Hoodia species responsible for suppressing appetite, the subsequent signing 
of a licence agreement for its further development and commercialization with 
the British company Phytopharm, and the sublicensing to American corporation 
Pfizer for clinical development.
At the time, no legal requirements for benefit sharing were in place, although 
South Africa was a signatory to the CBD, and these actions took place without the 
consent of the San or other indigenous groups that held knowledge about Hoodia. 
Moreover, although Hoodia species had been listed as protected since the 1970s,7 
the absence of pressure on the resource at the time allowed the government to 
adopt a largely passive approach towards regulating the plant’s use.
Entry of the state
Governance of the Hoodia chain was thus almost entirely led by the private sec-
tor prior to 2000, but this changed dramatically soon after. In 2001, a campaign 
spearheaded by NGOs Biowatch and Action Aid alerted the British media to the 
commercial development of Hoodia without the consent or involvement of the San, 
spurring the San to demand negotiations with the CSIR and the eventual develop-
ment of a benefit-sharing agreement in 2003. It was partly the unfolding of these 
experiences and the high-profile nature of the case that gave impetus to the devel-
opment of binding laws in South Africa, encapsulated in the National Environ-
mental Management: Biodiversity Act (10 of 2004) and the later promulgation of 
regulations governing access and benefit sharing in 2008. These laws now require 
a benefit-sharing agreement to be developed between different stakeholders to 
ensure that holders of traditional knowledge and custodians of biodiversity are 
fairly compensated.
Stronger involvement of the state was also spurred by concerns about the eco-
logical status of the resource. Publicity generated by the agreement, the market-
ing opportunities offered by the San use of the plant and the CSIR patent led to 
a frenzied interest in Hoodia among plant traders. A parallel market for Hoodia 
herbal and dietary supplements emerged, based on the export of dried wild-
harvested Hoodia, escalating exponentially from just a few tons in 2002 to more than 
600 tons of wet, harvested material in 2005, sold as ground powder for incorpora-
tion into non-patented dietary supplements. In South Africa and Namibia, illegal 
trade and harvesting of Hoodia resulted in a number of prosecutions and arrests; 
the high prices commanded for the dry product of up to USD 200 per kilogram 
had led to the incorporation of the plant into a global underground network of 
diamonds, drugs and abalone (Wynberg and Chennells 2009).
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Regional governance and the emergence of new regulatory 
approaches
This escalation in demand necessitated new regulatory approaches, including the 
listing of Hoodia species in Appendix II of the CITES (2004). In response, southern 
African governments began developing a more tightly regulated permitting system 
for Hoodia use and trade, although this was done differentially, both within and 
between countries. In Namibia and Botswana a moratorium was put in place on 
wild harvesting and trade of any Hoodia species. In South Africa, different sets of 
regulatory approaches evolved in the Northern Cape and Western Cape prov-
inces, the areas in which most Hoodia species occur, with the Northern Cape using 
a moratorium to curb trade, while the Western Cape issued a so-called ‘open per-
mit’ to several traders, arguing that a moratorium would simply drive the Hoodia 
industry underground and make the trade more difficult to track and manage 
(Wynberg 2010). As the only legal point of export for Hoodia, the Western Cape 
thus saw a flood of material pass through it, and the open-ended nature of the per-
mit provided the perfect means through which illegally harvested material could 
be included and legitimately exported under a CITES permit (Wynberg 2010).
Increased awareness of these problems, combined with concerns about the 
quality and safety of material sold as Hoodia, and recognition of the need to ensure 
the sustainability of Hoodia supply, led to a rapid response from conservation 
Figure 14.3 Timeline of Hoodia spp. commercialization.
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authorities across the region. Faced with a resource crisis, Namibia, South Africa 
and Botswana strengthened permitting as well as export and border controls, to 
bring improved policy cohesion and standardization alongside greater efforts to 
ensure the cultivation of the species.
Regional cohesion was, however, more challenging when it came to policies 
of community identity and benefit sharing. South Africa, through the parastatal 
CSIR, had played a leading role in lodging the patent, developing the commercial 
partnerships for Hoodia and negotiating benefit-sharing agreements with the San 
(Wynberg and Chennells 2009). Moreover, South Africa had adopted legislation 
on access and benefit sharing and fully recognized the San as a community with 
clear rights to benefit from Hoodia. Namibia and Botswana, on the other hand, did 
not have such laws in place and considered benefits from Hoodia to belong to the 
state, rather than to traditional knowledge holders. These different approaches 
were not contrary to the CBD, which allows states to decide how traditional 
knowledge holders should be acknowledged, but caused confusion because the 
distribution of the San, just like that of the resource, straddles national borders.
Community governance
Such complexities were to unravel further at the community level. San leaders 
believed they needed to be united across the region, regardless of political bounda-
ries. In 1996, they had established their own advocacy organization, the Work-
ing Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA), charged with 
uniting and representing San communities from Botswana, Namibia and South 
Africa. Through WIMSA, the South African San Council was formally mandated 
to represent the San of Namibia and Botswana as well as those in South Africa in 
all benefit-sharing negotiations. The South African San Council, supported by the 
South African San Institute, a San service NGO helping San-based organizations 
access funding and expertise, thus became an important part of the governance of 
the Hoodia commercialization process.
San involvement was strongly informed by experiences of their land claim 
under South Africa’s post-apartheid land restitution programme, which had led 
to conflict between San communities (Robins 2002), as well as other agreements 
on access and benefit sharing that had fallen apart because of disputes as to which 
communities and countries should participate (e.g. Hayden 2003). In a bid to avoid 
similar controversies, the San decided in principle that their heritage was collec-
tively owned, and that any benefits arising from its use were to be divided equally 
among countries with San populations (Wynberg et al 2009). This provided the 
foundation for the establishment of a trust to distribute benefits.
With the establishment of the trust, questions of internal governance became 
paramount, bringing together Western and traditional systems of decision-making 
in an uneasy marriage of convenience. The CSIR, for example, was adamant that 
the body should be exclusively South African and saw no place in it for Namibia 
and Botswana. But the San believed that ‘it was our knowledge and therefore our 
money’ (San-Hoodia Trustee, Upington, personal communication, 18 September 
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2006) and that the principle of collective ownership could not be compromised. 
The final outcome was a compromise, with representation of Botswana, Namibia 
and Angola on the trust by three South African San nominated by the three 
countries. A decision was also taken to allocate 75 per cent of all trust income 
(a total of some ZAR 600,000 or USD 60,000) equally between San councils in 
Namibia, Botswana and South Africa, with the remaining amount to be used for 
trust administration.
The need to select representative decision-makers also caused decision-making 
power within San ranks to shift from its relatively egalitarian distribution to a 
Western model. Traditional decision-making had been based on a highly par-
ticipatory and consensual approach seeking to avoid conflict. Engaging with the 
CSIR, however, required individual representation, not recognized by traditional 
systems and often contested, fraught and with weak accountability. The San coun-
cils involved in deliberations were mostly no more than a few years old and had 
been set up to assert San rights rather than as traditional governance systems. 
These fragile institutional dynamics were further complicated by the need to 
acknowledge other groups holding traditional knowledge of Hoodia, such as the 
Nama and Damara.
Market-initiated changes
At the same time as institutional arrangements were being established to share 
benefits arising from the agreement between the CSIR and the San, an array 
of independent Hoodia growers and traders were emerging in South Africa and 
Namibia to supply the herbal and dietary supplement market. Hoodia was now 
being successfully cultivated, and growers were mindful of the need to be compli-
ant with South Africa’s laws on access and benefit sharing and the CBD. This 
led to the 2006 establishment of the South African Hoodia Growers Association 
(SAHGA), which subsequently developed a benefit-sharing agreement with the 
South African San Council that was later validated by the state and the parallel 
development of the Hoodia Growers Association of Namibia (HOGRAN), which 
in 2010 signed a benefit-sharing agreement with the San and Nama communities 
of Namibia (Figure 14.3).
As the Hoodia industry became more organized, it was dealt a blow by changes 
to the market. The pharmaceutical company Pfizer discontinued clinical devel-
opment of an appetite-suppressant drug based on Hoodia and handed the rights 
back to Phytopharm in 2003. Consumer giant Unilever stepped into Pfizer’s place 
through a joint development agreement with Phytopharm, and began investigat-
ing Hoodia as an ingredient for its line of Slim-Fast drinks. A massive cultivation 
programme was launched, involving over 300 hectares of Hoodia in South Africa 
and Namibia, clinical safety trials, manufacturing and an agreement to develop 
a ZAR 750 million (approximately USD 75 million)8 extraction facility. In 2008, 
however, Unilever made a sudden announcement that it was abandoning plans 
to develop Hoodia as a functional food, because of safety and efficacy concerns. 
Although some Hoodia herbal products remain on the market today, based almost 
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entirely on cultivated material, the multi-million dollar profits originally projected 
remain elusive.
Achieving sustainability and equity
The impacts of these initiatives on sustainability and equity outcomes are impor-
tant to examine and highlight the complexities of governing a species undergoing 
rapid commercialization, where information about both the biology of the species 
and its trade is incomplete and scarce, where several nation states are involved and 
where multiple laws apply to regulate harvesting, trade and commercialization.
Increased awareness of problems associated with illegal and unsustainable 
Hoodia harvesting led to a rapid response from conservation authorities and the 
establishment of a system to incentivize cultivation. This response, best charac-
terized as ‘reactive’ and ‘experimental’, had clear drawbacks in its lack of coher-
ence, comprehension and foresight, but also had its benefits. Significant changes 
in Hoodia markets, availability and demand necessitated an iterative and flexible 
approach by government towards regulation, suggesting that reactive decision-
making may well be a vital mechanism to cope with rapidly changing situations, in 
this case market and trade fluctuations.
In contrast to its response to resource depletion, the state played a very minimal 
role in securing equity outcomes, with deliberations centred instead on the San 
and commercial partners. Here too, however, there were concerns. The benefit-
sharing agreement that was negotiated between the San and the CSIR was hailed 
initially as a significant breakthrough in the access and benefit-sharing impasse. 
Here was an example of how the CBD could work in practice to benefit both indig-
enous communities and those seeking to reap profit from traditional knowledge and 
biodiversity. The dietary control of obesity is valued at USD 3 billion per annum in 
the United States alone, and thus returns were expected to be lucrative.
But very soon the cracks began to show. Analysis of the agreement revealed 
that although the San might receive a considerable amount of money, this would 
be less than 0.01 per cent of the total royalties generated (Wynberg 2004). Monies 
received by the San would be extracted from royalties received by the CSIR, but 
the profits of Pfizer, Unilever and Phytopharm were to remain untouched. Was 
this equitable benefit sharing? Moreover, the CSIR had insisted on an exclusive 
agreement with the San. This had been agreed to prior to the boom in trade in 
Hoodia in 2006 and the emergence of many other potential business partners. The 
exclusive nature of the agreement was now reducing opportunities for the San to 
benefit from the use of Hoodia, although in practice other benefit-sharing agree-
ments continued to be signed between the San and Hoodia growers and traders.
Additionally, the inflow and distribution of potentially huge sums of money 
to the San was very worrying because of the fragility of local San institutions. 
What impact would this have on the San, and how could a system be created 
that ensured fairness and equity across three countries? This matter was especially 
complex and fraught because of the wide dispersal of San across very remote parts 
of southern Africa. Experiences of distributing the USD 60,000 received by the 
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San-Hoodia Trust in 2006 had already highlighted the immense challenges of this 
task (Wynberg et al 2009).
Some five years later these issues remain unresolved, largely thanks to the near 
collapse of the Hoodia market. The withdrawal of Unilever, and later Phytopharm, 
from the commercial development of Hoodia due to worrying results from clini-
cal trials has severely reduced demand for the plant, although a small number of 
products are still sold on the herbal supplement market by other players. Nonethe-
less, the case has yielded valuable experiences for the San, who have subsequently 
launched benefit claims based on their traditional knowledge of other indigenous 
species from the region such as Sceletium tortuosum, rooibos and honeybush.
A very different set of experiences emerges in the next case, that of Pelargonium 
sidoides, but with some remarkably similar outcomes. Investigating the actions of 
those directly involved, and the consequences of their interactions, offers a glimpse 
into the complexity of the governance of this NTFP, exposing the pressure and 
friction that can result when global ambitions such as access and benefit sharing 
under the CBD collide with local realities (Morris 2012).
Pelargonium sidoides: Governing a resource in times of 
regulatory transformation
A medicinal plant from the geranium family, Pelargonium sidoides (hereinafter 
Pelargonium) is endemic to South Africa and Lesotho. Long used as a traditional 
Figure 14.4 Cultivated Hoodia gordonii (photo: Rachel Wynberg).
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medicine by local communities, the plant is also incorporated into a cold-care 
remedy manufactured and distributed worldwide by German pharmaceutical 
company Schwabe. The raw material supplying the industry is largely sourced 
from the wild, harvested by rural communities on communal lands in the Eastern 
Cape Province of South Africa, and across Lesotho, where the resource is most 
abundant (Figure 14.1).
Community members from these areas suffer high levels of poverty, widespread 
dependence on state welfare grants and inadequate provision of basic services such 
as water, sanitation and health care – circumstances that still haunt the former 
homelands9 of the Transkei and Ciskei (Westaway 2012). These conditions, which 
are also prevalent in Lesotho, one of the least developed countries in the region 
(Global Policy Network [GPN] 2006), create a situation conducive to the wide use 
of the plant in place of modern medicines, which are either unobtainable or in 
short supply, and high reliance on the income earned by the hundreds of people 
engaged in harvesting the plant.
With a history of commercialization spanning more than a century, the Pelargo-
nium trade has seen significant changes in its governance. Once characterized by 
unfettered access, the industry has become subject to progressively stricter regula-
tory measures, which have affected a variety of actors: rural community members, 
who use the plant traditionally and rely on collecting the resource to supplement 
their livelihoods; traditional authorities responsible for land and natural resource 
allocation; members of the private sector bringing Pelargonium-based products to 
market; and NGOs concerned about biopiracy and inequality in the value chain.
Pelargonium commercialization
The transition from local remedy to global phytomedicine commenced around 
the turn of the twentieth century. In 1897, Charles Henry Stevens, an Englishman 
suffering from tuberculosis, travelled to southern Africa on his doctor’s advice (‘An 
English Physician’ 1931). In the highlands of Lesotho, a healer treated him with a 
remedy derived from Pelargonium tubers, and upon his return to England Stevens 
was declared healthy.
He then set about commercializing a remedy based on the healer’s preparation 
which he called ‘Umckaloabo’. The industry gradually spread to the European 
continent, and once the identity of the plant material was established in 1974, 
renewed interest led to clinical trials which proved the efficacy of the herbal rem-
edy for treating respiratory ailments. Since the 1980s, when Schwabe acquired the 
rights to sell Umckaloabo, it has been one of the company’s best sellers, particu-
larly in Germany, where the value of the local market for the product increased 
from €8 million in 2001 to €80 million in 2006 (Brendler and Van Wyk 2008).
For the past three decades, Schwabe has had a near-monopoly on the Pelar-
gonium industry (see Figure 14.5). Until the end of 2011, the Pelargonium supply 
chain consisted of a large number of harvesters – the precise number has not 
been determined – resident in the Eastern Cape and Lesotho who sold the mate-
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rudimentary processing, whereas the local buyer in South Africa was responsible 
for transporting the raw material to an intermediary buyer in the Western Cape, 
where processing took place. Ultimately all material was shipped to Germany via 
Parceval, an erstwhile subsidiary of Schwabe based in the Western Cape. The 
majority of value-adding, and therefore profit, such as manufacturing the tincture, 
marketing and selling the final product, thus happened on German soil.
Challenging the patents
Schwabe’s domination of the Pelargonium industry, strengthened by a number of 
Pelargonium-based patents held by the company, did not go unnoticed. Around 
2007, a South African-based NGO, the African Centre for Biosafety (ACB), started 
drawing attention to the industry, expressing concern about the high rates of wild 
harvesting and the low returns received by harvesters, and accusing Schwabe of 
‘biopiracy’ (ACB 2008). Together with representatives from a community in the 
Eastern Cape and the Berne Declaration, a Swiss NGO, the ACB challenged 
four Schwabe patents related to Pelargonium at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
in 2008 (ACB 2010a). Challenges were also launched by three competitors of 
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Schwabe. Almost two years later, on 26 January 2010, the EPO revoked the pat-
ent for the method of extracting the substance used to make Umckaloabo on the 
conventional grounds of lack of inventive step10 (ACB 2010b).
Three months later, Schwabe announced that it would voluntarily withdraw 
four other Pelargonium patents, stating that the company did not want to be drawn 
into the ongoing international debate around patents and biopiracy, an issue which 
the company ascribed to incompatibility between the CBD and the international 
patent system (Schwabe 2010). 
Southern African states grapple with regulation
As demand for Umckaloabo rose towards the late 1990s, wild harvesting increased, 
raising concerns about sustainability. Provincial authorities responded by impos-
ing limitations on harvesting permits, such as the requirement that a certain 
percentage of harvested material be replanted. Existing legislation (the Nature 
Conservation Act No. 10 of 1987, enacted in the former Ciskei, but remaining in 
force after the dissolution of the homelands) already required local buyers to apply 
for harvesting permits in the Ciskei area, although similar laws did not exist in 
other parts of the province. Permitting conditions were not adhered to, meaning 
that the majority of material was harvested illegally. Permit restrictions also had 
the effect of relocating the industry across the border to Lesotho, where escalating 
harvesting, most of it illegal, led to the listing of the species as protected in 2004 
Figure 14.6 Timeline of Pelargonium sidoides commercialization.
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through an amendment (Legal Notice No. 93) to Lesotho’s Historical Monuments, 
Relics, Fauna and Flora Act (No. 41 of 1967) (Newton et al 2009).
Concerns about continued illegal harvesting led authorities in the Eastern Cape 
to impose a temporary ban on wild harvesting in the province from 2007 to 2009. 
During this period, the Bioprospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations 
(BABS Regulations) giving effect to the access and benefit-sharing provisions in 
the Biodiversity Act were promulgated in South Africa (Department of Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism [DEAT] 2008). Although the trade in Pelargonium raw 
material could be viewed as biotrade, or bulk trade in plant material, rather than 
bioprospecting, the broad definition for ‘bioprospecting’ in the Biodiversity Act 
meant that the industry would be subject to the conditions of the national access 
and benefit-sharing legislative framework (Van Niekerk and Wynberg 2012).
Provincial authorities were still responsible for granting harvesting permits, but 
only did so once users had obtained a bioprospecting permit from the national 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), which hinged on their demonstrating 
sustainable use, material disclosure to stakeholders and evidence of prior informed 
consent and arrangements such as benefit-sharing and/or material transfer agree-
ments concluded with providers to the satisfaction of the Minister of Environmen-
tal Affairs. With the introduction of the BABS Regulations, those already active in 
the industry were given time to align their activities to the regulations and submit 
their applications to the DEA. The ban on wild harvesting was thus partially lifted 
to give stakeholders with applications awaiting approval the opportunity to ply 
their trade (Van Niekerk and Wynberg 2012).
Figure 14.7 Pelargonium sidoides growing in the wild, Eastern Cape Province (photo: Jaci van 
Niekerk).
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In South Africa, bioprospecting permits were granted in 2011 to companies 
that had concluded benefit-sharing agreements with various traditional leaders: 
Gowar Enterprises, formerly part of the Schwabe chain, and Essential Amathole, 
a newcomer to the industry. This was done on the understanding that harvesting 
permits would be issued to traditional leaders – via pre-existing development 
bodies or ‘trusts’ – on behalf of communities. Gowar Enterprises agreed to share 
benefits with the King Sandile Development Trust of the Rharhabe Kingdom 
in the Eastern Cape, while Essential Amathole concluded agreements with the 
Essential Amathole Community Trust, the community development arm of the 
Amabhele Traditional Authority. By the end of 2013, the bioprospecting permit 
applied for by Schwabe, in conjunction with its local partner, Parceval, after 
agreeing to share benefits with chiefs of the Rharhabe Kingdom in 2008, had 
not been approved – marking an end to the domination by the Schwabe supply 
chain.
Sustainability and equity in the Pelargonium industry
While these developments may seem to represent an important step towards greater 
sustainability and equity, questions remain about what they mean in practice. As 
a result of the guarded nature of the industry, the lack of monitoring and repeated 
shifts in wild harvesting between South Africa and Lesotho, calculating volumes of 
wild-harvested Pelargonium has been difficult, if not impossible (Newton et al 2009; 
Van Niekerk and Wynberg 2012). This scenario is set to change, however, as bio-
prospecting permits issued in terms of the BABS Regulations require that reports 
be submitted to the issuing authorities within one year of the permit being issued 
and annually thereafter. Once these reports are received, information on trade 
volumes, trade pathways and resource provenance will become known (Republic 
of South Africa [RSA] 2013). The DEA intends for sustainable wild harvesting to 
be attained by rotational harvesting. This means that each village under a certain 
chief’s control will be given a chance to collect material in a ten-year cycle in order 
to give the tubers time to regenerate. Critics suggest this is unlikely to happen, as 
the lack of resources allows little monitoring and enforcement on the ground (A.P. 
Dold, curator, Selmar Schonland Herbarium, Grahamstown, personal commu-
nication, 2012).
Equity outcomes are equally ambiguous. In many ways the Pelargonium industry 
typifies the historically unequal relationship between Southern providers of NTFPs 
and Northern users, which persists despite decades of attention to this inequality 
via instruments such as the CBD. Examination of actors in the Pelargonium value 
chain reveals that rural harvesters are reaping limited benefits from their engage-
ment with the industry. On the one hand the structure of the industry, in particu-
lar the near-monopoly of the Schwabe supply chain, has meant that harvesters 
have been unable to negotiate better returns for their labour, earning between 
ZAR 2 and ZAR 4 (USD 0.2 and USD 0.4) per kilogram of tubers – a price set 
by the industry. In addition, harvesters have limited access to markets, credit and 
technology, and unclear rights of access to the resource, and thus remain unable 
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to establish enterprise ownership and improve their prospects (Van Niekerk and 
Wynberg 2012).
Driven by the desire to alleviate rural poverty and address inequalities, the 
DEA has turned to the implementation of access and benefit sharing as a solution. 
Regrettably, early attempts at doing so, as witnessed in the Pelargonium industry, 
have not accomplished these goals. In fact, the need for benefit-sharing agree-
ments has stimulated the interest of the ruling elite in rural communities, which 
does not bode well for harvesters without close ties to traditional leaders. This 
form of elite capture may well have been driven by the industry and government 
themselves, albeit unintentionally, since both sets of actors are in favour of deal-
ing with traditional leaders or established groups because they see it as ‘easier to 
work with an overarching structure rather than individual communities’ (industry 
representative, personal communication, 2009), and believe that ‘chiefs will take 
care of their communities’ (DEA 2010).
Prior to the introduction of access and benefit sharing, harvesting permits were 
obtained by local buyers who dealt directly with harvesters, but the permitting 
process is now routed via the chiefdoms. While this might not affect the price 
harvesters receive, it does mean that any residents of the former homelands who 
do not accept the authority of traditional leaders are forced to defer to those lead-
ers in order to participate in the industry (Morris 2012; Van Niekerk and Wyn-
berg 2012). Indeed, pressing questions remain about the validity of traditional 
authorities who are not universally accepted and have been criticized for execut-
ing their roles in an undemocratic, unaccountable and inequitable manner, often 
placing the interests of individuals before community interests (Ntsebeza 2002; 
Logan 2009).11
Like Hoodia, the Pelargonium case presents valuable lessons for the unfolding 
process of access and benefit sharing, especially with respect to the complexities of 
regulating both for sustainability and for equity. Unlike Hoodia, though, providers 
in this case have not been empowered. In fact, the opposite is true, as local har-
vesters have been disregarded in terms of participation and benefit sharing, with 
ruling elites prominent. Issues of identity and leadership are not easily resolved by 
access and benefit sharing, which is an approach designed for commercial agree-
ments. Moreover, the contested nature of traditional leadership and concomitant 
land tenure questions in South Africa are much larger issues that require debate in 
many forums before any kind of satisfactory solutions can be determined.
Discussion
An examination of the trade chains of these two commercially valuable southern 
African resources yields valuable insights into the way in which the state, the pri-
vate sector, NGOs, rural communities and other relevant institutions engage in 
and respond to the development of a natural product and changes in its supply and 
demand. There are a number of differences between the Hoodia and Pelargonium 
industries in their governance arrangements, levels of equity and approaches to 
sustainability (Table 14.1), yet their congruencies allow for useful cross-analyses.
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The Hoodia case reveals interesting changes to the cycles of governance that occur 
with the commercialization of a high-value species associated with traditional 
knowledge. State intervention was initially triggered when an NGO lobbied for the 
San to be acknowledged for their traditional knowledge. As the value of the plant 
increased in the early stages of commercialization and overharvesting became a 
problem, state intervention strengthened, in response to peaked commercial inter-
est and declines in the availability of the resource. As cultivation emerged as a 
Table 14.1 Comparative table of the two case studies
Hoodia gordonii Pelargonium sidoides 
Biological 
characteristics
Spiky stems are utilized. Underground tubers are utilized; can 
possibly be sustainably harvested, but 
tubers take eight to nine years to reach 
harvestable size.
Harvesting Initially wild-harvested, but 
since 2007 cultivated by 
commercial farmers.
Mostly harvested from the wild by 
rural poor, but cultivation under way 
by commercial farmers in the Free 
State Province and Schwabe-funded 
operations in Kenya and Mexico.
Sustainability Listed in CITES Appendix II 
in 2004. The ease of cultivating 
Hoodia and a decline in market 
interest have reduced threats 
from wild harvesting.
Little cultivation in southern Africa. 
Wild harvesting raises concerns about 
sustainability: listed as threatened in 
Lesotho in 2004, South African resource 
assessment declares it not threatened, 
with localized overharvesting in 2010.
Traditional 
knowledge
Acknowledged as the 
foundation of product 
development, but only after 
NGO intervention. Benefit 
sharing is based on use of 
traditional knowledge rather 
than provision of resources.
Traditional knowledge exists widely 
and was indeed used by Stevens in 
early commercialization, but is not 
explicitly linked to products and is not 
given recognition in the benefit-sharing 
agreements concluded thus far.
Market Peaked in 2002 and 2003, 
but fake products, inconclusive 
clinical trials and a lack of 
interest from business 
partners have caused market 
stagnation.
Market has steadily grown since the 
1990s. Schwabe has plans to roll out 
to other countries, but the company’s 
near-monopoly has diminished since 
early 2012, when new market entrants 
were awarded bioprospecting permits.
Patents The CSIR and Phytopharm 
hold a number of patents 
related to Hoodia’s appetite-
suppressant properties.
Schwabe held a number of patents, one 
revoked in 2010. Subsequently four 
were withdrawn, but others remain.
Equity Benefit-sharing agreements 
developed between the San 
and the CSIR, and South 
African and Namibian Hoodia 
growers. Whether or not these 
are equitable is open to debate, 
but the slump in trade makes 
this a largely moot point.
It is likely that two thirds of monies 
collected will be retained by the King 
Sandile Development Trust, with each 
chiefdom allocated a percentage of 
remaining funds. However, there have 
been claims of a lack of transparency 
in earlier cases, raising questions of 
fairness.
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viable option, the role of the state in regulating use tapered off and the industry 
became more self-regulated.
In contrast, while the state was initially not interested in questions of equity and 
benefit sharing, its agency in these issues became increasingly prominent – ironi-
cally at a time when the benefits were dwindling. NGOs were initially responsible 
for catalysing changes towards greater equity in the commercialization process, 
and have remained involved in supporting the San with capacity development 
and negotiation. The approach of industry has also changed, from one of aloof-
ness from equity considerations, to one based on a perception that benefit-sharing 
agreements are a vital part of securing regulatory approval and niche markets.
Although Pelargonium has a much longer history of commercial use than Hoodia, 
rapid escalation in demand for the raw material prompted a similar response from 
the state. Initially reacting to fears of overexploitation, environmental regulators in 
South Africa tightened permitting conditions for harvesting, and, with the advent 
of legislation on access and benefit sharing, became increasingly heavy-handed. In 
Lesotho, wild harvesting increased as a direct result of stricter regulation in South 
Africa, leading to tighter controls. In 2009, a requirement for harvesting permits to 
provide evidence of benefit sharing precipitated increased involvement of the state 
in equity deliberations. Governance of the Pelargonium industry has thus become 
increasingly state-centric, despite the long history of commercialization.
Unease about inequality in the supply chain also troubled NGOs, as did notions 
that the patents held by Schwabe had misappropriated traditional knowledge. 
Whether or not this was the case was never fully explored, but the successful chal-
lenge of the Umckaloabo process patent nevertheless served to highlight the power 
imbalances inherent in the value chains of commercially successful NTFPs. Fol-
lowing the patent challenge, and with benefit sharing a prerequisite for trading 
Pelargonium, the structure of the industry altered dramatically. Schwabe’s 30-year 
near-monopoly, sustained by both patents and control over the supply chain, 
came to an end when bioprospecting permits were allocated to entities outside the 
remaining partners in the chain.
Despite attempts to bring about equity and secure wider benefits through 
the sustainable use of Pelargonium, the lot of the rural community members who 
engage in the trade has remained largely unchanged. In fact, for those who do not 
acknowledge traditional leadership, the opportunity to collect Pelargonium to sup-
plement their livelihoods is compromised, as both government and industry have 
identified traditional authorities as the legitimate ‘resource and access providers’ 
envisioned by the CBD. The agency of traditional authorities has thus strength-
ened alongside increased state intervention, but not necessarily with more equi-
table outcomes for harvesters. Further confusing the picture in these rural areas 
is the effect of plural, overlapping and, in some cases, contradictory governance 
regimes between customary and statutory systems.
These findings provide pointers as to the way in which the governance of natu-
ral product value chains is unfolding, in a context that increasingly incorporates 
sustainable use and equity as integral parts of the policy landscape. The private 
sector, for example, is well known for its pioneering nature and ability to identify 
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market opportunities, its lead in the initial commercialization and later cultivation 
of a product and the way in which it thrives and declines in parallel with supply and 
demand trends. As specific industries evolve and mature, the private sector typi-
cally becomes more able to influence government policy and more likely to regu-
late itself. While this approach may work for cultivated and managed resources, 
questions remain as to how far the private sector can be assigned to self-regulate 
wild-harvested resources, or to determine equity along the chain.
The crucial role played by NGOs in the governance of natural product value 
chains has been well demonstrated and is likely to become stronger in the face of 
dwindling government capacities and in a policy space that is increasingly unclear, 
uncoordinated and confusing. NGO involvement typically lags behind that of the 
private sector and initially corrects for market failures by bringing in neglected 
social and environmental dimensions and lobbying for change. As the Hoodia case 
demonstrates, this can range from actively campaigning against biopiracy to sup-
porting communities in negotiating conditions and contracts and catalysing mar-
ket and policy interest as activities become more established. An increased global 
emphasis on equity and benefit sharing is likely to enhance this role, especially 
among public interest organizations that provide legal support to communities.
The role of the state, commonly recognized as a key factor influencing natural 
product development (e.g. Dove 1995; Schreckenberg 2003; Laird et al 2009) is 
similarly changing with greater scrutiny of resource sustainability and equity. The 
state has typically been reactive and interventionist in the early stages of com-
mercialization, initially responding to peaked commercial interest and declines in 
resource availability through policy measures that regulate resource access. This 
role has often tapered off as the resource has become better managed, generally 
through increased cultivation (Wynberg 2006).
The introduction of regulations on access and benefit sharing, however, is set to 
change this pattern, signalling a new era of increased state intervention in deter-
mining who gets what benefits, and how this occurs. This in turn raises the ques-
tion: does access and benefit sharing promote or hinder equity and sustainability? 
The requirement for benefit-sharing agreements in South Africa’s Biodiversity 
Act, for example, has generated its own suite of complications. While the inclusion 
of prior informed consent and benefit sharing in this law represents a major step 
forward in redressing past imbalances in the way in which biodiversity and tradi-
tional knowledge have been exploited, implementation presents major challenges 
(Crouch et al 2008; Taylor and Wynberg 2008). Because the Biodiversity Act fails 
to vest ownership of genetic resources in the state, an approach has been pursued 
that looks to bilateral arrangements between specific communities or individuals 
and companies as the modus operandi for securing benefit sharing (see Taylor and 
Wynberg 2008). As the two case studies explain, singling out ‘access providers’ 
or ‘knowledge providers’ with whom to conclude benefit-sharing agreements is 
highly contentious and problematic, in current practice encouraging elite capture 
rather than establishing equity.
The examination of the trade chains of two high-value NTFPs from southern 
Africa – each industry having its own nuances and determinants, each species and 
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production system its own ecological characteristics, each product its own particu-
larities and each actor its own political and cultural configurations and dynamics 
– reveals the realities that result when global ideals such as the equity and sustain-
able use envisioned by the CBD play out on the ground. Interventions initiated by 
the state, transformations in the private sector and mediations offered by NGOs 
offer great promises of benefit distribution, sustainable resource use and poverty 
alleviation, yet these initiatives may well get caught up in a policy snare that is 
fundamentally self-serving, and ultimately detrimental to rural producers and tra-
ditional knowledge holders.
With demand for natural products set to rise in future, it is vital that decision-
makers take heed of the need for tailored solutions that are better informed, reflect 
the heterogeneity of the actors and are rooted in realities on the ground that seek 
to reduce inequality and achieve ecological sustainability.
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Notes
 1 Meaning ‘all biological materials other than timber which are extracted from forests’ 
(De Beer and McDermott 1989).
 2 ‘Genetic resources’ is defined by the CBD as ‘genetic material of actual or potential 
value’, and ‘biological resources’ includes ‘genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, 
populations, or other biotic components of ecosystems with actual or potential use or 
value for humanity’ (United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] 1992).
 3 The CBD is a leading international treaty on biodiversity. It came into force in 1993, is 
legally binding and has 193 parties. Its three objectives are: the conservation of biologi-
cal diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol is a sup-
plementary agreement to the CBD providing a legal framework for the implementation 
of the CBD’s third objective. It will enter into force 90 days after its fiftieth ratification, 
whereupon obligations in terms of access to resources and traditional knowledge, ben-
efit sharing and compliance will become a legal requirement for parties.
 4 http://fairwild.org
 5 ‘Biotrade’ refers to the commercial collection, processing and sale of products derived 
from biodiversity, usually in large volumes.
 6 ‘Biopiracy’ refers to the misappropriation of genetic resources or traditional knowledge 
through the patent system, and/or the unauthorized collection for commercial ends of 
genetic resources or traditional knowledge (Dutfield 2002).
 7 Provincial legislation in South Africa – the Environmental Conservation Ordinance 
No. 19 of 1974 in the Northern Cape Province and Nature Conservation Ordinance 
19 of 1974 in the Western Cape Province – lists Hoodia species as protected, requiring a 
permit for certain activities related to the plants.
 8 Exchange rate as at June 2013: USD 1 = ZAR 9.99
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 9 The apartheid state demarcated certain predominantly rural areas, such as the Tran-
skei and Ciskei, as ‘homelands’, or nominal states where the black majority were con-
centrated and to which they were given obligatory citizenship.
 10 According to patent law, for an invention to be patentable, it must be novel, non-
obvious or involve an inventive step, and it must have useful application.
 11 When the apartheid government, which was in power from 1948 until 1994, established 
the homelands, traditional leaders were given land administration roles and had uncon-
tested powers in rural areas. The legitimacy of these leaders remains a fiercely debated 
issue. In the Ciskei, for example, where no formally recognized tribal authorities existed 
at the time of its declaration as a homeland, chiefdoms such as the Rharhabe were 
‘resuscitated’ by apartheid rulers (Peires 1989).
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The threats posed by global climate change are severe, and are already impacting 
on natural resources, food security, human health, the environment, economic 
activity and physical infrastructure. The quest for social justice is central to inter-
national human rights, development and environmental conventions and the glo-
bal issues they aim to govern. This is nowhere more so than for climate change: 
massive questions of distributional justice between countries now, and of equity 
intergenerationally, result from what has been termed the biggest and widest-
ranging market failure ever seen (Stern 2006).
While the concepts of ‘equity’ and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
in the response to climate change do lie at the heart of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), resolving these dilemmas may 
seem impossible in practice, particularly given the stagnation at the level of inter-
national negotiations. The problem is so complex, so interlinked, so wide-ranging, 
so global and yet so locally specific, that we may wonder whether we are attempt-
ing to govern what may, in fact, be ungovernable.
Our failure to respond adequately to climate change is foreclosing options for 
future generations: as we hurtle towards dangerous climate change with annually 
increasing emissions of greenhouse gases, changes in weather patterns are acceler-
ating and the relative climate stability we have enjoyed for centuries is now a thing 
of the past (Solomon et al 2007; Anderson and Bows 2008). There can be nothing 
just about condemning future generations to climatic mayhem.
Sobering as the question of treating future generations equitably is, it should 
not deflect us from examining current climate-justice-development nexuses, which 
include human rights questions, responsibility for past emissions, links between 
poverty and climate change and responsibility for financing adaptation to climate 
change (Huq et al 2006; Gardiner 2010; Arora-Jonsson 2011; Moellendorf 2012). 
It is where existing vulnerabilities and a high degree of climate risk come together, 
such as in the marginalized dryland areas of southern Africa, that we may most 
need to interrogate the fairness of evolving responses to the climate challenge. 
What are the key equity issues associated with climate change in southern Africa, 
and how will natural resource management and governance systems need to be 
modified to address these?
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This chapter does not attempt to set out a comprehensive framework for evolv-
ing effective and equitable governance systems for managing climate change, but 
rather aims to provide an initial exploration of these questions. Firstly, the con-
text of climate change risks and multiple livelihood stresses that act upon existing 
high levels of vulnerability in southern Africa is set. This leads to a discussion of 
key equity issues in climate change and some reflections on existing governance 
regimes in the region. The focus then shifts to practical and policy issues for the 
two main areas of adaptation and mitigation, in which some of the emerging haz-
ards on the route to a fair and just response are sketched out. In conclusion, some 
ways forward are explored, which include new approaches and orientations in the 
way we go about the multi-level processes of adaptation and mitigation.
Southern Africa’s vulnerability to climate change
Southern Africa is extremely vulnerable1 to the temperature and precipitation 
changes linked to climate change, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). Nearly all climate models used in the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report show overall drying for southern Africa, with increased rain-
fall variability. Subsequent multi-model analysis for the region projects a delay 
in onset of the rainy season, an early cessation in many parts, a decrease in mean 
summer rainfall in some areas and an increase in rainfall intensity in others (Con-
way 2011).
Analysis for southern Africa carried out by the Climate Systems Analysis Group 
at the University of Cape Town found that the median (average) of 21 model 
simulations2 comparing the period 1980–1999 with the period 2080–99 projected 
the following changes:
• a 3.4 °C increase in annual temperature (up to 3.7 °C in spring)
• a 23 per cent decrease in winter rainfall
• a 13 per cent decrease in spring rainfall.
However, these changes will not be experienced uniformly across the region: for 
instance, the western parts of South Africa are projected to become drier while the 
eastern parts become wetter, and central Botswana is likely to warm up much faster 
than surrounding areas. The warming over Africa is very likely to be larger than 
globally, and the observed temperature changes for southern Africa are higher 
than the increases reported for other parts of the world (Solomon et al 2007). In 
most parts of eastern and southern African, potential evaporation is almost twice 
as high as rainfall totals; thus less than 15 per cent of rainfall contributes to rivers 
and groundwater (Mwendera 2010).
There is growing evidence of the interactions between current climate variability 
and extreme weather events and long-term climate change (Field et al 2012). In 
southern Africa, despite the paucity of observational data (Tadross et al 2009), there 
is medium confidence that droughts will intensify in the twenty-first century, due to 
reduced precipitation and/or increased evapotranspiration (Field et al 2012).
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Recent analyses indicate that two thirds of the countries most vulnerable to 
climate variability and change are in Africa. Southern Africa’s vulnerability is 
considered to be high due to the large number of people who make their living 
off the land, as well as to underlying causes such as structural poverty, combined 
with high climate risks (Darkoh 2009; Midgley et al 2011). A recent exercise to 
map current and future climate-related vulnerability in southern Africa found a 
current band of high exposure lying between 12° S and 25° S, which will, it is 
projected, extend south to the 30° S latitude and into the north-western parts of 
the region by 2050 (Midgley et al 2011). This analysis found that vulnerability 
to climate impacts would intensify in the following areas: eastern and northern 
Angola, parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, southern Malawi, the 
Highveld of South Africa, parts of Madagascar and southern and western Zambia 
(Midgley et al 2011). A key factor in this water-stressed region is the impact of cli-
mate change on water availability and access: as Schulze (2007) points out, water 
poverty is already acute in many mesoscale catchments and will in all likelihood be 
exacerbated by climate change.
Climate change both introduces new sources of risk and acts as a risk multi-
plier, for example by exacerbating existing food insecurity or placing additional 
stress upon already degraded ecosystems. Key risks relate to increased average 
temperature, heightened intensity and/or the frequency of extreme events such 
as floods and droughts, more severe heat and water stress, rising sea levels and 
landslides and soil erosion. The sectors upon which the livelihoods and food secu-
rity of rural people depend are the very ones most vulnerable to climate change: 
agriculture, forestry (including non-timber forest products) and fisheries, including 
water-related aspects of these sectors.
There is a growing understanding of urban vulnerability to climate change in 
the region too, key factors being the rapid urban growth over the past three dec-
ades, resulting in large proportions of inhabitants living in informal settlements 
with high levels of vulnerability to extreme events such as flooding, and low lev-
els of services. The movement of people from the rural areas has not necessarily 
reduced climate vulnerability: as Chapman and Sasman (2012: iv) note, ‘Urbani-
sation has largely replaced one type of climate vulnerability experienced in rural 
areas with another.’
Climate change threatens development gains, makes sustainable natural resource 
management increasingly difficult, and is likely to further entrench poverty, in the 
absence of appropriate and sufficient responses (Parry et al 2007; Shackleton and 
Shackleton 2012). While climate change impacts are locally specific, the effects 
where many livelihoods are directly dependent on rainfed agriculture and natu-
ral resources will include an increased likelihood of crop failure; an increase in 
diseases and mortality and forced sales of livestock and other assets; increased 
livelihood insecurity, indebtedness, migration and dependency on food aid; and a 
downward spiral in human development indicators such as health and education 
(Parry et al 2007; Midgley et al 2011).
Negotiations under the UNFCCC have centred on keeping the average global 
temperature to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, although it is now 
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widely held that a safer goal is 1.5 °C, equivalent to 350 parts per million (ppm) of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide (Hansen et al 2008; Anderson and Bows 2008; Rock-
ström et al 2009). If we reach the two-degree boundary, between 350 million and 
600 million Africans will suffer increased water scarcity (Boko et al 2007). If the 
global temperature increases by 3 °C to 4 °C, changed run-off patterns and glacial 
melt could force an additional 1.8 billion people to live in a water-scarce environ-
ment by 2080 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2008a). James 
Hansen, a pre-eminent climate scientist formerly attached to the USA’s National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, has stated that stabilizing emissions at 450 
ppm will not, in fact, limit the increase in temperatures to two degrees above 
pre-industrial levels – still the goal of the UNFCCC negotiating process – but will 
instead result in an increase of six degrees this century (Hansen et al 2008). This 
takes us into uncharted territory for projections of climate impacts.
A particularly severe climate impact on humanity in the near future is likely to 
be an increase in hunger (Oxfam 2009; Ericksen et al 2011). By 2050, under what 
we must now consider to be optimistic scenarios, the number of people at risk of 
hunger is expected to increase by 10 to 20 per cent more than would be expected 
without climate change, with at least 24 million additional malnourished children, 
and the worst impacts would be in sub-Saharan Africa (Parry et al 2007). This is of 
grave concern in southern Africa, with its widespread food insecurity, high burden 
of disease and rapidly increasing population densities in areas of high agricultural 
productivity, which correspond with areas of high vulnerability to current and 
future climatic factors (Osbahr et al 2010; Midgley et al 2011).
Notwithstanding progress made since the 1990s, figures from the 2004–6 period 
reveal that approximately 95 million people in southern Africa, or 40 per cent 
of the population, are undernourished (De Wit and Midgley 2012). Given that 
food production in the region is already greatly influenced by high degrees of 
climatic unpredictability and extreme events like droughts and floods, there are 
serious concerns about the impacts of climate change, which will exacerbate these 
variables.
Of course, food production is just one element of food availability, which is one 
of four dimensions of food security (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] 
2008). Nevertheless, the projected decreases in food production and changes in 
the nutritional value of crops as a result of climate change are likely to worsen food 
security in the region, as attaining food security relies on fulfilling all four dimen-
sions simultaneously (Misselhorn 2005; De Wit and Midgley 2012). In southern 
Africa, food insecurity has numerous social and political dimensions, which include 
diminished social capital linked to poverty, conflict and HIV/AIDS. These are 
also fundamental constraints to food production (Misselhorn 2005).
A 2010 Stanford University report notes that by 2050, under the two-degree 
warming scenario, the growing season average temperature will be hotter than any 
year in historical experience for nine years out of ten, which could result in a 32 
per cent production loss for key staple crops like maize and sorghum. This would 
be bad enough if the overall global temperature increase was indeed going to be 
kept to two degrees or less above pre-industrial levels. However, current pledges 
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for emissions reductions are setting a course towards an average global tempera-
ture increase of at least four degrees (see, for example, Anderson and Bows 2008), 
which implies a higher increase in Africa. Moreover, emissions are now beyond 
even the most extreme of the IPCC’s emissions scenarios (Anderson and Bows 
2008).
Climate change will have grave impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems in 
southern Africa (Biggs et al 2004; Parry et al 2007), with implications for the liveli-
hood opportunities and food security of communities that eke out their existence 
from these sources. Such impacts could affect agro-ecological functions, such as 
crop pollination, which could be severely affected by the loss of large numbers 
of insect species in what is being referred to as the ‘sixth great extinction’. This 
highlights the importance of achieving synergy between biodiversity conservation 
and actions to address climate change and ensure that the ‘dynamic and complex 
linkages and feedbacks between human vulnerability and ecosystem vulnerability’ 
(Shackleton and Shackleton 2012) are taken into account in responses to climate 
change.
The convergence of these climate risks and other threats would constitute an 
extremely serious situation for the livelihoods of poor people and the ecosystems 
upon which they depend, as well as for national economies in southern Africa and 
elsewhere, even if the processes and institutions for governance were well devel-
oped and functioned effectively. However, this is not the case.
Climate governance and justice
A broad definition of governance is the ‘system of rules that shape the actions of 
social actors’ (in Treib et al 2007, p. 3). While recognizing a range of actors and 
stakeholders, the concept of governance implies the centrality of institutions at 
different levels. As Sowman and Wynberg point out in their introduction to this 
volume, governance for justice and sustainability is concerned not only with state 
regulation and enforcement, but also with the ‘political, institutional, and cultural 
frameworks through which diverse interests in natural and cultural resources are 
coordinated and controlled’ (Cronkleton et al 2008, p. 1). Consequently, the inter-
action between private and public actors in natural resource management is an 
important element of governance for justice and sustainability.
In Africa, multiple uncertainties that affect the lives and livelihoods of poor peo-
ple relate not only to the changing climate, but to the numerous environmental, 
social, economic, institutional and political stressors acting at different levels and 
across scales, sectors and stakeholder groups (Boko et al 2007; Ziervogel and Tay-
lor 2008). And in southern Africa, as in many developing countries, climate-sensi-
tive sectors such as water, agriculture, forestry and fisheries are not well adapted to 
current climatic risks and variability (Midgley et al 2011; Smith et al 2011), and the 
region as a whole has low levels of adaptive capacity, defined by the IPCC in 2007 
as ‘the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability 
and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, 
or to cope with the consequences’ (Parry et al 2007; Woolfrey 2012). While this 
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definition emphasizes systems, it is relevant to consider the adaptive capacity of 
individuals and institutions as well.
The low levels of adaptive capacity in southern Africa are linked to many short-
comings in the environmental and climate governance system, including fragmented 
legislative and policy frameworks, inadequate institutional coordination, a failure to 
recognize and integrate customary arrangements and limited participation by civil 
society organizations and communities. This has been well described in relation to 
the governance of natural resources elsewhere in this volume, and more specifi-
cally to climate issues by, for example, Madzwamuse (2010a). Adaptive capacity is 
directly related to governance at different levels. At the local level, adaptive capacity 
is influenced by the institutional environment, access to information, finances and 
technology, political power and also by governance resources and processes at the 
regional level (Smit and Wandel 2006). Regional, national and global processes, 
including governance regimes and economic forces such as globalization, constitute 
the enabling environment in which communities and individuals must try to adapt 
(Smit and Wandel 2006; Jones et al 2010; Ludi et al 2012).
Legislative and policy frameworks for climate change and adaptation in south-
ern Africa remain fragmented (Chandani 2011). This is the case for Africa as a 
whole: adaptation policy approaches fail to consider realities in the political and 
institutional spheres (Naess et al 2011; Lockwood 2012). While African countries 
have initiated comprehensive planning processes by developing national adapta-
tion programmes of action or climate change response strategies, in general these 
have not been facilitated, integrated responses, as they often focus on biophysical 
vulnerabilities, adopt sectoral and project approaches to adaptation, and do not 
incorporate adaptation needs at the micro level (Madzwamuse 2010a). Current 
responses in the region do not recognize or address the interdependent factors 
causing vulnerability, nor do the governance frameworks yet create an enabling 
environment that reflects and could support the variety of interlinked components 
that comprise adaptive capacity.
Given the extremely wide-ranging and cross-cutting nature of climate change, 
and of the determinants of adaptive capacity, the situation calls for transdiscipli-
nary research and action which recognizes that natural and social systems (society 
and ecology) are interlinked. Apart from overarching planning frameworks that 
incorporate these elements, critical areas to address for southern Africa include 
water and human and food security. Governance institutions at the regional, 
national and subnational levels will need to develop and promote adaptive man-
agement systems to deal with the rapidly changing prognoses.
Yet the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a regional entity 
has been weak on translating policy statements and declarations into concrete 
implementation plans (Richards, 2008) and still lacks a clear agenda on climate 
change (Ruppel and Ruppel-Schlichting 2012). The SADC region’s high levels of 
vulnerability to global developments such as the financial crisis, oil and food price 
increases, climate change and the regional energy crisis indicate the need to build 
institutional capacity for conflict management, mediation and, in a broad sense, 
forecasting (Giuffrida and Müller-Glodde 2009).
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Taking one example, adaptation and development would require the manage-
ment of transboundary water resources in the region to ensure equitable sharing, 
particularly for people in the most vulnerable sub-basins (Midgley et al 2011). 
While SADC does have institutions and processes designed to promote this, suc-
cessful implementation and conflict management will require sustained political 
commitment. At the national level, climate policy institutional frameworks are not 
yet able to coordinate existing adaptation projects and programmes, a shortcom-
ing that results in a donor-driven, ad-hoc and project-level approach, which is not 
optimal for promoting local or national ownership.
There is now broad consensus that questions of equity, justice and ethics are 
central to managing climate change (Eakin and Luers 2006; Biermann et al 2012). 
Climate justice dimensions operate at various levels and across different times-
cales. They include justice between generations – there is little doubt that climate 
change is foreclosing options for future generations, which is unjust – and social 
justice in the present. This is particularly pertinent for Africa, as people in poor 
countries, especially in Africa, are already far more likely to die as a result of cli-
matic changes that occurred up to 2000 – and these regions and populations are 
the least responsible for the increase in greenhouse gases that is driving climate 
change (Patz et al 2007).
The literature on climate change, equity and social justice has several themes: 
climate change and human rights, responsibility for past emissions and the pol-
luter-pays principle, the setting of mitigation targets, questions concerning entitle-
ments for future emissions and responsibility for financing adaptation (including 
technology transfer) (Paavola and Adger 2002; Brown et al 2007; Gardiner 2010; 
Jamieson 2010; Winkler et al 2011; Moellendorf 2012). These themes include both 
procedural and distributive justice matters (Paavola and Adger 2002), and are 
clearly set out in the Rock Ethics Institute’s White Paper on the Ethical Dimen-
sions of Climate Change (Brown et al 2007). This chapter does not discuss all of 
the ethical themes of relevance to climate change, but instead focuses on compo-
nents of a number of different themes as they relate to the key developmental and 
governance issues discussed here.
In the global negotiations arena, the concepts of ‘equity’ and ‘common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities’ lie at the heart of the UNFCCC, the centrepiece of the 
evolving international climate change regime (International Council on Human 
Rights Policy [ICHRP] 2008). The UNFCCC sets down principles for distributive 
justice to address the fact that countries and communities that are not responsible 
for creating the problem, in that their contribution to greenhouse gas emissions 
has been negligible, are often the most vulnerable to climate change, as they gen-
erally have lower adaptive capacity (Stern 2006; Fankhauser and Schmidt-Traub 
2010). In addition to equity issues linked to causal responsibility, there are justice 
issues related to the response to climate change.
Thus article 3 of the UNFCCC provides that parties to the convention should 
respond to climate change ‘on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities’, specifying 
that developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change, and 
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that responses should take into account the development needs of developing 
countries. In this way, the UNFCCC is relevant to the defining characteristics 
of our world: global inequality and extreme poverty (Moellendorf 2012). Emerg-
ing economies and developing countries, including those in southern Africa, have 
stated that equitable access to sustainable development and other issues of equity 
should be the foundation of the proposed global climate change agreement (Win-
kler et al 2011).
The recent IPCC special report on extreme events has highlighted how inequal-
ities among people influence local coping and adaptive capacity. These inequali-
ties, which also constitute significant challenges to disaster risk management and 
adaptation from local to national levels (Field et al 2012), comprise social and 
power inequities based on gender, class, caste, race, age, education, religion and 
health. An equitable response to climate change necessitates governance across 
national boundaries too. In southern Africa, ‘hotspot’ regions (in terms of current 
and future climate-related vulnerability) correspond with climate and land use 
systems that cut across political boundaries, but national governance systems and 
socio-economic factors influence the risks (Midgley et al 2011).
While climate change is a global problem that does indeed require global politi-
cal solutions, the context-specific nature of vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
highlights the importance of localized responses. However, globalization and other 
external forces may heighten susceptibility to the effects of climate change for the 
most vulnerable countries at different levels, for example where increasing scarcity 
and/or contestation for resources exacerbates inequities between and within com-
munities, regions and nations. As Gomera et al (2012, p. 301) note, climate change 
is ‘expanding the suite of global claimants on local resources’.
The discussion above sets a broad context for the examination of some specific 
equity issues that impinge on the two core policy areas of climate change: adapta-
tion and mitigation, which some have characterized as a false dichotomy (Simon 
2011). The following discussion is not exhaustive; it merely highlights some key 
areas in which equity and social justice considerations may be particularly rel-
evant to natural resource-based livelihoods in southern Africa, and begins with a 
consideration of the interlinked concepts of adaptation, vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity.
Adaptation
‘Adaptation’ has been defined as the adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates 
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities (Parry et al 2007). Different types of adap-
tation can be distinguished according to timing, intent and form, with common 
types being anticipatory, autonomous and planned adaptation (Smit and Wandel 
2006; Parry et al 2007; Collier et al 2008). Adaptation responses may occur at 
different levels. As Paavola and Adger (2002) note, ‘Adaptation is comprised of 
inaction and proactive and reactive responses at the international, national, local 
and individual levels’.
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There is growing acknowledgement that adaptation responses must include 
increased resilience in both social and ecological systems (Girot et al 2012). The 
focus on resilience has developed largely in response to the many uncertainties 
about future carbon emissions and their impacts, as well as the multi-stressor con-
text in which people live and pursue their livelihoods (Conway 2011).
The other side of building resilience is reducing vulnerability, usually consid-
ered in terms of a number of different components: inherent vulnerability within 
a system, which may be termed sensitivity; the magnitude of change imposed 
upon the system; and exposure to that change (Eakin and Luers 2006; Smit and 
Wandel 2006). There are, however, diverse definitions of vulnerability that draw 
from natural and social sciences and focus, respectively, on the climate impacts 
and on the social, political or economic context (Adger et al 2004; O’Brien et 
al 2007; Kazmierczak and Handley 2011). Vulnerability is linked to adaptive 
capacity, which we can consider as the ability of individuals, institutions and sys-
tems to adjust to climate change. For effective adaptation, vulnerability (which 
encompasses exposure, as used here) needs to be reduced and adaptive capacity 
built.
Paavola and Adger’s (2002) framework for analysing justice issues in adaptation 
has two main components: distributive justice, which includes how the benefi-
cial and adverse effects of climate impacts and adaptation to them are distributed 
across groups of people and time, and procedural justice, which concerns how and 
by whom decisions on adaptive responses are made.
According to this framework, distributive justice issues centre on the concepts 
of equity and fairness. Vulnerability to climate change is highly differentiated, 
socially and spatially (Adger 2008), with clear implications for equity. A decade 
ago, Burton et al (2002) raised the issue of the differential distribution of adap-
tation benefits and costs. While this is now receiving greater attention in policy 
and practice (see, for example, Hesse 2011, concerning drylands development and 
adaptation), little attention, in general, has been paid to equity and social justice 
issues in adaptation initiatives (Thomas and Twyman 2005). There is no doubt 
that adaptation costs are highly distorted at the global scale (Adger 2001); this 
applies as well at the local scale, where some groups and individuals who may 
least be able to respond, for various reasons, are more vulnerable than others to 
the effects of climate change. Significant thematic areas for considering equity at 
the local level include gender and the involvement of vulnerable or marginalized 
groups such as children and the elderly.
Low levels of gender equality in southern Africa have implications for adapta-
tion to climate change in the region. While it is recognized that not all women are 
poor (Arora-Jonsson 2011), poor women often have limited access to resources, 
restricted rights, restricted mobility and little say in shaping decisions, all of which 
makes them highly vulnerable to climate change. Gender inequalities in the natu-
ral resource arena include inequitable access to resources, a lack of empowerment 
and participation in decision-making and the burden of unpaid household work 
(Raworth 2008; Arora-Jonsson 2011). Despite significant efforts over the past 
few decades, the gender equality bar remains depressingly low: in 2012 it was 
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estimated that 34–77 per cent of the global population fell below the social founda-
tion for gender equality (Raworth 2012).
Sub-Saharan Africa scores lowest among regions on the gender inequality 
index (UNDP, 2011), with most SADC countries scoring low on gender empow-
erment measures (UNDP and SADC 2000). Gender inequalities intensify cli-
mate risks and vulnerabilities, and climate change threatens to exacerbate exist-
ing inequalities and jeopardize gains made in this area (UNDP 2008a; Raworth 
2008; Patt et al 2009; UNFPA 2009). Actions to deal with the depletion of 
natural resources linked to climatic changes in Africa increase women’s work-
load (UNDP 2010; Romero González et al 2011), and can reverse educational 
achievements, if girls are kept out of school to assist with heavier household 
duties (Raworth 2008).
Secure tenure is considered essential to enhancing the adaptive capacity of poor 
and vulnerable people (African Development Forum 2010). Differential security 
of tenure over land and resource access between men and women, often linked to 
cultural norms, further reduces the ability of women to adapt to climate change, 
and places them at greater risk of losing customary informal tenure arrangements 
in the face of ‘land grabs’. Such loss of land, which affects men too, is increasingly 
linked to mitigation initiatives and the evolution of the global carbon market, dis-
cussed below.
Children and the elderly are disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change (Drimie and Casale 2009; Seballos and Tanner 2011). The mul-
tidimensional nature of children’s vulnerability is shaped by the context in which 
they live and the physical, social, and emotional changes that occur during the 
childhood years, which are exacerbated by their lack of agency and voice (United 
Nations Children’s Fund South Africa [UNICEF] 2011). Children and youth 
form the majority of Africa’s population, but are largely excluded from national 
policy development, and their needs are not incorporated into climate change 
negotiations (African Development Forum 2010). Studies point to serious climate 
impacts aggravating child malnutrition and hunger. The International Food Pol-
icy Research Institute estimates that by 2050, 20 per cent more children will be 
malnourished than would have been the case in a world without climate change 
(Nelson et al 2009).
These differential aspects of vulnerability, which demand an analysis from the 
perspectives of equity and justice, are very much present in southern Africa, where 
women and unemployed young people are considered particularly at risk from cli-
mate change (Midgley 2011). Moreover, the increase in extreme events projected 
for the region may worsen vulnerability levels for those most at risk. Research in 
disaster management has highlighted the fact that women and other marginal-
ized social groups suffer more during disasters and find it harder to bounce back 
afterwards (Adger et al 2007), although Arora-Jonsson (2011) has questioned the 
evidence for this assertion. If it is true, then the increased intensity and frequency 
of disasters linked to climate change could exacerbate existing social inequalities. 
In southern Africa, this relates to the increased incidence and severity of drought 
and floods, as well as cyclones along the eastern coast.
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As we have seen, entrenched cycles of vulnerability characterize southern Africa’s 
food-insecure communities, caused largely by poverty, environmental stressors and 
conflict. Multiple stresses related to HIV and AIDS, land degradation, trends in eco-
nomic globalization and exposure to violent conflict aggravate exposure to climate 
risks (Adger et al 2007) and affect the capacity of poor and vulnerable people in 
southern Africa to adapt to climate change (Drimie 2010; Midgley et al 2011). The 
incorporation of considerations of both climate change and vulnerability to climate 
change into development activities is essential to preserving and increasing develop-
ment gains and to supporting the kind of adaptation that reduces both vulnerability 
and poverty: that is, sustainable adaptation measures (Eriksen et al 2007).
There is a range of climate adaptation programmes in southern Africa, includ-
ing both inter-country and civil-society-driven programmes (Chishakwe 2010). 
Most of these are donor-funded and range in implementation approach from 
community-based interventions to government disaster management activities. 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter, an analysis of these programmes 
aimed at understanding the degree to which equity and justice considerations are 
incorporated would be instructive.
Many programmes in the region have included vulnerability assessments, for 
example under the Assessments of Impacts and Adaptation to Climate Change 
programme3 and the more recent Regional Climate Change Programme for 
Southern Africa.4 Vulnerability indices and vulnerability assessment methodology 
are being refined to better elucidate the underlying causes of vulnerability that 
relate to the inequity issues discussed above, such as a lack of voice or agency, and 
inequitable access to land. At the international level, the Climate and Regional 
Economics of Development integrated assessment5 (or climate-economics) model 
is designed to emphasize issues of international equity while using the most up-to-
date estimates of physical climate impacts and emissions abatement costs.
The greater emphasis now being placed on understanding the social dimen-
sions of climate change has both analytical and normative components (SDCC 
Task Team 2011). This focus both highlights the fundamentally social aspects of 
climate processes and elaborates equity and social justice principles, particularly 
for the most vulnerable people. The social dimensions of climate change include 
social, institutional, economic, knowledge, informational and behavioural aspects, 
emphasizing the socio-economic dimension of vulnerability (Bauer and Scholz 
2010; SDCC Task Team 2011; African Development Forum 2010; Chambwera 
and Anderson 2011). Taking account of this broader context, there is a growing 
focus on the social, institutional, policy, knowledge and informational approaches 
to responding to climate change. This evolving view allows for enhanced linkages 
between the diverse range of adaptation options and the multiple stressors at liveli-
hood level – or, in the words of Tschakert and Dietrich (2010), the ‘multi-faceted 
livelihood-vulnerability risks’ faced by many people in Africa.
Successful adaptation strategies will need to embrace social and behavioural 
change. Recognition of this is evident in the emerging trend of transforming 
adaptation projects from technical interventions into social or process interventions 
(Urquhart 2009). Political aspects, in addition to social dimensions, have often 
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been downplayed in the early emphasis on technological and infrastructural adap-
tation approaches (Brown et al 2007). However, power dynamics, access to infor-
mation and services and control over resources are important determinants of 
people’s capacity to adapt to climate change, as indeed they are for any develop-
ment process. Institutions (both formal, such as government bodies, and informal, 
such as kinship networks), social processes and political context influence how peo-
ple decide on adaptation actions, reflecting the centrality of these preoccupations 
of governance to understanding the adaptation process.
Work carried out by the Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) 
in Uganda, Mozambique and Ethiopia highlights the pivotal role of social proc-
esses and institutions in influencing people’s response to changing external pres-
sures (Jones et al 2011). In the context of climate variability and change, formal 
and informal institutions hold sway over individual and collective decision-making 
and may often control entitlements to key resources in lean times. In addition to 
rules for collective ownership rights to natural resources, informal social institu-
tions include religious and ethnic belief systems and household gender roles and 
responsibilities (Jones et al 2011). Adaptation also requires a long-term approach: 
thus it necessitates institutions and governance structures capable of managing 
evolving climate change risks and adaptation priorities over time (UNDP 2008b).
Equity and human rights issues are finding new focus in the growing literature 
on environmental migrants and climate refugees. It is likely that climate change 
will exacerbate the existing movement of people towards areas of actual or per-
ceived higher resilience, so it will require careful management to reduce inherent 
conflicts and promote sustainable livelihoods for host communities and new resi-
dents. However, SADC currently lacks the necessary political engagement, insti-
tutions, policy and management frameworks for reducing the potentially serious 
impacts of climate change on regional security (Midgley et al 2011; Ruppel and 
Ruppel-Schlichting 2012).
Despite a range of adaptation initiatives in the region (International Development 
Research Centre [IDRC] 2010; Climate Change Adaptation in Africa Program 
[CCAA] 2011; Chambwera and Anderson 2011; Jones et al 2011; Global Environ-
ment Facility [GEF] 2011; Koelle and Anneke n.d.) and the prospects of additional 
international financing, limits to the ability of poor households to adapt (in particular 
autonomously) are becoming evident (Adger et al 2009; Ludi et al 2012). Related 
factors include reduced access to assets and resources, linked to environmental deg-
radation or elite capture; less functional social networks and reciprocity related to 
migration and displacement; and limited options for livelihoods diversification. This 
emphasizes the importance of a focus on enhancing the adaptive capacity of com-
munities dependent on natural resources, so that they can adjust management and 
use patterns in response to climate change (UNDP 2008b).
Mitigation
Mitigation consists of actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
improve sinks for carbon. The aim is to reduce the concentration of greenhouse 
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gases in the atmosphere and limit the extent of dangerous climate change. While 
effective mitigation requires action by major greenhouse gas emitters globally, 
including far-ranging moves in the industrial, transport and energy generation sec-
tors (Klein et al 2007), the diverse portfolio of mitigatory initiatives includes some 
that can be coupled with adaptation actions to benefit poor rural people (Eriksen 
et al 2007; Urquhart 2010). An example is systems that reward smallholders and 
natural resource users for conserving environments such as forests, woodlands and 
peatlands, known as ‘payments for ecosystem services’. Given new understandings 
of the urgency of the climate situation – briefly stated, a global mean temperature 
increase will reduce the biosphere’s ability to store carbon emissions (Anderson 
and Bows 2008) – it is important to integrate adaptation and mitigation, especially 
through activities that can reduce carbon cycle feedbacks.
Activities that can serve both adaptation and mitigation goals simultaneously are 
agroforestry, conservation agriculture – including conservation tillage and appro-
priate cropping systems – and the rehabilitation of degraded environments such 
as grasslands (Verchot et al 2006; Syampungani et al 2010; World Bank 2011). 
Afforestation and reforestation have similar potential, if the negative ecological 
effects associated with monocrop plantations can be avoided (International Fund 
for Agricultural Development [IFAD] 2009). Through these and other activities, 
such as maintaining forests and managing rangelands, small-scale farmers and 
grassroots natural resource managers provide a wide range of environmental serv-
ices that support carbon sequestration and limit the emissions of other greenhouse 
gases.
However, equity considerations are important here: such people account for 
only a small part of agricultural emissions, and are very often the most highly 
vulnerable to and severely affected by climate change (IFAD 2009). Similarly, 
it is widely accepted that indigenous peoples are among those most harmed by 
climate change, despite having made negligible contributions to the creation of 
the climate challenge. The global mitigation imperative has a valuable role for 
these indigenous and local communities, a role which should be recognized and 
rewarded. Payments for mitigation services do come from a number of sources, 
but are currently limited in scale and benefits.
Among the substantial external threats to the natural resource-based liveli-
hoods of poor communities are deforestation (including the conversion of forests 
to monocultures), impacts from the growing number of dams for hydropower and 
fast-paced land privatization for plantations and mining (Brown et al 2007). The 
impacts of climate change are likely to increase the risks to the poor which are 
already evident in external processes such as globalization, particularly where they 
involve powerful actors like agricultural industries making new claims over scarce 
land and water (Brown, Slaymaker et al 2007). Heightened competition for natu-
ral resources and a worsening asset situation both put the welfare of the poor at 
risk. The vulnerability of indigenous and other traditional local communities to 
external interests that are keen to take over control of their traditional resources 
(Swiderska et al 2009; Gomera et al 2012) is exacerbated by environmental degra-
dation, which may in turn be exacerbated by climate change.
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The global carbon market is a driver behind some of these threats, as transna-
tional interests scramble for land in Africa for mitigation-related activities such as the 
cultivation of crops for biofuels (Gomera et al 2012). Problematic areas related to the 
expansion of biofuels include negative effects on biodiversity and ecosystems, com-
petition for land and water between fuel and food crops, risks to land tenure security 
and reduced livelihood opportunities for women, pastoralists and migrant farmers 
related to reduced access to land (German et al 2011; Unruh 2008).
The UN’s Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation ini-
tiative, known as REDD+, embodies approaches that can provide financial and 
non-financial incentives for the protection and restoration of forests and degraded 
land, and, if so designed, can also offer tools to leverage more secure access or 
tenure. Despite this potential, caution should be exercised, as REDD+ and similar 
approaches could result in the loss of access to land if collective and individual 
rights and customary laws are not recognized, and in negative impacts on biodi-
versity (Phelps et al 2012). Such approaches may also not deliver ecological and 
mitigation benefits, as there are doubts about whether deforestation can be pre-
vented by carbon markets.6 Stronger provisions will be needed than just trading 
the carbon stored in forests and hoping that the magic of the markets will keep the 
profits from carbon trading higher than the profits from palm oil trading (Lang 
2010).
In an analysis of the threats to community resource governance arising from 
the global carbon market, Gomera et al (2012) discuss issues of devolved versus 
centralized governance, and highlight the vested interests that operate at every 
level. Discussing REDD+, they note that forest governance is critical to the opera-
tional effectiveness of this regime. They point out the paradox inherent in needing 
strong local institutions and resource rights to capture the benefits of REDD+, in 
a context in which the greater the benefits, the more contested the rights are likely 
to be. This is strongly reminiscent of the contested landscape for community-based 
natural resource management (CBNRM), emphasizing the desirability of drawing 
on lessons learned from the many years of CBNRM in southern Africa in design-
ing and implementing carbon governance regimes.
Security of tenure and/or usufruct is a key basic requirement for ensuring that 
local communities are able to benefit from initiatives like REDD+ and other car-
bon market possibilities. It is also, of course, a basic human right, as well as an 
important step for supporting local and indigenous knowledge that may itself be 
important for responding to climate change. For example, Swiderska et al (2009) 
show how maintaining indigenous knowledge is critically linked to ensuring ongo-
ing access to traditional lands.
Not only should equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms be adopted for imple-
menting REDD+ at the local level, but such mechanisms should also diversify the 
asset base for all groups within communities, and include steps to ensure synergies 
with adaptation (Graham 2011). Equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms necessi-
tate effective participation from all groups in their design, as well as the targeting 
of benefits to particular groups in order to attain distributional equity (Graham 
2011).
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Discussion and ways forward
Promoting more accountable and effective decision-making and governance 
mechanisms is an integral part of building adaptive capacity (Jones et al 2010; Ludi 
et al 2012). We have seen that equity and social justice are central considerations 
of governance and responding to climate change. This chapter has highlighted 
significant and unresolved equity issues relating to climate change and natural 
resource management in southern Africa, and the inadequacy of existing govern-
ance systems to address existing constraints. Given the very serious threats posed 
by climate change in the near future, what are some of the ways forward towards 
developing more responsive and adaptive governance systems that can help to 
build adaptive capacity, mediate the response to climate change and promote cli-
mate justice? Five key approaches are proposed.
Developing a new orientation for adaptation
This chapter has highlighted the importance of a focus on equity and justice when 
designing and implementing adaptation and mitigation measures. As Brooks et 
al (2005) note, adaptive capacity is strongly associated with governance, civil and 
political rights and literacy. The discussion above has pointed to the move to see 
adaptation as an ongoing social process, rather than consisting of discrete steps 
to adapt to one or more specific impacts, within a multi-stressor context (see, for 
example, Eriksen et al 2011).
Sustainable or structural adaptation aims to address poverty and the underly-
ing causes of vulnerability through the adaptation process, and as such is critical 
for a focus on redressing inequity. This kind of pro-poor adaptation incorporates 
a ‘soft path’ approach in which participatory action learning is emerging as a key 
mechanism to drive an iterative adaptation process that is cognizant of climate 
uncertainties and the dynamic multiple-stressor livelihood contexts in which peo-
ple live. Research carried out under the CCAA programme has highlighted that 
adaptation actions are most likely to also help reduce poverty when they are the 
result of participatory processes that promote local ownership (CCAA 2011). At 
the same time, critical reflections on how ‘participatory approaches can miss social 
dynamics of power at the community level and in the broader context’ (Roncoli et 
al 2011) must be acknowledged.
Other criteria for pro-poor adaptation indicated by CCAA research are institu-
tional strengthening to sustain community-based adaptation, also involving policy 
actors in order to develop supportive policy frameworks. However, while adapta-
tion must take place in the context of development, it does not merely demand 
doing more of the same. Speaking at a meeting of the Overseas Development 
Institute on climate change and development, Nigel Arnell, director of the Walker 
Institute for Climate Systems Research at the University of Reading, argued that 
the extra dimension in adaptation is not the techniques used but the degree of 
uncertainty, demanding new criteria of robustness and flexibility (Overseas Devel-
opment Institute [ODI] 2009).
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Valuing the role of indigenous and local knowledge
Attention is increasingly being paid to the role of indigenous knowledge systems, 
and to the potential that the blending of indigenous and scientific knowledge holds 
for more robust and locally specific adaptation responses or integrated adapta-
tion-mitigation measures (Tschakert and Dietrich 2010; Ziervogel and Opere 
2010; Newsham and Thomas 2011). Interventions that recognize and recover 
local knowledge and culture, and highlight the value of indigenous environmental 
knowledge, are likely to be critical in speeding up adaptation responses.
However, reports from different parts of the world increasingly indicate that as a 
result of the pace of climate change, indigenous knowledge about natural resource 
use and agriculture, passed down from generation to generation, is now becom-
ing obsolete or unable to support adaptive responses (Roncoli et al 2009). While 
many indigenous technologies in southern Africa embody ecologically sustainable 
development and promote adaptation to climate change, others may have nega-
tive adaptation effects, particularly given changing socio-political contexts. For 
example, slash-and-burn cultivation is no longer sustainable in many areas, due 
to population pressure and limited land access resulting in shorter fallow periods, 
and is also believed to aggravate soil degradation, as well as dryness in an already 
semi-arid area (Syampungani et al 2010; Culas 2012).
Despite these reservations, the multiple livelihood strategies of people living in 
marginal lands in southern Africa remain underpinned by indigenous knowledge 
systems, developed through cumulative experience of the interactions between 
land use management systems and changing environmental conditions, as Dube 
and Sekhwela (2007) show for Botswana. Moving forward on both adaptation and 
mitigation in such areas will require the constraints upon the utility of indigenous 
knowledge to be understood, and addressed where possible.
Promoting equity through human-rights-based and empowerment 
approaches
Human rights-based approaches to development are designed to integrate inter-
national human rights principles into development planning and practice. Specifi-
cally, human rights-based approaches promote understanding and integration of 
equity issues. Using these approaches means asking the critical questions: ‘What, 
why, who and what capacities?’ (UNDP 2012). For example, adopting a rights-
based approach to understand climate-related disaster risk would call for a risk 
analysis that probed the root causes of the vulnerabilities that heighten the disaster 
risk of certain groups. Analysis would include determining who has the duty to 
reduce these disaster risks, and what capacities are needed to address disaster risk, 
both for rights holders and for duty bearers.
Former United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan set it out this way:
[A] rights-based approach to development describes situations not simply 
in terms of human needs, or of development requirements, but in terms of 
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society’s obligations to respond to the inalienable rights of individuals, empow-
ers people to demand justice as a right, not a charity, and gives communities a 
moral basis from which to claim international assistance when needed.
(UN 1998)
Few dispute that climate change is already destabilizing the realization of many 
internationally protected human rights: rights to health and to life; rights to food, 
water, shelter and property; and rights associated with livelihood and culture, 
with migration and resettlement and with personal security in the event of conflict 
(International Council on Human Rights [ICHRP] 2008).
The agency of individuals and communities, or their ‘ability to act independ-
ently and to make their own choices’ (Jones et al 2011, p. 37; Ludi et al 2012) is 
a critical component of adaptive capacity, with some suggesting that agency and 
adaptive capacity are synonymous (Jones et al 2011). Agency relates strongly to 
adaptation’s procedural justice concerns about how and by whom decisions on 
adaptive responses are made – concerns that centre on concepts of recognition, 
participation and legitimacy (Paavola and Adger 2002). Empowerment, which 
can be seen as a mechanism to achieve agency, is linked to innovation: interven-
tions should seek to empower rural poor people to develop their own adaptive 
strategies in response to new challenges and opportunities resulting from trade lib-
eralization, the dismantling of state welfare programmes, climate change, conflict 
and pest outbreaks, rather than mutely accept these as they descend from above 
(IFAD 2007).
Agency is an important element in unlocking the potential contribution to 
changing power relationships of a rights-based approach, just as mainstreaming 
gender is in climate change initiatives. The differential impacts, as discussed, are 
real, but there has been little research aimed at understanding different adaptive 
strategies of benefit for women and men. Moreover, tenure security over land and 
resources is frequently not sufficiently extended to women in adaptation responses 
(Madzwamuse 2010b).
While the UNFCCC’s principles of ‘equity’ and ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ may open the way to a consideration of human rights claims across 
borders relating to climate change impacts, this potential has not yet been realized 
in practice (ICHRP 2008), although reparations for climate change damage con-
stitute a growing field of enquiry, closely linked to the likely costs of adaptation. 
The evolving system of monitoring, reporting and verification is one of the key 
areas where the focus on equity and human rights issues can be entrenched, both 
internationally and within countries.
Southern African countries are beginning to move on this component of the 
governance system, by pushing for the inclusion of key equity aspects in interna-
tional negotiations, and by setting in place the required institutions nationally. 
For example, South Africa’s Department of Environmental Affairs has set up an 
expert working group on the monitoring, reporting and verification of adaptation 
actions. The role of these experts (not more than 15 people, including civil society 
representatives) will be to provide advice and guidance for the development of 
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the national monitoring, reporting and verification system. For countries likely 
to suffer loss or damage from climate change, in particular vulnerable developing 
countries, redress options outside the UNFCCC, such as international litigation, 
are being considered (Hyvarinen 2012).
Pursuing integrated approaches to adaptation
Given the cross-sectoral nature of the climate challenge, and the context of vul-
nerability to multiple stressors within which many people in southern Africa pur-
sue their livelihoods, integrated approaches to adaptation are required to provide 
a sufficiently broad and realistic intervention capacity. Such approaches would 
need to consider the range of institutional, environmental, political, social and 
economic realities that impinge on people’s lives, livelihoods and agency. The 
failure of developmental strategies to adequately address current climate risks rein-
forces the need for strong linkages between adaptation and development (Bauer 
and Scholz 2010). Low-regrets adaptation strategies7 that produce developmental 
co-benefits are called for, as well as integrated ways to address environmental and 
climate change issues together, and to integrate adaptation and mitigation in a 
way that benefits poor people.
Drawing on past regional experience, it is clear that there are possibilities inher-
ent in Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) for improv-
ing links between ecosystem services and poverty reduction (Shackleton et al 2010), 
which will be an important component of sustainable adaptation approaches. This 
is reflected in recent debate on the integration of community-based adaptation 
and ecosystem-based adaptation approaches (Girot et al 2012). Given that grow-
ing populations in southern Africa are likely to remain highly vulnerable, or to 
become increasingly so, as climate change impacts accelerate, there is a real risk 
they will be unable to maintain any existing sustainable natural resource manage-
ment and land use practices, as they increasingly rely on natural resources for food 
and livelihoods (Midgley et al 2011). Enhancing natural resource management 
now, and planning to maintain this in the future, is essential. Chishakwe et al 
(2012) point out the synergies between CBNRM and adaptation at the community 
level, based on an analysis of lessons learned in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Formulating adaptive and flexible governance frameworks
Perhaps most importantly, all of this needs to occur within adaptive and flexible 
governance and management frameworks capable of dealing with rapid and uncer-
tain rates of change. The adaptive capacity of societies relies on their ability to act 
collectively, through institutions that govern social relations between individuals 
and social groups, for natural resource management at multiple scales (Adger et al 
2004). These institutions need to be flexible and responsive: work carried out under 
the Africa Climate Change Resilience Alliance (ACCRA) programme points to 
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the importance of what the alliance terms ‘flexible, forward-looking governance’ 
(Jones et al 2011, p. 30; Ludi et al 2012), and the need for a shift from ‘optimal’ 
decisions (the best ones in current conditions) to ‘robust’ decisions (reliable ones 
over the widest range of likely conditions) (Jones et al 2011, p. 35).
Institutions that facilitate cross-sectoral and cross-scale adaptation planning in 
order to create multiple benefits are required at all levels (Bizikova et al 2010; 
Brown et al 2010; Madzwamuse 2010a; Bronen 2011). Participatory monitor-
ing and evaluation involving local users, which feeds back into an action learn-
ing approach at different levels, is essential for the kind of rapid and proactive 
responses required.
Conclusion
These new approaches and orientations are important ingredients for climate 
governance systems that promote equity, social justice and environmental 
sustainability:
• Developing a new orientation for adaptation that is pro-poor and emphasizes 
social dimensions and processes will also serve to address the root causes of 
vulnerability.
• Valuing the role of indigenous and local knowledge provides a basis for engaging with 
and supporting autonomous and community-based adaptation.
• Promoting equity through human rights-based and empowerment approaches will develop 
the agency that is seen as critical for enhancing adaptive capacity.
• Pursuing integrated approaches to adaptation more accurately reflects the context of 
vulnerability to multiple stressors in which many people in southern Africa 
have to pursue their livelihoods.
• Formulating adaptive and flexible governance frameworks, including frameworks for 
sustainable natural resource management, is a critical precursor to sound and 
equitable adaptation responses.
There are interconnections and areas of overlap among these five themes: for 
example, a human-rights-based approach highlights the need to focus adaptation 
efforts on vulnerable groups and to address the root causes of vulnerability, which 
is consistent with a pro-poor and sustainable orientation to adaptation; and pursu-
ing integrated approaches to adaptation necessitates institutional frameworks that 
can effectively coordinate the range of adaptation initiatives being implemented, 
across sectors and between scales, which is a component of an adaptive govern-
ance framework.
These five approaches do not make up a comprehensive framework for evolv-
ing governance systems, but they are vital ingredients of this. They constitute 
entry points for tackling current constraints and for evolving the kinds of adaptive, 
multi-level, integrated and responsive governance systems that can deal with the 
complex socio-ecological conditions of the region, subject to a changing climate. 
Making progress on each of the five themes will mean that we can begin to govern 
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what at times seems ungovernable – at least from equity and ecological sustainabil-
ity perspectives – and ensure that the response to climate change in the southern 
African region is just, as well as effective.
Notes
1 ‘Vulnerability’ is here defined as the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and 
unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude and rate of climate 
change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity 
(Parry et al 2007).
2 This analysis was conducted for the land area falling within the coordinates 12–35°S 
and 10–52° E, and for the emissions scenario named ‘A1B’ (see http://media.csag.uct.
ac.za/faq/qa_3impacts.html). This area encompasses South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Zambia, most of Malawi 




6 Persson and Azar (2009) found that putting a price on carbon is unlikely to prevent 
forests being cleared for oil palm plantations. This is partly because a higher carbon 
price drives up demand for biofuels as an alternative to expensive fossil fuels, which in 
turn increases both the price of biofuels and the likelihood that forests are converted to 
oil palm plantations. http://www.redd-monitor.org/2010/02/17/why-a-price-on-car-
bon-will-not-stop-deforestation/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_
campaign=Feed%3A+Redd-monitor+%28REDD-Monitor%29
7 Low-regrets adaptation measures provide benefits under current climate and a range 
of future climate change scenarios. Potential low-regrets measures include early warn-
ing systems, sustainable land management, ecosystem management and restoration, 
improvements to health surveillance, water supply and sanitation, changes to building 
codes and better education and awareness (Field et al 2012).
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16 Towards robust governance 
for justice and environmental 
sustainability
 Lessons from natural resource 
sectors in sub-Saharan Africa
Merle Sowman and Rachel Wynberg
Introduction
The overall aim of this book has been to enhance understanding of the nature of 
governance in relation to social justice and sustainability across a range of natural 
resource sectors in sub-Saharan Africa. The case studies presented have explored 
and critiqued various governances processes and systems, providing insight into 
the values and principles that shape governance in different contexts, the institu-
tional arrangements that characterize different modes of governance and the driv-
ers that determine governance interactions, approaches and outcomes in different 
contexts. Also reviewed are the local conditions that determine how governance 
plays out in different settings.
This final chapter attempts to synthesize the key findings and outcomes of these 
different governance modes, and the normative approaches adopted, including 
their implementation in practice. We also aim to identify the factors that enable 
or constrain the achievement of socially just and environmentally sustainable out-
comes. The chapter concludes with recommendations for addressing challenges 
and strengthening enabling conditions for more robust forms of natural resource 
governance. These recommendations recognize, however, that natural resource 
governance is inextricably linked to broader governance systems and that struc-
tural, political and economic forces are major impediments to transforming gov-
ernance across natural resource sectors in sub-Saharan Africa.
Many scholars have highlighted the lack of empirical research informing the natu-
ral resource governance field (Adger and Jordan 2009; Nelson 2010) and the need to 
improve understanding of governance in all its complexity and diversity. This volume, 
with its chapters on different aspects of natural resource governance in sub-Saharan 
Africa, goes some way towards contributing to filling that information deficit. The 
cases discussed do not by any means represent the full range of natural resource sectors 
and modes of governance encountered in sub-Saharan Africa, so the findings pre-
sented and lessons learned cannot be generalized. However, they do provide insights 
into the principles and norms that inform governance policies and rhetoric, the drivers 
that shape how governance plays out in practice and the modes and specific features of 
governance encountered in the natural resource arena in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Histories and context
Following several decades of colonial rule, the process of transforming natural 
resource governance in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa was informed very 
much by the need for redress: improving the lives of poor and marginalized peo-
ple, securing their rights to natural resources and helping them gain equitable 
access to these resources. Reforms in the natural resource governance arena were 
also shaped by global debates about the limitations of conventional technocratic, 
centralized and highly regulatory natural resource management systems and the 
need to move towards more holistic, participatory and integrated approaches 
(Berkes et al 2003; Garcia et al 2008; Sowman 2011; Symes 2006). There was 
also increasing evidence of the important role played by local collective resource 
institutions and customary systems in sustainable resource governance (Ostrom 
1990; Ribot 2004). Growing concerns about the declining capacity of state gov-
erning institutions in Africa to execute a range of governance functions (Bratton 
and Rothchild 1992) and increasing calls for countries in Africa to embrace 
good governance principles (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 
1997; World Bank 2002) also contributed to a shift in approaches to natural 
resource governance. 
The transition to multiparty elections and democracy led to a major overhaul 
of the legal systems and the restructuring of governance institutions in many sub-
Saharan countries. In the natural resource governance arena, reforms at policy, 
programme and institutional level were largely focused on decentralizing and 
devolving powers and responsibilities to local resource-dependent communities 
and promoting the participation of resource users in planning, management and 
decision-making processes.
These reforms expanded rapidly during the 1990s with the emergence of 
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programmes such 
as the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe and similar projects later in Botswana, the com-
munity-based conservancy programme in Namibia, and the Administrative 
Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) programme 
in Zambia.
However, despite initial optimism, research undertaken in southern Africa by 
several scholars across a wide range of disciplines is increasingly showing that 
many of these initiatives have failed to achieve their aims of providing tangible 
benefits to local communities, enhancing social equity and alleviating poverty. 
Instead, decisions regarding who gains access to land and resources, especially 
for high-value resources such as land, wildlife, forests and fisheries, remain 
vested in the state (Murombedzi 2001; Van Sittert 2002; Ribot 2004; Murphree 
2005; Isaacs 2006; Anstey and Rihoy 2009; Jones 2010; Murombedzi 2010; 
Nelson 2010). A key obstacle to implementing these decentralization and devo-
lution programmes has been the reluctance of central governments to relinquish 
power over valuable natural resources (Keeley and Scoones 2003; Nelson 2010; 
German et al 2010).
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Evolving governance approaches to natural resource 
management in sub-Saharan Africa: What do the 
chapters tell us?
An overview
The narratives examined in this volume provide ample evidence of these trends. 
Table 16.1 offers an overview of all the case studies, describing the sectors and coun-
tries involved, the modes of governance adopted, the drivers of different modes of 
governance, the stated policy and outcomes for each case and factors that enable 
or constrain governance towards social justice and environmental sustainability. 
As the table demonstrates, the case studies cover a wide range of natural resource 
sectors – forestry, fisheries, non-timber forest products, land, wildlife, agriculture 
and freshwater and lake systems – across Botswana, Cameroon, Lesotho, Mada-
gascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia and Zim-
babwe. The governance modes examined in these cases fall mainly into three of 
the five categories discussed in the introductory chapter, namely, state-centric (or 
hierarchical), co-governance (networks) and self-governance, which includes cus-
tomary governance.
The cases highlight the diverse and changing nature of natural resource govern-
ance in sub-Saharan Africa, but provide little evidence that governance reforms 
have enhanced social justice in a meaningful way, secured better access to resources 
and land or produced improved benefits for the poor. There is also little indica-
tion that governance reforms have led to improvements in ecosystem health and 
resource sustainability.
While there have been significant policy and institutional reforms in all of 
the countries covered in this volume, the overwhelming trend is that these have 
been ineffectual at best, and detrimental to livelihoods and resource sustainabil-
ity at worst. New governance rhetoric that embraces so-called ‘good governance’ 
principles such as respect for the rule of law and for human rights, participa-
tion in decision-making, free informed prior consent, transparent and account-
able institutions, subsidiarity, benefit sharing and sustainable resource use and 
development, has not been translated into day-to-day management and decision-
making. Governance praxis has been and continues to be significantly influenced 
by various external drivers including globalization, the desire to accumulate capi-
tal, direct foreign investment and an expanding conservation agenda. Country-
specific drivers and factors such as weak governance institutions and mechanisms 
for meaningful participation, limited capacity, political and economic interests and 
power asymmetries at all levels of governance, as well as the plurality of normative 
and legal systems operating in natural resource management, play a significant 
role in shaping governance practice.
While there is widespread evidence of governance reform, as well as experimen-
tation with more decentralized, participatory and community-orientated forms 
of governance – in particular the roll-out of CBNRM programmes in Botswana, 
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generally delivering on intended policy and programme objectives (Gupta; Child 
et al; Ferguson et al; Hansen et al; Buchy and Maconachie, this volume). Few 
contributors (Hoole; Child et al, this volume) have reported on positive outcomes 
associated with new forms of governance that theorists anticipate, such as tangi-
ble benefits for local communities, well-functioning and empowered local level 
institutions, improved participation and representation, especially of marginal-
ized groups and individuals, improved mechanisms of accountability, sustainable 
resource use and biodiversity conservation.
Instead, the majority of chapters provide a harsh critique of the shortcomings of 
natural resource governance systems in sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting progres-
sive policy and governance reforms on paper, but little tangible improvement to 
the lives of local communities or resource sustainability.
State remains the key governing actor
A key finding is that despite the rhetoric of new and reformed modes of govern-
ance, the de facto situation is that the state remains the key governing actor and 
continues to hold the power to make decisions. While various case studies report 
that community-based management or co-management is the intended mode of 
governance, they highlight – aside from the Namibian case study, which presents 
a positive and more promising picture of CBNRM – the central role that the state 
plays in decision-making with regard to access to and the ownership, use and man-
agement of resources.
In the case of CBNRM in Botswana, Gupta (this volume) suggests that local 
communities have restricted-use rights over wildlife, which is regarded as the 
property of the state. Community-level decisions are limited to those concern-
ing the distribution of revenues generated through leasing wildlife resources to 
tourism and wildlife operators. Critical decisions about the allocation and use of 
resources and decisions about management interventions that may be required 
to address problems, such as culling troublesome elephants on communal land, 
are still within the purview of central government. Regarding another Botswanan 
case, Child et al (this volume) suggest conditions under which CBNRM can be 
more empowering and deliver benefits to households, but conclude that in many 
cases there is a move towards the recentralization of resource decisions.
Although the community-based management of forests in Cameroon and 
Madagascar (Buchy and Maconachie; Ferguson et al, this volume), is delivering 
some benefits to local communities, these projects typically comprise a small per-
centage of the forestry sector in these countries by comparison to projects under 
state and private control. In the case of Madagascar, the strong presence of conser-
vation-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has resulted in a focus 
on biodiversity at the expense of social justice (Ferguson et al, this volume). In 
several of the cases (Madagascar, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, South Africa), political 
and economic pressures and interests, which may in turn be influenced by global 
processes, have significantly undermined efforts to transition to more participatory 
and locally appropriate forms of governance.
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Disjunctures between policy and praxis
The new governance ideas and language found in the plethora of multilateral 
agreements, national policies, programmes and initiatives all indicate a definite 
shift over the past four decades. However, most of the cases suggest that there is 
a significant disjuncture between policy rhetoric and implementation praxis. On 
the one hand, the policies and programmes incorporate principles such as rights-
based, community-based and participatory approaches, as well as calls for equity, 
securing property rights and accountable and transparent forms of governance. 
Yet, in practice, the cases report shortcomings in policy implementation: restricted 
user rights (Botswana, South Africa, Madagascar, Cameroon, Sierra Leone), lim-
ited participation in planning and decision-making (all countries), a failure to rec-
ognize and accommodate local customary systems (South Africa, Madagascar, 
Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Botswana), limited distribution of tangible benefits at the 
local level (Botswana, Zambia, South Africa, Cameroon, Sierre Leone) and gener-
ally weak governance, especially with regard to accountability.
However, in the case of South African and Botswanan fisheries, new poli-
cies and programmes now require the implementation of co-management. This 
approach is largely supported by politicians, resource managers and other gov-
ernance actors who acknowledge that conventional top-down and technocratic 
approaches have failed both communities and the environment. Both countries 
stress the importance of the enabling and empowering role that the state needs to 
play to effect this shift to a more people-centred, developmental and participatory 
form of governance.
Paradoxical role of the state
Other cases highlight the important role of the state in regulating activities to 
ensure biodiversity protection and social justice. This points to a paradox regarding 
the role of the state: on the one hand it is censured for retaining powers, including 
management and decision-making authority, but on the other hand it is expected 
to regulate activities to protect natural resources and community interests.
In their study of the commercialization of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) 
in South Africa, Wynberg and van Niekerk (this volume) highlight the impor-
tant role of the state in regulating the overexploitation of biodiversity products 
and introducing regulations to protect biodiversity and the rights of traditional 
knowledge holders. However, this has sometimes been at the cost of community 
benefits, owing to the inappropriate translation of laws at the local level and a lack 
of understanding of the local context on the part of the state.
In the case of a partnership between a large mining company and an NGO work-
ing on behalf of local communities in Namaqualand in South Africa, Hamann (this 
volume) concludes that the state has a critical regulatory role to play in safeguard-
ing the rights of communities and ensuring that environmental commitments by 
the private sector are honoured. The government, this would suggest, needs to be 
attuned to the needs of its citizens, responsive to particular situations, flexible in 
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executing its mandate and ready to provide guidance, leadership, regulatory con-
trol or management intervention as appropriate. This is a lot to expect.
Multiple legal systems
Another central finding is the fact of multiple legal systems operating in the natural 
resources arena in sub-Saharan Africa. Several chapters report on the prevalence 
of customary practices and institutions, with these systems being the de facto mode 
of governance guiding the activities and lives of rural dwellers, albeit in an eroded 
state. Yet these customary systems are seldom recognized and accommodated in 
formal state-centric systems.
Several case study authors (Pollard and Cousins; Kozanayi et al; Ferguson 
et al; Hansen et al, this volume) highlight the tensions between the two systems 
of governance, including the lack of clarity regarding the roles and powers of 
traditional leaders, the conflicts between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ values and 
the co-option of traditional leaders to serve the interests of powerful political 
players. These chapters illustrate how customary systems prevail, especially in 
situations of political change or uncertainty or where communities are remotely 
situated. They argue that customary governance systems are more congruent 
with local resource users’ world views and cultural and religious practices and 
beliefs, are more flexible than Western approaches and thus better serve local 
interests.
These findings concur with research conducted in other parts of the world 
which highlights the resilient nature of customary management systems in the face 
of socio-economic and political changes (Jentoft et al 2003; Bernard and Kumalo 
2004; Cinner and Aswani 2007). However, Kozanayi et al and Pollard et al (this 
volume) highlight how state-imposed laws have weakened customary governance 
systems, thereby undermining practices and norms that contribute to resource 
sustainability and social justice. The existence of parallel legal systems also cre-
ates confusion and uncertainty for both local resource users and state-appointed 
functionaries, resulting in ‘forum shopping’ (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002) as 
resource users select the rules and regulations that best suit their particular needs 
and circumstances. While customary systems are more suited to natural resource 
management because they are more flexible and responsive to change, such sys-
tems can entrench power relations and thus threaten the already precarious posi-
tion of the most vulnerable in society.
Yet for resource users on the ground, the de facto situation is that authority 
derives from both customary systems and state laws. Given the dire socio-eco-
nomic circumstances of many resource-dependent communities in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the increasing pressure on natural resources, some authors in this vol-
ume (Kozanayi et al; Ferguson et al; Pollard and Cousins) argue that both state 
and customary forms of governance have an important role to play in regulating 
resource use. Thus the challenge is to recognize and respect the existence of a plu-
rality of legal systems and embrace a kind of ‘cooperative pluralism’ (New Zealand 
Law Commission 2006, p. 44), that can ‘draw strength and inspiration’ from both 
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legal systems (p. 23). The feasibility of such a legal pluralist regime would depend 
on many factors, not least of them the political will and a desire among people to 
find a compromise (Benda-Beckman and Benda-Beckman 2006).
Participation and representational failures
Much has been written about the need to enhance participation in natural resource 
management and decision-making (e.g. Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Cleaver 1999; 
Berkes et al 2001; Pinkerton 2009) affirmed by bodies as diverse as the United 
Nations, the World Bank, national governments and human rights organizations 
(Eyben 2003; Greiber et al 2009). Furthermore, this principle is advocated in a 
number of international policy instruments adopted by governments worldwide 
(e.g. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 1992 [United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme [UNEP 1992b]; the Convention on Biological Diversity [UNEP 1992a]; 
World Summit on Sustainable Development [WSSD], Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation [WSSD 2002]; the Aarhus Convention [United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe [UNECE] 1998]).
Given this breadth of uptake it is perhaps not surprising that experiences of 
what participation means in practice remain extremely divergent – from lip-service 
‘stakeholder consultation’, which is more easily achieved, to challenges of secur-
ing genuine participation in decision-making and, in some cases, co-management 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al 2000; Pomeroy and Douvere 2008). Indeed, standing 
out as a common theme across most chapters in this book is the failure of govern-
ance arrangements to adequately ensure effective and inclusive participation.
In their case study on Madagascar, Ferguson et al (this volume) describe how 
a lack of inclusivity in environmental authorization processes for mining has led 
to community disempowerment, leaving the communities with few opportunities 
for meaningful engagement and no influence over the outcome of the process. 
Similarly, in the conservation sector, while participatory governance has been pro-
moted as the basis for park management, this has not always been adequate, with 
several protected areas failing to recognize local needs and effectively integrate 
customary land tenure. Thus, while policy reform has advocated participation, 
flaws in conception, design and implementation have precluded the attainment of 
social justice. Local communities often lack the capacity, literacy and legal aware-
ness to make informed and meaningful contributions to the process.
Experiences from the iSimangaliso Wetland Park in the northern part of Kwa-
Zulu-Natal offer a similar narrative. While the South African Constitution empha-
sizes ‘cooperative government’ and ‘participatory democracy’, and post-apartheid 
policies require the inclusive participation of citizens in planning and decision-
making, Hansen et al (this volume) report that the depth of participation needed 
for engagement in planning and development activities was lacking, with the result 
that community members had no voice in decision-making.
Several authors point to the institutional challenges of participation, more 
especially in the context of representational democracy. Gupta (this volume), for 
example, explains how representatives of the Chobe Enclave Community Trust, 
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like those of many other trusts, were not downwardly accountable to the villages 
represented, leading to elite capture of benefits from wildlife and minimal distribu-
tion of those benefits.
Through six CBNRM case studies across Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana, 
Child et al (this volume) introduce the term ‘micro-governance’, concluding that 
‘weaknesses in benefit sharing and participation reflect the challenge of scaling 
down and the fact that human interactions are better managed at smaller scales’. 
They strongly advocate ‘face-to-face’ participatory democracy, where the whole 
community meets together to discuss issues, to make decisions, and to instruct 
the committee on matters of implementation. Complex systems, they say, must 
be ‘constructed from the bottom up to serve the bottom’. These ideas resonate 
with scholars who argue that participatory democracy provides an opportunity 
for more direct forms of citizen participation in governance and is better able to 
address the diverse needs and interests of citizens (Holmes and Scoones 2000; Petts 
2001; Manor 2004).
This is, however, more easily said than done. Buchy and Maconachie (this vol-
ume) describe the centrality of power in determining the efficacy of participation, 
pointing out that participatory initiatives, for example in the distribution of ben-
efits from natural resources or minerals, are often ‘invited’ spaces within a coun-
try, designed and managed by a state bureaucracy. While these can lead to some 
benefits for local communities, more often than not they fail to address underly-
ing, and often ‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’, power issues. As Hamann (this volume) and 
several other authors (e.g. Wynberg and van Niekerk; Kozanayi et al; Ferguson 
et al; Buchy and Maconachie, this volume) explain, this becomes all the more 
challenging when several other voices such as local government, state-supported 
traditional authorities or NGOs act on behalf of communities.
Mosepele et al and Sowman et al (this volume) suggest that when significant 
effort is devoted to facilitating an inclusive participatory process, the outcome has 
broader support and is more likely to succeed. In the first case, the establishment of 
a fisheries co-management committee helped to enhance local participation in the 
management of the Okavango Delta in Botswana and to reduce conflict and facili-
tate understanding about sustainable resource use. In the case of South Africa, 
participation of civil society in policy formulation ensured that the voices of previ-
ously marginalized fishers were heard and integrated into the final policy. Even 
so, there are still ongoing challenges in including the voices of those less organized 
and in sustaining the interest of different stakeholders. In common with many of 
the other case studies in this book, these authors point to the ongoing challenges of 
capacity development, leadership and financial support.
Lack of attention to resource sustainability
One of the more surprising findings of the case studies presented in this volume 
is the lack of detailed attention given by authors to questions of resource sustain-
ability. It is an open question whether this is due to the breadth of topic, the social 
science discipline of many of the authors, or the underlying assumption that if 
348  Merle Sowman and Rachel Wynberg
governance systems perform well in delivering equitable and socially just benefits, 
then desirable ecological outcomes will follow (Folke 2006). As Tacconi et al (2006) 
note, it is imperative to interrogate whether or not this ‘romantic’ view of conser-
vation following benefits is necessarily true. In a detailed analysis, they further 
argue that the complex linkages existing among decentralization, forest manage-
ment and livelihoods imply that it is not possible to assert that the democratic 
decentralization of forest management leads to sustainable forest management 
and increased livelihood benefits (Tacconi et al 2006). This finding is reinforced by 
various studies on forest governance in Africa (German, Colfer et al 2010) which 
suggest that community-based governance can result in either sustainable forest 
management or deforestation.
What is clear is that the complex social-ecological systems introduced in dif-
ferent cases present a diverse array of biological and physical characteristics that 
interplay with a plurality of legal systems, institutional contexts, livelihood pos-
sibilities and political histories in ways that are bound to be indeterminate and 
non-linear (Ribot 2010). In eastern Zimbabwe, for example, Kozanayi et al (this 
volume) show how customary systems to regulate the use of the baobab tree have 
become increasingly entangled with and undermined by statutory systems, lead-
ing to a confusing governance landscape that has served only to further degrade 
the resource. Pollard and Cousins (this volume) similarly imply that overlapping 
customary and statutory regimes, combined with the existence of multiple laws, 
have had negative impacts on freshwater resources. Wynberg and Niekerk (this 
volume), describing regulatory frameworks for two high-value NTFPs in South 
Africa, illustrate how overharvesting concerns led to state intervention to regulate 
resource use, but with negative social and economic outcomes for local people. 
None of these cases, however, sketches a context where socially equitable ben-
efits have indeed been secured, suggesting a need for further detailed, empirical 
research to explore the interface between equity and ecological sustainability.
Key drivers of change
It is pertinent to ask at this point why state-centric governance persists, and what 
factors inhibit a transition to more participatory and locally appropriate forms 
of governance. Table 16.1 provides a synthesis of the drivers that influence the 
nature of governance in the cases examined as well as the factors that constrain or 
enable governance for justice and sustainability outcomes. Here we focus on three 
main drivers of these trends: capital, profit and foreign investment; the political 
and economic underpinnings of natural resource governance; and international 
multilateral agreements and related processes.
Capital, profit and foreign investment
In many respects, the central role of African states is being backed up by for-
eign governments concerned about future food supplies and seeking land for food 
exports, agribusiness companies acquiring land for biofuels, mining companies 
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pursuing gas, oil and minerals and a host of other investors and speculators inter-
ested in Africa’s hitherto ignored natural resources (Nelson 2010; African Progress 
Panel 2012). Such trends are amplified by the fact that some 60 per cent of the 
world’s uncultivated arable land is believed to be in Africa (Roxburgh et al 2010).
Investments in resource-rich African countries are having profound influences 
on governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Emerging economies, and China in partic-
ular, are at the forefront of setting in place a new South-South ‘global architecture’ 
for trade and investment (Cotula et al 2009; Karsenty 2010). African countries are 
being offered direct, condition-free financial assistance in exchange for guaranteed 
access to strategic resources, with the result that African states are enjoying greater 
autonomy, free from the conditionals imposed by international financial institu-
tions such as the World Bank (Karsenty 2010).
Not all of the chapters focus on the driving force of investments, profit and capi-
tal, but those that do share similar threads. Investments in Madagsacar, for exam-
ple, have led to numerous mining ventures and agricultural land acquisitions. As 
Ferguson et al (this volume) explain, this growth of interest in Madagascar from 
the extractive sector, from those seeking land for biofuels and from the global con-
servation movement, has led to cases of social injustice against the rural Malagasy 
people, whose customary and ancestral lands have been caught up in a ‘modern 
natural resource rush’. Although rights to ancestral lands have been legislated, the 
process of formalizing these rights by providing title to local communities has suf-
fered lengthy bureaucratic delays and, in the process, local rights holders have lost 
land due to foreign investors and political deals.
Often the impacts of such investments permeate to a much deeper level. In 
Sierra Leone and Cameroon, for example, Buchy and Maconachie (this volume) 
describe how the links between government departments that oversee mining and 
forestry, high-level politicians and the private sector filter down to ties with corrupt 
village elites, thus depriving the wider community of benefits. The case studies of 
Pelargonium and Hoodia, both high-value NTFPs, illustrate some of the challenges of 
introducing investment, capital and global value chains into a rural setting where 
the organizational infrastructure is weak and the possibilities of deepening inequal-
ity high (Wynberg and Van Niekerk, this volume). In the Pelargonium case, govern-
ment interest was piqued by increased demand, prompting regulatory measures 
with negative consequences for harvesters and a requirement for benefit sharing 
that did little for horizontal equity and improving the lot of the poor.
Left to its own devices, unfettered capitalism – when its power and resources 
are combined with unaccountable governments – is almost certain to produce 
inequality and environmental devastation (Newell 2011). New governance config-
urations mean that environmental and social standards are falling by the wayside, 
with Asian companies often preferring rather ‘to pay the heavy surcharges associ-
ated with breaches of law than the costs of compliance’ (Karsenty 2010, p. 83). As 
resources become more scarce, and thus more valuable, it is likely that national 
African governments with high-value and strategic resources will strengthen their 
efforts to retain ownership and stewardship, rather than attempt to meet demands 
for local control. Urquhart (this volume) notes that the introduction of the United 
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Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation initia-
tive, known as REDD+, may offer tools to use global carbon markets and invest-
ment to leverage more secure local access, but joins others in cautioning that it 
could have the reverse effect too (Naughton-Treves and Day 2012).
Political and economic drivers
The strong links between the state and private sector in the acquisition and control 
of natural resources is evident throughout Africa where the state facilitates and 
supports the accumulation of wealth by those in positions of power (Van Sittert 
2002; Karsenty 2010; Nelson 2010). This powerful alliance, entrenched during 
the colonial period, has effectively limited democratization and the envisaged ben-
efits associated with devolving powers to local resource users.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of democratization and devolution, the state has 
retained ownership and control over land and resources, and power over deci-
sions to assign use and management rights. It has also controlled the pace of legal 
reforms, illustrated by the formalization of customary title to land in Madagascar 
(Ferguson et al, this volume) and the implementation of community forestry laws 
and fisheries co-management in Cameroon and South Africa respectively (Buchy 
and Maconachie; Sowman et al, this volume). The lack of awareness of people’s 
rights, the lack of capacity of institutions and individuals to make claims or chal-
lenge decisions and the absence of social movements that can monitor and put 
pressure on corrupt state activities or of NGOs that can support communities to 
demand their rights, fuels the ongoing accumulation of wealth among corrupt 
politicians, state functionaries and local elites, as well as the private-state alliances 
that serve their interests. These factors represent major constraints to promoting 
governance towards justice and environmental sustainability.
Several scholars have questioned the underlying assumption that the state and 
its political economy will serve the socio-economic interests of the poor (Bromley 
2009; Davis and Ruddle 2012). They argue that neoliberal economics is market-
driven and does not take account of the socio-cultural and historical characteristics 
of specific community contexts or the power differentials that exist. Furthermore, 
they argue that the neoliberal project serves the wealthy sectors of society and that 
alternative forms of governance that promote community involvement and co-
management all work to serve the interests of the wealthy (Bromley 2009; Davis 
and Ruddle 2012). The lack of evidence, in most of the cases, of structural and 
institutional changes to enable more inclusive participation, empowerment and 
equitable benefit sharing suggests that powerful political and economic processes 
play a significant role in influencing the praxis of governance.
The issue of power and politics at different levels of governance is a key theme 
emerging throughout the cases, particularly at the local level, where power-
ful local actors capture benefits through political patronage or corruption (Fer-
guson et al; Buchy and Maconachie; Gupta; Kozanayi et al; Wynberg and Van 
Niekerk, this volume) or through relationships among actors across different 
governance scales – for example, the co-opting of traditional leaders by the state 
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(Ferguson et al; Kozanayi et al, this volume). Systematic ignorance of power rela-
tions and their influence on social relations and structures was identified by Buchy 
and Maconachie (this volume) as a key factor undermining progress towards social 
justice and poverty reduction in resource-rich areas. These authors also refer to 
the importance of recognizing ‘invisible power’, such as social values, witchcraft, 
gender and ethnicity, which are frequently overlooked by policy-makers and 
governance-implementers.
International multilateral agreements and related processes
An important driver in several of the case studies is the role of multilateral agree-
ments, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations Framework Con-
vention for Climate Change [UNCED] 1992), in exerting influence on national 
and local governance processes (Hansen et al; Sowman et al; Wynberg and Van 
Niekerk; Urquhart, this volume).
Growing realization of the precarious balance between socio-economic devel-
opment and resource limitations has prompted calls for policy and institutional 
reforms, and this has resulted in a plethora of bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments. The aim of these agreements is not only to protect natural resources and 
ensure their long-term sustainable use, but equally to protect the rights and socio-
economic needs of indigenous and local resource-dependent communities. Most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa have committed to several of these conventions 
and agreements1 in an effort to halt environmental degradation and protect Afri-
ca’s natural resources and its peoples. However, while desirable in terms of pro-
tecting resources and natural systems, the increasing appropriation of land and 
marine areas for conservation purposes, referred to by some scholars as ‘green and 
blue grabbing’ (Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012; Fairhead et al 2012) is resulting 
in increased restrictions on access to land and resources for resource-dependent 
communities, and in some cases in dispossession, with concomitant livelihood and 
socio-cultural impacts.
Balancing the tensions across these various instruments and national impera-
tives, which are often in conflict, has proven a challenging task (Brown 2009). 
Resource-dependent communities are being squeezed, on the one hand, by global 
and national economic pressures for land and development, and, on the other, by 
conservation expansion policies and programmes.
A number of authors in this book raise concerns about the uncritical applica-
tion of these normative environmental sustainability concepts at the local level. 
Hansen et al (this volume) describe how the World Heritage status of iSimangaliso 
in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, raises it above the level of the local territory and 
often beyond the decision-making authority of local people, also placing extra 
responsibilities on park managers. Gupta (this volume) explains the introduction 
of the CBNRM concept in Botswana by the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development as a tool to promote conservation, but not necessarily with the 
livelihood outcomes envisaged. Wynberg and Van Niekerk (this volume) describe 
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the indiscriminate application in South Africa and Lesotho of access and benefit 
sharing requirements under the Convention on Biological Diversity, with out-
comes that are far from fair and equitable. Combined, these cases reaffirm the 
importance of assessing the impacts of international agreements and initiatives 
prior to their national implementation, and of tailoring their implementation in a 
manner that is intelligent and needs-driven.
Reflections and recommendations
The overwhelming message of this book, derived from a multitude of experi-
ences, contrasting national contexts and diverse sectors, is that natural resource 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa is still driven from the centre by a complex 
mix of global and country-specific factors, is technocratic, and has largely failed 
to implement policy reforms on the ground. Despite commitments to a host of 
multilateral agreements, many of which incorporate good governance, human 
rights and sustainability principles, few countries have translated these princi-
ples into resource governance praxis. Furthermore, governance is constantly in 
a state of flux, with external and country-specific drivers influencing and being 
influenced by changing political and economic interests. Power dynamics, per-
sonal enrichment and political motivations play a key role in keeping local com-
munities marginalized and disempowered. While some of the case studies point 
to various enabling factors that enhance governance practices (refer to Table 
16.1), these are limited to factors such as support from NGOs, external financial 
support and an enabling policy environment. Many of the potential solutions 
to this situation exist only at a macro level, but important steps can be taken to 
begin to realize governance solutions that can deliver social justice and environ-
mental sustainability.
Recognizing the multiscalar character of environmental 
governance
Although they may adopt the ‘right’ rhetoric, the processes of governance reform 
– broadening the network of actors, facilitating inclusive participation, build-
ing legitimate local-level institutions and developing appropriate rules – have 
not embraced a holistic, integrated, participatory, multicultural, evolutionary 
approach. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the multiscalar and multisectoral character of 
environmental governance, characterized by piecemeal, silo-like decisions taken 
by individual ministries mandated to govern a particular resource rather than 
overarching systems, has been challenging to implement. This is especially the 
case when competing interests are at stake.
There is an urgent need to put effort into developing approaches that can work 
for diverse actors with multiple worldviews, cultural contexts, social-legal systems, 
knowledge systems, needs and perceptions. Building upon existing local conditions 
and institutions, and fashioning governance from the bottom up, are underpin-
ning principles for such approaches.
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Embracing legal pluralism
Related to this is the need to embrace legal pluralism and work creatively within 
the framework of Africa’s multiplicity of legal systems and governance actors. A 
diversity of systems of governance is part and parcel of the African reality and will 
become more so with the blurring of boundaries between the rural and urban. 
It is vital that governance systems evolve in such a way that they recognize and 
incorporate customary systems. This would involve assessing the extent to which 
customary rules are applied and complied with in practice (Techera 2008). The 
accommodation of different systems of law suggests a form of hybridization which 
allows customary law to continue to evolve and adapt rather than be subsumed 
by state law. The embrace of legal pluralism as a principle enables governance 
actors to identify legal frameworks that are informed by state and customary legal 
systems and are thus more likely to be supported.
Developing cultures of accountability
Accountability, at both individual and institutional levels, is a central pillar of gov-
ernance systems for justice and sustainability. Mechanisms to ensure both upward 
and downward accountability need to be firmly entrenched in governance proc-
esses and institutions. Accountability can only be assured if democratically elected 
leaders are accountable to their constituencies and responsive to their needs and 
changing political, social, economic and ecological conditions.
Also required are the existence of multiple mechanisms including regular fair 
and transparent elections, agreed upon constitutions and modus operandi, full 
transparency in financial matters and the right to protest and voice objections 
(Ribot 2010).
Setting in place the social, human and knowledge infrastructure 
for implementation
As so many of the chapters in this book attest, the policies and norms to realize 
governance objectives of social justice and environmental sustainability are now 
largely in place in many African countries. This has been enabled, often through 
donor funding, by significant attention to policy formulation and an emphasis on 
inclusive participation in these processes. The largest lacunae now lie in the imple-
mentation of these policies.
Unlike policy formulation, which is considered the domain of all governance 
actors, implementation typically falls back into the hands of the government, which 
remains hampered by limited resources, poor leadership, constrained capacity 
and, in some cases, a lack of political will to draw in the range of actors required 
to realize policy objectives. It is crucial that more time be allocated in the process 
of policy formulation to the strategies, plans and institutional arrangements that 
may be required to give effect to policy. Intimate actor involvement is required 
to work out the how, who and when, as well as the measures and methods, of 
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policy implementation. This in turn will create the continuity and accountability 
required to challenge application and interpretation. Hand in glove with such 
approaches should be the amalgamation of local, traditional and Western knowl-
edge systems to enable new governance styles that are truly African in nature and 
appropriate to local needs.
It is vital that adaptive management, or ‘learning by doing’, underpins such 
processes. Whether at the policy, plan or project-implementation level, greater 
attention needs to be devoted to monitoring, learning and adapting policies and 
plans and revisiting management approaches and rules as understanding of the 
practical implementation challenges and realities becomes clearer. Ongoing 
monitoring and assessment of what is and is not working, and what is under-
mining policy intentions, is a logical step if good policies are to become good 
practice.
As Ojha et al (2013, p. 318) observe, the policy system is a learning system, 
and thus there is a need for participants to engage in ‘action-reflection-review 
processes’. Viewing policy formulation and implementation as a learning proc-
ess implies change as fresh understandings and insights evolve, new governance 
arrangements emerge and environmental changes occur. It also requires new 
forms of accountability as the range of governance actors involved in the policy 
system offer insights and ideas about how policy can be made more appropriate 
to context.
Developing the capacity to govern
The growing number of governance processes, actors, activities and legal and pol-
icy instruments relating to natural resource use and management, along with the 
multiplicity of institutions charged with their implementation, can be overwhelm-
ing, both for resource users and for those responsible for applying and interpreting 
law. Carefully designed capacity development initiatives, building on local skill 
sets and mentorship rather than externally imposed training programmes, need 
to be set in place to equip this diverse collection of governance actors to deal 
with the steering, regulating, monitoring and facilitation that accompanies policy 
implementation. Also needed are new, creative approaches to build an African 
leadership that can think about natural resource management in bold and vision-
ary ways.
Strengthening and affirming a rights-based agenda
Lastly, an enormous resource lies within African citizens themselves. Awareness 
and confidence need to be developed and strengthened to ensure that local users 
are confident of their rights to natural resources, can effectively defend them, and 
have a battery of tools enabling them to seek help and support where needed. This 
should include partnerships with NGOs, researchers and development agencies 
that are well networked and supportive of the rights and needs of local communi-
ties and can collectively hold the state and private sector to account.
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Note
1 Most countries in this volume have signed up or indicated commitment to a number of 
multilateral conservation and human rights agreements including the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (UNEP 1992a), the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNCED 1992), the International Labour Organization Convention 169 
(ILO 1989) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2006).
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